Caoimhin O’Muraile ☭ Could the Easter Rising of 1916 have been won by the Irish? 

Yes, it probably could had a different set of conditions prevailed and areas of neglect had not been neglected. 

Perhaps too much was put on the shoulders of James Connolly who, although an able commander and political genius had his limitations. In any situation of such seriousness one person often comes to the fore as the most competent and Connolly was certainly that. However, this does not mean contributing ideas from others would not have been helpful, like suggestions on areas perhaps missed. 

The fact was the other leaders involved at overall command level were not in any way military strategists. The rising itself was organised by the sickly, though very brave, Joe Plunket who had suffered from TB all his life, Padraig Pearse was a School Teacher and a poet, he was not a military man, yet he was the overall Commander in Chief. According to Ernest Blythe, Plunket would have steeled for a German Crowned Prince to become King of Ireland, an idea he proposed to the IRB in January 1915 before Connolly came onboard. Connolly, rightly so, was the overall military commander of all Irish forces, confined for disastrous factors, mainly to Dublin as he was the Commandant General of the Irish Citizen Army, one of the two components making up Irish forces, the other being the much larger Irish Volunteers. These came together, despite overwhelming ideological differences, for the duration, to form the “Army of the Irish Republic”, not, as some think, the Irish Republican Army. 

The Easter Rising was lost for a number of reasons, some of the major ones I shall examine.

Perhaps the first and by far most obvious failing of the rising was man made by the Volunteers Chief of Staff, Eoin MacNeill. The Irish Volunteers had been infiltrated by the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood which had planned on using the Volunteers to stage an armed rebellion against the British Empire of which Ireland was a part. The aim being not so much to smash the empire, just the bit that affected Ireland, meaning separating the country from British rule. Eoin MacNeill was opposed to such an armed confrontation, fearing the Volunteers would stand little chance against the British Army. MacNeill would sanction such armed action only if the promised Home Rule for Ireland was not forthcoming or the British attempted to bring in conscription in Ireland to fight in the slaughter which was covering Europe in the First World War.

The IRB, which now included Connolly who, according to myths, and that is all it is, a myth, had been kidnapped by the IRB due to the fact he was planning an uprising of his own using the Irish Citizen Army. They felt Connolly’s plans may disrupt their own and wanted him onboard, along with the ICA. This is the only part of the story which bears any truth, he was planning to use the ICA for this purpose, but any notion about kidnapping should be quashed. Connolly attended a meeting with the IRB of his own accord, he was not kidnapped. On hearing of the panned rising MacNeill countermanded all Volunteers manoeuvres for Sunday 23rd April 1916, the date originally planned for the rising. This countermanding seriously weakened the manpower who turned out, with the majority under the impression nothing was happening on the Sunday. 

The ICA turned out to a man for the duration, but the numbers for their allies, the Irish Volunteers, were depleted. Obviously, this had an effect on the plans of the IRB. They decided to postpone the rising for twenty-four hours until Monday 24th April at which such time hostilities would begin. MacNeill’s countermanding, though effective in reducing the efficiency of the Irish forces, was not the only reason the Rising failed, or lasted only one week. Even though their numbers were depleted the bravery of those who took part in the field cannot be questioned. On issuing the surrender, countersigned by James Connolly on behalf of the Irish Citizen Army, Padraig Pearse told all outlying garrisons to save any “further damage” to Dublin and hardships for its citizens all Irish forces were to surrender their arms. Sean Heuston, who held command in the Mendicity Institute on the river Liffey argued to fight on, as did Edward Daly, Commandant of the 1st Battalion, as they both felt the Irish side were winning.

The second and perhaps most obvious overlooked building during the rising, or before to be accurate, was perhaps Trinity College. Here were based the Army Officer Training Corps and hundreds of state-of-the-arts rifles, unlike the dated equipment the rebels had at their disposal, and grenades along with much other ordnance. With the loss of the Aud this kit would have been more than useful and would have helped the determined Irish forces to compensate for their lack of numbers. Why did nobody think and bring this to Connolly’s attention? James Connolly had got much right, the defending of the headquarters in the GPO using barricades, the choosing of outlying areas for attack though he did miss, apart from Trinity College other opportunities. Again, it could not all be left to Connolly alone and he should have been helped.

