Part one available here.
BS: Still focusing on Tyrone, when researching the book, did you get a sense that the OIRA, or INLA, had significant presence or impact in Tyrone?
JT: INLA was a no, but OIRA was a yes. During the early days, there was a significant residual loyalty to the Officials, and it has to be remembered that communication and access to information wasn’t it as it is now, so people simply didn’t know all the details of what was going on with the split and when. Add to this the natural reluctance of rural folk to trust what ‘outsiders’ – particularly city boys – would be coming in and saying and you get the relatively slow transition over to support for the Provisionals.
BS: Regarding the Officials, did the British Army in general have any thoughts on them as a distinct entity from the Provisionals? And you personally?
JT: No for both, we were never briefed on the Officials, and the vast majority of soldiers didn’t know there were two separate IRA organisations.
BS: This is a comment left under a TPQ review of Up Like a Bird:
Which do you think is more accurate?
JT: Good question, but I’m always wary of exact figures that relate to numbers of units or volunteers. A guerilla force doesn’t keep records – for very good reasons – and by necessity their organisation, structure and strength is fluid and oft changing. I think the major point to take from this is that the Provos in Tyrone were growing in strength throughout the 70s, and – I suspect – not just from new recruits but also from former Officials going over.
BS: That's an interesting reflection about the Provisionals growing in strength throughout the 1970s. The implication being that that tailed off in the 1980s. If that's the case, why do you think it is? I'm wondering if it was Ulsterisation, the realisation that it wasn't going to be a "quick war" or security force attrition?
JT: It wasn’t so much that the Provisionals tailed off in the 1980s, rather that they changed, and went from a more ‘people’s force’ to a smaller, far more secretive organisation operating in the shadows. They had to of course in order to survive as the security forces became more effective – and arguably the evolution made them more effective militarily - but it irrevocably altered their relationship with the nationalist community who then had very little contact with them and so ‘grew apart’ from them if I can put it that like that. The concentration – some might say overconcentration – of recruitment from a small number of republican families impacted that change as well. Again, a totally understandable approach but one that had consequences.
BS: A number of debates have taken place on TPQ about the ability of the IRA to have continued. Again focusing on Tyrone, do you think the IRA in Tyrone by 1994 could have continued indefinitely? And, if so, what sort of operational potency might they have had? Alternatively, did you see a more likely path to defeat?
JT: ‘Indefinitely’ is a long time and I’d hesitate to label anything as being to last that long! But I do think the IRA in Tyrone could have continued to function beyond 1994 – some would say elements of it are still functioning today. The potency question I think is more relevant, and on that point you can look at the stats and see that by ’94 the numbers were all declining; number of attacks, casualties caused etc. The type of attacks had also changed significantly, the days of multi-weapon shoots and close quarter assassinations were gone, replaced by stand-off mortar attacks on security force installations. That type of attack could be devastating – the 1985 Newry RUC station for example - but more often than not the ops weren’t successful.
BS: When I think of "combined arms attacks" by the IRA, the Derryard attack in Dec 1989 comes to mind. Could you talk a bit about that particular attack?
JT: Derryard was a major op, not just in the weaponry used and the number of volunteers involved, but in its ambition. To destroy a PVCP and its garrison - not by a stand-off mortar or IED attack but by, in effect, a classic infantry assault – was unprecedented. I didn’t cover it in Death In The Fields, but my understanding is that Pete Ryan of the ETB commanded the attack, with volunteers from both the ETB and Fermanagh, and possibly S Armagh too included, and Tom Murphy was involved in some way – not actually on the op I hasten to add but in its planning. The British Army in professional terms was both impressed by it – specifically the fact that the volunteers didn’t bug out when fire was returned but tried to fight through the position – and alerted as it then knew it had to be prepared for more attacks like that. The fact there weren’t is something I’ve scratched my head over. Ryan was still very active until his death in Coagh in 1991, as – I assume – were many of the volunteers on the op, Lawrence McNally for example, and the weapons were available, and they had the lessons from Derryard for the next time. The only thing I can think of is the senior leadership not wanting that sort of multiple casualty operation at that stage as they progressed with politics. Funnily enough no-one I spoke to in Tyrone mentioned it, maybe because it was out of area, I don’t know.
