Social Items

TPQ
Showing posts with label Provisional IRA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Provisional IRA. Show all posts
Michael Phillips ✍ I picked up Talking to Strangers by Malcolm Gladwell some time ago, partly because I like the author and partly because the title caught my attention. 

What I didn’t expect was how directly some of its case studies could be applied to Republicanism — especially to the leadership’s repeated inability, or refusal, to identify touts even when the evidence was staring them in the face.

That does not excuse the fact that certain touts were allowed to operate with apparent impunity, no matter what information came to light.

Gladwell explores why human beings are so poor at detecting lies. In one study, Professor Timothy Levine found that people could identify liars only 54% of the time. Those are decent odds if you fancy your luck on a horse, but hardly the sort of odds on which you’d re-mortgage your house. Other experiments, involving job interviews and orchestra auditions, showed evaluators made better decisions when they did not actually see the candidates.

Gladwell then turns to more striking examples: the CIA’s supposed crème de la crème being made to look like amateurs by internal moles. Top-secret departments were infiltrated for years despite rumours, suspicions and even lie-detector tests. The most embarrassing part is that these spies were not masterful James Bond figures, skilled in deception and cunning. They left trails of breadcrumbs that Hansel and Gretel would have been proud of.

The reason, according to Levine, lies in what he calls Truth Default Theory: human beings are inclined to believe others, even when confronted with signs of dishonesty. There is an evolutionary logic to this. Society cannot function if we treat every stranger as a potential liar. Without some basic level of trust, society would collapse into suspicion and chaos — wonder if this sounds familiar today.

The surprising part is that even when we understand deception in theory, we often hesitate to suspect those close to us. A truth bias overrides the doubts we might otherwise have. Consequently, those who raise suspicions early, therefore, take enormous risks: public humiliation, loss of employment, isolation, and in some cases even death. We still see this today when whistleblowers leak damaging information that society should, in theory, be grateful to know.

But there is one factor Gladwell touches on without, in my view, giving it enough weight: likeability.

A few years ago, one of my neighbours was finally exposed as a paedo after what felt like an eternity of being widely known as a pervert. Yet most people liked him, more or less, provided they ignored the strange, off-the-wall remarks he made regardless of who was present. The American and British spies discussed in Gladwell’s book were often oddballs too. But they were generally liked — until, years later, the truth became impossible to ignore.

And this brings me to the real reason for these thoughts.

I have written several times about the person I consider to be the Brits’ current top Republican tout. I often wondered what a chance encounter with him would feel like, especially after having known him personally for so many years. Then it happened.

What struck me most was the likeability factor. We often imagine touts as rats, monsters, people without conscience. But one reason some of them survive for so long is precisely because they are nice guys! They can be friendly, approachable, easy in company. They can talk like old school friends at a reunion and slip naturally into their surroundings.

That was exactly how my encounter felt, despite everything I know about him and the damage he has inflicted on all of us. No wonder so many Republicans had doubts over the years.

Yet, to return to Gladwell, even the best spies and informers leave breadcrumbs. What they often share is an inability to provide respectable answers for the inconsistencies, contradictions and strange quirks throughout their careers.

At first, that failure is on us. After that, it belongs to those who still refuse to act on the evidence — and especially to those who stand in their corners defending them, when we know that they already know.

⏩Michael Phillips is a former republican prisoner.  Keep up with his work.

An Academic Theory Of Being A Good Tout

Michael Phillips ✍ How many touts does it take to change a lightbulb? 

Just one—but only if there’s a spotlight on them while they do it.

In recent years, a pattern has emerged as new stories slip past the censors: being outed once no longer seems enough to damage a reputation. If anything, some lean into it.

Once, touts, informers, rats—and even paedos (a stretch in the past, but no longer)—were the scourge of Republican areas. Families of those exposed could barely show their faces. Meanwhile, being a ‘dissident’—the hardliners of the period—was seen as naughty but necessary, tolerated for putting their cojones on the line for good ole Éire. Now, those roles appear to have been cleverly reversed.

How so? Prominent touts today are not only kept within the Republican fold but rewarded: comfy jobs, public roles, meetings with presidents, trips to Washington. Agent Jude and Agent Shirley Temple, for instance, have held prestigious positions despite their past being widely known. When former comrades questioned them, the ‘dissident’ label was swiftly deployed to silence critics. ‘Friends’ have a word in their ear.

We’re not yet at the point where touts are falling from the trees, and those at the top still manage the narrative with care. But there’s a growing restlessness—a sense that people won’t be fooled forever.

Because the truth is simple: touts don’t change. They are driven by self-preservation, ambition, and exploitation. Having survived the worst of the Troubles, many now feel emboldened—confident enough to let it all show.

More troubling still is the failure of those who know better. Time and again, warnings have been ignored. Agents Jude and Shirley Temple have never been held accountable; they continue to enjoy political protection. At the very least, they should be expelled, condemned, and publicly ostracized—not quietly shuffled around like paedo priests.

But—and it’s a big but—there remains a chance to correct these failures.

If such agents are fully exposed, it could begin to restore faith in what remains of true Republicanism—a truth many of us ex-POWs are too proud, or too embarrassed, to admit we were once misled about.

 ⏩Michael Phillips is a former republican prisoner.  Keep up with his work.

Touts Are The New Hardliners

Brian Morgan ✍ In the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict, there were only two occasions when security forces were completely absent from IRA funerals. 

Figure 1: IRA Volunteer Charlie Hughes funeral 11-March-1971

The first was at the funerals of the Gibraltar 3. The second was on 19 March 1988, when Corporals Derek Wood and David Howes drove at high speed into the funeral cortege of IRA volunteer Caoimhin MacBradaigh, in West Belfast. The 1988 absences remain suspiciously deliberate, the result of a questionable secret 'stand-off' agreement between security forces and the Catholic Church, brokered for the Gibraltar 3 funerals and for Caoimhin MacBradaigh after loyalist Michael Stone's murderous attack at Milltown Cemetery three days earlier.

Too much weight is given to any agreement made with the Church. In the history of IRA funerals, the Church would have considered it unthinkable to ask the security forces to stay away completely - they would have simply asked that they keep a respectful distance. The alleged claim of an agreement to a complete absence is not credible. Figure 1 above shows how close both the security forces and mourners could be to each other without incident.

What followed remains one of the most contested incidents of the Troubles: were two British soldiers simply lost, or were they engaged in a covert operation when they met their deaths?

I do not know the Corporals' full intention but their presence at the funeral was not an accident. I will show the official account to be false. I will also show there is more evidence that they left Woodbourne RUC Barracks and not North Howard Street Barracks.

By the 1980s, IRA funerals had become flashpoints. The RUC, increasingly given front-line roles in nationalist areas, regularly engaged in aggressive sectarian confrontations with mourners, often triggered by Unionist/Loyalist aversion to the sight of Tricolours. Michael Stone's attack on 16 March 1988, which killed three and wounded over fifty at the Gibraltar 3's funeral, changed the dynamic entirely.