The British were bringing in reinforcements via Kingstown, now Dun Laoghaire, pier. Had this pier been secured they could not have landed these extra men, chiefly the Sherwood Foresters who suffered huge losses at the hands of the rebels in the Battle of Mount Street Bridge. However, if they had been prevented landing in the first place those of the Sherwoods who went to fight on would not have been able to do so. Was this an opportunity missed through not paying enough attention to Britain’s maritime capabilities? Or, would such action by the insurgents have been impractical given the man shortage? Did anybody even think of securing Dun Laoghaire? Who knows? All is well with hindsight. Could such an area have been secured without artillery? Perhaps even with a full complement of volunteers this may have been too much, it would have involved hand-to-hand combat with seasoned troops. The main question is, was this point of disembarkation of Crown forces ever considered?

With greater reconnaissance the poorly defended Dublin City Hall and Dublin Castle could have been taken by Captain Sean Connolly and the ICA. Connolly inflicted the first casualty of the insurrection when he shot a member of the Dublin Metropolitan Police. Many have criticised this action as the DMP were an unarmed police force but it must be remembered the duty of any soldier, in any conflict, is to take his objective. This DMP officer was preventing this so he was shot. This objective could have been done far more completely if the ICA had known how weakly defended the complex of Dublin Castle and City Hall were. They could have marched straight in and taken it with little opposition. Instead they allowed the few British troops inside to know of their presence and a firefight began which cost Sean Connolly his life. Again, this oversight regards reconnaissance could not be laid at the feet of James Connolly, the commanding officers on the ground should have thought of this before moving. Once these officers knew their objectives reconnaissance measures to ascertain the enemy strength should have been taken. This complex would have been a strategically important stronghold to take plus, with Dublin Castle being the seat of British administration in Ireland, a brilliant propaganda fete.

Predominantly though perhaps not exclusively, the failure to capture the Shelbourne Hotel on Stephens Green was costly. Again, with more reconnaissance this building could, and should, have been taken. It cost Michael Malin and the ICA dearly as the British moved a machinegun into the hotel keeping Malin’s troops pinned down for the duration. Eventually they evacuated Stephens Green and set up HQ in the Royal College of Surgeons where they ultimately surrendered. Taking the hotel could have been invaluable, particularly if they had also taken Trinity College and all the arms and equipment available to the insurgents, toys of the OTC, there. No doubt, a machinegun would have been in Trinity for the taking and then it may have been the rebels and not the British with a machine gun nest in the Shelbourne.

Finally, James Connolly’s conviction that capitalism would not use artillery against capital proved a huge miscalculation. They bombed the crap out of Dublin City even using a gunboat, The Helga to shell Liberty Hall.

This is not a criticism of those men and women who fought at Easter week 1916, their bravery is beyond question. Even some British officers admired young Edward Daly on the war he had fought, and some had made their feelings known. Unfortunately, those higher up the British command decided that committing today what we would call a war crime, by executing captured prisoners, did not share their subordinate’s views. It was a war crime to execute the sixteen men because the British had on occasions referred to the situation that week as a war and therefore these prisoners were “prisoners of war.” Some, wrongly, called it a second front of the misleadingly termed “Great War” in Europe. 

My observations are done in hindsight and, no doubt these which I have paid attention to may not have been the only oversights by the rebels. Amid all the confusion, exasperated by MacNeill’s countermanding there is little wonder points were missed, irrespective of their importance. James Connolly, in line with his Marxist ideology, perhaps was hoping the masses would come out in support of the rising and had half an eye on such a scenario. Others should have helped him by pointing out minor details which could have helped and were overlooked. They did not, not because they did not want to, but moreover lacked the military expertise to offer anything of relevance. The same could not be said of the officers in the field whose actions were worthy of any supposed “military tactician” in any full-time army of the day, including the finest the British had at their disposal on the western front.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist

Military Errors 1916

Caoimhin O’Muraile ☭ Could the Easter Rising of 1916 have been won by the Irish? 

Yes, it probably could had a different set of conditions prevailed and areas of neglect had not been neglected. 

Perhaps too much was put on the shoulders of James Connolly who, although an able commander and political genius had his limitations. In any situation of such seriousness one person often comes to the fore as the most competent and Connolly was certainly that. However, this does not mean contributing ideas from others would not have been helpful, like suggestions on areas perhaps missed. 