BS: What do you think the decline in number and type of IRA operations was about? My own view is that the IRA at management level was reducing the tempo of the campaign and that this, probably more than security force success (and with loyalist violence an arguable and very distant influence) informed the decline.
JT: I would agree that the leadership had a downward influence on the tempo of the campaign, but would make a case for the security forces becoming far more effective too – especially Special Branch. The other element I would propose is war weariness, and I mean that in the human sense of the sheer will needed to maintain a campaign ad infinitum. By their nature regular armed forces can sustain a campaign for longer by treating it as a job complete with regular pay, holidays, medical services, housing, equipment provision, pensions etc, while irregular forces struggle to do the same, making it far harder for people to focus on operations.
BS: Regarding a particularly infamous action from the ETB, was Teebane done from a position of strength or weakness? Could you imagine the A-Team who were killed at Loughall conducting such an operation? It's interesting that it was carried out without notifying senior ranking Provisionals.
JT: I think Teebane was born of weakness, and perhaps also from the internal struggles going on at the time within the Movement. I can’t imagine the A-Team carrying out such an op because it wasn’t their type of op, they specialised in close quarter assassinations of course, but mainly multi-weapon shoots, mostly combined with other weapon types such as bombs/mortars, far more a ‘combined arms’ approach if I can put it like that, whereas Teebane was a far simpler remote attack. The Harry Henry killing showed they weren’t worried about hitting contractors – as did several other such killings – but they were more ‘look them in the eyes’ stuff. Teebane definitely wasn’t that.
BS: Moving on from Tyrone and into Operation Banner more generally, I wonder if you have any thoughts or analysis on the "Corporals Killings" of March 1988? Some interesting documentaries have been made in recent years that covers the sequence of events surrounding that incident. Also, any thoughts on the Gibraltar killings (Operation Flavious).
JT: The chain of events leading up to the Corporal Killings was clearly instrumental in what happened that day. And especially given Stone’s attack at Milltown I can understand the fear engendered by the unknown car with two guys appearing during the funeral procession etc, but I still think despite all that once their identities had been ascertained by volunteers involved – and my understanding is that was done – there was no need to kill them. It was an appalling act that did the Republican Movement nothing but harm. A lot of the debate around the killings has centred on the role of the two Corporals; were they Special Forces and what were they doing there? I have interviewed a former 14 Company officer who knew them (the more experienced one well and the other hardly at all as he’d just arrived) and he confirmed to me they were NOT 14 Company themselves But Were Royal Signals comms specialists attached to 14 Company. I haven’t had that corroborated but given my knowledge of how 14 Company operated that explanation seems wholly plausible, as does his explanation of their being there as the older guy’s ‘showing off’ to the new guy who’d only just arrived in the Province. Cock-up or conspiracy, and on this one I go with tragic cock-up.
Flavius is something I would very much like to delve more into at some point, especially given it was my battalion who were the intended target of the trio of volunteers – I obviously wasn’t with them at the time and was still in school. Until I know more I think I’ll keep my powder dry on that one though.
BS: Could you talk a bit about different regiments of the British Army, their attitude, training, aptitude, reputation within the army, and their efficacy for Operation Banner?
JT: That’s a huge topic and I could bang on for hours – I won’t as it would bore most people to death – but in general terms it was infantry battalions which were deployed to Northern Ireland, but Not the Irish Guards (they did go but only at the very end of Banner) or the Gurkhas. Royal Artillery and Cavalry units also went but usually only for specific roles such as guarding the Maze or manning PVCPs such as at Aughnacloy. In the 70s artillery units especially did some ‘normal’ patrolling, for example Derry from 1972 for two years but it was relatively rare. Each battalion would also have specialists from other Corps attached for specific roles e.g. Pay Corps, REME for vehicle maintenance, Signals for specialist comms etc.
