Showing posts with label Threat To Democracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Threat To Democracy. Show all posts
Barry Gilheany ✒ Contemporary liberal democracy faces a global threat, at national institutional and global governance levels, from what Moises Naim terms the 3Ps: populism, polarisation and post truth. 

Those who deploy these weapons are the 3P autocrats. 3P autocrats are political leaders who span traditional ideological divides and who come to power through a reasonable democratic election and then proceed to take apart the checks on executive power through populism, polarisation and post-truth. As they cement their power, they cloak their autocratic aspirations behind veils of secrecy, bureaucratic obfuscation, pseudo-legal subterfuge, manipulation of public opinion, and the repression of critics and adversaries. Once the mask drops, it is too late. (1) 

I have termed this 3P phenomenon as the Triple P Virus not only because of the commonality of governance style in each autocracy but also the linkages and crosspollination of ideas between the 3P autocrats. Each learn from each other; share resources with each other as mafia states and have each other’s back in international bodies such as the United Nations. The turn of this decade has seen some pushback of the 3P tide in the electoral defeats of Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro in the US and Brazil, not least because of the hundreds of thousands of needless deaths from Covid 19 due to the flagrant violation of public health advice and denigration of medical expertise indulged in by both rogue leaders. The coming together of liberal democracies to support Ukraine in its struggle against the military aggression of Vladimir Putin’s Russia (the 3P autocrat par excellence and lodestar to illiberal regimes and movements globally) is heartening. Defeats of right-wing nationalist populism in national elections in the Czech Republic and Slovenia are also positive markers on liberal democracy’s scorecard.

However, there is no room for complacency in the struggle against the illiberal, pseudo democracies of 3P type. Marine Le Pen achieved 24 per cent of the vote in the 2022 French Presidential election and her rebranded party has ninety-five seats in the National Assembly. For the first time in a West European liberal democracy, the far right has a presence in government in the form of Giorgia Meloni who, coming from a fascist background, heads up a rightwing coalition in Italy. The poster boy for European and North American 3P aspirants, Victor Orban, has been comfortably returned to power in Hungary having virtually neutered all independent media and civil society there.

Perhaps most alarming of all has been the formation of the most right wing government in the history of Israel under the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu which consists of Jewish supremacists and apologists for the anti-Arab racist Kahane movement and the terrorist Baruch Goldstein (who massacred 29 worshippers in a mosque in Hebron in 1994) such as Itamar Bin Gvir as Interior Minister and Bexalel Smotrich, leader of the Religious Zionist Party as Finance Minister. Following the 3P playbook elsewhere, this administration seeks to curb the power of the Israeli Supreme Court to overrule laws and actions of the government, the only major check in Israel on the executive. It also seeks to attack LTGB rights.

It is hardly coincidental that Netanyahu is facing long standing corruption charges and that by blatantly seeking to neutralize the power of the judiciary in the manner of a Trump or Duda in Poland he seeks to get himself off this particular hook. Recall that Trump and Berlusconi saw election to office as a means of avoiding criminal prosecution for business malpractices and one can understand Netanyahu’s criminal logic. It is a logic that could well lead to not just Israel becoming another pseudo democracy but the descent of already poor Israeli ­- Palestinian relations into a complete death spiral as Itamar Ben Givr and his supremacist and Religious Zionist colleagues propose ever more punitive measures on the Palestinian Arab population of the occupied West Bank leading to possible annexation of the Palestinian territories; territories awash with weapons held by a despairing Palestinian Arab populace who see a diminution of the possibility of a two state solution to practically zero. Smotrich has been given sweeping authority over governance over the West Bank and the former US ambassador to Israel has accused Netanyahu’s far right government of breaking a written agreement in 2004 to dismantle illegal outposts and settlements in the West Bank by retrospectively legalizing them. (2)

The reactions of Israeli settlers to the murder of two brothers in Huwara on the weekend of 24-25 February 2023 gives a chilling foretaste of just what such a cycle of violence could amount to with settlers, in revenge for the murder of two settler brothers, accompanied by an inactive IDF launched an hours long rampage with hundreds of Palestinians injured; miraculously just one fatality and dozens of cars, homes and buildings set alight, leading to one Israeli commentator to compare the violence to “Kristallnacht in Huwara”. (3) Prospects for Israel’s Arab citizenry also look bleak under this administration.

It is heartening that Israelis are demonstrating in their tens of thousands against these threats to their democracy but it will take the mobilization of Israeli Arabs and their votes to enable the broad based campaign that is necessary to eject the SP autocrat Netanyahu and his dangerous allies from power (Fresh elections in the Palestinian territories and Gaza would also help but that is an argument and discussion for another occasion and paper).

Choosing the Battlefields for Democracy

In his latter-day incantation of President John F. Kennedy’s “long twilight struggle,” Naim advises that democracy’s defenders must choose their battles wisely to triumph. He identifies the following five: the battle against the Big Lie; the battle against criminalised governments; the battle against autocracies that seek to undermine democracies; the battle against political cartels that stifle competition, and the battle against illiberal narratives. (4)

All these struggles are interconnected. They are all part of the modus operandi and discourse of authoritarian, populist pseudo democracies all feed parasitically of each other. However, the foundation stone of all contemporary populist movements from the Brexit campaign and governments from Trump to Orban to Modi is the Big Lie. And that is why I choose to focus on that part of the 3P armoury.

