Quillversation With Jonathan Trigg: The Eksund, Libyan Arms, Derry Brigade, Coshquin “Proxy” Bomb Attack, “Long War”

Brandon Sullivan 🎤 The third part of the Quillversation with Jonathan Trigg, author of Death in the Fields: The IRA in East Tyrone.

Part one available here. Part two available here.

Some Quillers contributed questions/themes for this piece. My thanks to them, and to Jonathan Trigg for taking part in what has been a fascinating piece of work.

As ever, comments/questions very welcome.

The Eksund, and Libyan Arms shipments

BS: After the capture of the Eksund (01/11/87) and revelation of the previous shipments, what were the British Army’s expectations of operations to come? And what was their attitude or understanding if and when those expectations did not materialise?

JT: The biggest thing at first was anger towards the security services that hadn’t uncovered the Libyan link beforehand, and then there was a general expectation that both the number and sophistication of PIRA operations would increase significantly. One former 14 Company officer I interviewed said all the talk on the Special Forces side was ‘this is going to get very hairy very soon’, but then it was tumbleweed. Yes, a portion of the weaponry began to find its way to the ASU’s, but almost as fast as it was appearing it was getting picked up. In ‘on the ground’ terms the Army saw the Armalite increasingly replaced by the AK47/AKM, and Semtex was making a splash of course, but where was the ‘muscle’, where was the mass of weaponry? Even on Semtex the Army saw it being used as a ‘booster’ charge and not the main charge in most devices, so Semtex wasn’t replacing HME {Home Made Explosive) but supplementing it. There were no crew served mortars, the SAM-7s were a damp squib, the Dushka wasn’t used in an effective manner that would harness its strengths – for example, the Coalisland RUC station operation, where a Dushka with an effective range of 1.5 miles was used from less than 20 metres? It would’ve been far better to go for medium machine-guns like the GPMG for example. By the early 1990s with little sign of the Libyan stockpiles coming on line the Army had stopped really thinking about them if I can put it like that – definitely at my pay grade we didn’t know why, but we just got on with it.

BS: Do you think that the IRA's inability/failure to utilise more effectively the Libyan weaponry at its disposal had a direct bearing on the outcome of their negotiations with the British Government?

JT: Very good question, in effect the question boils down to what was the better negotiating position for the IRA leadership; use the weapons to launch a major wave of attacks that hugely upped the ante militarily and then negotiate, or not use the weapons but make sure the British knew they had them and could unleash them if necessary. Personally I think the leadership opted for the latter approach as they – understandably – feared an all-out offensive would result in a British military reaction that would cripple them, while not moving the dial too much on public opinion i.e. the British wouldn’t start shelling nationalist areas or villages but would – potentially – being back internment and launch a host of ‘lethal’ ambushes in rural areas in particular. This would be internment Mark 2, based on all the up to date intel the British had and so avoid the mistakes of internment Mark 1. The second part of the question could be what approach would have achieved a British withdrawal and a united Ireland at that point – and in my view it was neither, the leadership went for the best they thought they could get.

BS: Regarding the anger towards security services for not uncovering the link/shipments, I wonder if you could comment more broadly on the attitudes of the British army towards MI5/MI6 in this regard? And towards special forces?

JT: Two different things there. MI5/MI6 was way above my lowly rank and we had nothing to do with them, even battalion commanders were too low in the food chain to get involved at that level, but at brigade level and above that’s where the frustration kicked in. On Special Forces if you mean how did the rest of the Army think of them it was one of almost ‘adulation’ if I can put it like that. Everyone knew what the selection process was for Hereford and so knew just how hard it was – 14 Company were different, no-one really knew what their selection process was, but everyone assumed it was incredibly tough as we did know the drop-out rate was over 90%. Special Forces were obviously far more plugged into the intelligence picture than we were, but even they were only ever given snippets – ‘need to know’ was the strict rule.

BS: Was the AK47/AKM a "better" weapon for the IRA purposes? Aesthetically, the Armalite was iconic, of course, but the AK has a certain revolutionary chic.

JT: In my opinion yes it was a better weapon, guerillas usually have issues in keeping weapons clean and in good working order and if they can’t then they jam at the wrong time, and the Armalite wasn’t that robust, but the AK – wow – we had a few lessons on using and firing it and at the start of the first lecture about it the instructor dropped one into a pool of muddy water at his feet and stood on it while he gave his lecture. At the end he picked it up, shook the water and mud off it, aimed it at the target and fired - and it worked!

BS: If we can move across to attitudes from volunteers about the Libyan weaponry. How much awareness was there within the rank and file that substantial shipments had arrived? And could you talk a bit about how they felt when the supply of Libyan weaponry was so limited?