The Army tried to ‘spread the load’ as it were among the infantry but some battalions went more than others, including the Light Infantry, Royal Green Jackets, Royal Anglians, Fusiliers and Paras – this was down to a combination of experience and timing. All battalions would do 6-month work-up training before deployment, with UK-based units doing specialist training in Kent and West German-based units doing it in Sennelager. The training was intense, comprehensive and geared to where you were deploying, i.e. a city or rural tour. The training was the same if you were going for an emergency 6-month roulement tour or a two-year residential tour. Each battalion would also run specialist courses so as to have a Close Observation Platoon for static covert surveillance, specialist Search teams for weapons hides and some would also have an Operations Company for high intensity Brigade-wide operations.
Preparing for Northern Ireland was taken extremely seriously, nothing was taken for granted and if officers and NCOs weren’t up to scratch they’d be sacked, but by the late 80s in particular most battalions had a large core of very experienced officers, NCOs and soldiers who’d done multiple tours and knew what they were doing. For example when I led my platoon to Tyrone I was one of less than a half dozen out of 30 who hadn’t been before. As to reputations the key thing was performing professionally on a tour, if a unit didn’t do that it was a black mark.
BS: Could you expand a bit more on what we discussed on the phone, Para's, Marines, Highland Fusiliers and their aptitude, or otherwise for Op Banner?
JT: Generalisations about different battalions are exactly that, generalisations, but in broad terms the Paras are viewed as aggressive on operations; in part because they’re selected and trained with that characteristic in mind, whereas the Marines – who also undergo a rigorous selection and training regime – tend to be ‘calmer’ if I can put it like that. The Royal Highland Fusiliers always had a ‘challenging’ reputation, good on the job but a bit mad off it. In general county infantry regiments were seen as quiet, steady and good under pressure, they wouldn’t do anything particularly spectacular but would just get on and do the job.
JT: INLA was a no, but OIRA was a yes. During the early days, there was a significant residual loyalty to the Officials, and it has to be remembered that communication and access to information wasn’t it as it is now, so people simply didn’t know all the details of what was going on with the split and when. Add to this the natural reluctance of rural folk to trust what ‘outsiders’ – particularly city boys – would be coming in and saying and you get the relatively slow transition over to support for the Provisionals.
BS: Regarding the Officials, did the British Army in general have any thoughts on them as a distinct entity from the Provisionals? And you personally?
JT: No for both, we were never briefed on the Officials, and the vast majority of soldiers didn’t know there were two separate IRA organisations.
BS: This is a comment left under a TPQ review of Up Like a Bird:
When Hughes began operating in East Tyrone under Kevin Mallon there seemed to be one Provo unit, when the IRA intercepted the secret British army document on future trends in 1979 that assessed the IRA it stated that East Tyrone had 10 active service units in the field.
Which do you think is more accurate?
JT: Good question, but I’m always wary of exact figures that relate to numbers of units or volunteers. A guerilla force doesn’t keep records – for very good reasons – and by necessity their organisation, structure and strength is fluid and oft changing. I think the major point to take from this is that the Provos in Tyrone were growing in strength throughout the 70s, and – I suspect – not just from new recruits but also from former Officials going over.
BS: That's an interesting reflection about the Provisionals growing in strength throughout the 1970s. The implication being that that tailed off in the 1980s. If that's the case, why do you think it is? I'm wondering if it was Ulsterisation, the realisation that it wasn't going to be a "quick war" or security force attrition?
JT: It wasn’t so much that the Provisionals tailed off in the 1980s, rather that they changed, and went from a more ‘people’s force’ to a smaller, far more secretive organisation operating in the shadows. They had to of course in order to survive as the security forces became more effective – and arguably the evolution made them more effective militarily - but it irrevocably altered their relationship with the nationalist community who then had very little contact with them and so ‘grew apart’ from them if I can put it that like that. The concentration – some might say overconcentration – of recruitment from a small number of republican families impacted that change as well. Again, a totally understandable approach but one that had consequences.
BS: A number of debates have taken place on TPQ about the ability of the IRA to have continued. Again focusing on Tyrone, do you think the IRA in Tyrone by 1994 could have continued indefinitely? And, if so, what sort of operational potency might they have had? Alternatively, did you see a more likely path to defeat?