The 21st Century Big Lie: Goebbels for Our Age

Every populist pitch has a Big Lie at its core, casting the aspiring autocrat as the rescuer, the only hope of the noble, downtrodden and betrayed people against a shadowy elite that hates them. Any strategy to defend democratic values and society rests on the capacity of citizens to differentiate truth from lies. As Timothy Snyder warns, “Post truth is pre fascism … to abandon facts is to abandon freedom”. (5)

Big Political Lies are of a fundamentally different character to the spin, economies of the actualite and massaging of information that is (sadly) common in contemporary democracies. In a very competitive field, probably the Champion Big Liar and Big Lie is Donald Trump for his totally unfounded “Big Steal claim that his loss in the 2020 US Presidential Election was due to fraudulent voting. Sharing No.1 spot is Putin’s assertion of the “Nazi” nature of the Ukrainian government to justify Russia’s “special military operation against Ukraine in February 2022. In the running for Champions League places are the clams made by Leave campaigners in the UK’s EU was the notorious figure for supposed weekly UK contributions to the UK and that remaining in the EU would enable 70m Turks to come to the UK. Not far behind is the Kremlin’s framing of Chechen separatists for the false flag operation in 1999 in which four apartment blocks in Moscow and other Russian cities were bombed by the FSB which enabled Putin to consolidate his power; Turkey’s Erdogan alleging a shadowy conspiracy of Guelenist wreckers and Trump’s fulminations about the “Deep State” arrayed against his administration.

To stretch football analogies further, the assertion by the UK Home Secretary Suella Braverman that 100m asylum seekers could up to Britain as justification for her draconian Illegal Migrants Bill is certainly worthy of a Europa League place. It is no coincidence that Ms Braverman was a prominent member of the uber-Brexiteer Tory pressure group, the European Research Group and is a strident anti-woke rhetorician.

To tackle the epidemics of post truth and false narratives that are sweeping the world and risks they pose of possible terminal damage to democracy, it is vital to interrogate the meaning of post-truth and to grasp the changes in media ecology especially the impact of the internet on the roles of journalism as traditional gatekeepers of facts and truth and the harmful impact of Big Tech on how humanity receives and is, often unconsciously moulded, news and information.

Speaking Lies to Power: Post-Truth and Propaganda

Post-truth has been defined by the Collins English Dictionary as “the disappearance of shared objectives for truth." It is a feature of the communications architecture of politics and power in today’s world. In the words of Alan Rusbridger, the former editor in chief of The Guardian newspaper, “a society that cannot agree on a factual basis for discussion or decision making cannot progress.” (Naim)

Timothy Snyder warns that “you submit to tyranny when you renounce the difference between what you want to hear and what is actually the case”. Quoting Victor Klemperer, the astute and courageous observer of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, he states that truth dies in a quadruple of ways. (Snyder, 2017)

The first way is open hostility to verifiable reality like, as mentioned earlier Trump’s Big Steal fiction of the 2020 Presidential Election and the denial of objective scientific reality practiced by climate change deniers and opponents of medical vaccination.

The second is shamanic incantation depending on “endless repetition, designed to make the fictional plausible and the criminal desirable. The systematic use of nicknames such as “Crooked Hillary” and “Sleepy Joe” by Trump at campaign rallies and on Twitter transformed these individuals as stereotypes that people spoke aloud. The repeated chants of “Lock Her Up” and “Build That Wall” at rallies with their grandiose promises and demonological depiction of opponents fused further a sense of oneness between Trump and his audience.

The next mode is magical thinking or the open adoption of contradiction such as Trump’s promises to cut taxes for everybody, eliminate the national debt and increase expenditure on both social security and defence; acceptance of such mutual contradiction requires total abandonment of one’s critical thinking faculties and of reason.

Related to the abandonment or reason is the fourth operating mode of post truth; misplaced faith in deity type figure like Trump or his contemporary analogues who tells his followers “I alone can solve it” or “I am your voice”. Such heaven-descended faith permits no room for individual experiences nor the acceptance of evidence not least because it becomes necessary to the psychic makeup of the believer as is borne out by the comment made to Klemperer at the end of the war by a worker that “understanding is useless, you have to have faith. I believe in the Fuhrer."

So fascists and their 2tst century variants and indeed of populists of all ideological hues despised the small truths of daily existence, loved slogans that pressed the same buttons as a new religion and preferred creative myths to history or journalism. They used new media , which at the time was radio, to create a drumbeat of propaganda that aroused feelings before people had the opportunity to discern the facts. And then, as now, Snyder writes , faith in a very flawed leader was confused with the truth about the world that belongs to all of us. (Snyder, p.71)

Propaganda is at its core a set of communication strategies designed to sow confusion and uncertainty, discourage critical thinking, and persuade people that reality is what the leader says it is. In the words of Goebbels “In Propaganda as in Love, anything is permissible, which is successful” While few strongmen have a Goebbels equivalent, all of them shared his “ends justify the means” credo. Many of them had backgrounds in the arts of mass communication and dissimulation. Mussolini and Mobutu were professional journalists and, like Hitler and Gaddafi, knew how to use their voices and bodies for maximal impact. Putin honed his skills at deception in the KGB. Pinochet and Franco’s military backgrounds trained them in the optics of power and pageantry (Ben Ghiat, 2021).

From Mussolini’s use of newsreels to Trump’s use of Twitter, authoritarians have had direct communication channels with the public, allowing them to pose as authentic interpreters of the popular will. From the Nuremberg rallies, with Hitler’s name spelled out in Klieg lights, the strongmen have turned politics into an aesthetic experience, with him as the star. The communication codes and celebrity cultures and celebrity cultures of film, television and now digital storytelling shape the leader’s self-preservation and the images he releases of both followers and enemies. So do advertising and marketing strategies. (Ben Ghiat, p.93)

Propaganda is also a system of attention management that works through repetition. The state disseminates the same message through multiple channels and institutions to synchronise society around the leader’s person and ideological priorities. Slogans and ways of thinking are drip fed insidiously to individuals leading them “in the same direction, but differently” (Ben Ghiat, p.94)