Cyril Donnan, then RUC Chief Superintendent, had planned the security operation for the Gibraltar 3 funerals, involving both RUC and Army personnel. In The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), he recalls: after his plan for the Gibraltar 3 had been approved, he was later told there was to be no security force presence.[1] This was the first time in the history of the Conflict where there would be no security force presence at an IRA funeral. Donnan says he was shocked by the decision.

The security forces agreed to stay away from the funerals in exchange for an IRA agreement not to fire volleys over the graves. When and with whom was this agreement made, and why was it not made with the senior officer responsible for the planning, Chief Superintendent Donnan?

Someone agreed to unprecedented conditions Donnan did not like. Donnan confirms he was operating under strict orders not to deploy after the Corporals launched what looked like an attack on the funeral.[2] Sight of a weaponised car, mounting the footpath and driving at high speed through mourners should have been all he needed to know. One occupant of the car firing a shot should have been enough to know. Donnan passively watched events unfold on a 10-inch heli-teli screen in real-time. His eventual intervention came too late and he would have known it.[3]

The heli-teli footage shows 12 minutes from start to execution. Father Alex Reid, who tried to intervene, later questioned: "There was a helicopter circling overhead and I don't know why they didn't do something, radio to the police or soldiers to come up."

The Chief Superintendent watched a speeding car drive directly into mourners, but did nothing. He watched the moment Wood fired a warning shot, but did nothing. He saw Wood being tackled to the ground and unarmed, but did nothing. He saw both soldiers being taken into Casement Park, but did nothing. He watched as both soldiers were stripped and thrown over a wall, but did nothing. He watched both soldiers being bundled into a black taxi, but did nothing. I assume he watched both soldiers being executed; he arrived afterwards and the IRA killers had long escaped.

One explanation for the Chief Superintendent's inaction: whoever told him not to intervene already knew what the Corporals' intentions were. The Chief Superintendent would have been astute enough to know, when he relayed the events to his superiors and was still told not to intervene, that it may have been a sanctioned operation.

Donnan claims he defied orders to deploy,[4] but only after fatal delay. The timeline conclusively confirms observation without intervention. Who told a Chief Superintendent with operational command on the ground not to intervene?

The Ministry of Defence maintained that Wood and Howes were Royal Corps of Signals communications technicians who had left North Howard Street base. They were supposed to drive along the M1 motorway to Lisburn. The story: Wood was 'showing around' his new colleague Howes, took a wrong turn from North Howard Street Military Base, and accidentally drove into the funeral. They should have turned left onto Westlink from North Howard Street but they turned right instead.[5]

Even the BBC would know that the claim that they could not access the motorway from the alleged route they took is false. After turning right (if they did leave North Howard Street), multiple other routes existed: Grosvenor Road, Broadway Road, Donegall Road, and Kennedy Way.

Traffic on the Falls Road would have been significantly reduced that day. Once they were past Kennedy Way roundabout there was zero traffic. Both Wood and Howes would have been acutely aware of their surroundings and what was ahead of them.

Donnan questions the official route.[6] He stated that the soldiers would have known the area was out of bounds, that they would have been compelled to find out what areas were off-limits, and that checking routes was "like pulling a shirt on in the morning."

Former RUC officer 'Noel' adds:[7] "The army are good at routes, so when something happens they know where they are, plus they would have been warned going out the gate."

The Funeral Murders captures a critical revelation at [43:58].[8] An RUC inspector from Woodbourne Barracks told Chief Superintendent Cyril Donnan that the Corporals were driving "one of my unmarked patrol cars."

This contradicts the North Howard Street origin story entirely. The soldiers were initially identified by the RUC by a commanding RUC officer in Andersonstown because they were driving one of his unmarked cars from Woodbourne Barracks.

The implication is significant. They were already inside the republican heartland, having approached the Andersonstown Road from Kennedy Way, not ‘straying’ into it from the Falls Road direction.

Even after mounting the footpath, the Corporals could still have escaped had they turned up Slemish Way. Instead, they drove across the junction and continued to drive into mourners. They stopped when they drew parallel to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness but were separated by a steel pedestrian barrier on their left. They immediately reversed, driving across the junction of Slemish Way further than they needed if escape had been their intention. The car seems to straighten to make a repeat attempt to drive forward, this time keeping the barrier to their right. Two taxis moved forward to block their path.

Speculation among Republicans was that it was an assassination attempt on Adams and McGuinness - weaponising the car gave them a better chance than Stone's attack.

It was further speculated that the steel barrier's presence, visible at ground level but potentially missed on maps, suggests pre-planning that did not account for physical reality.

As an undercover car from Woodbourne, it was fitted with communication equipment. They could have made radio contact. Why didn't they receive radio warnings from the helicopter? Undercover operatives normally coordinate to avoid compromise.

The helicopter recorded the full 12 minutes of real-time events without intervention. Chief Superintendent Donnan was watching everything on his monitor. His "strict policy not to intervene" strains credibility given the live feed. They watched the soldiers being beaten, stripped and driven to waste ground before being killed.

Former Joint Communications Unit - NI technician Seán Hartnett, in his memoir Charlie One (2016), makes claims that are not credible.[9] He states: 

There was no special mission, no clandestine operation, and no cover-up, as has been suggested by some. Howes and Wood were the architects of their own demise.

Hartnett further claimed that the Corporals' car was civilian-registered and unflagged in police systems, creating fatal identification delays.[10]

Hartnett is not a first-hand witness and is repeating rumours he has heard. His claims are discussed in turn below.

An RUC Inspector identified the car as one of his. It was not a military car as Hartnett alleges, nor did it go unidentified because it was unmarked. If the helicopter crew relayed the car's registration to the control room, that would be even more damning for Donnan - because it would mean an RUC Inspector had confirmed to him that they were two soldiers as events were still unfolding. When Donnan makes that revelation in the documentary, a fire crew is extinguishing the burning car. Viewers are led to assume that the RUC only identified the car from being present at the scene while it burned.

Hartnett makes an additional unfounded claim regarding the magazine of Wood’s gun:[11]

As the vehicle was surrounded and Wood was being dragged out, he produced his pistol and fired a single warning shot in the air. While his restraint was admirable, it ultimately proved to be fatal. If you look closely at the image on the screen you can see that the magazine housing is empty. Either Wood had been sitting on his pistol for quick access while driving around and accidentally sat on the magazine ejector switch, or it was ejected during the scuffle to get him out of the vehicle. Either way, when he went to fire a second shot all he got was a dead man's click.

This account is contradicted by direct evidence. First, the IRA used the soldiers' own guns to kill them - Wood's gun was loaded. Second, and conclusively, I personally searched the driver's side of the car, including under the seat, and found no magazine.[12] Hartnett's account amounts to uninformed speculation or repeating rumours.