JT: Rank and file didn’t know much at all, but more senior guys did – not the Libyan bit until that hit the news – but they knew lots of stuff had come in but it only trickled out so even the more senior guys didn’t have any real idea just how much had been shipped in. The changes for them though were the switch to AKs, Semtex and the odd ‘prestige’ weapon like the Duschka rather than the M60s of yesteryear.

BS: Did any volunteers suggest reasons or rationale for the lack of access to the stockpiles?

JT: Only one really, he was ‘middle ranking’ I’d say and he thought it was the leadership wanting to go for politics and move away from the war. He was appalled by it and it made him lose a lot of faith in the Movement.

Researching the Derry Brigade

BS: Moving onto Derry, what made you choose that Brigade area?

JT: Having covered a rural brigade in Death In The Fields I didn’t want to do another ‘country’ unit as it were – going over the same ground in terms of themes etc. Instead, I wanted to juxtaposition that narrative with a ‘city’ unit, so it was either Derry or Belfast, and I’m saving Belfast til last, so Derry it was. Having said that I didn’t want to stop at the city limits, so South Derry PIRA are very much part of the story in the next book.

BS: In terms of research, how was it different to East Tyrone?

JT: Chalk and cheese. Persuading former East Tyrone Volunteers to talk to me made pulling teeth look easy, it was only due to the help of a couple of very kind intermediaries that I was able to sit down with any of them. The same was not the case with Derry where a lot more veterans were willing to talk. I think the first book helped with that as well, as Volunteers could see what I’d written, and how, and that gave them some comfort they’d be treated fairly – I hope so.

As for former members of the security forces it was the same as for East Tyrone, my own background gives me that ‘in’ with them, although covering Derry I was out of my personal experience zone having never served there. Having said that, I loved the research – I always do, which many people think is a bit sad and weird (and they’re probably right!) – it’s seeing and doing something new. For example, going to see the Bloody Sunday monument, the Claudy monument, spending hours walking round the Bogside and Creggan, Bellaghy and Dungiven. One memory that sticks with me; I was in Dungiven waiting to interview Séan ‘Chinky’ McGlinchey – which I really enjoyed by the way, he was very generous with his time and memories – so I walked around the village and as I went up Main Street from the Sinn Féin office I looked down and there was a slab in the pavement with a dedication to Francis McCloskey. I’d researched his death and here I was standing looking at a mini-monument to him.

The other huge difference in the research was Martin McGuinness. He dominated everything in Derry in a way that I don’t think anyone else in the Movement did. East Tyrone had some stand out individuals; Kevin Mallon, Jim Lynagh, Padraig McKearney and Paddy Kelly for example, but no-one was like McGuinness. Standing outside his family home in the Bogside was surreal.

BS: What did you expect the differences in the Brigade areas to be?

JT: Geography was the biggie. Fighting in a city – the British Army calls it FIBUA; Fighting In a Built-Up Area – is a world away from fighting in the countryside, it affects everything from tactics, to weapons to organisational structure, and it certainly did.

BS: Was there much difference between South Derry IRA and the East Tyrone Brigade?

JT: In military terms not much; they were equipped and trained in much the same way, and had the same outlook on the war, both units also produced their fair share of standout individuals – for East Tyrone’s Jim Lynagh, Padraig McKearney and Paddy Kelly read South Derry’s Francis Hughes, Ian Milne and Dominic McGlinchey. Unfortunately they also shared the same enemy; namely for both the focus of their war was the RUC, UDR and – latterly - civilian contractors. Was this inevitable given the composition of the security forces ranged against them? Perhaps in part, but it was also clear that both units were fighting a ‘local’ war that they felt was inter-generational as much as anything else.

BS: Dominic McGlinchey and Francie Hughes are now legends (or infamous), but Ian Milne was on a wanted poster, too. Did you uncover any more "unsung" figures in your research?

JT - I was very keen to talk to Ian Milne for the Derry book but Séan McGlinchey told me that unfortunately his wife was very unwell and naturally he was focused on that – I left it at that of course and I hope she is recovering. It’s an interesting question, as to attain the sort of Dominic McGlinchey or Francie Hughes status you really need to either be dead or have served an extraordinarily long time in prison, and is that a sign of ‘success’? What I can say is that I interviewed more than one former Volunteer who I think were very successful in their roles, and part of that success was not being in the limelight, and of course still being alive.

BS: Could you talk a bit about the "human bomb" attacks (24/10/90) - how did Derry Brigade veterans negotiate discussing such a topic? Was Ranger Best (killed by the Official IRA in Derry a few days after Bloody Sunday) discussed?

JT: Ranger Best was only mentioned in passing, and then as a mistake, but the proxy bomb attacks were universally condemned by the former Volunteers I spoke to – particularly Patsy Gillespie’s killing. Don’t get me wrong, the men I spoke to aren’t guilt wracked, wondering around in floods of tears with their heads in their hands – these are hard men who accepted long ago that war is brutal and people die – but they viewed the proxy attacks (that’s what the British Army terms ‘human bomb’ attacks) as massive errors of judgement on behalf of whoever ordered them as they turned their natural supporters against them. More than one even thought there was perhaps more to it and they were launched deliberately to discredit the armed struggle and support the move towards a political solution.