Leaders use propaganda to legitimate and solidify their authority through the discrediting of the press and manipulation, falsification and suppression of information. While, as we have seen, the Big Lie can be effective; falsehoods and the consequent othering of can be built around a grain of truth. This has particularly pertinent in immigration narratives in both Trumpian and Brexiteer propaganda in which the strongman claims that the foreigners are breaching borders in order to commit crime. The fact that large numbers of foreigners do indeed traverse the border is contorted by the absence of information as to reasons and time sales of arrival and the reasons for the migration. Information massaging on this subject often links immigration to crime and terrorism. In 2019, when Trump’s Department of Justice was forced to admit that its data on the subject was false, it refused to alter the official record this paper trail of lies was needed to justify further repressive actions.(Ben Ghiat)

In the UK, right wing nationalist narratives talk about the “invasion” of its shores (with the white cliffs of Dover acting as an historically potent symbol of this “invasiveness”) by “swarms” of “illegal” immigrants including many unaccompanied single men from “backward”, invariably Islamic cultures. Populist folk devils are created such as “woke” or “liberal” immigration layers and refugee advocacy networks. Blame for the flotilla of small boats carrying migrants is conveniently deflected onto another, albeit much more deserving, folk devil - people smugglers while the truth that all legal avenues for migrants have been closed down is conveniently airbrushed from the dominant narrative. The treatment of migrants to the UK hasn’t quite exceeded the depth of hostility and repressive response demonstrated by Italy’s far right led government but the centrality of immigration and the “enemies of the people” designation of the judiciary and parliamentarians who sought scrutiny of Prime Ministers May and Johnson’s legislative pathways to withdrawal from the EU to Brexiteer discourse are worrying echoes of the words and actions of the 3P autocrats. 

While not the unexpurgated version of 3P autocracy, the right wing “Get Brexit Done” populist nationalism of the Boris’ relatively brief Premiership; the proven law breaking over Covid restrictions; the cronyism evident in key public appointments and government contracts for PPE equipment; the (unlawful) prorogation of Parliament in August 2019 and the wholesale purging from the Conservative Parliamentary Party of MPs insufficiently committed to Hard Brexit certainly ticked more than a few boxes.

Ireland’s nascent (and hopefully short lived) far right movement has also deployed historically potent tropes in its opposition to the entry and settlement of migrants; describing it as the “new plantation”; a conscious invocation of the dispossession of indigenous Gaelic clans and communities by in the Ulster and Munster Plantations of English and Scottish settlers by the conquering English Crown in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It is of no great irony that professed English uber nationalists such as Nigel Farage and Stephen Yaxley Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) have attached themselves to this Irish nativist movement with contrasting reactions from within. the Irish far right.

Theodor Adorno’s assertion that television could continue fascist tyranny by fostering “intellectual passivity, and gullibility” has even more resonance in the 3P era. All autocrats know that discouraging critical thinking is key to maintaining themselves in power. (Ben Ghiat). Berlusconi’s Forza Italia movement in the 1990s was practically the political arm of his media conglomerate Mediaset. A landmark study in 2019 found that heavy viewing of Mediaset’s entertainment channels translated into a decline in civic engagement and a preference for simplistic populistic rhetoric. This translated into almost 10 percent spike in the polls for Berlusconi and his party over five elections from 1994 to 2008. (Ben Ghiat, p.114).

Rather than ban all opposition media, the 3P authoritarians deny licenses to media outlets, bribe, sue, threaten their owners, call for advertising boycotts to cause financial ruin, and stage hostile takeovers. In a mass deference in 2018, media bosses in Orban’s Hungary “donated” almost five hundred media properties to a government allied foundation. As a consequence in the words of one analyst, “opposition views could not even reach significant portions of the electorate”, just as the Hungarian Prime Minister intended (Ben Ghiat, p.111).

Autocrats also suppress knowledge that challenges their ideologies and goals. Pinochet closed down philosophy departments and Orban prohibited gender studies. All 21st century authoritarians suppress climate change science, lest that discourage the theft of national resources that generates profits for them and their allies (Ben Ghiat).

Just as the strongmen of the past used radio and television to project their image and to amplify their propaganda, so contemporary authoritarians use digital media to target critics, and spread hate speech, conspiracy theories and lies. Among the recipients of their hate are the press. The Committee to Protect Journalists found “an unprecedented level of hostility towards media personnel” around the world in 2018, with record breaking numbers of journalists murdered, imprisoned and taken hostage (Ben Ghiat, p.112).

Case Study: Rappler and Big Tech’s Role in the Suppression of Free Media

In 2012, Maria Ressa, who was to win the Noble Peace Prize in 2021 for services to independent journalism, cofounded Rapper, a digital only news website in the Philippines. Her ambition was to create a new standard of investigative journalism in the Philippines which would harness the social media platforms to build communities of action for better governance and stronger democracies. Using Facebook and other platforms, her service was able to crowdsource breaking news, find key sources and tips, harness collective action for climate change and good governance, and help increase voter knowledge and participation in Filipino elections.(Ressa, 2022)

Rappler exposed corruption and manipulation both in government and increasingly in the behemoth of technology companies that had begun to dominate, if not colonise all of our lives. But by the fifth year of its existence, Rappler was being targeted by the government of the 3P autocrat, President Rodrigo Duterte due to its highlighting of the impunity in Duterte’s drug war (estimated by the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights to have cost 27,000 lives from 2016 to 2018) and that of Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook. (Ressa, pp.1-3)

Ressa tells a cautionary tale of how the Philippines is ground zero for the pernicious effects that social media can have on a nation’s institutions, its culture and the minds and deliberative capacities of its citizenry. 2021 was the sixth year in a row that Filipinos spent the most time out of all global citizens on the internet and social media. Despite slow internet speeds, Filipinos uploaded and downloaded the largest number of videos on You Tube in 2013. By 2017, 97 percent of Filipinos were on Facebook. (Ressa, p.3).