One would expect the passenger side window to be open if, Republican speculation was true, and Howes was to shoot Adams and McGuinness from the car. However, the footage shows a mourner smash the window to disarm Howes after his gun jammed. That the gun jammed follows Howes having attempted to fire through the closed window.

Within hours, IRA sources claimed the Corporals were two SAS members. Howes' ID was marked ‘Herford’ - a British Army base in Germany. This was allegedly misread as ‘Hereford’ - SAS headquarters. That may be true, but it is also possible the British authorities did not want the apparent attack associated with the same regiment that had unlawfully killed the Gibraltar 3. Regardless, as members of the Signals regiment with the Joint Communications Unit - NI, the Corporals were support personnel to the SAS.

Why were they using a local RUC unmarked car from Woodbourne? As an undercover vehicle, it was fitted with communication equipment from which they could have made radio contact. The absence of any communication like this, combined with the absence of any radio warning from the helicopter to the Corporals, remains unexplained on the official account. One explanation might be, undercover units practice radio silence at crucial moments of operations.

Why the Corporals Wood and Howes drove at speed into mourners has remained unresolved for nearly four decades. The official narrative - that two soldiers simply got lost - does not survive scrutiny. The Woodbourne vehicle identification places them already inside the republican heartland, in an unmarked RUC patrol car from a local barracks, approaching from a direction wholly inconsistent with a wrong turn from North Howard Street. The route analysis eliminates accident as a credible explanation. My first hand account directly contradicts the central factual claim advanced by Hartnett regarding the magazine from Woods gun. The behaviour of the vehicle - continuing past escape routes, drawing parallel to Adams and McGuinness, reversing and seeming to realign for a second pass - contradicts the actions of lost soldiers attempting to extricate themselves. Chief Superintendent Donnan’s inaction to a deadly incident he personally watched, sustained across 12 minutes of live overhead surveillance despite multiple observable triggers for intervention, is more consistent with prior knowledge than with institutional inertia alone. Taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Corporals were sent. I do not know what their intentions were, but they were determined to achieve something.

References

[1] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [16:26]

[2] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018):

[3] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:26]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n2AX4zm6R10

[4] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [41:00]

[5] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [51:57]

[6] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [52:33-53:18] 

[7] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [53:20] 

[8] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:58] 

[9] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One: The True Story of an Irishman in the British Army and His Role in Covert Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Ireland, Merrion Press, 2016, pp. 45-46.

[10] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[11] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[12] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One,, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

Additional Sources:

Irish Times, 'The funeral murders that changed Northern Ireland forever' (16 March 2018): 

Belfast Newsletter, 'Corporals' murders: I was operating under a policy not to deploy, says RUC commander' (11 March 2018):.

Two Corporals 🪶 19 March 1988 🪶 Did They Stray Or Were They Sent?

Seamus Kearney 🎤 In April 1986 the IRA Army Council gave permission to the Director of Northern Command to tighten the grip on all IRA operations, as a result of a number of civilian deaths.

Consequently, all future IRA military operations had to be vetted by him and become more centralised, a sound idea at the time provided there were no leaks in the initiative.

Unfortunately, the Director of Northern Command still had unquestioning faith in the integrity of the Internal Security Unit and ordered Scappaticci as OC of the unit to vet all proposed operations in the Belfast Brigade area. When the Task Coordinating Group ( TCG) were told about this latest development, to say they were salivating would be an understatement. They were ecstatic. However, the elite and security conscious South Armagh Brigade declined in general to comply with the order, because they simply didn't trust Belfast and were security conscious at all times. The fact that their calls for Freddie Scappaticci 's removal had fallen on deaf ears may have fed into their overall attitude toward the new order.

In a highly spectacular military operation, the South Armagh Brigade blasted the Forensic Science Laboratory at Belvoir, South Belfast, on September 23rd, 1992 with a massive 3,000 lb van bomb, destroying vital evidence and undermining the justice system in the North. When the Director of Northern Command was told after the explosion that it was a South Armagh operation he was livid.
The centralisation of IRA operations may have aided the electoral process, but it was a chink in the armour when it came to IRA operations being compromised, as they were no longer water tight within a cell structure.

In 1986 the TCG decided to shed one of their assets, Agent Mints, possibly due to the agent passing his 'sell by date'. The agent had been working since 1978 and had primarily worked in the IRA's Engineering Department, compromising a number of explosive dumps in his eight year tenure. Freddie Scappaticci was invited in by Belfast Brigade to investigate the suspect and the ISU were convened in a safe house in West Belfast to await his arrival. Another agent masquerading as IRA personnel was instructed to fetch Agent Mints, with both men arriving at the safe house without incident.

To the astonishment of the ISU, which included Scappaticci, the former Marine, 'Burke' and 'Hare', Agent Mints broke immediately and gushed out that he had been working for Special Branch since 1978 and had compromised the 'Short Strand Bombs' in which Volunteer Michael Kearney had been executed for in July 1979. He had been the 'East wing' of the operation, while another agent had been the 'West wing', both agents providing the British with a holistic view of the operation in March 1979.

The victim had informed his handlers where he had been summoned to and they had instructed him to go meet the ISU and that they would rescue him. However, no rescue mission was launched and the death penalty was handed down to him after 2 days of interrogation.

His eyes were taped shut and his hands were tied behind his back. A number of shots rang out and Agent Mints fell to the ground. The TCG had shed no tears for him, as he was yet another cog in a bigger wheel, mere cannon fodder to be discarded in their dirty war against the IRA.

Seamus Kearney is a former Blanketman and author of  
No Greater Love - The Memoirs of Seamus Kearney.

Stakeknife 🕵 The Rise And Fall 🕵 Act ⅤⅠ

Muiris Ó Súilleabháin ✍ "The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts. To understand the world as it is, not as we should wish it to be, is the beginning of wisdom." - Bertrand Russell

I am not convinced that when the renowned philosopher Russell penned these lines as part of his series of essays “Mortals and Others” between 1931 and 1935 that even he could have predicted the extent to which the “fools and fanatics” would control the world and dominate the narrative in the early part of the 21st Century.

By the same token, I remain decidedly ambivalent as to whether I would even wish to understand the world as it currently is. I cling to the forlorn hope that good people speaking truth to power can reset the horrific genocidal trajectory now being taken, even though we are witnessing an era readily comparable to Germany of the 1930s.

My interest in Republicanism and world affairs fluctuates. My attention to such matters is occasionally drawn to key touchpoint moments such as elections, the passing of former comrades and genocide. At this juncture in my life, I enjoy reading about our recent past, not the sanitised and “cleared” versions, that I do not recognise, but the ones that challenge the fictions that have been grafted onto the “peace process”. The pressures of work mean that it is only during periods of leave that I have the opportunity to dissect the multitude of books and papers that are now emerging.

