Tonight The Pensive Quill carries a study of the Bell and Blanket magazines by guest writers Niall Carson and Paddy Hoey. The Bell and The Blanket: Journals of Irish Republican Dissent
by Niall Carson, University of Liverpool and Paddy Hoey, Liverpool Hope University
A chara
It was deeply moving to read your double page coverage about the publication of In the Footsteps of Ann and glimpses into the special hardships suffered by Republican women prisoners.
Guest writer Larry Hughes with a piece that addresses the issue of British massacres. Drawing on historical precedent he suggests there is little hope of the Ballymurphy relatives getting justice.
Much has been made in recent days and weeks of rights and freedom of speech and the right to public protest. Governments are good at attacking each other and avail of every opportunity to place other nations firmly under the international spotlight in order to cause political embarrassment. Should it be China on the Tibet issue, Russia over the Pussy Riot incident or America with Guantanamo Bay and rendition. With this in mind an event which occurred in Malaya in 1948 may be of particular interest to those Ballymurphy residents presently seeking an inquiry into the murder by British Government forces of their relatives between the 9th and 11th August 1971.
Guest writer Alfie Gallagher takes Kevin Myers to task on his interpretation of the Royal Irish Constabulary.
In last Friday’s Irish Independent, the journalist Kevin Myers accused the Irish Times of regurgitating “the standard, fact-free, Fenian fairy-tale” [1] in its editorial about a recent commemoration of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). [2] However, there are elements of fantasy in Myers’s own analysis.
To begin with, Myers makes a big song and dance out of the fact that the last inspector-general of the RIC, John Aloysius Byrne, was a Catholic. However, he deliberately ignores the broader point that the Irish Times editorial was making: whereas 86 percent of RIC recruits by 1913 were Catholics, the officer class was still 60 percent Protestant in 1920.[3] Myers also fails to mention that Byrne was the very first Catholic to hold the highest rank in the RIC when he was appointed in 1916.
Myers’s characterisation of Home Rule as a genuine form of independence for Ireland is also very misleading. He neglects the stark realities of the Suspensory Act 1914 and the attendant understanding that the Westminster parliament would have the opportunity to pass an unspecified amending bill for Ulster.[4] Carson, Bonar Law and the Ulster Volunteers hadn’t gone away, you know. Partition was on the agenda, not 32-county Home Rule. Yet even if nationalists were prepared to accept partition, a Home Rule parliament would have been a hamstrung one. In fact, it would not have had control over relations with the Crown, defence, foreign policy, custom and excise, or land purchase. Even control of the police was to be retained by Westminster for 6 years. What is more, effective control of Ireland’s economy would remain with Westminster.[5] The offer was so paltry that John Redmond had great difficulty in persuading his parliamentary colleagues to accept it.[6] Redmond told them that it was “a provisional settlement” which would be revised in the future,[7] but the notion that nationalist politicians could have used all of their wiles and guile to turn such a parliament into a fully independent one is dubious, particularly because their representation in Westminster – the real powerhouse of the Empire – would have been massively reduced under the terms of the third Home Rule bill.
And full independence – albeit under the Crown – was what Home Rule had always meant to most Irish nationalists. Even anti-Fenians like James Daly described Home Rule in 1879 as “a complete, an unqualified control of Irish affairs by the Irish people”.[8] Thus, as Brian Hanley argues, there was a significant gulf between the reality of Home Rule and what ordinary Irish nationalists were expecting. Moreover, even before 1916, most of them were not opposed in principle to using military means to achieve self-government. Nationalists celebrated the centenary of the 1798 rebellion; they sang ‘A Nation Once Again’; they marched in memory of the Manchester Martyrs and many were prepared to fight a civil war against the Ulster Volunteers to secure Home Rule.[9] It seems the chief objection that Home Rulers had to armed resistance against British rule was not that it was immoral, but simply that it was unlikely to succeed.[10] Therefore, it is not really surprising that many former supporters of Redmond’s party voted for Sinn Féin in the 1918 general election.
As a student of Irish history, Kevin Myers ought to know that the percentage of votes cast for Sinn Féin in the 1918 general election grossly underestimated the party’s real support at that time. There were 25 uncontested constituencies in 1918 and most of them were in areas where Sinn Féin was already dominant. Thus, it seems certain that had these constituencies been contested, a clear majority of the electorate in Ireland would have voted for Sinn Féin[11], a party which promised to secure an Irish republic “by any and every means available”.[12] Furthermore, Michael Laffan’s The Resurrection of Ireland shows that while intimidation did indeed occur in the 1918 election campaign, Sinn Féiners were both perpetrators and victims of it. In fact, the British censored Sinn Féin’s newspapers and pamphlets, broke up their meetings, and arrested their election candidates. In any case, intimidation and personation were often used by Home Rulers themselves in previous elections and Laffan contends that “even if allowance is made for widespread personation, it is likely that in almost all cases Sinn Féin would have won fairly without recourse to such measures."[13] Most importantly, about 75 percent of Irish adults had the right to vote in 1918, as opposed to 26 percent in previous general elections. Thus, for all its flaws, the 1918 general election was arguably more democratic than the preceding ones.
