It’s my pleasure to start another Quillversation with Jon Trigg. This time, the focus is on Derry, where the late Martin McGuinness held sway for a very long time. As with the last Quillversation with Jon, my hope is that questions will follow, and we’ll get another piece. Or two, as proved to be the case last time.
Please add your own questions in the comments below, or comments on the answer, or indeed questions, on this piece.
Let’s get started.
Brandon Sullivan (BS): You wrote the well-received book on the East Tyrone Brigade (ETB). In writing the Derry book, did you do anything differently?
Did writing the ETB book make the Derry book easier or harder to write?
Jon Trigg (JT): Very kind of you to say on the ETB book, I'd probably say it was well received by some, less so by some others. In retrospect I probably wasn't prepared as I thought I was for some of the criticism, which was pretty vitriolic. Naive of me really, this is a very emotive subject with people holding very strong views indeed, so one thing I did differently was 'armour' myself better for what I now knew would come my way.
The second, and far more important thing I wanted to do in the Derry book was to interview more former volunteers than I'd been able to for Tyrone. They're the lifeblood of the books and that's where Death in the Fields came in very handy. I don't flatter myself that every former volunteer devoured every word of it, but the feedback I got from the Derry guys was that they'd read - or heard - enough of it to think they would get a fair hearing. They also believed - rightly - their words wouldn't be distorted or their identities revealed, and on that basis I had a lot more people willing to be interviewed, and that made a huge difference. Experience always helps too, so having written one book on a PIRA brigade, I was hopefully better equipped to write another - but I'll let the readers judge that.
BS: In terms of the reviews that you received, one thing that I saw as positive and interesting was that it started conversations on TPQ, and I presume among former volunteers, and amongst people like myself, amateur historians/researchers.
Did any of your sources for the Derry book give a specific reason or rationale for their participation?
Going back to the reviews again, what stands out as being useful?
And going to the content of the book itself, let's start off with a fairly standard question - simply, what were the main differences between the ETB and the Derry Brigade?
JT: Yes I think it did, and I see that as a big win - if we want something to die then a good way of achieving that is not to talk about it, and I strongly believe that would be a major error for the Troubles and do all those from all sides who fought and suffered a huge disservice.
By far the most common reason sources gave me for participating was to ensure their side of what happened was recorded and heard by the wider public. For Seán McGlinchey - who was very kind in giving up his time to meet - he knows he's a well-known figure with a public profile and his past is documented, but often without any input from him and he wanted the opportunity to talk about it in his own words. For other former volunteers quite a few had never been asked to talk before and felt their stories had been overlooked and would soon be forgotten. They'd devoted their lives to the Movement and while they didn't want plaudits or brass bands they wanted that commitment remembered in some way.
Strangely enough there were echoes of the same motivations among some of the ex-members of the security forces I interviewed. None of them were 'bigwigs' or the men in the headlines but they wanted their experiences recorded and remembered.
As for reviews I was initially going to say 'all reviews are useful', but then I remembered those that aren't; I've had several that simply said 'after ordering, the book arrived quickly' . . . useful for Amazon perhaps but less so for me. Reviews can be helpful though, less so perhaps for specific points but more in terms of a 'general view', so if readers consistently point out a lack of balance on an aspect of the book, for example, that's useful. One such theme I get quite a lot of is where readers say the book leans too heavily towards one side but is a good read nonetheless - I get that from both sides of the fence, so am I doing something right? Perhaps.
For the South Derry units and the ETB they had a lot in common and fought broadly similar wars, but Derry city PIRA was very different as you'd expect. Firstly, the geography of the war in Derry was hugely compressed compared to the ETB. Operations were often sandwiched into small networks of streets, lanes and alleys, and that flowed through to the type of operations carried out. The Derry Brigade couldn't launch the type of attacks the ETB often could - large road mines, improvised mortars and major assaults on police stations, because of the danger to civilians. Of course that was mostly to avoid innocent bloodshed, but let's be clear it also had a practical, military driver as well in attacks like that eroded support from the communities they operated in, and that was very dangerous.