I inwardly mapped the skeleton for this article, in August, on perhaps the shittiest RyanAir flight ever, returning from a week’s rest and relaxation in Northern Europe. As before, the catalyst for my writing were the papers released by the UK Government on some seminal moments of the “peace process” but also Trigg's book on East Tyrone and my sabbatical conversations with a group of elderly communists who shared much of my world view.

My holiday hosts had decades of experience in subversive activity in political parties and trade unions. They were vexed and amused by my naivety when we discussed Ireland, the revolution and the current state of nation. Their perceptions on revolution and the inexorable abandonment of principle had been shaped by the multiple betrayals that they had to endure from former comrades who are now very wealthy establishment politicians. As we spent several nights drinking a plentiful local wine, they tried to imbue me with their stoic and pragmatic mindset.

They laughed loudly at my foolishness in thinking that my revolutionary goddess would never become just another cheap whore and for believing that the Irish struggle could ever have culminated in the socialist republic we had toiled for.

They asserted that adopting a binary perspective on life is simplistic and neglects the intricate realities of the world and human nature. The contemporary era is characterised by paradoxes, subtleties, and contradictions: “get used to it” they urged, as if at my age, I am for turning. People and revolutionary movements are inevitably subject to compromise, and at times, may themselves become compromised in pursuit of their objectives. They encouraged me to acknowledge certain unavoidable truths: politicians are a corrupt class, and absolute revolutionary purity is unattainable.

“The rich will always betray the poor” - Henry Joy McCracken.

This presents a challenge for me, as I tend to be a sensitive soul and take dishonesty from others personally. I am offended that we live in such a dystopian reality and that in an era where information and knowledge are so readily available, utopian thinking, rational analysis and honesty appear to have been lost in a fictional world where strawman thinking is paramount.

The intensification of the genocide being inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the state of Israel, we are told, is a justifiable response to the horror inflicted upon them by Hamas on October 7th, 2023. There is no contextualisation of the brutal assault on innocent civilians and an entire population whose survival has been almost totally dependent upon the UNs longest standing mission since 1947. It didn’t start in October 2023!

Children, Doctors, Hospitals, Journalists and aid workers are considered collateral damage in an asymmetrical conflict that has seen all the major conurbations in Gaza razed to the ground. Gaza no longer has any functioning hospitals. Starvation is being used a means to control the movement of millions of people and the inevitable consequential increase in infant mortality barely merits mention.

Similar to the Nazi sacking of Warsaw in 1944, some in the Western World have looked on in disbelief, others have turned a blind eye but most have facilitated the obliteration of Gaza in pursuit of their wider geo-political agenda. October 7th, the fall of Assad and the invasion of Ukraine have all paved the way for the Israeli state to aggressively pursue their final solution to their Palestinian problem.

The belated recognition of a Palestinian State by a handful of Western Governments, who have hitherto actively supported the Israeli state genocide, is nothing more than fig leaf political posturing. Starmer, Macron et al. in trying to reposition themselves to the right side of history, have given far too little far too late. The previously agreed two state solution, which was never optimal for the Palestinian people, can now never be realised - ask Bibi. The newly established Palestinian missions in France and the UK are likely to be the only sovereign territory that a Palestinian State ever again controls.

Trump, Starmer and our very own Mary Lou, the great and the good, have all avowed that the State of Israel has the right to self-defence. Having received this almost universal carte blanche, the State of Israel has defensively attacked Yemen, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories since October 7th, 2023, with weapons primarily supplied by the USA and UK. The ill-fated recipients of these pre-emptive, self-defence measures have all experienced the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in breach of international law.

Wherever the choice has had to be made between the man of reason and the madman, the world has unhesitatingly followed the madman - Huxley.

Back in the Narnia of Ireland, we are showing the world that when you stop killing each other but fail to address the underlying socio-economic conditions, you really are just kicking the can down the road. Our dystopian post-GFA paradise exploded yet again during the summer recess and brought once more into sharp focus that the sectarian polarisation that continues to plague us has now been inculcated with an overtly racist dynamic. This newer dynamic to the north is as depressing as it was predictable and even more so because it was entirely preventable.

August marked 20 years since the IRA’s final statement which formally approved the GFA as the only legitimate route to Unity and/or the Republic. The GFA was supposed to bring about new dispensation, prosperity, equality for all and radical change. At the time, the late Brendan Hughes referred to the GFA in a manner that was somewhat sarcastic and definitely prescient as “Got Fuck All”.

The Shinners, public masturbation over how much Northern Ireland has changed since the IRA Statement and the return to Stormont was abruptly cut short by the pre-eminent think tank Pivotal.

According to Pivotal, the “Government of change” led by Sinn Fein has delivered fuck all (DFA) socially, economically or politically. There are few who could argue with this assessment and Gerry Adams ceded as much in an article written to counter the growing public and internal discontent with the underperforming Provos in Stormont.

Adams’s missive in the Andytout News explicitly acknowledged his party’s failure to address the issues of real importance to real people such as health, education, sectarianism and poverty. Of course, as one would expect, the Brits, the Unionists and the Free State still shoulder the blame, almost 30 years after the signing of the GFA/DFA.

In what will someday be used as the apotheosis of the “Dunning Kruger Effect” Adams enunciated that Stormont is the only vehicle upon which to build “on the opportunities for progress created by the peace process”. Whatever to fuck this gobbledygook is supposed to mean, it will be little of comfort to the poor, the sick and the hungry as they struggle to survive in our little northern utopia.

In a powder puff piece in the Irish News, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the decommissioning of the IRA (and the completion of IRA decommissioning), Adams was once again given a free rein to rewrite our collective past. Stressing that his greatest fear in 2005 was that the IRA would reject his peace proposals, cuddly Gerry reminisced, that the IRA would not have been sighted on his proposals or his speech in which he was to ask the IRA to “leave the stage”.

There are two aspects of the Adams interview that are jaw droppingly incredulous. The first being that Adams was not challenged on this denial and the second pertains to the report from the “Kew files” published by Sam McBride, also in August.

It is inconceivable (or is it?) that Adams would expect anyone to swallow the falsehood, that neither the IRA nor the British would have advance notice of the keynote speeches he was delivering throughout the peace process. Indeed, McBride’s research, spotlighted a level of choreography between the leadership of the IRA and the British establishment that would not have looked out of place on “Strictly Come Dancing”.

Jonathan Powell, who has been credited with writing key tracts of a crucial Adams’s speech in 2002, did not ascend to the role of UK National Security Advisor without having honed his “tradecraft” during his time in the FCO. His part in the speech where Adams predicts a future “without the IRA” specifically related to the lines on the disbandment of the IRA.