Every development in the Philippines, Ressa saw as a chronicle foretold of what would occur in the rest of the world. As early as 2015, there were reports of account farms creating social media phone verified accounts, or PVAs, from the Philippines. That same year, a report showed that most of Donald Trump’s Facebook likes came from outside the United States and that one in every twenty-seven Trump followers was from the Philippines. She describes how when the influence economy took off, shady companies that sold Twitter likes and followers had offices in the Philippines. Political marketing was by now morphing into “networked disinformation. (Ressa: p.124).

She also describes the evolution of Philippines into a fraud hub. By 2019 it was the global leader of online attacks, both automated and human, followed distantly by US, Russia, UK and Indonesia. This development was facilitated by sophisticated tools, cheap manual labour and good economic incentives associated with online fraud. The Philippines also has a higher-than-average number of unlicencsed software installations, often seeding malware into PCs to turn them into botnet platforms for automated attacks. (Ressa: p.124-250).

So began “democracy’s death by a thousand cuts” (Ressa, p.4). Ressa lays out how Rappler had charted three stages of the degradation of the online information ecosystem and political life in the Philippines. The first was the early experimentation and buildup of campaign machinery in 2014 and 2015. The second was the concentration of a new black ops industry. The third was the consolidation of power at the top and the spread of political polarization across the country (Ressa, p.127)

Rappler documented the homicidal nature of Duterte’s extra-judicial war on drugs policy in its “The Impunity Series”. Every night since the June 2016 Presidential election, an average of thirty-three dead bodies had been found on the streets and in the poorer environs of Manila. The Impunity Series gave names and faces to the people killed (many poor teenagers and children) and detailed police involvement in the killings. It carefully tracked the rising death toll and how the police tried to change the numbers. The drug war, in reality a war against the poor as it is around the world, was Rappler’s focus (Ressa, p.149).

In 2016 Rappler launched its #NoPlaceForHate campaign to alert and warn the public by introducing more rigorous comment moderation standards to counteract the hate, gaslighting and reputation smearing by Duterte supporters against anyone questioning the drug war. Ressa documents how, sadly, despite the rearguard action performed by a few users, most real people elected for silence and so legitimizing and enabling victory for the narrative for Duterte’s arguments for killing.

Eventually, following the playbook of 3P autocrats elsewhere such as Orban and Erdogan, the Filipino Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), after an enquiry ordered by the solicitor general, Jose Calida, revoked Rappler’s license to operate in January 2018. This decision was taken on the absurd grounds that Rappler’s Philippine Depositary Receipts (PDRs), a kind of security, owned by investors outside the country constituted foreign control and violated the Constitution (Ressa: pp.176-179).

So ends the cautionary tale of this brave attempt by Rappler to create “a kind Interpol for disinformation networks” (Ressa, p.131). It is the story of the subversion of truth by falsehoods; of facts by lies; of proper investigative journalism by the ad hominem attack; of the complexity of the modern world by the conspiracy theory and cheap populist headline. 

The creation of metanarratives of “alternative facts” and the accompanying trashing of the “mainstream media” is in no small measure due to the algorithms and business models of Facebook, Twitter and other social media outlets which (purposefully or not) push their consumers into polarized tribes and monetizes the lies and disinformation of the Trumps, Putins and Dutertes with real life global consequences such as Russia’s aggressive war in Ukraine; climate change denial and vaccine hesitancy.

An information ecosystem which collapses the difference between private and public through salacious and malicious gossip and which tries to draw the whole of society away from normal politics and toward conspiracy theories reawakens the vista of totalitarianism. That is the main danger to humanity of the 3P virus and its main antidote has to be a free print and online media outside the orbit of state and commercial intrusion.

References


[1] Moises Naim (2022) The Revenge of Power. How Autocrats are Reinventing Politics for the 21st Century. p. xv New York: St Martin’s Press.
[2] Guardian - Israel accused of violating deal with US on West Bank outposts.
[3] Bethan McKernan ‘Never like this before’ West Bank convulsed by violence. Guardian 28th February 2023.
[4] Naim (2022).
[5] Naim (2022), pp.247.

Bibliography

Ruth Ben-Ghiat (2021) Strongmen: How They Rise, Why They Succeed, How They Fall. Profile Books
Maria Ressa (2022). How To Stand Up To A Dictator. The Fight For Our Future. London: W.H. Allen
Timothy Snyder (2017) On Tyranny. Twenty Lessons From The Twentieth Century. London: Bodley Head.

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter. 

Threats To Democracy ✑ Antidotes To The Triple P Virus

Barry Gilheany ✒ The global threat posed to democracy in what Moses Naim describes as the Triple P era, the era of Populism, Polarisation and Post-Truth,[1] has almost paradoxically been heightened by apparent democratizing trends in the media and information worlds. 

The internet has enabled an explosion of new and supposedly media; the boundaries between traditional and citizen journalism has been steadily eroded; the proliferation of new media outlets has challenged the hegemony and legitimacy of what their critics deride as “the mainstream media”; the growth of open source reportage and the activities of whistle-blowing bodies such as WikiLeaks is reckoned to have shown a bright light on the murky goings on in the global corridors of power and the postmodernist dream of the deconstruction of metanarratives has seemingly been realised by the ability of the blogger to by-pass traditional publishing regimes by self-publishing on the Web. 

However, this apparent “levelling-up” of the established media world and culture has proved to be a massive boon for today’s autocrats particularly those with a media background, most famously Donald Trump. Rather than enabling more noble citizenship traits such as healthy scepticism and informed deliberation; the 21st century media landscape has sedimented modern tribes into their silos of media echo chambers in which tribe adherents seek out and republicise the information they wish to hear in the same way that football fans flock to the message boards of their teams. It has facilitated the “politics of fandom” [2] in which the charismatic leader speaks directly to their followers cementing their loyalty in this “in your face” way while by stealth removing the layers of accountability which are the pillars of democracy.