I'd also say a big difference between the two was the men in the ranks themselves. In general terms the ETB relied on recruits from a network of families with republican traditions that had links with each other often going back generations. That links with motivation too - the ETB's war sprung in large part from the land itself and what they viewed as the injustice of confiscations that happened centuries previously. This wasn't the case in Derry. Civil rights and not land were bigger motivators there as you'd expect in the city that suffered the tragedy of Bloody Sunday. In Derry the links that bound ETB members weren't as strong - or so tied up in history, and the very proximity to each other of volunteers in the city made security so much harder, hence why Derry was easier for the security forces to penetrate and the likes of Raymond Gilmour for instance could do so much damage.
The biggest difference though - in my opinion - was Martin McGuinness. The ETB had some notable commanders in its time; Kevin Mallon, Patrick Kelly etc, but no-one like McGuinness. His longevity and influence dominated the Brigade almost from its creation. You can see it in the brigade's lifecycle; when he was engrossed in the military struggle so was the brigade, when he began to move towards a political solution the brigade's military side withered.
BS: I think one of the strengths if the book was the presence of McG - it wasn't a book about McG, or even about McG's command of Derry. I think it successfully showed Derry as an entity independent of McG. A few questions on McG:
Do you have an opinion on whether he was an agent of some type? Perhaps a strange question, but were you left with the impression that you'd have liked to have gone for a pint with McG?
What are your thoughts on him as a military leader? And as a leader of men more generally?
JT: I'd have very much liked to have had a quiet drink with McG, albeit I don't think he would have had a pint, a soft drink for him I think and he wouldn't have said much, far too cagey and self-possessed for a simple scribbler like me.
No, I don't think he was an agent of any type, despite the thoughts of some of my interviewees. Do I think there was more to his thinking - and perhaps his actions - than was apparent at the time? Perhaps, but not to the point where he was in any way working for the British. I do think, however - and let me be very clear here that I have no written or verbal evidence for this whatsoever, this is purely my own 'hunch' if you like - that he had confidential back channels to the British (Security Service personnel in particular and that's not news of course) that he might have used on very rare occasions to discuss sensitive subjects of mutual benefit. But who knows for sure? Maybe we'll find out in years to come, but probably not.
Hmm, a military leader/leader of men, he was definitely a leader of men, he obviously inspired devotion and admiration among his own men and commanded both their respect and that of his enemies. He was a good tactician in many ways but what I would call his 'military knowledge' was not as good as it was made out to be. John Crawley makes some very good points about this in his book 'The Yank' - which is excellent by the way - and I agree with him. To be an effective military leader you need to have the basic knowledge of individual and small unit tactics, understand weapons systems and their characteristics as well as pros and cons, and have a good understanding of all the necessary facets of military leadership; training, logistics, communications, intelligence etc, and McG didn't have that. Perhaps more importantly he didn't either surround himself with (or delegate to) those that did have that knowledge, or seek to remedy the gaps in his knowledge through learning.
BS: I share your hunch - but at a certain point his interests became in-line with strategic British (though not RUC) interests. From memory there was a significant RUC operation against him (Operation Taurus). Had there been the political will, I think he could possibly have been convicted of "directing terrorism" a la Adair, and a UVF character named Maguire.
Crawley's criticisms of McGuinness's military leadership are hard to refute - it seems he had a natural charisma and an innate military cunning, but didn't seek to nurture these talents with appropriate training, or as you say surround himself with those who could fill the gaps or train him. Could this be a personality defect that he had? An arrogance? Or, as you say, do you think he simply got more interested in politics and the military aspect took a back seat?
I was trying to think of a comparison with McGuinness. Gerry Adams didn't really control Belfast, but he was obviously a strong influence. Slab Murphy is more analogous to McGuinness in terms of longevity and unquestioned leadership. But obviously Slab wasn't a politician, and in fact seems to have very little respect for most of them. Did you hear any commentary on McGuinness's relationships with, or attitudes to, figures such as Slab, or the former Chief of Staff Kevin McKenna (alleged to have had a non-violent feud with him).