JT: ‘Indefinitely’ is a long time and I’d hesitate to label anything as being to last that long! But I do think the IRA in Tyrone could have continued to function beyond 1994 – some would say elements of it are still functioning today. The potency question I think is more relevant, and on that point you can look at the stats and see that by ’94 the numbers were all declining; number of attacks, casualties caused etc. The type of attacks had also changed significantly, the days of multi-weapon shoots and close quarter assassinations were gone, replaced by stand-off mortar attacks on security force installations. That type of attack could be devastating – the 1985 Newry RUC station for example - but more often than not the ops weren’t successful.
BS: When I think of "combined arms attacks" by the IRA, the Derryard attack in Dec 1989 comes to mind. Could you talk a bit about that particular attack?
JT: Derryard was a major op, not just in the weaponry used and the number of volunteers involved, but in its ambition. To destroy a PVCP and its garrison - not by a stand-off mortar or IED attack but by, in effect, a classic infantry assault – was unprecedented. I didn’t cover it in Death In The Fields, but my understanding is that Pete Ryan of the ETB commanded the attack, with volunteers from both the ETB and Fermanagh, and possibly S Armagh too included, and Tom Murphy was involved in some way – not actually on the op I hasten to add but in its planning. The British Army in professional terms was both impressed by it – specifically the fact that the volunteers didn’t bug out when fire was returned but tried to fight through the position – and alerted as it then knew it had to be prepared for more attacks like that. The fact there weren’t is something I’ve scratched my head over. Ryan was still very active until his death in Coagh in 1991, as – I assume – were many of the volunteers on the op, Lawrence McNally for example, and the weapons were available, and they had the lessons from Derryard for the next time. The only thing I can think of is the senior leadership not wanting that sort of multiple casualty operation at that stage as they progressed with politics. Funnily enough no-one I spoke to in Tyrone mentioned it, maybe because it was out of area, I don’t know.
BS: What do you think the decline in number and type of IRA operations was about? My own view is that the IRA at management level was reducing the tempo of the campaign and that this, probably more than security force success (and with loyalist violence an arguable and very distant influence) informed the decline.
JT: I would agree that the leadership had a downward influence on the tempo of the campaign, but would make a case for the security forces becoming far more effective too – especially Special Branch. The other element I would propose is war weariness, and I mean that in the human sense of the sheer will needed to maintain a campaign ad infinitum. By their nature regular armed forces can sustain a campaign for longer by treating it as a job complete with regular pay, holidays, medical services, housing, equipment provision, pensions etc, while irregular forces struggle to do the same, making it far harder for people to focus on operations.
BS: Regarding a particularly infamous action from the ETB, was Teebane done from a position of strength or weakness? Could you imagine the A-Team who were killed at Loughall conducting such an operation? It's interesting that it was carried out without notifying senior ranking Provisionals.
JT: I think Teebane was born of weakness, and perhaps also from the internal struggles going on at the time within the Movement. I can’t imagine the A-Team carrying out such an op because it wasn’t their type of op, they specialised in close quarter assassinations of course, but mainly multi-weapon shoots, mostly combined with other weapon types such as bombs/mortars, far more a ‘combined arms’ approach if I can put it like that, whereas Teebane was a far simpler remote attack. The Harry Henry killing showed they weren’t worried about hitting contractors – as did several other such killings – but they were more ‘look them in the eyes’ stuff. Teebane definitely wasn’t that.
BS: Moving on from Tyrone and into Operation Banner more generally, I wonder if you have any thoughts or analysis on the "Corporals Killings" of March 1988? Some interesting documentaries have been made in recent years that covers the sequence of events surrounding that incident. Also, any thoughts on the Gibraltar killings (Operation Flavious).