The Political Entertainment Complex

Modern day autocrats are, unlike those in previous eras, visible, inescapable, and familiar. They are, in contemporary literary jargon, accessible. Their ubiquity has been in no small measure by the changing media landscape and the nexus it has facilitated: a nexus between entertainment, celebrity, and politics. Writing about the right-wing ecosystem in the USA, the author and former speech writer for President George W. Bush David Frum coined the phrase “conservative entertainment complex.”[3]. I describe The Political Entertainment Complex or PEC as a sui generis environment for that nexus of showbiz, fame, and politics which putative autocrats of all ideological hues fully exploit. The PEC encapsulates the culture of fandom. It facilitates the transfer to or projection onto of the tribal devoted following of sports teams, pop idols and the celebrity with millions of ‘likes’ and followers on social world onto the modern charismatic political “stars” of today. In such an atmosphere, political opponents can become delegitimised as central to the identities of many sports and not too few music fans are rivalries with other teams and groups that become bitter enmities. The patterning of today’s political cults on the entertainment values of our age thus sharpens polarisation which within the Triple P framework is accentuated and globalized by digital media and by the intense activism of social groups such as “left behind “white working classes who feel alienated from the old order and who relish the chance to take the fight to those who live on the opposite pole; be they liberal or banking elites or multicultural advocates. The consequences of these culture wars are writ over post-Trump America and Brexit Britain.

The exemplar of the triumph of the entertainer over politics is, justifiably in the opinion of many, is ex-President Donald J. Trump. The route from the world of entertainment to a Presidency or State Governorship had been negotiated before, in the cases of Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger from the cinematic arena. But in their cases, reinvention was a lengthy and laboured process. Not so in the case of Donald Trump. From his four decades in celebrity culture from the brashness of the New York real estate scene to the abrasiveness (but morbidly fascinating for those who became captivated by it), he understood the power of spectacle. Those who believed in the separation of entertainment from politics as a basic guardrail in US democracy could not countenance the possibility, never mind reality of his arrival in the White House. Yet news editors operating as they were in an increasingly competitive media environment could not be help but be captivated by his every outrageous policy announcement such as a total shutdown of Muslim immigration into the US; racist jibe at Mexicans and other migrants from “s___thole countries;” by his every sexist and disablist put-down and his outlandish personal wealth. They understood he never bored an audience. They grasped the commercial benefits of affording him wall-to-wall coverage.[4]

What tragically the elites and guardians of civility did not appreciate until it was too late was that sneering responses to him such as Hillary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables who could not be redeemed” comment proved to be possibly his major electoral asset. Trump was able to tap into the public's feelings of being ignored, of being trapped, of being under siege, and he tapped into their overall weariness about politics. Elite scorn for Trump somehow translated into elite scorn for them.[5]

Yet the triumph of the values of entertainment over those of traditional politics in 2016 which so (rightfully) horrified the American commentariat might not have come as much as a shock had they examined more closely events in Italy in the mid-1990s. There they would have observed Trump before Trump in the persona of Silvio Berlusconi and how this media magnate remade Italian politics using the [6] model of the Entertainment Political Complex.

Silvio Berlusconi: A Chronicle of Trump Foretold

The long march from the disintegration of the Italian First Republic and the webs of corruption and kickbacks that sustained all its major political parties (apart from the Italian Communist Party) exposed in the Tangentopoli judicial investigations in 1992 to the very real possibility of Western Europe’s first far right led government headed by the Brothers of Italy Party after the general election to be held on 5th September can in no small way be attributed to the media revolution that occurred there in that decade.

Italy in the 1990s was almost unique in the virtual hold that RAI, its state-owned and publicly subsidized broadcaster, RAI had over the media. Known for its intellectually high-brow output; it was also a notoriously boring network that well into the 1980s had no system for tracking its own ratings. The boring nature of RAI was a heaven-sent opportunity for Silvio Berlusconi, one-time real estate speculator and owner of AC Milan football club who went onto acquire billionaire status through Mediaset, his hugely profitable and sprawling TV holding company which lay at the centre of multiple enterprises from insurance to publishing and financial services. Mediaset’s sales and marketing team were legendary with its USP of pitching ads to midsized Italian businesses and Berlusconi later perfected the art of delivering mass audiences to companies that had no other way through selling ads on regional affiliates to the sort of companies that had never appeared on Italian TV before.[7]

Barred by existing legislation from establishing a nationwide operation all at once; Berlusconi, started to buy up small regional broadcasters in different parts of Italy and weld them into a de facto network with unabashedly lowbrow, mass-appeal programming familiar elsewhere but revolutionary in Italy. Mediaset may have given the Italian public but had detrimental effects on the public sphere and on cognitive abilities. For decades later studies by the Italian economists of the differences in voting patterns between regions which had received early exposure to Berlusconi’s behemoth and those who could only access it later. Working from a vast and detailed dataset about where Mediaset expanded, as well as granular psychometric tests measuring Italians’ cognitive abilities, these researchers found that early exposure to the junk TV served by Berlusconi’s media empire accounted for a substantial component of his electoral success. In particular, according to the OECD administered, Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), very young and very old viewers exposed to Mediaset early turned out to be significantly less sophisticated than Italians who could only access the network later. Italians with early exposure to junk tv became more susceptible to populist rhetoric not just from Mediaset’s owner but later on from populist movements such as Five Star.[8]

Faced with bribery allegations and multiple investigations into tax evasion, Berlusconi sought to avoid imprisonment by becoming Prime Minister through the transformation of his media empire into a political party, Forza Italy whose parliamentary candidates were, more often than not, network employees. Reveling in stories of Berlusconi’s billionaire playboy lifestyle and all its pizzazz of glitz and glamour gleefully promoted by the magazines and newspapers he owned, Forza Italia’s strategy was unashamedly based on Mediaset’s commercial success. At its heart was the doctrine of the simple message “Remember your job is to appeal to the regular people of Italy – not to the smartest student in the class.”[9]

