What I didn’t expect was how directly some of its case studies could be applied to Republicanism — especially to the leadership’s repeated inability, or refusal, to identify touts even when the evidence was staring them in the face.
That does not excuse the fact that certain touts were allowed to operate with apparent impunity, no matter what information came to light.
Gladwell explores why human beings are so poor at detecting lies. In one study, Professor Timothy Levine found that people could identify liars only 54% of the time. Those are decent odds if you fancy your luck on a horse, but hardly the sort of odds on which you’d re-mortgage your house. Other experiments, involving job interviews and orchestra auditions, showed evaluators made better decisions when they did not actually see the candidates.
Gladwell then turns to more striking examples: the CIA’s supposed crème de la crème being made to look like amateurs by internal moles. Top-secret departments were infiltrated for years despite rumours, suspicions and even lie-detector tests. The most embarrassing part is that these spies were not masterful James Bond figures, skilled in deception and cunning. They left trails of breadcrumbs that Hansel and Gretel would have been proud of.
The reason, according to Levine, lies in what he calls Truth Default Theory: human beings are inclined to believe others, even when confronted with signs of dishonesty. There is an evolutionary logic to this. Society cannot function if we treat every stranger as a potential liar. Without some basic level of trust, society would collapse into suspicion and chaos — wonder if this sounds familiar today.
The surprising part is that even when we understand deception in theory, we often hesitate to suspect those close to us. A truth bias overrides the doubts we might otherwise have. Consequently, those who raise suspicions early, therefore, take enormous risks: public humiliation, loss of employment, isolation, and in some cases even death. We still see this today when whistleblowers leak damaging information that society should, in theory, be grateful to know.
But there is one factor Gladwell touches on without, in my view, giving it enough weight: likeability.
A few years ago, one of my neighbours was finally exposed as a paedo after what felt like an eternity of being widely known as a pervert. Yet most people liked him, more or less, provided they ignored the strange, off-the-wall remarks he made regardless of who was present. The American and British spies discussed in Gladwell’s book were often oddballs too. But they were generally liked — until, years later, the truth became impossible to ignore.
And this brings me to the real reason for these thoughts.
I have written several times about the person I consider to be the Brits’ current top Republican tout. I often wondered what a chance encounter with him would feel like, especially after having known him personally for so many years. Then it happened.
What struck me most was the likeability factor. We often imagine touts as rats, monsters, people without conscience. But one reason some of them survive for so long is precisely because they are nice guys! They can be friendly, approachable, easy in company. They can talk like old school friends at a reunion and slip naturally into their surroundings.
That was exactly how my encounter felt, despite everything I know about him and the damage he has inflicted on all of us. No wonder so many Republicans had doubts over the years.
Yet, to return to Gladwell, even the best spies and informers leave breadcrumbs. What they often share is an inability to provide respectable answers for the inconsistencies, contradictions and strange quirks throughout their careers.
At first, that failure is on us. After that, it belongs to those who still refuse to act on the evidence — and especially to those who stand in their corners defending them, when we know that they already know.
That does not excuse the fact that certain touts were allowed to operate with apparent impunity, no matter what information came to light.
Gladwell explores why human beings are so poor at detecting lies. In one study, Professor Timothy Levine found that people could identify liars only 54% of the time. Those are decent odds if you fancy your luck on a horse, but hardly the sort of odds on which you’d re-mortgage your house. Other experiments, involving job interviews and orchestra auditions, showed evaluators made better decisions when they did not actually see the candidates.
Gladwell then turns to more striking examples: the CIA’s supposed crème de la crème being made to look like amateurs by internal moles. Top-secret departments were infiltrated for years despite rumours, suspicions and even lie-detector tests. The most embarrassing part is that these spies were not masterful James Bond figures, skilled in deception and cunning. They left trails of breadcrumbs that Hansel and Gretel would have been proud of.
The reason, according to Levine, lies in what he calls Truth Default Theory: human beings are inclined to believe others, even when confronted with signs of dishonesty. There is an evolutionary logic to this. Society cannot function if we treat every stranger as a potential liar. Without some basic level of trust, society would collapse into suspicion and chaos — wonder if this sounds familiar today.
The surprising part is that even when we understand deception in theory, we often hesitate to suspect those close to us. A truth bias overrides the doubts we might otherwise have. Consequently, those who raise suspicions early, therefore, take enormous risks: public humiliation, loss of employment, isolation, and in some cases even death. We still see this today when whistleblowers leak damaging information that society should, in theory, be grateful to know.
But there is one factor Gladwell touches on without, in my view, giving it enough weight: likeability.
A few years ago, one of my neighbours was finally exposed as a paedo after what felt like an eternity of being widely known as a pervert. Yet most people liked him, more or less, provided they ignored the strange, off-the-wall remarks he made regardless of who was present. The American and British spies discussed in Gladwell’s book were often oddballs too. But they were generally liked — until, years later, the truth became impossible to ignore.
And this brings me to the real reason for these thoughts.
I have written several times about the person I consider to be the Brits’ current top Republican tout. I often wondered what a chance encounter with him would feel like, especially after having known him personally for so many years. Then it happened.
What struck me most was the likeability factor. We often imagine touts as rats, monsters, people without conscience. But one reason some of them survive for so long is precisely because they are nice guys! They can be friendly, approachable, easy in company. They can talk like old school friends at a reunion and slip naturally into their surroundings.
That was exactly how my encounter felt, despite everything I know about him and the damage he has inflicted on all of us. No wonder so many Republicans had doubts over the years.
Yet, to return to Gladwell, even the best spies and informers leave breadcrumbs. What they often share is an inability to provide respectable answers for the inconsistencies, contradictions and strange quirks throughout their careers.
At first, that failure is on us. After that, it belongs to those who still refuse to act on the evidence — and especially to those who stand in their corners defending them, when we know that they already know.
⏩Michael Phillips is a former republican prisoner. Keep up with his work.