The revelation that British Intelligence contributed to the central sections of the public pronouncements for an individual serving on the Army council presents several scenarios, with the least plausible being that the IRA leadership was unaware of the Adams/Powell tango.

A truth can walk naked, but a lie always needs to be dressed - Gibran

The perpetuation of such dishonesty barbs now as much as the initial act of dishonesty does itself. It was not realistic to expect that the leadership of the movement could inform every member about every detail during critical negotiations. Lies had to be told at that time, and information withheld from the base, that is a given. But it is not unreasonable to expect that (now the “butterfly has flown”), the leadership would at some point in time, bestow the truth upon those who sweated and bled in the fields and the streets.

While we were sent out to paint hollow slogans such as “no return to Stormont” and “not an ounce, not a bullet,” it is now abundantly clear that the leadership had already decided to take a predetermined course of action that included decommissioning and a return to Stormont. The only debate that remains is when that decision was taken.

If one is to believe the recent utterances of Mr Morrison, the chameleon of Carrigart, then the decision to wind down the armed struggle was taken by the kitchen cabinet in the early 80s in the wake of the hunger strikes. The obvious problem with this analysis is that the rank and file were not privy to this decision and it could well be the case that history is now being manipulated to harmonise with the narrative that beatifies former military leaders.

“Hail glorious saint Gerry, dear saint of our isle, he converted the RA with fine words and a smile”.

If Morrison and others are being truthful (oxymoronic I know) then every negotiation and every IRA action from that period onwards should be viewed through the prism of the leadership’s imperative to “maintain the unity and cohesion of the movement” while simultaneously marshalling the movement victoriously up the steps to Stormont. Some of us unknowingly played a bit part in that deception by painting walls, delivering leaflets, protesting on streets and relaying internal briefings with fervour, others paid a much heavier price and none more so than the East Tyrone Brigade of the IRA.

Only bad generals need heroes - Brecht

I have strong familial ties to East Tyrone and was domiciled in the area for quite a few years. I knew the towns, the villages, the families and some of the players depicted in Trigg's book on the killing fields of East Tyrone. The book was in my view a fine if somewhat chilling read. Previously reviewed on The Pensive Quill (by Packy Carty and The Fenian Way) here it received a mixed reaction from Republicans and British establishment figures alike.

East Tyrone and its hinterlands were never short of heroes willing to volunteer for active service in the army. Trigg empathetically portrays the internecine conflict as it played out in this small close-knit community where the hunter and the hunted (depending on your perspective) lived cheek by jowl. The British, Loyalists and the IRA all contributed to an attrition rate not matched in any Brigade area in the most recent phase of the struggle. It was however the East Tyrone Brigade of IRA who were to carry the supreme burden of the fallen.

What struck me about the detail that Trigg has added to the post-conflict discourse is that his research is almost entirely reliant upon “grassroots” sources. His innovative approach has provided a valuable insight into some of the most challenging periods of the war, but it also is his work’s weakness.

As someone who did not have an insight into the command structures of the IRA at that time in a rural Brigade area, I would be shocked if the same level of centralised operational planning and oversight did not exist in East Tyrone as for example would have been in place in Belfast.

While some of the operations where volunteers lost their lives seem to have been opportunistic responses to British “come ons” others such as Loughall, Coagh and Clonoe do not give the impression of having been adequately planned, without, for example, realistic fall-back options. One can only speculate as to why the Brigade OO and the Northern Command would have let these operations proceed, but the failure surely rests with the Generals and not with the men who perished. What puzzles more notably than the speculation around informers is why the disasters of Loughall etc. were not seized upon by the then leadership to sue for peace.

The scale of death at Loughall could have been used by those who now state they were “doves” to bring an honourable end to the long war. Why then, did that same leadership choose to send more young volunteers to their deaths and to Long Kesh?

Trigg's book screams from the pages that Loughall was the turning point in the conflict. If the generals who oversaw the IRA could not see this, then they should not have been generals. If they did see it and ignored it then they should not have been in the IRA.

It may have been the cynic in me, or the wine, or just the candour of the company with whom I had just spent a very convivial few days, but I couldn’t help but reflect on the interconnectedness of all of these matters. The dystopian and dishonest nature of the modern world is now enthusiastically embraced by the people who promised us we were fighting for a utopian Ireland. These same people now dispense deceit, injustice and inequality in doses that are equivalent in measure to any historical British and Unionist misrule.

The simple step of the courageous individual is not to take part in the lie - Solzhenitsyn.

⏩Muiris Ó Súilleabháin was a member of the Republican Movement until he retired in 2006 after 20 years of service. Fiche bhliain ag fás.

Summertime Blues

Belfast Telegraph ★ Written by Suzanne Breen.

26-July-2025

Two decades after Séanna Walsh announced the Provos’ historic cessation to the world, former prisoners, a police chief and academics reflect on whether group’s armed campaign achieved its goals or represented defeat disguised as victory.

It was a softly spoken former prisoner in a white shirt who made one of the most momentous declarations in republican history.

Standing in front of a tricolour, Séanna Walsh became the first person since the 1972 truce talks to publicly represent the IRA without wearing a balaclava.

On July 28, 2005, the republican who had spent almost half his life in jail announced a “formal end to the armed campaign” from 4pm that day. All Provisional units were ordered to “dump arms”, and the organisation pledged to decommission its weapons.

In the statement recorded on DVD for broadcast media, IRA members were instructed “to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means”.

It added: “Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.”

Walsh was carefully chosen to deliver the declaration. A former friend and cellmate of Bobby Sands, he had spent a total of 21 years in prison.

20 Years On From IRA Stand-Down 🪶 ‘The War Ended On Terms Satisfactory To The British, And Was An Implosion Of Republican Principles’

Brandon Sullivan 🎤 Quillversation with Jonathan Trigg, author of the newly released book: Death in Derry: Martin McGuinness and the Derry IRA’s War Against the British, and his first book in this area, the well-received Death in the Fields: The IRA in East Tyrone.

It’s my pleasure to start another Quillversation with Jon Trigg. This time, the focus is on Derry, where the late Martin McGuinness held sway for a very long time. As with the last Quillversation with Jon, my hope is that questions will follow, and we’ll get another piece. Or two, as proved to be the case last time.

Please add your own questions in the comments below, or comments on the answer, or indeed questions, on this piece.

Let’s get started.

Brandon Sullivan (BS): You wrote the well-received book on the East Tyrone Brigade (ETB). In writing the Derry book, did you do anything differently?

Did writing the ETB book make the Derry book easier or harder to write?

Jon Trigg (JT): Very kind of you to say on the ETB book, I'd probably say it was well received by some, less so by some others. In retrospect I probably wasn't prepared as I thought I was for some of the criticism, which was pretty vitriolic. Naive of me really, this is a very emotive subject with people holding very strong views indeed, so one thing I did differently was 'armour' myself better for what I now knew would come my way.