JT: Very good questions on the 'why' with him. He was clearly hugely charismatic and an inspiring figure in republicanism, but why this lack of military leadership at anything above a very local, tactical level? He obviously was involved in operations and took risks personally - that is a very clear sign of a leader and one that would have gone a long way in inspiring devotion from his men, but why not kick on from there? True, I think his adoption of the car bomb and conviction that an economic offensive would be a pragmatic military pathway in Derry was something that in classic military thinking would be termed an 'operational' level, but he didn't appear to kick on from there - was the lure of politics too great, did Adams persuade him that was the route to success?
You're right on Slab Murphy, but I would say Murphy was a better military leader than McG as he evolved and in particular - and I would be the first to admit I'm no expert on S Armagh - he did indeed delegate to others around him and promote younger men around him who showed sharp tactical minds, ingenuity and innovation in their operations - S Armagh were also happy to learn the use of newer, heavier weapons which require military expertise to use effectively.
No commentary from Derry volunteers on McKenna and the alleged feud.
BS: John Crawley was a former training instructor with US Marine Reconnaissance teams. I imagine that South Armagh would have recognised Crawley would have been better employed training IRA volunteers in weapons and tactics than going into gun stores in New York to buy one rifle at a time because he had an American accent. In simple terms, McGuinness sent John Crawley to America to buy weapons. That is unimaginative at best, and purposefully damaging at worst.
In Derry, there wasn't an equivalent to "The Surgeon" that I could see, at least not in Derry City. South Derry was different, but they seem to have more in common with the ETB than South Armagh.
Were many volunteers positive about McGuinness?
JT: That's exactly what I’d have used John Crawley to do, and I would have ensured his 'shopping list' of weapons was what he got. Agreed on the commonality between South Derry and ETB, linkage across to West Tyrone and Donegal and tie in Fermanagh and you've got a 'super brigade' area.
There was no outright hostility to McG from any of the volunteers. Some had questions/concerns and one obviously believed he was compromised in some way, but almost all of them greatly admired him - they loved the fact that he was 'one of their own' and had risen so high in the Movement too.
BS: Were the 1974 murders of Winston Smith and Bert Slater ever discussed? How were Protestants, unionists, and loyalists generally discussed? And regarding the killing of Alan "Smudger" Smyth - was this well received by the volunteers you spoke to? The IRA in Derry had some successes against loyalist figures, reasonably high-profile UDA men were killed, and Smudger was quite a coup. And South Derry got a few UVF members.
Compared with the East Tyrone Brigade - how much did conflict with loyalists inform the attitudes/fears/motivations of republicans?
JT: In general the former Derry volunteers didn't say much about Protestants, unionists and loyalists. They very much thought the RUC and the UDR in particular were sectarian, albeit the city volunteers didn't have that much firsthand experience of the UDR. With the ETB it was a huge issue, I mean huge, and there were echoes of it among the S Derry volunteers - Sean McGlinchey was very clear about that - but it wasn't nearly as big a deal in the city.
Quillversation about informers in Derry
BS: The Derry brigade seemed to be badly affected by touts. What was the attitude to volunteers about them? I've read so many conflicting stories about Paddy "Warhead" Flood. Your Branch contact seemed emphatic. What did the volunteers think?
Did anyone ever discuss the paedophile John Collett who the IRA shot dead? Apparently he was a prolific child abuser, and the community put intense pressure on the IRA to do something, so they killed him.
JT: All the volunteers felt the same about informers - they detested them. They understandably saw them as the 'enemy within' and the greatest potential weakness in the Brigade. The city volunteers knew there was getting away from the fact that the city is fairly small so by necessity it was almost impossible not to know who was involved which made them very vulnerable.
Yes on Flood I've heard a lot of conflicting stories too, and the volunteers I spoke to weren't sure whether he was or not - they mostly didn't want to talk about it really. But the SB guy was clear on it, but I would have preferred to have more corroboration.
No-one mentioned Collett and I didn't ask any of the interviewees as I didn't think it important enough to be a line of questioning. I knew he was a habitual criminal but I didn't know he was a child abuser. CAIN has it down as a punishment shooting gone wrong which is what I went with in the book.