Bizarrely, Myers also believes that Irish republicans behaved far worse than Crown forces in 1916-21. Analysis of the civilian casualties during that period suggests otherwise. According to Eunan O’Halpin, between January 1917 and December 1921, roughly 900 civilians were killed in the conflict. The IRA was responsible for about 31% of these killings while British forces were responsible for about 42%. The remaining 27% of civilians were killed by loyalists, in riots or in ambiguous circumstances. In many cases, their deaths were not attributable to any particular group.[14] Most importantly, Thomas Earls Fitzgerald notes that though individual IRA volunteers may well have made mistakes or acted dishonourably on occasion, “the IRA’s civilian targets were all carefully selected in the sense that the killers had some reason, however tenuous, to believe that their victims were helping the enemy.” Fitzgerald contrasted this with those civilians killed in the “indiscriminate” reprisals by Crown forces.[15]
To my mind, meaningful independence for all or even part of Ireland could not have been achieved without a separatist rebellion. Ulster unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and armed themselves to the teeth in response to non-violent nationalist activism; thus they were not going to be seduced into any kind of united Ireland, federalist or otherwise. Indeed, F.S.L. Lyons believed that a civil war between nationalists and unionists was perhaps averted only by the outbreak of WWI[16], so it is wishful thinking to claim that a peaceful solution was just around the corner but was scuppered by the rebels in 1916.
This is the context in which the Irish revolutionaries of 1916-21 fought their battles. Three constitutional attempts had been made to attain all-Ireland Home Rule prior to 1916, and all had failed. Force (or the threat of it) had worked for the unionists in scuppering all-Ireland Home Rule, so there was reason to believe that force might work for nationalists. Of course, the Easter Rising was not democratically sanctioned, but given the contemporary public approval of past rebellions and of the formation of the Irish Volunteers in 1913, the rebels had reason to believe that they might receive popular support. It must also be pointed out that the Rising was effectively endorsed by the Irish electorate at its first opportunity to do so in 1918. This was the generation of Irish people most affected by the Rising and therefore most entitled to pass judgment on it.
Moreover, the volunteers who fought between 1919 and 1921 were the military arm of a political order that had been established by a popular vote. It is true that the relationship between the IRA and the first Dáil was ambiguous at best. Nevertheless, key figures in the Dáil's executive, such as Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins, were IRA leaders. Indeed, it seems that with Cathal Brugha's reconstitution of the Irish Volunteers as the IRA in August 1919 as well as his plans for IRA volunteers to start swearing an oath of allegiance to the Dail, the provisional Irish government was unofficially assuming responsibility of the volunteers’ activities (though it would not officially declare war on Britain until much later).
Certainly, one can argue that the first Dáil did not have an explicit mandate to go to war against Britain. However, given the British government's disregard of the mandate for a republic in 1918 and its suppression of the Dáil after some sporadic attacks on the RIC in 1919, one can also argue that the Dáil executive was justified in giving tacit approval to the incipient rebellion. Furthermore, the Sinn Fein manifesto for the 1918 general election uses very militant language. It invokes the 1916 Proclamation, "the principles of Tone, Emmet, Mitchel, Pearse and Connolly", and promises "to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection".[17] Therefore, it is hard to believe that the electorate who endorsed this manifesto was utterly opposed to further conflict if it proved to be necessary.
This is the context in which the Irish revolutionaries of 1916-21 fought their battles. Three constitutional attempts had been made to attain all-Ireland Home Rule prior to 1916, and all had failed. Force (or the threat of it) had worked for the unionists in scuppering all-Ireland Home Rule, so there was reason to believe that force might work for nationalists. Of course, the Easter Rising was not democratically sanctioned, but given the contemporary public approval of past rebellions and of the formation of the Irish Volunteers in 1913, the rebels had reason to believe that they might receive popular support. It must also be pointed out that the Rising was effectively endorsed by the Irish electorate at its first opportunity to do so in 1918. This was the generation of Irish people most affected by the Rising and therefore most entitled to pass judgment on it.
Moreover, the volunteers who fought between 1919 and 1921 were the military arm of a political order that had been established by a popular vote. It is true that the relationship between the IRA and the first Dáil was ambiguous at best. Nevertheless, key figures in the Dáil's executive, such as Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins, were IRA leaders. Indeed, it seems that with Cathal Brugha's reconstitution of the Irish Volunteers as the IRA in August 1919 as well as his plans for IRA volunteers to start swearing an oath of allegiance to the Dail, the provisional Irish government was unofficially assuming responsibility of the volunteers’ activities (though it would not officially declare war on Britain until much later).