The second, and far more important thing I wanted to do in the Derry book was to interview more former volunteers than I'd been able to for Tyrone. They're the lifeblood of the books and that's where Death in the Fields came in very handy. I don't flatter myself that every former volunteer devoured every word of it, but the feedback I got from the Derry guys was that they'd read - or heard - enough of it to think they would get a fair hearing. They also believed - rightly - their words wouldn't be distorted or their identities revealed, and on that basis I had a lot more people willing to be interviewed, and that made a huge difference. Experience always helps too, so having written one book on a PIRA brigade, I was hopefully better equipped to write another - but I'll let the readers judge that.

BS: In terms of the reviews that you received, one thing that I saw as positive and interesting was that it started conversations on TPQ, and I presume among former volunteers, and amongst people like myself, amateur historians/researchers.

Did any of your sources for the Derry book give a specific reason or rationale for their participation?

Going back to the reviews again, what stands out as being useful?

And going to the content of the book itself, let's start off with a fairly standard question - simply, what were the main differences between the ETB and the Derry Brigade?

JT: Yes I think it did, and I see that as a big win - if we want something to die then a good way of achieving that is not to talk about it, and I strongly believe that would be a major error for the Troubles and do all those from all sides who fought and suffered a huge disservice.

By far the most common reason sources gave me for participating was to ensure their side of what happened was recorded and heard by the wider public. For Seán McGlinchey - who was very kind in giving up his time to meet - he knows he's a well-known figure with a public profile and his past is documented, but often without any input from him and he wanted the opportunity to talk about it in his own words. For other former volunteers quite a few had never been asked to talk before and felt their stories had been overlooked and would soon be forgotten. They'd devoted their lives to the Movement and while they didn't want plaudits or brass bands they wanted that commitment remembered in some way.

Strangely enough there were echoes of the same motivations among some of the ex-members of the security forces I interviewed. None of them were 'bigwigs' or the men in the headlines but they wanted their experiences recorded and remembered.

As for reviews I was initially going to say 'all reviews are useful', but then I remembered those that aren't; I've had several that simply said 'after ordering, the book arrived quickly' . . . useful for Amazon perhaps but less so for me. Reviews can be helpful though, less so perhaps for specific points but more in terms of a 'general view', so if readers consistently point out a lack of balance on an aspect of the book, for example, that's useful. One such theme I get quite a lot of is where readers say the book leans too heavily towards one side but is a good read nonetheless - I get that from both sides of the fence, so am I doing something right? Perhaps.

For the South Derry units and the ETB they had a lot in common and fought broadly similar wars, but Derry city PIRA was very different as you'd expect. Firstly, the geography of the war in Derry was hugely compressed compared to the ETB. Operations were often sandwiched into small networks of streets, lanes and alleys, and that flowed through to the type of operations carried out. The Derry Brigade couldn't launch the type of attacks the ETB often could - large road mines, improvised mortars and major assaults on police stations, because of the danger to civilians. Of course that was mostly to avoid innocent bloodshed, but let's be clear it also had a practical, military driver as well in attacks like that eroded support from the communities they operated in, and that was very dangerous.

I'd also say a big difference between the two was the men in the ranks themselves. In general terms the ETB relied on recruits from a network of families with republican traditions that had links with each other often going back generations. That links with motivation too - the ETB's war sprung in large part from the land itself and what they viewed as the injustice of confiscations that happened centuries previously. This wasn't the case in Derry. Civil rights and not land were bigger motivators there as you'd expect in the city that suffered the tragedy of Bloody Sunday. In Derry the links that bound ETB members weren't as strong - or so tied up in history, and the very proximity to each other of volunteers in the city made security so much harder, hence why Derry was easier for the security forces to penetrate and the likes of Raymond Gilmour for instance could do so much damage.

The biggest difference though - in my opinion - was Martin McGuinness. The ETB had some notable commanders in its time; Kevin Mallon, Patrick Kelly etc, but no-one like McGuinness. His longevity and influence dominated the Brigade almost from its creation. You can see it in the brigade's lifecycle; when he was engrossed in the military struggle so was the brigade, when he began to move towards a political solution the brigade's military side withered.

BS: I’ve decided to cluster a series of questions and answers by topic:



Quillversation about Martin McGuiness (McG)

BS: I think one of the strengths if the book was the presence of McG - it wasn't a book about McG, or even about McG's command of Derry. I think it successfully showed Derry as an entity independent of McG. A few questions on McG:

Do you have an opinion on whether he was an agent of some type? Perhaps a strange question, but were you left with the impression that you'd have liked to have gone for a pint with McG?

What are your thoughts on him as a military leader? And as a leader of men more generally?

JT: I'd have very much liked to have had a quiet drink with McG, albeit I don't think he would have had a pint, a soft drink for him I think and he wouldn't have said much, far too cagey and self-possessed for a simple scribbler like me.

No, I don't think he was an agent of any type, despite the thoughts of some of my interviewees. Do I think there was more to his thinking - and perhaps his actions - than was apparent at the time? Perhaps, but not to the point where he was in any way working for the British. I do think, however -  and let me be very clear here that I have no written or verbal evidence for this whatsoever, this is purely my own 'hunch' if you like - that he had confidential back channels to the British (Security Service personnel in particular and that's not news of course) that he might have used on very rare occasions to discuss sensitive subjects of mutual benefit. But who knows for sure? Maybe we'll find out in years to come, but probably not.

Hmm, a military leader/leader of men, he was definitely a leader of men, he obviously inspired devotion and admiration among his own men and commanded both their respect and that of his enemies. He was a good tactician in many ways but what I would call his 'military knowledge' was not as good as it was made out to be. John Crawley makes some very good points about this in his book 'The Yank' - which is excellent by the way - and I agree with him. To be an effective military leader you need to have the basic knowledge of individual and small unit tactics, understand weapons systems and their characteristics as well as pros and cons, and have a good understanding of all the necessary facets of military leadership; training, logistics, communications, intelligence etc, and McG didn't have that. Perhaps more importantly he didn't either surround himself with (or delegate to) those that did have that knowledge, or seek to remedy the gaps in his knowledge through learning.

BS: I share your hunch - but at a certain point his interests became in-line with strategic British (though not RUC) interests. From memory there was a significant RUC operation against him (Operation Taurus). Had there been the political will, I think he could possibly have been convicted of "directing terrorism" a la Adair, and a UVF character named Maguire.

Crawley's criticisms of McGuinness's military leadership are hard to refute - it seems he had a natural charisma and an innate military cunning, but didn't seek to nurture these talents with appropriate training, or as you say surround himself with those who could fill the gaps or train him. Could this be a personality defect that he had? An arrogance? Or, as you say, do you think he simply got more interested in politics and the military aspect took a back seat?