The fact was the other leaders involved at overall command level were not in any way military strategists. The rising itself was organised by the sickly, though very brave, Joe Plunket who had suffered from TB all his life, Padraig Pearse was a School Teacher and a poet, he was not a military man, yet he was the overall Commander in Chief. According to Ernest Blythe, Plunket would have steeled for a German Crowned Prince to become King of Ireland, an idea he proposed to the IRB in January 1915 before Connolly came onboard. Connolly, rightly so, was the overall military commander of all Irish forces, confined for disastrous factors, mainly to Dublin as he was the Commandant General of the Irish Citizen Army, one of the two components making up Irish forces, the other being the much larger Irish Volunteers. These came together, despite overwhelming ideological differences, for the duration, to form the “Army of the Irish Republic”, not, as some think, the Irish Republican Army. 

The Easter Rising was lost for a number of reasons, some of the major ones I shall examine.

Perhaps the first and by far most obvious failing of the rising was man made by the Volunteers Chief of Staff, Eoin MacNeill. The Irish Volunteers had been infiltrated by the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood which had planned on using the Volunteers to stage an armed rebellion against the British Empire of which Ireland was a part. The aim being not so much to smash the empire, just the bit that affected Ireland, meaning separating the country from British rule. Eoin MacNeill was opposed to such an armed confrontation, fearing the Volunteers would stand little chance against the British Army. MacNeill would sanction such armed action only if the promised Home Rule for Ireland was not forthcoming or the British attempted to bring in conscription in Ireland to fight in the slaughter which was covering Europe in the First World War.

The IRB, which now included Connolly who, according to myths, and that is all it is, a myth, had been kidnapped by the IRB due to the fact he was planning an uprising of his own using the Irish Citizen Army. They felt Connolly’s plans may disrupt their own and wanted him onboard, along with the ICA. This is the only part of the story which bears any truth, he was planning to use the ICA for this purpose, but any notion about kidnapping should be quashed. Connolly attended a meeting with the IRB of his own accord, he was not kidnapped. On hearing of the panned rising MacNeill countermanded all Volunteers manoeuvres for Sunday 23rd April 1916, the date originally planned for the rising. This countermanding seriously weakened the manpower who turned out, with the majority under the impression nothing was happening on the Sunday. 

The ICA turned out to a man for the duration, but the numbers for their allies, the Irish Volunteers, were depleted. Obviously, this had an effect on the plans of the IRB. They decided to postpone the rising for twenty-four hours until Monday 24th April at which such time hostilities would begin. MacNeill’s countermanding, though effective in reducing the efficiency of the Irish forces, was not the only reason the Rising failed, or lasted only one week. Even though their numbers were depleted the bravery of those who took part in the field cannot be questioned. On issuing the surrender, countersigned by James Connolly on behalf of the Irish Citizen Army, Padraig Pearse told all outlying garrisons to save any “further damage” to Dublin and hardships for its citizens all Irish forces were to surrender their arms. Sean Heuston, who held command in the Mendicity Institute on the river Liffey argued to fight on, as did Edward Daly, Commandant of the 1st Battalion, as they both felt the Irish side were winning.

The second and perhaps most obvious overlooked building during the rising, or before to be accurate, was perhaps Trinity College. Here were based the Army Officer Training Corps and hundreds of state-of-the-arts rifles, unlike the dated equipment the rebels had at their disposal, and grenades along with much other ordnance. With the loss of the Aud this kit would have been more than useful and would have helped the determined Irish forces to compensate for their lack of numbers. Why did nobody think and bring this to Connolly’s attention? James Connolly had got much right, the defending of the headquarters in the GPO using barricades, the choosing of outlying areas for attack though he did miss, apart from Trinity College other opportunities. Again, it could not all be left to Connolly alone and he should have been helped.

The British were bringing in reinforcements via Kingstown, now Dun Laoghaire, pier. Had this pier been secured they could not have landed these extra men, chiefly the Sherwood Foresters who suffered huge losses at the hands of the rebels in the Battle of Mount Street Bridge. However, if they had been prevented landing in the first place those of the Sherwoods who went to fight on would not have been able to do so. Was this an opportunity missed through not paying enough attention to Britain’s maritime capabilities? Or, would such action by the insurgents have been impractical given the man shortage? Did anybody even think of securing Dun Laoghaire? Who knows? All is well with hindsight. Could such an area have been secured without artillery? Perhaps even with a full complement of volunteers this may have been too much, it would have involved hand-to-hand combat with seasoned troops. The main question is, was this point of disembarkation of Crown forces ever considered?