JT: The chain of events leading up to the Corporal Killings was clearly instrumental in what happened that day. And especially given Stone’s attack at Milltown I can understand the fear engendered by the unknown car with two guys appearing during the funeral procession etc, but I still think despite all that once their identities had been ascertained by volunteers involved – and my understanding is that was done – there was no need to kill them. It was an appalling act that did the Republican Movement nothing but harm. A lot of the debate around the killings has centred on the role of the two Corporals; were they Special Forces and what were they doing there? I have interviewed a former 14 Company officer who knew them (the more experienced one well and the other hardly at all as he’d just arrived) and he confirmed to me they were NOT 14 Company themselves But Were Royal Signals comms specialists attached to 14 Company. I haven’t had that corroborated but given my knowledge of how 14 Company operated that explanation seems wholly plausible, as does his explanation of their being there as the older guy’s ‘showing off’ to the new guy who’d only just arrived in the Province. Cock-up or conspiracy, and on this one I go with tragic cock-up.
Flavius is something I would very much like to delve more into at some point, especially given it was my battalion who were the intended target of the trio of volunteers – I obviously wasn’t with them at the time and was still in school. Until I know more I think I’ll keep my powder dry on that one though.
BS: Could you talk a bit about different regiments of the British Army, their attitude, training, aptitude, reputation within the army, and their efficacy for Operation Banner?
JT: That’s a huge topic and I could bang on for hours – I won’t as it would bore most people to death – but in general terms it was infantry battalions which were deployed to Northern Ireland, but Not the Irish Guards (they did go but only at the very end of Banner) or the Gurkhas. Royal Artillery and Cavalry units also went but usually only for specific roles such as guarding the Maze or manning PVCPs such as at Aughnacloy. In the 70s artillery units especially did some ‘normal’ patrolling, for example Derry from 1972 for two years but it was relatively rare. Each battalion would also have specialists from other Corps attached for specific roles e.g. Pay Corps, REME for vehicle maintenance, Signals for specialist comms etc.
The Army tried to ‘spread the load’ as it were among the infantry but some battalions went more than others, including the Light Infantry, Royal Green Jackets, Royal Anglians, Fusiliers and Paras – this was down to a combination of experience and timing. All battalions would do 6-month work-up training before deployment, with UK-based units doing specialist training in Kent and West German-based units doing it in Sennelager. The training was intense, comprehensive and geared to where you were deploying, i.e. a city or rural tour. The training was the same if you were going for an emergency 6-month roulement tour or a two-year residential tour. Each battalion would also run specialist courses so as to have a Close Observation Platoon for static covert surveillance, specialist Search teams for weapons hides and some would also have an Operations Company for high intensity Brigade-wide operations.
Preparing for Northern Ireland was taken extremely seriously, nothing was taken for granted and if officers and NCOs weren’t up to scratch they’d be sacked, but by the late 80s in particular most battalions had a large core of very experienced officers, NCOs and soldiers who’d done multiple tours and knew what they were doing. For example when I led my platoon to Tyrone I was one of less than a half dozen out of 30 who hadn’t been before. As to reputations the key thing was performing professionally on a tour, if a unit didn’t do that it was a black mark.
BS: Could you expand a bit more on what we discussed on the phone, Para's, Marines, Highland Fusiliers and their aptitude, or otherwise for Op Banner?
JT: Generalisations about different battalions are exactly that, generalisations, but in broad terms the Paras are viewed as aggressive on operations; in part because they’re selected and trained with that characteristic in mind, whereas the Marines – who also undergo a rigorous selection and training regime – tend to be ‘calmer’ if I can put it like that. The Royal Highland Fusiliers always had a ‘challenging’ reputation, good on the job but a bit mad off it. In general county infantry regiments were seen as quiet, steady and good under pressure, they wouldn’t do anything particularly spectacular but would just get on and do the job.
About Jonathan Trigg: Historian, writer and broadcaster, Jonathan Trigg has written over a dozen books with Death On The Don nominated in 2014 for the Pushkin Prize for Russian History. Latterly his Through German Eyes series exploring various Second World War campaigns and battles from the German perspective have been a critical and popular success. Inspired by events closer to home Jonathan has now embarked on a project to cover the Troubles. His first book on the subject - Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone was published by Merrion in Easter 2023.
Jonathan previously served in the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment, reaching the rank of Captain, and completing emergency tours of East Tyrone and Bosnia. He left the Army after a final posting as a Military Instructor to the United Arab Emirates.
For further information and to contact Jonathan directly please visit his website
To be continued . . .
⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.
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