Brian Morgan ✍ In the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict, there were only two occasions when security forces were completely absent from IRA funerals.
The security forces agreed to stay away from the funerals in exchange for an IRA agreement not to fire volleys over the graves. When and with whom was this agreement made, and why was it not made with the senior officer responsible for the planning, Chief Superintendent Donnan?
Someone agreed to unprecedented conditions Donnan did not like. Donnan confirms he was operating under strict orders not to deploy after the Corporals launched what looked like an attack on the funeral.[2] Sight of a weaponised car, mounting the footpath and driving at high speed through mourners should have been all he needed to know. One occupant of the car firing a shot should have been enough to know. Donnan passively watched events unfold on a 10-inch heli-teli screen in real-time. His eventual intervention came too late and he would have known it.[3]
The heli-teli footage shows 12 minutes from start to execution. Father Alex Reid, who tried to intervene, later questioned: "There was a helicopter circling overhead and I don't know why they didn't do something, radio to the police or soldiers to come up."
The Chief Superintendent watched a speeding car drive directly into mourners, but did nothing. He watched the moment Wood fired a warning shot, but did nothing. He saw Wood being tackled to the ground and unarmed, but did nothing. He saw both soldiers being taken into Casement Park, but did nothing. He watched as both soldiers were stripped and thrown over a wall, but did nothing. He watched both soldiers being bundled into a black taxi, but did nothing. I assume he watched both soldiers being executed; he arrived afterwards and the IRA killers had long escaped.
One explanation for the Chief Superintendent's inaction: whoever told him not to intervene already knew what the Corporals' intentions were. The Chief Superintendent would have been astute enough to know, when he relayed the events to his superiors and was still told not to intervene, that it may have been a sanctioned operation.
Donnan claims he defied orders to deploy,[4] but only after fatal delay. The timeline conclusively confirms observation without intervention. Who told a Chief Superintendent with operational command on the ground not to intervene?
The Ministry of Defence maintained that Wood and Howes were Royal Corps of Signals communications technicians who had left North Howard Street base. They were supposed to drive along the M1 motorway to Lisburn. The story: Wood was 'showing around' his new colleague Howes, took a wrong turn from North Howard Street Military Base, and accidentally drove into the funeral. They should have turned left onto Westlink from North Howard Street but they turned right instead.[5]
Even the BBC would know that the claim that they could not access the motorway from the alleged route they took is false. After turning right (if they did leave North Howard Street), multiple other routes existed: Grosvenor Road, Broadway Road, Donegall Road, and Kennedy Way.
Traffic on the Falls Road would have been significantly reduced that day. Once they were past Kennedy Way roundabout there was zero traffic. Both Wood and Howes would have been acutely aware of their surroundings and what was ahead of them.
Donnan questions the official route.[6] He stated that the soldiers would have known the area was out of bounds, that they would have been compelled to find out what areas were off-limits, and that checking routes was "like pulling a shirt on in the morning."
Former RUC officer 'Noel' adds:[7] "The army are good at routes, so when something happens they know where they are, plus they would have been warned going out the gate."
The Funeral Murders captures a critical revelation at [43:58].[8] An RUC inspector from Woodbourne Barracks told Chief Superintendent Cyril Donnan that the Corporals were driving "one of my unmarked patrol cars."
This contradicts the North Howard Street origin story entirely. The soldiers were initially identified by the RUC by a commanding RUC officer in Andersonstown because they were driving one of his unmarked cars from Woodbourne Barracks.
The implication is significant. They were already inside the republican heartland, having approached the Andersonstown Road from Kennedy Way, not ‘straying’ into it from the Falls Road direction.
Even after mounting the footpath, the Corporals could still have escaped had they turned up Slemish Way. Instead, they drove across the junction and continued to drive into mourners. They stopped when they drew parallel to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness but were separated by a steel pedestrian barrier on their left. They immediately reversed, driving across the junction of Slemish Way further than they needed if escape had been their intention. The car seems to straighten to make a repeat attempt to drive forward, this time keeping the barrier to their right. Two taxis moved forward to block their path.
Speculation among Republicans was that it was an assassination attempt on Adams and McGuinness - weaponising the car gave them a better chance than Stone's attack.