BS: Regarding the human/proxy bombs, do you have an opinion as to whether they were carried out to limit/discredit the IRA? Compared to, for example, Enniskillen, what effect do you think they had on IRA morale, and 'popular' support within the nationalist community?

JT: Oooh, murky waters here, I don’t think the proxy bombs were done specifically to limit/discredit the IRA, I think they were seen - by some at least - as pretty successful military operations, but perhaps there was also a thought for some of the leadership that it might have that negative effect too, which wouldn’t be a bad thing necessarily. Enniskillen vs proxy bombs, degrees of losing really. Perhaps the proxies were viewed with more horror than Enniskillen because the ‘humans’ used were Catholics, I don’t know, but as ever with these things it was a combination of events that created momentum rather than a single action.

BS: It's interesting that you describe the East Tyrone Brigade and South Derry units if the Derry Brigade as being primarily concerned with targeting the RUC and UDR. My understanding is that within the IRA, that in terms of prestige/esteem of success, targets were British Army soldiers (not UDR), RUC, UDR, loyalist paramilitaries, security force contractors. Did any volunteers that you spoke to ever discuss a "hierarchy" of targets? Or appear to derive particular pride from an operation that killed British soldiers, as opposed to one that assassinated a UDR man at home/work?

JT: I’m not surprised about the ‘hierarchy’ of targets you outline, but no volunteer has ever expressed it to me in that way, and as for any of them being ‘happier’ if a particular operation was against British soldiers as opposed to say the UDR or RUC the answer is no, a target was a target and that was that as far as the veterans I’ve spoken to have said. Having said that many of them have also expressed a visceral hatred of the RUC and even more so for the UDR, and that hasn’t been the case for the regular British Army – don’t get me wrong, they detest the Army too but it’s not the same, not by a long chalk.

BS: Following on from the above question about "success" it brings to mind a joke I was made aware of in IRA circles. When you joined, you were told your likely outcomes were death or jail. But on the upside, you "got a good funeral!" South Armagh were the Brigade least affected by death or jail for their volunteers. The ETB seemed to suffer high fatalities. In terms of death/jail, compared to other Brigades, where did Derry sit?

JT: ‘A good funeral’ like it! Yes, I got the same from former volunteers, they said they were never sugar coated, joining would almost certainly end in either death or jail and they had to accept it. And yes, South Armagh suffered relatively few casualties, especially given the focus put on them by the security forces. East Tyrone were second hardest hit – after Belfast which tops the list by a long way – and then Derry was in third if I can put it like that, not that I want to portray it as some sort of ‘league table’ or anything like that.

BS: Do you have a take on the Peace and Reconciliation Group and how they helped to shape the mindset of the soldiers.

JT: Soldiers on the ground had no view on them at all as they knew next to nothing about them, that ‘wider’ context of what was going on was never covered, everything was very operationally focused.

BS: Did any soldiers feel a certain "foreboding" being deployed in Derry due to the legacy of Bloody Sunday?

JT: Perhaps in the 1970s but by the 80s, no. Most of the guys were school kids when Bloody Sunday happened and knew nothing about it. Some of the older guys did know, but as far as they were concerned it was the Paras and not them, and that was that. As for what the Paras thought . . . you’d have to ask them.

BS: According to David Norris, he:

...dealt with a group of gay people who left Derry in terror. They were both Nationalists and Roman Catholics who had made little badges entitled 'Saoirse Go Homogeneasai'. They emigrated to London but before leaving they told me on the way of the bullying and harassment they received from the Provos and how others were being beaten and knee-capped. This is of course hear say but I have no reason to disbelieve it.

Anyone I have spoken to who is from Derry has never heard of this tale. Has he?

JT: Sorry, no, never heard it but sounds awful.

This will be the last Quillversation with Jonathan for now. I hope you’ve enjoyed them, and look forward to maybe having more when the Derry Brigade book is released.

About Jonathan Trigg: Historian, writer and broadcaster, Jonathan Trigg has written over a dozen books with Death On The Don nominated in 2014 for the Pushkin Prize for Russian History. Latterly his Through German Eyes series exploring various Second World War campaigns and battles from the German perspective have been a critical and popular success. Inspired by events closer to home Jonathan has now embarked on a project to cover the Troubles. His first book on the subject - Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone was published by Merrion in Easter 2023.

Jonathan previously served in the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment, reaching the rank of Captain, and completing emergency tours of East Tyrone and Bosnia. He left the Army after a final posting as a Military Instructor to the United Arab Emirates.

For further information and to contact Jonathan directly please visit his website

⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.