Such crude but effective anti-intellectualism provided the ideal “common touch” smokescreen to obscure his shady deals, ethical defects and personal decadence symbolised so starkly by his “Bunga Bunga” parties. He fiddled with electoral rules, denounced judges engaged in a vast left-wing conspiracy against him (shades of the Daily Mail “enemies of the people” condemnation of the judges who in late 2016 stymied the UK government’s attempt to steamroll Brexit through without parliamentary consultation) and mocked his opponents through the airwaves and print outlets that he owned. Despite or, more likely, because of these multiple malpractices, Silvio Berlusconi served, albeit in three separate periods between 1994 and 2011, as prime minister longer than any other Italian leader since World War II. His legacy is the reproduction of a new generation of Italian populists such as the ideologically eclectic Five Star movement led by the comedian Bepe Grillo and the far right, anti-immigrant Legia Nord party led by Matteo Salvini plus the latest kid on the block, the Brothers of Italy led by Georgia Meroni which is poised to form Western Europe’s first far right government since 1945.

The Politics of Outrage

The current crop of populist leaders feeds into a self-reinforcing celebrity culture as the familiarity of a name and the outrageousness of a celebrity’s exploits attracts people’s curiosity, fascination and, ultimately, political loyalty. Globally, outrageous public personas have become the new normal. In Guatemala, the bawdy TV comedian Jimmy Morales who ran on the vaguest of platforms won the presidency with a 67% landslide in 2015. The former Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte’s frequent swearing in public proved to be almost as incendiary and popular as his pledges to institute death squads against drug dealers. His successor “Bong Bong” Marcos did not find his defence of the tyrannical regime of his notorious parents to be an obstacle to electoral success. In Britain, the bombast of Nigel Farage (assisted, many Remainers have argued, by his numerous appearances on mainstream broadcasting shows) proved to be an asset in the successful campaign to force the country’s exit from the European Union.[10]

It wasn’t just Donald Trump and other populist right-wing ethno-nationalist leaders who borrowed from Berlusconi’s playbook. One of the most successful practitioners of politics as entertainment came from the supposedly opposite end of the ideological spectrum – the late Hugo Chavez President of Venezuela. Rather than viewing Chavez and the movement he headed as an ideological and rhetorical throwback to the Cuba of the 1960s which inspired it, it is more instructive to see him a version of Berlusconi. For like the Italian tycoon-cum-politician, Chavez understood that ideology matters less than celebrity status, and that through the medium of television it is possible to create a world where style equivocates to substance.[11].

Through his TV show, Alo President and his theatrical speeches, Chavez fused charismatic leadership, celebrity antics, and autocratic ambition. On his TCV show between storytelling, political diatribe, and fulmination against real and imagined enemies, he was able to establish a direct, personalised rapport with his audience. He portrayed empathy in spades; hugging weeping mothers who struggled to find money for her children’s school supplies; learning the names of viewers who regaled him with their daily issues. But this feeling the pain of his people was interspersed by Trumpian style denunciation of the media and major TV networks as the “four horsemen of the apocalypse" or grandiose promises to build a gas pipeline through the Andes to Buenos Aires. In his hours-long speeches that all broadcasters were forced to show, he wove together these intimate bonding with individuals with party revolutionary harangues, part revival meetings and part history lecture into a coherent narrative of Bolivarian Socialism (or more accurately Nationalism).

The fandom and devotional following which Chavez the celebrity leader inspired became the raw material that he fashioned into power: power which he used to take apart the checks and balances at the heart of Venezuela’s constitution. Political divisions rapidly polarized around the single, binary question “Are you pro-Chavez or anti-Chavez.” Opponents and supporters ceased seeing themselves as belonging to a shared nation but as opposite tribes and existential enemies. His personality cult survived his death from cancer in 2013 with the assimilation of his figure into the pantheon of Santeria, the Afro-Caribbean syncretic religion to which millions of outwardly Catholic Venezuelans are secretly devoted to. Chavez statuettes began to appear in santero rites alongside ancestral Indigenous deities such Maria Primero and the legendary slave-born lancer who rose to become the only Black officer in Simon Bolivar’s republican army. [12] The elevation of charismatic leaders such as Higo Chavez into a space between ordinary humanity and divinity and the devotional cult of their followers and their turbocharging by modern media technology thus reduces to rubble the cordon sanitaire between politics and entertainment and upends all the rules and norms of established democracy.

The Media as Guardians of Democracy

The political entertainment complex as it has functioned in Trump’s USA, Putin’s Russia, Berlusconi’s Italy, and Chavez’s Venezuela is proving to be a major portend of a post-democratic world. The elevation of the trivial over matters of substance in media output and the worship of the charismatic celebrity masks the slow emasculation of independent media and of other guardrails which constitute the critical infrastructure of democracy.

Independent and trusted media, be it print, broadcast or digital are one of the essential intermediary institutions between rulers and ruled in democratic states. Donald Trump used Twitter as a “megaphone” (until it was taken away in January 2021) and as “the way I speak directly to the people without any filter”. Beppe Grillo, one of the founders of the Five Star Movement in promised to be an “amplifier” for ordinary people. He told his followers to connect with him directly via his blog, bypassing pollical parties – la casta of corrupt politicians, in his words – and professional journalists, who were all said to be in bed with the politicians.[13] Just two examples of the common populist refrains that the “mainstream media represent “corporate interest” or that they will not publish the stories that the Establishment or elites (be they liberal or corporate) do want you to hear or read; be they those of vaccine damage or the covering up of crimes committed by “illegal” immigrants. How then can the integrity and professional independence of the Fourth Estate deal be strengthened?