Quillversation about Patsy Gillespie
BS: Could you talk a bit more about this operation, how the volunteers felt about, and if anyone actually defended it?
JT: None of the volunteers defended it, although most were ambivalent about it, seeing it as a successful operation in that it killed soldiers but also understanding the strong emotions using Gillespie as a proxy bomb had inevitably evoked. As I say in the book the Gillespie operation was one of three coordinated to happen pretty much simultaneously - which is a sophisticated feat in itself requiring a lot of planning, logistics and communications. I can't help but think the proxy bomb concept is clumsy and not a sound military operation. In effect by bringing in an unwilling 'bomber' into the very heart of the action you lose the ability to control the attack.
Quillversation about Sinn Fein
BS: What was the volunteers attitudes to Sinn Fein? Any difference between the city and country volunteers in terms of attitudes?
JT: None of the volunteers were anti-Sinn Fein, mostly their attitude seemed to be that the party is a 'necessary evil' if the Movement is to achieve its goals; although interestingly none of them were personally involved in Sinn Fein. A few of them admired Michelle O'Neill, they hadn't met her but felt she'd outsmarted many other SF bigwigs by playing up the 'dumb blonde' persona while actually being a very savvy political operator.
Sean McGlinchey was pro-Sinn Fein as you'd expect from the former Mayor of Limavady, and I got the feeling from him the country volunteers were more pro-Sinn Fein on the whole than the city lads, seeing it a community organisation that very much worked in the interests of local nationalists across the board - the city volunteers were a little more sceptical about ts motives, but not overly much.
Quillversation about the security forces
BS: One of the strengths of the books was the inclusion and voice given to the army and RUC. What do the security forces have in common with volunteers? And what, besides the uniform (or lack of) are the main differences?
JT: I agree. This to me is one of the key drivers for the book - for all of them actually - the books aren't the story of the IRA told exclusively from the standpoint of the IRA - I want to give everyone a voice, including the army and the RUC - and even loyalists, because everyone was involved and has a story to tell. I want to prominently feature former volunteers because I feel strongly that the voices of the frontline volunteers has been largely unheard for a variety of reasons, some of them understandable, others less so. But that means walking a difficult and tricky path; and so much hinges on the use of language. When is a death a 'murder', or an 'execution'? Wherever I can I try not to describe an act myself but allow the interviewees to use their own language, but clearly that isn't possible for every incident in a book so that invariably means me as the author getting involved as it were, and I know from personal experience that can be very, very difficult for a lot of people. They contact me and tell me in no uncertain terms how angry my writing had made them - and that's from all sides, former security forces, volunteers etc.
On areas of common ground what a lot of interviewees (but by no means all!) have always told me about the other side as it were is that they respected the fact they believed in their cause - all sides thought the other sides' cause was wrong, but in general they knew it took commitment to adhere to it.
In terms of differences the three that stand out are resources, focus and training. For obvious reasons the security forces have vastly more resources than the volunteers, be that money, weapons, logistics, technology, you name it. But the second issue of 'focus' counterbalances that to a degree - not a huge degree, but some - and by that I mean for the British Army the war in Northern Ireland wasn't the be all and end all of soldiering, the main theatre was at the time in Western Germany and countering the Warsaw Pact. That's what the mass of equipment, training, preparation etc was geared for. Obviously that wasn't the case for the volunteers, for them the war in Northern Ireland was the Only war.
Lastly, there's training. For members of the security forces - and the army in particular - life revolves around training at all levels. Volunteers didn't have that luxury but at the same time I didn't get a sense from the volunteers that the organisation they were members of really valued or invested in training. As one interviewee said 'if you hadn't got the hang of a rifle or whatever in a couple of sessions then you never would.' I understand the thinking but don't agree. Training, training and more training is the key to successful soldiering, especially down at small unit size, for example an ASU.
The next book
BS: I think to finish up, maybe talk a little about future plans, approach to Belfast book and so on?