It was further speculated that the steel barrier's presence, visible at ground level but potentially missed on maps, suggests pre-planning that did not account for physical reality.
As an undercover car from Woodbourne, it was fitted with communication equipment. They could have made radio contact. Why didn't they receive radio warnings from the helicopter? Undercover operatives normally coordinate to avoid compromise.
The helicopter recorded the full 12 minutes of real-time events without intervention. Chief Superintendent Donnan was watching everything on his monitor. His "strict policy not to intervene" strains credibility given the live feed. They watched the soldiers being beaten, stripped and driven to waste ground before being killed.
Former Joint Communications Unit - NI technician Seán Hartnett, in his memoir Charlie One (2016), makes claims that are not credible.[9] He states:
Hartnett further claimed that the Corporals' car was civilian-registered and unflagged in police systems, creating fatal identification delays.[10]
Hartnett is not a first-hand witness and is repeating rumours he has heard. His claims are discussed in turn below.
An RUC Inspector identified the car as one of his. It was not a military car as Hartnett alleges, nor did it go unidentified because it was unmarked. If the helicopter crew relayed the car's registration to the control room, that would be even more damning for Donnan - because it would mean an RUC Inspector had confirmed to him that they were two soldiers as events were still unfolding. When Donnan makes that revelation in the documentary, a fire crew is extinguishing the burning car. Viewers are led to assume that the RUC only identified the car from being present at the scene while it burned.
Hartnett makes an additional unfounded claim regarding the magazine of Wood’s gun:[11]
This account is contradicted by direct evidence. First, the IRA used the soldiers' own guns to kill them - Wood's gun was loaded. Second, and conclusively, I personally searched the driver's side of the car, including under the seat, and found no magazine.[12] Hartnett's account amounts to uninformed speculation or repeating rumours.
One would expect the passenger side window to be open if, Republican speculation was true, and Howes was to shoot Adams and McGuinness from the car. However, the footage shows a mourner smash the window to disarm Howes after his gun jammed. That the gun jammed follows Howes having attempted to fire through the closed window.
Within hours, IRA sources claimed the Corporals were two SAS members. Howes' ID was marked ‘Herford’ - a British Army base in Germany. This was allegedly misread as ‘Hereford’ - SAS headquarters. That may be true, but it is also possible the British authorities did not want the apparent attack associated with the same regiment that had unlawfully killed the Gibraltar 3. Regardless, as members of the Signals regiment with the Joint Communications Unit - NI, the Corporals were support personnel to the SAS.
Why were they using a local RUC unmarked car from Woodbourne? As an undercover vehicle, it was fitted with communication equipment from which they could have made radio contact. The absence of any communication like this, combined with the absence of any radio warning from the helicopter to the Corporals, remains unexplained on the official account. One explanation might be, undercover units practice radio silence at crucial moments of operations.
Why the Corporals Wood and Howes drove at speed into mourners has remained unresolved for nearly four decades. The official narrative - that two soldiers simply got lost - does not survive scrutiny. The Woodbourne vehicle identification places them already inside the republican heartland, in an unmarked RUC patrol car from a local barracks, approaching from a direction wholly inconsistent with a wrong turn from North Howard Street. The route analysis eliminates accident as a credible explanation. My first hand account directly contradicts the central factual claim advanced by Hartnett regarding the magazine from Woods gun. The behaviour of the vehicle - continuing past escape routes, drawing parallel to Adams and McGuinness, reversing and seeming to realign for a second pass - contradicts the actions of lost soldiers attempting to extricate themselves. Chief Superintendent Donnan’s inaction to a deadly incident he personally watched, sustained across 12 minutes of live overhead surveillance despite multiple observable triggers for intervention, is more consistent with prior knowledge than with institutional inertia alone. Taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Corporals were sent. I do not know what their intentions were, but they were determined to achieve something.
References
[1] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [16:26]
[2] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018):
[3] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:26]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n2AX4zm6R10
[4] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [41:00]
[5] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [51:57]
[6] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [52:33-53:18]
[7] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [53:20]
[8] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:58]
[9] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One: The True Story of an Irishman in the British Army and His Role in Covert Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Ireland, Merrion Press, 2016, pp. 45-46.