Democracy has a dual nature or two crucial sites. First, it requires a designated locus (and specific times) for collectively binding decisions. Second, it requires a forum for the dynamic formation of opinions and political judgments in society at large: anyone can have their say, at whatever time.[14]

This dualistic nature of democracy has always been a given. John Stuart Mill observed that “The [British Parliament] has an office …. To be at once the nations’ Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions …. Where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind, as well or better than he could speak it himself – not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy …”[15].

The opinion publique of Montaigne’s creation was supposed to supervise governments. Jeremy Bentham praised the “superintendence of the public which had adopted a “habit of reasoning and discussion.”[16]

However, Christopher Lasch wisely qualifies the superintendent role of the public by stipulating that “What democracy requires is public debate, not information” or “the kind of information…. Generated only by vigorous popular debate". For “We do not know what he needs to know until we ask the right question, and we can identify the right questions only by subjecting our own ideas to the test of public controversy”.[17]

It is fair to say that the superintendent role of the public in countries like Italy where cognitive competencies have been so weakened over the last generation by exposure to the diet of junk tv served up by Berlusconi’s media empire. It is a role that the public, in the US at any rate, is increasingly unwilling to fulfill due to declining trust in the print media. In 2020, for the first time, fewer than half of Americans said they trust traditional media according to Edelman’s annual trust barometer. In polling after the 2020 US presidential election, trust had worsened with 57 percent of Democrats trusting the media and only 18 percent of Republicans. It has also been compromised in the social media world by the strong propensity of online algorithms to favour the flashy but false over the humdrum but true.[18].

The biggest threat, both in epistemic and in moral terms, to democracy is the Big Lie peddled by all authoritarian populists from Trump to Bolinasario; from Putin to Orban. So, the overriding duty of today’s ruth-tellers in the Fourth Estate is to restore the ability of citizens to differentiate truth from lies and so become authoritative superintendents of powerholders again. The ingrained journalistic instinct to ensure “impartiality” by reporting or giving platforms to “both sides” if one of those sides is attacking democracy or promoting misinformation; climate change denial and opposition to vaccines being two pressing contemporary examples. This does not mean, as Lionel Barber former editor of the Financial Times argues, that journalism has to be openly partisan, or advocacy orientated. So long as arguments are made in good faith and are evidence based, the public does need to hear both sides. However, there can be no journalistic requirement to be equidistant between people who peddle Big Lies about immigration, the EU, or the result of the 2020 US Presidential election since that has always formed part of the playbook of the aspiring autocrat.[19]

We live in the era of the “Polidol;” the age of the celebritised and falsely charismatic leader. The Triple P autocrat is a performative phenomenon; made by a “reality” televisual culture which has had actual effects on real politics. Recovery of civic competence through taming the powers of the modern media and digital conglomerates; the redefinition and refining of traditional journalistic standards and the inculcation of civic education and critical thinking skills are just a few of the measures needed to roll back the onward march of 21st populist autocracy.

[1] Moses Naim, The Revenge of Power. How Autocrats are Reinventing Politics for the 21st Century. New York: St Martin’s Press

[2] Naim, pp.30-59

[3] Dylan Byers, Frum: Republicans Lied to by Conservative Entertainment Complex” Politico 11 September 2012,

[4] Naim, pp.34-35

[5] Naim, p.34

[6] Nam, pp.37-38

[7] Naim, p.36

[8] Naim, pp.37-38

[9] Naim, pp38-40

[10] Naim, p.44

[11] Naim, p.51

[12] Naim, p.52

[13] Jan-Werner Muller (2021) Democracy Rules. London: Allen Lane

[14] Muller p.94

[15] Muller, p.95

[16] Muller, p.96

[17] Muller, p.101

[18] Naim, p.247.

[19] Naim, p.249

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter. Barry Gilheany

Threats To Democracy ✑ The Triple P Virus And Its Superspreaders, Media And Celebrity

Barry Gilheany ✒ Democracy or more accurately the liberal representative model of underpinned by the post-1945 “rules based international order” and for whom reports of its final triumph were greatly exaggerated by writers such as Francis Fukuyama in the first spasm of post-Cold War hubris faces a type of danger that is simultaneously overt but yet hiding in plain sight. 

Unlike the totalitarian systems of Nazi Germany and the USSR, apartheid South Africa and Cold War client state dictatorships of Latin America and Africa, modern anti-democratic forces operate within the formalities of democracy while undermining its culture and safeguards. 

Across the globe, authoritarian regimes have emerged in the 21st century through formal elections; spanning the ideological spectrum from Hugo Chavez/Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Recep Erdogan in Turkey, Narendra Modi in India, and Jair Bolsonaro, but who operate to a similar playbook of how to retain power undemocratically. As Moises Naim explains; the centrifugal forces that weaken power, the constraints of checks and balances; competitive elections, codified rights, and obligations of the citizen; globalisation, technology, demographic change, have generated a new set of centripetal forces that tend to concentrate it. He sees the clash between these two sets of forces as one of the defining struggles of our time; a struggle whose outcome is far from certain.[1]

The 3P Autocrat

The aforementioned putative autocrats have very modern methods they can deploy to stake claim to unlimited power. These are unconventional leaders who have witnessed the decay of traditional power and have discovered that a radically new approach can deliver hitherto untapped opportunities. The formula that they use is conceptualised by Naim in the following triptych: populism, polarization, and post-truth. They are therefore the 3P Autocrats.[2]

3P autocrats are defined by Naim as political leaders who come to power through a reasonably democratic election and then set out to dismantle the checks on executive power through populism, polarisation, and post-truth. As they consolidate their power, they shield their autocratic plans behind walls of secrecy, bureaucratic obfuscation, pseudo-legal subterfuge, manipulation of public opinion, and the repression of critics and adversaries. Once the mask is removed, it’s too late[3]

None of the 3Ps taken in isolation is sufficient to explain contemporary mutations of power but utilised in tandem they can counteract the centrifugal forces that tend to disperse, fragment and dilute power. The specifics vary from place to place and from leader to leader as power is always contextual but the basic elements of the 3P approach wherever it is deployed.[4]

Let us briefly look at the constituent elements of the 3P framework. First populism. 