With greater reconnaissance the poorly defended Dublin City Hall and Dublin Castle could have been taken by Captain Sean Connolly and the ICA. Connolly inflicted the first casualty of the insurrection when he shot a member of the Dublin Metropolitan Police. Many have criticised this action as the DMP were an unarmed police force but it must be remembered the duty of any soldier, in any conflict, is to take his objective. This DMP officer was preventing this so he was shot. This objective could have been done far more completely if the ICA had known how weakly defended the complex of Dublin Castle and City Hall were. They could have marched straight in and taken it with little opposition. Instead they allowed the few British troops inside to know of their presence and a firefight began which cost Sean Connolly his life. Again, this oversight regards reconnaissance could not be laid at the feet of James Connolly, the commanding officers on the ground should have thought of this before moving. Once these officers knew their objectives reconnaissance measures to ascertain the enemy strength should have been taken. This complex would have been a strategically important stronghold to take plus, with Dublin Castle being the seat of British administration in Ireland, a brilliant propaganda fete.

Predominantly though perhaps not exclusively, the failure to capture the Shelbourne Hotel on Stephens Green was costly. Again, with more reconnaissance this building could, and should, have been taken. It cost Michael Malin and the ICA dearly as the British moved a machinegun into the hotel keeping Malin’s troops pinned down for the duration. Eventually they evacuated Stephens Green and set up HQ in the Royal College of Surgeons where they ultimately surrendered. Taking the hotel could have been invaluable, particularly if they had also taken Trinity College and all the arms and equipment available to the insurgents, toys of the OTC, there. No doubt, a machinegun would have been in Trinity for the taking and then it may have been the rebels and not the British with a machine gun nest in the Shelbourne.

Finally, James Connolly’s conviction that capitalism would not use artillery against capital proved a huge miscalculation. They bombed the crap out of Dublin City even using a gunboat, The Helga to shell Liberty Hall.

This is not a criticism of those men and women who fought at Easter week 1916, their bravery is beyond question. Even some British officers admired young Edward Daly on the war he had fought, and some had made their feelings known. Unfortunately, those higher up the British command decided that committing today what we would call a war crime, by executing captured prisoners, did not share their subordinate’s views. It was a war crime to execute the sixteen men because the British had on occasions referred to the situation that week as a war and therefore these prisoners were “prisoners of war.” Some, wrongly, called it a second front of the misleadingly termed “Great War” in Europe. 

My observations are done in hindsight and, no doubt these which I have paid attention to may not have been the only oversights by the rebels. Amid all the confusion, exasperated by MacNeill’s countermanding there is little wonder points were missed, irrespective of their importance. James Connolly, in line with his Marxist ideology, perhaps was hoping the masses would come out in support of the rising and had half an eye on such a scenario. Others should have helped him by pointing out minor details which could have helped and were overlooked. They did not, not because they did not want to, but moreover lacked the military expertise to offer anything of relevance. The same could not be said of the officers in the field whose actions were worthy of any supposed “military tactician” in any full-time army of the day, including the finest the British had at their disposal on the western front.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist

14 comments:

  1. There was not a chance in hell of the East Rising ending any other way than it did. The only surprise is that it last for as long as it did. No matter how noble the intentions of those who took part in it a few amateurs with limited arms were never going to defeat the British military.

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  2. I don't think you read what I wrote Terry. I said "had a different set of conditions prevailed" it was possible to win. One of those conditions was the full mobilisation of the Volunteers nationally, another being the seizure of better weapons from the OTC to name but two. Victory under those circumstances was possible particulary as the British were slugging it out in Fance, their manpower was relatively limited. I said possible, I think victory could have been secured, underline could.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Caoimhín
      I think you fail to understand who the 'Irish Volunteers' actually were: essentially the majority were nationalists rather than republican. Their genesis was largely a mirror response to Carson's Ulster Volunteer Force, a response to the formation of the the UVF. The Volunteer movement was originally initiated by Redmond and other leading constitutional nationalists. It was subsequently infiltrated by the revolutionary IRB.
      If accounts in John Crawley's autobiography, which I've just now finished, are correct, then members of the Volunteers in County Galway loyal to McNeill in 1916 even assisted British Forces in quelling attempts by factions supportive of Connolly and Pearse. According to that source they assisted the RIC and the British Army in identifying and routing IRB elements. According to Crawley some of the Volunteers were aboard gunboats in Galway Bay helping the Brits direst fire against IRB positions.