Certainly, one can argue that the first Dáil did not have an explicit mandate to go to war against Britain. However, given the British government's disregard of the mandate for a republic in 1918 and its suppression of the Dáil after some sporadic attacks on the RIC in 1919, one can also argue that the Dáil executive was justified in giving tacit approval to the incipient rebellion. Furthermore, the Sinn Fein manifesto for the 1918 general election uses very militant language. It invokes the 1916 Proclamation, "the principles of Tone, Emmet, Mitchel, Pearse and Connolly", and promises "to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection".[17] Therefore, it is hard to believe that the electorate who endorsed this manifesto was utterly opposed to further conflict if it proved to be necessary.
It is difficult to determine how supportive the general public were towards the IRA's guerrilla campaign. For one thing, Sinn Féin won overwhelming majorities in urban and rural councils in 1920 despite being the party associated with the sporadic IRA violence of 1919. Also, the very fact that the British had lost control of much of the South by mid-1920 does suggest a large degree of popular support for the revolution. Armed volunteers did act on their own initiative to start the war, but the fact remains that key members of the Dail's cabinet soon took command of the armed campaign and did this with the knowledge of their cabinet colleagues. That a formal declaration of war was not issued until two years into the conflict appears to have been for strategic reasons rather than opposition to armed action. In fact, Éamon De Valera was concerned that a formal declaration of war would "over-tax their strength".[18]
My great-grandfather Dominic O’Grady was a member of the Sligo IRA. Kevin Myers would probably view him and his comrades as heartless butcherers. Yet Dominic was by all accounts a gentleman. He was also a reluctant soldier: indeed, he would only admit to having fired at enemies in his sights, for he could not bear to believe he had killed anyone. Dominic refused to fight in the Civil War; as a result, he was abused and exploited by both sides. I will not disown his memory, no more than I would disown my own niece and nephews.
So Kevin Myers can keep telling himself tales of the heroic RIC, the gentle Black and Tans, and the murderous IRA. I'm quite happy with my “fairy-tale”.
[1] Kevin Myers, Irish Independent, 31 August 2012, Retrieved: 2 September 2012 from http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/kevin-myers/kevin-myers-there-is-no-political-constituency-that-gets-angry-at-the-neglect-of-these-poor-murdered-policemen-3215567.html
[2] Irish Times, 25 August 2012, Retrieved: 2 September 2012 from http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2012/0825/1224322962372.html
[3] John M. Regan, Joost Augusteijn (ed), The Memoirs of John M. Regan: A Catholic Officer in the RIC and RUC, 1909-48, Dublin, 2007, p.10
[4] Robert Kee, The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism, London, 2000, pp.517-518
[5] F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since The Famine, London, 1971, pp.301-302
[6] J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society, New York, 1989, p.7
[7] Cited in Lyons, Ireland Since The Famine, p.302
[8] Cited in Joseph Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society, 1848-1918, Dublin, 1989, p.162
[9] Brian Hanley, Fear and Loathing at Coolacrease, Retrieved: September 2, 2012 from http://www.historyireland.com/volumes/volume16/issue1/news/?id=114165
[10] [10] Lee, Modernisation, pp.162-163
[11] Nicholas Whyte, The Irish Election of 1918, Retrieved: September 2, 2012 from http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/h1918.htm
[12] From the widely-circulated, uncensored Sinn Féin Manifesto 1918, Retrieved: September 2, 2012 from http://143.239.128.67/celt/published/E900009/index.html
[13] Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923, Cambridge, 1999, p.168
[14] Eunan O’Halpin, ‘Counting Terror: Bloody Sunday and The Dead of the Irish Revolution’ in David Fitzpatrick (ed), Terror in Ireland, 1916-1923, pp.153-154
[15] Thomas Earls Fitzgerald, “The Execution of ‘Spies and Informers’ in West Cork, 1921” in ibid., p.190
[16] Lyons, Ireland Since The Famine, p.310
[17]Sinn Fein Manifesto 1918
[18] PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. - TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS, Dáil Éireann - Volume 1 - 25 January, 1921, Retrieved: September 2, 2012 from http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/DT/D.F.C.192101250030.html
Sandy Boyer (SB) of Radio Free Éireann WBAI 99.5 Pacifica Radio New York City interviews Jerry McGlinchey, (JM) Marian Price's husband, via telephone from Belfast about Marian's health and her continued internment at the whim of Northern Ireland Secretary of State Owen Paterson.
Saturday 18th August 2012
SB: We're going over to Belfast to speak to Jerry McGlinchey whose wife, Marian Price, has been imprisoned for two years (Ed Note: fifteen months) on secret evidence she's never been allowed to see. Marian's health has been deteriorating badly. And this week she had to be taken from the prison hospital where she's being treated to a local hospital both on Thursday and Friday. Jerry, thanks very much for being with us.
Saturday 18th August 2012
SB: We're going over to Belfast to speak to Jerry McGlinchey whose wife, Marian Price, has been imprisoned for two years (Ed Note: fifteen months) on secret evidence she's never been allowed to see. Marian's health has been deteriorating badly. And this week she had to be taken from the prison hospital where she's being treated to a local hospital both on Thursday and Friday. Jerry, thanks very much for being with us.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