I was trying to think of a comparison with McGuinness. Gerry Adams didn't really control Belfast, but he was obviously a strong influence. Slab Murphy is more analogous to McGuinness in terms of longevity and unquestioned leadership. But obviously Slab wasn't a politician, and in fact seems to have very little respect for most of them. Did you hear any commentary on McGuinness's relationships with, or attitudes to, figures such as Slab, or the former Chief of Staff Kevin McKenna (alleged to have had a non-violent feud with him).

JT: Very good questions on the 'why' with him. He was clearly hugely charismatic and an inspiring figure in republicanism, but why this lack of military leadership at anything above a very local, tactical level? He obviously was involved in operations and took risks personally - that is a very clear sign of a leader and one that would have gone a long way in inspiring devotion from his men, but why not kick on from there? True, I think his adoption of the car bomb and conviction that an economic offensive would be a pragmatic military pathway in Derry was something that in classic military thinking would be termed an 'operational' level, but he didn't appear to kick on from there - was the lure of politics too great, did Adams persuade him that was the route to success?

You're right on Slab Murphy, but I would say Murphy was a better military leader than McG as he evolved and in particular - and I would be the first to admit I'm no expert on S Armagh - he did indeed delegate to others around him and promote younger men around him who showed sharp tactical minds, ingenuity and innovation in their operations - S Armagh were also happy to learn the use of newer, heavier weapons which require military expertise to use effectively.

No commentary from Derry volunteers on McKenna and the alleged feud.

BS: John Crawley was a former training instructor with US Marine Reconnaissance teams. I imagine that South Armagh would have recognised Crawley would have been better employed training IRA volunteers in weapons and tactics than going into gun stores in New York to buy one rifle at a time because he had an American accent. In simple terms, McGuinness sent John Crawley to America to buy weapons. That is unimaginative at best, and purposefully damaging at worst.

In Derry, there wasn't an equivalent to "The Surgeon" that I could see, at least not in Derry City. South Derry was different, but they seem to have more in common with the ETB than South Armagh.

Were many volunteers positive about McGuinness?

JT: That's exactly what I’d have used John Crawley to do, and I would have ensured his 'shopping list' of weapons was what he got. Agreed on the commonality between South Derry and ETB, linkage across to West Tyrone and Donegal and tie in Fermanagh and you've got a 'super brigade' area.

There was no outright hostility to McG from any of the volunteers. Some had questions/concerns and one obviously believed he was compromised in some way, but almost all of them greatly admired him - they loved the fact that he was 'one of their own' and had risen so high in the Movement too.



Quillversation about sectarianism in the Derry IRA

BS: Were the 1974 murders of Winston Smith and Bert Slater ever discussed? How were Protestants, unionists, and loyalists generally discussed? And regarding the killing of Alan "Smudger" Smyth - was this well received by the volunteers you spoke to? The IRA in Derry had some successes against loyalist figures, reasonably high-profile UDA men were killed, and Smudger was quite a coup. And South Derry got a few UVF members.

Compared with the East Tyrone Brigade - how much did conflict with loyalists inform the attitudes/fears/motivations of republicans?

JT: In general the former Derry volunteers didn't say much about Protestants, unionists and loyalists. They very much thought the RUC and the UDR in particular were sectarian, albeit the city volunteers didn't have that much firsthand experience of the UDR. With the ETB it was a huge issue, I mean huge, and there were echoes of it among the S Derry volunteers - Sean McGlinchey was very clear about that - but it wasn't nearly as big a deal in the city.


Quillversation about informers in Derry

BS: The Derry brigade seemed to be badly affected by touts. What was the attitude to volunteers about them? I've read so many conflicting stories about Paddy "Warhead" Flood. Your Branch contact seemed emphatic. What did the volunteers think?

Did anyone ever discuss the paedophile John Collett who the IRA shot dead? Apparently he was a prolific child abuser, and the community put intense pressure on the IRA to do something, so they killed him.

JT: All the volunteers felt the same about informers - they detested them. They understandably saw them as the 'enemy within' and the greatest potential weakness in the Brigade. The city volunteers knew there was getting away from the fact that the city is fairly small so by necessity it was almost impossible not to know who was involved which made them very vulnerable.

Yes on Flood I've heard a lot of conflicting stories too, and the volunteers I spoke to weren't sure whether he was or not - they mostly didn't want to talk about it really. But the SB guy was clear on it, but I would have preferred to have more corroboration.

No-one mentioned Collett and I didn't ask any of the interviewees as I didn't think it important enough to be a line of questioning. I knew he was a habitual criminal but I didn't know he was a child abuser. CAIN has it down as a punishment shooting gone wrong which is what I went with in the book.


Quillversation about Patsy Gillespie

BS: Could you talk a bit more about this operation, how the volunteers felt about, and if anyone actually defended it?

JT: None of the volunteers defended it, although most were ambivalent about it, seeing it as a successful operation in that it killed soldiers but also understanding the strong emotions using Gillespie as a proxy bomb had inevitably evoked. As I say in the book the Gillespie operation was one of three coordinated to happen pretty much simultaneously - which is a sophisticated feat in itself requiring a lot of planning, logistics and communications. I can't help but think the proxy bomb concept is clumsy and not a sound military operation. In effect by bringing in an unwilling 'bomber' into the very heart of the action you lose the ability to control the attack.


Quillversation about Sinn Fein

BS: What was the volunteers attitudes to Sinn Fein? Any difference between the city and country volunteers in terms of attitudes?

JT: None of the volunteers were anti-Sinn Fein, mostly their attitude seemed to be that the party is a 'necessary evil' if the Movement is to achieve its goals; although interestingly none of them were personally involved in Sinn Fein. A few of them admired Michelle O'Neill, they hadn't met her but felt she'd outsmarted many other SF bigwigs by playing up the 'dumb blonde' persona while actually being a very savvy political operator.

Sean McGlinchey was pro-Sinn Fein as you'd expect from the former Mayor of Limavady, and I got the feeling from him the country volunteers were more pro-Sinn Fein on the whole than the city lads, seeing it a community organisation that very much worked in the interests of local nationalists across the board - the city volunteers were a little more sceptical about ts motives, but not overly much.


Quillversation about the security forces

BS: One of the strengths of the books was the inclusion and voice given to the army and RUC. What do the security forces have in common with volunteers? And what, besides the uniform (or lack of) are the main differences?

JT: I agree. This to me is one of the key drivers for the book - for all of them actually - the books aren't the story of the IRA told exclusively from the standpoint of the IRA - I want to give everyone a voice, including the army and the RUC - and even loyalists, because everyone was involved and has a story to tell. I want to prominently feature former volunteers because I feel strongly that the voices of the frontline volunteers has been largely unheard for a variety of reasons, some of them understandable, others less so. But that means walking a difficult and tricky path; and so much hinges on the use of language. When is a death a 'murder', or an 'execution'? Wherever I can I try not to describe an act myself but allow the interviewees to use their own language, but clearly that isn't possible for every incident in a book so that invariably means me as the author getting involved as it were, and I know from personal experience that can be very, very difficult for a lot of people. They contact me and tell me in no uncertain terms how angry my writing had made them - and that's from all sides, former security forces, volunteers etc.