      Delete
  3. That was the reason Pearse et al went ahead with it. They knew they would lose the battle but that their subsequent martyrdom would would them the war in the long run.

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  4. I understand Pearse's belief in the blood sacrifice, not least his own, what I'm saying is it was winnable under diferent conditions. In my view the insurgents were right to go ahead. Connolly realised the fact itwas not winnable, certainly with the forces available. When asked by anothe ICA soldier, what will happen, he replied "we are going out to be slaughtered" and to hold out for a week was an achievement in itself.
    The point I am making is, had the OTC arms been taken at Trinity and had that arsehole MacNeill not cancelled the manoevres for Sunday 23rd April, the result may have been different. Again everything is grand in hindsight, noteable to recall Eoin MacNeil went on to become the top legal man in the first Free State Government. He was also Irelands representative on the border commission, 1924, and once again failed to force the Brits hand. MacNeil was never a republican, he was a home ruler, a big difference.


    Caoimhin O'Muraile.

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    Replies
    1. Caoimhin. After the capture of Roger Casement and the seizure of the German arms shipments at Beanna Strand, he probably realised that any realistic hope of military success for the Rising had disappeared.

      Delete
  5. Is it possible the leaders of 1916 hoped their actions would have a domino effect around the country and the often peddled insinuation that they set out to die as martyrs is not entirely true? Like volunteers of later campaigns, I am sure they partook in operations that could've killed them but they hoped that wouldn't be the case and that their efforts would result in knock on effects. Martyrdom was a last small comfort? I would guess the Rising leaders would have wanted to be involved in taking the reins of power machinations rather than to be just martyrs. Just saying.

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  6. I know, Henry, Redmond took his larger faction to be slaughtered in France, ironically alongside the 36th Ulster Rifles, originally the UVF. "Full steam ahead John Redmond said that all is well chum, home rule will come when we are dead and burried out in Belgium" (James Connolly).

    I must read John Crawleys book, I was unaware of the situation you speak of in Galway. Thanks for the info.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

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    Replies
    1. Even though it sometimes reads as a hagiography for the 'Irish Republic' Caoimhin, I'd still highly recommend it.
      John is hardly alone in his idealistic tendencies but like idealists of all hues he fails to grasp that those same ideals are limited in their usefulness, save but in terms of orientation. Yes, the ideal can be the guiding star but if people are to keep their feet on the ground (which most folk tend to do) they won't allow themselves be seduced by it as destination.
      That said John's book is an important addition to the literature on armed Irish Republicanism. At many levels, one might rightfully be inclined to borrow an Americanism and say to the author 'Thank-you for your service'.

      Delete
  7. It is possible Mick, though Connolly said to an ICA officer, "we are going out to be slaughtered", whether he believed that himself I do not know and he's not around to ask. I do know he did not wholly trust the Volunteers.
    What the Volunteer leadership told their troops, unlike the socialist ICA, were all male, I only know of Pearses "blood sacrifice" rantings, not a great start.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

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  8. That sounds a fair assement Henry, as a theoretical Marxist myself and socialist republican, I realise the ideal is the ultimate goal which cannot be done by going, for example, from A straight to Z, or A to U in the Irish alphabet, while missing all other letters between. If that makes any sense.
    I still want to read John Crawleys book from an objective point. Had it on order from the library for some time, it sounds like a book which it may be better to buy.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

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    Replies
    1. Caoimhín,
      I'm a library user and advocate too ... but if there's a €17 surplus in this week's budget, then buy it.

      Delete
  9. Will do Henry, sounds the best bet.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
  10. The odds of a successful rebellion were always pretty slim, given the paucity of training, experience and weapons the rebels had. Stories from the Bureau of Military History include a bayonet being formed by welding a garden shear blades to a shotgun or Galway Volunteers using homemade grenades that were so bad that one participant didn't think they would have done any harm even if they had exploded in one's hand (notably, the Galway men tried and failed to capture two RIC barracks, one after another, despite an overwhelming numerical advantage over the garrisons).

    Had it come to a slugfest between Irish and British forces, the result would most likely have been a bloodbath, with civilians catching the brunt. The countermanding orders arguably did the Rising a favour, since it confined it largely to Dublin, thus sparing the rest of the country and allowing people to immediately romanticise it as a heroic if unlucky venture (people might not have been so charitable had their homes been turned into rubble, like with the Dubliners who tried to attack the rebel prisoners).

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