[10] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
[11] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
[12] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One,, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
The first was at the funerals of the Gibraltar 3. The second was on 19 March 1988, when Corporals Derek Wood and David Howes drove at high speed into the funeral cortege of IRA volunteer Caoimhin MacBradaigh, in West Belfast. The 1988 absences remain suspiciously deliberate, the result of a questionable secret 'stand-off' agreement between security forces and the Catholic Church, brokered for the Gibraltar 3 funerals and for Caoimhin MacBradaigh after loyalist Michael Stone's murderous attack at Milltown Cemetery three days earlier.
Too much weight is given to any agreement made with the Church. In the history of IRA funerals, the Church would have considered it unthinkable to ask the security forces to stay away completely - they would have simply asked that they keep a respectful distance. The alleged claim of an agreement to a complete absence is not credible. Figure 1 above shows how close both the security forces and mourners could be to each other without incident.
What followed remains one of the most contested incidents of the Troubles: were two British soldiers simply lost, or were they engaged in a covert operation when they met their deaths?
I do not know the Corporals' full intention but their presence at the funeral was not an accident. I will show the official account to be false. I will also show there is more evidence that they left Woodbourne RUC Barracks and not North Howard Street Barracks.
By the 1980s, IRA funerals had become flashpoints. The RUC, increasingly given front-line roles in nationalist areas, regularly engaged in aggressive sectarian confrontations with mourners, often triggered by Unionist/Loyalist aversion to the sight of Tricolours. Michael Stone's attack on 16 March 1988, which killed three and wounded over fifty at the Gibraltar 3's funeral, changed the dynamic entirely.
Cyril Donnan, then RUC Chief Superintendent, had planned the security operation for the Gibraltar 3 funerals, involving both RUC and Army personnel. In The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), he recalls: after his plan for the Gibraltar 3 had been approved, he was later told there was to be no security force presence.[1] This was the first time in the history of the Conflict where there would be no security force presence at an IRA funeral. Donnan says he was shocked by the decision.
Too much weight is given to any agreement made with the Church. In the history of IRA funerals, the Church would have considered it unthinkable to ask the security forces to stay away completely - they would have simply asked that they keep a respectful distance. The alleged claim of an agreement to a complete absence is not credible. Figure 1 above shows how close both the security forces and mourners could be to each other without incident.
What followed remains one of the most contested incidents of the Troubles: were two British soldiers simply lost, or were they engaged in a covert operation when they met their deaths?
I do not know the Corporals' full intention but their presence at the funeral was not an accident. I will show the official account to be false. I will also show there is more evidence that they left Woodbourne RUC Barracks and not North Howard Street Barracks.
By the 1980s, IRA funerals had become flashpoints. The RUC, increasingly given front-line roles in nationalist areas, regularly engaged in aggressive sectarian confrontations with mourners, often triggered by Unionist/Loyalist aversion to the sight of Tricolours. Michael Stone's attack on 16 March 1988, which killed three and wounded over fifty at the Gibraltar 3's funeral, changed the dynamic entirely.
Cyril Donnan, then RUC Chief Superintendent, had planned the security operation for the Gibraltar 3 funerals, involving both RUC and Army personnel. In The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), he recalls: after his plan for the Gibraltar 3 had been approved, he was later told there was to be no security force presence.[1] This was the first time in the history of the Conflict where there would be no security force presence at an IRA funeral. Donnan says he was shocked by the decision.
The security forces agreed to stay away from the funerals in exchange for an IRA agreement not to fire volleys over the graves. When and with whom was this agreement made, and why was it not made with the senior officer responsible for the planning, Chief Superintendent Donnan?
Someone agreed to unprecedented conditions Donnan did not like. Donnan confirms he was operating under strict orders not to deploy after the Corporals launched what looked like an attack on the funeral.[2] Sight of a weaponised car, mounting the footpath and driving at high speed through mourners should have been all he needed to know. One occupant of the car firing a shot should have been enough to know. Donnan passively watched events unfold on a 10-inch heli-teli screen in real-time. His eventual intervention came too late and he would have known it.[3]
The heli-teli footage shows 12 minutes from start to execution. Father Alex Reid, who tried to intervene, later questioned: "There was a helicopter circling overhead and I don't know why they didn't do something, radio to the police or soldiers to come up."