On areas of common ground what a lot of interviewees (but by no means all!) have always told me about the other side as it were is that they respected the fact they believed in their cause - all sides thought the other sides' cause was wrong, but in general they knew it took commitment to adhere to it.

In terms of differences the three that stand out are resources, focus and training. For obvious reasons the security forces have vastly more resources than the volunteers, be that money, weapons, logistics, technology, you name it. But the second issue of 'focus' counterbalances that to a degree - not a huge degree, but some - and by that I mean for the British Army the war in Northern Ireland wasn't the be all and end all of soldiering, the main theatre was at the time in Western Germany and countering the Warsaw Pact. That's what the mass of equipment, training, preparation etc was geared for. Obviously that wasn't the case for the volunteers, for them the war in Northern Ireland was the Only war.

Lastly, there's training. For members of the security forces - and the army in particular - life revolves around training at all levels. Volunteers didn't have that luxury but at the same time I didn't get a sense from the volunteers that the organisation they were members of really valued or invested in training. As one interviewee said 'if you hadn't got the hang of a rifle or whatever in a couple of sessions then you never would.' I understand the thinking but don't agree. Training, training and more training is the key to successful soldiering, especially down at small unit size, for example an ASU.


The next book

BS: I think to finish up, maybe talk a little about future plans, approach to Belfast book and so on?

JT: The next subject is the Belfast Brigade. It will be a huge undertaking. It's where the Provisionals were really birthed and where so much of the heart of the Movement sat - and still does. Covering it in one book alone wouldn't do it justice in my view, so I'm looking at maybe two. I've asked a couple of former volunteers themselves their thoughts and they've suggested the time split might be '69-'77 for vol 1 and then vol 2 for the rest, but I'm not sure as yet. If TPQers have thoughts on that then please let me know.

As ever the key will be getting people to talk to me and so again, if anyone out there wants to talk to me then please get in touch via my website - there's a Contact me function they can use. As usual it would be confidential and if people want to be quoted anonymously then that's fine.

The debates I have with former volunteers who I'm close to has been around my use of language - and the Derry book is a case in point. Some have very strong feelings that my personal background comes through in the language I use and it demonises them. It's a huge dilemma for me personally and has made me reflect on the way I write. I'm not interested in my work on being a mouthpiece for any side, and I neither condemn nor applaud any side, but achieving objectivity in such a highly charged environment is difficult beyond belief and I accept I don't always attain the goal I set myself - and for that I ask forbearance. I will leave it to those like TPQers who are immersed in the subject to tell me where I'm going wrong, and hopefully where I'm going right too.

⏩ About Jonathan Trigg: Historian, writer and broadcaster, Jonathan Trigg has written over a dozen books with Death On The Don nominated in 2014 for the Pushkin Prize for Russian History. Latterly his Through German Eyes series exploring various Second World War campaigns and battles from the German perspective have been a critical and popular success. Inspired by events closer to home Jonathan has now embarked on a project to cover the Troubles. His first book on the subject - Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone was published by Merrion in Easter 2023.

Jonathan previously served in the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment, reaching the rank of Captain, and completing emergency tours of East Tyrone and Bosnia. He left the Army after a final posting as a Military Instructor to the United Arab Emirates.

For further information and to contact Jonathan directly please visit his website

⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.

Quillversation With Jonathan Trigg 🪶 The Derry IRA

John Crawley 🏴delivered the graveside oration for IRA volunteer, Father Paddy Ryan.


Father Paddy Ryan spent a lifetime in the service of others. From missionary work in Africa as a priest with the Pallottine Order to crucial work as an active participant in the struggle for full Irish freedom.

Born in the townland of Turraheen near Rossmore in County Tipperary in 1930, Father Paddy was one of six children in a farming family instilled with Catholic piety and Irish nationalism. The great patriot Thomas Davis once said, Where Tipperary leads, Ireland follows. I know from my discussions with Father Paddy that he was enormously proud of his native county and its prominent role in the struggle to achieve Irish nationhood. From the 1848 rebellion to the rise of Fenianism and the founding of the GAA, County Tipperary was the focal point of so much that is best in our nation. Tipp places and names, such as Soloheadbeg, the Glen of Aherlow, Sean Treacy, Dan Breen, and Dinny Lacey, are etched into our historical consciousness. It wasn’t in a man like Father Paddy Ryan, from such a place and imbued with such a tradition, to stand idly by when a renewed fight for freedom called once again upon brave men and women to answer the call.

Father Paddy wasn’t impulsive. He was thoughtful and deliberate in his actions. He was both physically and morally courageous. That is a rare combination. He would never permit narrow rationalisations of what was best for him personally to affect his judgement on what was the right thing to do, regardless of the risk to his life or liberty.

Father Paddy never wavered in his devotion to the Republican ideal. We may have interpreted it in different ways, but we knew what it meant by the Republic. It is Ireland unfettered by foreign control or domestic divisions cultivated by the foreigner. It does not defer to Britain for terms and conditions regarding its unity and independence. The Republic is a thirty-two-county sovereign and secular state to which Irish citizens of all traditions give allegiance. It stands for freedom, social justice, and civic unity across the sectarian divide. Father Paddy stood by that Republic his entire life.

I would encourage anyone who wants to know more about Father Paddy Ryan to read the story of his remarkable life in a book called The Padre published two years ago. In that book he talks about his travels to Libya. Presented today at the altar was a coat that Colonel Ghadaffi gave him so that has some historical resonance.

I last met Father Paddy in February of this year and was planning to meet up with him again during the summer. When we spoke, it was clear he was fading physically, but his mental acuity and memory were outstanding. He was as sharp as ever. I was impressed with his encyclopaedic knowledge of the inner workings of the Republican Movement, as it was then, and fascinated by his depictions of some leading figures. Both good and bad.

Today, we bid farewell to a proud Tipperary man, a proud Irishman, a proud, unrepentant, and unapologetic Irish republican.

I believe I speak for many republicans around Ireland when I say to Father Paddy, thank you for your service and sacrifice. Thank you for devoting so much of your great intellect and courage to your country’s cause and not expending them solely on your personal advancement. He gave much, expecting nothing in return, and got nothing in return: nothing but the undying respect and admiration of his friends and comrades.

A man of faith in his god and his country. A man of steely determination. An authentic man. Father Paddy Ryan will be sadly missed but never forgotten as he enters the pantheon of Irish patriots and the pages of Irish history.

Deepest condolences to his family and friends.

Up the Republic!

John Crawley is a former IRA volunteer and author of The Yank.

Father Patrick Ryan

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)