JT: The next subject is the Belfast Brigade. It will be a huge undertaking. It's where the Provisionals were really birthed and where so much of the heart of the Movement sat - and still does. Covering it in one book alone wouldn't do it justice in my view, so I'm looking at maybe two. I've asked a couple of former volunteers themselves their thoughts and they've suggested the time split might be '69-'77 for vol 1 and then vol 2 for the rest, but I'm not sure as yet. If TPQers have thoughts on that then please let me know.
As ever the key will be getting people to talk to me and so again, if anyone out there wants to talk to me then please get in touch via my website - there's a Contact me function they can use. As usual it would be confidential and if people want to be quoted anonymously then that's fine.
The debates I have with former volunteers who I'm close to has been around my use of language - and the Derry book is a case in point. Some have very strong feelings that my personal background comes through in the language I use and it demonises them. It's a huge dilemma for me personally and has made me reflect on the way I write. I'm not interested in my work on being a mouthpiece for any side, and I neither condemn nor applaud any side, but achieving objectivity in such a highly charged environment is difficult beyond belief and I accept I don't always attain the goal I set myself - and for that I ask forbearance. I will leave it to those like TPQers who are immersed in the subject to tell me where I'm going wrong, and hopefully where I'm going right too.
⏩ About Jonathan Trigg: Historian, writer and broadcaster, Jonathan Trigg has written over a dozen books with Death On The Don nominated in 2014 for the Pushkin Prize for Russian History. Latterly his Through German Eyes series exploring various Second World War campaigns and battles from the German perspective have been a critical and popular success. Inspired by events closer to home Jonathan has now embarked on a project to cover the Troubles. His first book on the subject - Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone was published by Merrion in Easter 2023.
Jonathan previously served in the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment, reaching the rank of Captain, and completing emergency tours of East Tyrone and Bosnia. He left the Army after a final posting as a Military Instructor to the United Arab Emirates.
For further information and to contact Jonathan directly please visit his website
⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.
Any attention given to, or commentary from former comrades about the Hegarty debacle?
ReplyDeleteI find there exchanges between both of you very worthwhile. It is always good to get that sort of insight into how former adversaries regarded one another. The irony of course is that the voices of former republican combatants have a chance to be aired by a former British Army captain. Jon Trigg beats the sound barrier and allows republican voices, as well as British army ones, to be heard.
ReplyDeleteGreat Quillversation both of you.
@ Henry Joy
ReplyDeleteYes, the book notes discussions about Hegarty and the leadership among volunteers
'dúirt bean liom go ndúirt bean léi'
ReplyDelete"During the 80's I lived in North Roscommon and was familiar with some of the 'players' involved in storing parts of the Libyan gear. Two of the dumps discovered were geographically close to where I lived then.
One cache was discovered in a hay shed in Croghan, six miles south, and another in Mullaghroe, South Sligo, also about 5/6 miles away. A third 30 miles away in Newcastle West, Co Sligo was uncovered the same Easter Sunday morning, '86 if I'm getting the year right.
Hegarty set up the line and was subsequently executed for breaching. As far as I know, no local units ever knew more than 2 points of the distribution line. Those who moved gear from A to B did not know C. Likewise, those who shifted it from B to C did not know A. So, when 3 points of the line were breached, it pointed at Franko, either him or some of his upline."
Bought the book based on this review and have just hit chapter 5. Lots of mention of the Thompson being used and that McG had a "personal one". Never heard of this before, can any of the older timers verify if this was the case i.e. did Vols have personal weapons? - wasn't that way in my era. Good read but a bit of a slow burner, didn't expect the chapters on context , civil rights, Burntollet etc
ReplyDeleteMalachy O'Reilly, I'm told and whom I've written about previously here, carried a Smith & Wesson revolver almost constantly for his protection.
DeleteThe Armalites had a collapsible butt, and the Thompsons had a detachable one. Both were more easily secreted and therefore lent themselves to urban guerrilla ops.
(There's a story told that Frank McCarry, the North Antrim Republican flew out of Aldergrove to England for an operation with a Thompson, minus the butt under his overcoat).