The Chief Superintendent watched a speeding car drive directly into mourners, but did nothing. He watched the moment Wood fired a warning shot, but did nothing. He saw Wood being tackled to the ground and unarmed, but did nothing. He saw both soldiers being taken into Casement Park, but did nothing. He watched as both soldiers were stripped and thrown over a wall, but did nothing. He watched both soldiers being bundled into a black taxi, but did nothing. I assume he watched both soldiers being executed; he arrived afterwards and the IRA killers had long escaped.
One explanation for the Chief Superintendent's inaction: whoever told him not to intervene already knew what the Corporals' intentions were. The Chief Superintendent would have been astute enough to know, when he relayed the events to his superiors and was still told not to intervene, that it may have been a sanctioned operation.
Donnan claims he defied orders to deploy,[4] but only after fatal delay. The timeline conclusively confirms observation without intervention. Who told a Chief Superintendent with operational command on the ground not to intervene?
The Ministry of Defence maintained that Wood and Howes were Royal Corps of Signals communications technicians who had left North Howard Street base. They were supposed to drive along the M1 motorway to Lisburn. The story: Wood was 'showing around' his new colleague Howes, took a wrong turn from North Howard Street Military Base, and accidentally drove into the funeral. They should have turned left onto Westlink from North Howard Street but they turned right instead.[5]
Even the BBC would know that the claim that they could not access the motorway from the alleged route they took is false. After turning right (if they did leave North Howard Street), multiple other routes existed: Grosvenor Road, Broadway Road, Donegall Road, and Kennedy Way.
Traffic on the Falls Road would have been significantly reduced that day. Once they were past Kennedy Way roundabout there was zero traffic. Both Wood and Howes would have been acutely aware of their surroundings and what was ahead of them.
Donnan questions the official route.[6] He stated that the soldiers would have known the area was out of bounds, that they would have been compelled to find out what areas were off-limits, and that checking routes was "like pulling a shirt on in the morning."
Former RUC officer 'Noel' adds:[7] "The army are good at routes, so when something happens they know where they are, plus they would have been warned going out the gate."
The Funeral Murders captures a critical revelation at [43:58].[8] An RUC inspector from Woodbourne Barracks told Chief Superintendent Cyril Donnan that the Corporals were driving "one of my unmarked patrol cars."
This contradicts the North Howard Street origin story entirely. The soldiers were initially identified by the RUC by a commanding RUC officer in Andersonstown because they were driving one of his unmarked cars from Woodbourne Barracks.
The implication is significant. They were already inside the republican heartland, having approached the Andersonstown Road from Kennedy Way, not ‘straying’ into it from the Falls Road direction.
Even after mounting the footpath, the Corporals could still have escaped had they turned up Slemish Way. Instead, they drove across the junction and continued to drive into mourners. They stopped when they drew parallel to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness but were separated by a steel pedestrian barrier on their left. They immediately reversed, driving across the junction of Slemish Way further than they needed if escape had been their intention. The car seems to straighten to make a repeat attempt to drive forward, this time keeping the barrier to their right. Two taxis moved forward to block their path.
Speculation among Republicans was that it was an assassination attempt on Adams and McGuinness - weaponising the car gave them a better chance than Stone's attack.
It was further speculated that the steel barrier's presence, visible at ground level but potentially missed on maps, suggests pre-planning that did not account for physical reality.
As an undercover car from Woodbourne, it was fitted with communication equipment. They could have made radio contact. Why didn't they receive radio warnings from the helicopter? Undercover operatives normally coordinate to avoid compromise.
The helicopter recorded the full 12 minutes of real-time events without intervention. Chief Superintendent Donnan was watching everything on his monitor. His "strict policy not to intervene" strains credibility given the live feed. They watched the soldiers being beaten, stripped and driven to waste ground before being killed.
Former Joint Communications Unit - NI technician Seán Hartnett, in his memoir Charlie One (2016), makes claims that are not credible.[9] He states:
There was no special mission, no clandestine operation, and no cover-up, as has been suggested by some. Howes and Wood were the architects of their own demise.
Hartnett further claimed that the Corporals' car was civilian-registered and unflagged in police systems, creating fatal identification delays.[10]
Hartnett is not a first-hand witness and is repeating rumours he has heard. His claims are discussed in turn below.
An RUC Inspector identified the car as one of his. It was not a military car as Hartnett alleges, nor did it go unidentified because it was unmarked. If the helicopter crew relayed the car's registration to the control room, that would be even more damning for Donnan - because it would mean an RUC Inspector had confirmed to him that they were two soldiers as events were still unfolding. When Donnan makes that revelation in the documentary, a fire crew is extinguishing the burning car. Viewers are led to assume that the RUC only identified the car from being present at the scene while it burned.
Hartnett makes an additional unfounded claim regarding the magazine of Wood’s gun:[11]
As the vehicle was surrounded and Wood was being dragged out, he produced his pistol and fired a single warning shot in the air. While his restraint was admirable, it ultimately proved to be fatal. If you look closely at the image on the screen you can see that the magazine housing is empty. Either Wood had been sitting on his pistol for quick access while driving around and accidentally sat on the magazine ejector switch, or it was ejected during the scuffle to get him out of the vehicle. Either way, when he went to fire a second shot all he got was a dead man's click.
This account is contradicted by direct evidence. First, the IRA used the soldiers' own guns to kill them - Wood's gun was loaded. Second, and conclusively, I personally searched the driver's side of the car, including under the seat, and found no magazine.[12] Hartnett's account amounts to uninformed speculation or repeating rumours.
One would expect the passenger side window to be open if, Republican speculation was true, and Howes was to shoot Adams and McGuinness from the car. However, the footage shows a mourner smash the window to disarm Howes after his gun jammed. That the gun jammed follows Howes having attempted to fire through the closed window.
Within hours, IRA sources claimed the Corporals were two SAS members. Howes' ID was marked ‘Herford’ - a British Army base in Germany. This was allegedly misread as ‘Hereford’ - SAS headquarters. That may be true, but it is also possible the British authorities did not want the apparent attack associated with the same regiment that had unlawfully killed the Gibraltar 3. Regardless, as members of the Signals regiment with the Joint Communications Unit - NI, the Corporals were support personnel to the SAS.
Why were they using a local RUC unmarked car from Woodbourne? As an undercover vehicle, it was fitted with communication equipment from which they could have made radio contact. The absence of any communication like this, combined with the absence of any radio warning from the helicopter to the Corporals, remains unexplained on the official account. One explanation might be, undercover units practice radio silence at crucial moments of operations.
Why the Corporals Wood and Howes drove at speed into mourners has remained unresolved for nearly four decades. The official narrative - that two soldiers simply got lost - does not survive scrutiny. The Woodbourne vehicle identification places them already inside the republican heartland, in an unmarked RUC patrol car from a local barracks, approaching from a direction wholly inconsistent with a wrong turn from North Howard Street. The route analysis eliminates accident as a credible explanation. My first hand account directly contradicts the central factual claim advanced by Hartnett regarding the magazine from Woods gun. The behaviour of the vehicle - continuing past escape routes, drawing parallel to Adams and McGuinness, reversing and seeming to realign for a second pass - contradicts the actions of lost soldiers attempting to extricate themselves. Chief Superintendent Donnan’s inaction to a deadly incident he personally watched, sustained across 12 minutes of live overhead surveillance despite multiple observable triggers for intervention, is more consistent with prior knowledge than with institutional inertia alone. Taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Corporals were sent. I do not know what their intentions were, but they were determined to achieve something.
References
[1] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [16:26]
[2] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018):
[3] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:26]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n2AX4zm6R10
[4] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [41:00]
[5] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [51:57]
[6] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [52:33-53:18]
[7] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [53:20]
[8] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:58]
[9] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One: The True Story of an Irishman in the British Army and His Role in Covert Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Ireland, Merrion Press, 2016, pp. 45-46.
[10] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
[11] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
[12] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One,, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.
Additional Sources:
Irish Times, 'The funeral murders that changed Northern Ireland forever' (16 March 2018):
Belfast Newsletter, 'Corporals' murders: I was operating under a policy not to deploy, says RUC commander' (11 March 2018):.
Irish Times, 'The funeral murders that changed Northern Ireland forever' (16 March 2018):
Belfast Newsletter, 'Corporals' murders: I was operating under a policy not to deploy, says RUC commander' (11 March 2018):.






