Often the most widely discussed and perhaps misunderstood of the triumvirate; it is best understood not as an ideology despite the “ism” but rather as a strategy for the seizure and exercise of power. In the populist mind-set all the people’s problems stem from the decisions – often conspiratorial, always corrupts – of a venal elite. Populist leaders portray themselves as embodying the will of the people (the Volk, the plain folk, and the Corbynite variant of the community of the good) and championing their cause against a corrupt elite. A burgeoning scholarship on populism identifies the following themes in populist demagoguery

Populists wallow in catastrophism; they imagine the world around them is corrupt, dysfunctional, and failing. Think of the “American Carnage” vista conjured up by Donald Trump in his 2017 Presidential Inauguration speech and his (mostly unfulfilled) to “drain the swamp of Washingtonian lobbyists”. They demonise and criminalise political rivals. For the Trumps, Putins and their comparators across the world political opponents are not fellow citizens with different viewpoints but lawbreakers who deserve imprisonment. Think the “Lock Her Up” chants against Hillary Clinton at Trump’s campaign rallies before the Presidential election in 2016. Think of the trumped-up charges brought by Putin against his most fearless opponent Alexander Navalny and his subsequent imprisonment.

Particularly potent themes of populist discourse are the use of external threats and crumbling national borders. The populist leader claims that that nation is threatened by a foreign enemy be it in nations such as China in the Trumpian imagination which undercuts US economic competitiveness; immigrants who steal jobs like the “Polish plumber” and other East Europeans of Brexiteer demonology or who bring “crime and drugs” like the Mexicans of Trump’s xenophobic credo or migrants and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries who threaten the cohesion of European Christian civilisation in the eyes of Hungarian President Orban. Concomitant to these threats is the need to strengthen national borders as with Trump’s invocation to “Build that Wall” and Orban’s fencing out of migrants from the Middle east and beyond.

Such xenophobia and right-wing ethno-nationalism more often than not find targets at home. One example is Modi’s policy of creating a register of “genuine citizens” in India ostensibly to help identify illegal immigrants but which in excluding millions of Muslims who had immigrated from neighbouring countries decades earlier really affirms to Hindu nationalists that Hindus are “real Indians” and is meant to instill fear among Indian Muslims.[5]. Another is Benjamin Netanyahu ‘s proposed Nation – State Law in 2018 that refused to commit Israel either to legal equality or even to democracy, refounding the state in ways that exclude the full participation of the country’s Arab minority[6]. And there was the “trickle down aggression” emanating from the Trump’s Make America Great Again cosmos with clear evidence on racist attacks on Asian-Americans during the Covid 19 pandemic following on from Trump rallies; anti-Semitic incidents hit an all-time high in 2019 and the empowering of Trumpist vigilantes by the Republican Party’s showcasing a suburban couple training weapons on Black Lives Matters protestors. [7]

There is of course the approval of paramilitary and other anti-system groups and outright endorsement of violence by populist leaders. The incitement to physical assault on protestors at his rallies by Trump created the pathway towards the insurrection on Capitol Hill on 6th January 2021 and his ill-disguised goading of far-right militias like the Proud Boys on that terrifying day.

The most civically and intellectually aspects of populism are the denigration of experts and attacks on media. Experts and scientists are, by definition, part of the intellectual elite and are therefore complicit in the mistreatment of the noble people that the leader represents. Populism represents a universe of belief and gut feeling rather than facts and science which as we shall see later are utterly inimical to and a necessary counter to the post-truth leg of the 3P triumvirate. One egregious example of the trashing of expertise is that of the leading Brexiteer, Oxbridge graduate and UK Cabinet Minister Michael Gove who in the Brexit referendum campaign IN 2016 insouciantly proclaimed to his audience that “We have had enough of experts.”. Another was Donald Trump’s Presidential endorsement of a disproved anti-malarial treatment for Covid in full view of a flabbergasted Federal government public health official (he had previously supported the wholly discredited link between the MMR vaccine and autism made by the disgraced former medic Andrew Wakefield).

An independent media committed to accountability of governments to their citizens and that has the data and fearless journalists to expose government corruption and incompetence are also mortal enemies of populist demagogues and their followers. And of course, it is this demagogue; this charismatic saviour of the nation and/or the people who leads the struggle of the people against the elite.[8]

So once a populist frame is established; the would-be leader saviour and/or movement proceeds to next strategy of the Triple P framework: polarisation. 

This involves the relentless demonisation of opponents and the weaponisation of wedge or culture war issues around issues of identity which have the capacity to divide families, friends, and colleagues. The bitter conflicts among mangy families and in wider society created by the Brexit referendum strand as particularly stark examples of the scarring effects of culture wars; scars which have reddened further by the “war on woke” stances by the current UK government on immigration and on the legacies of the British Empire.

Brexit decided as it was in a binary referendum in a polity embedded in constitutional arrangement ill-suited to plebiscitary decisions was an especially polarizing issue; eliminating as it did the possibility of a middle ground and forcing every single person and organisation to take sides[9].

In the current era, polarization operates through the imprint of fandom: a pattern of identification rooted in the celebrity culture of the music industry and sports, where followers develop intense affinity with their favourite stars and corresponding antipathy towards rival stars. Think of any football rivalries or wars of the bands such as those between Blur and Oasis in the 1990s and transpose such irreconcilable, almost faith like divisions to the political sphere and we enter the dystopia where contending sides deny the basic legitimacy of the other side’s right even to contend for power, dispensing, as Trump tried and failed to do and as the Orbans and Maduros have done more successfully, with the recognised democratic norm that sees alternation in office as a normal, healthy pillar of democratic co-existence.[10]

Next, we come to the most peculiar and disturbing aspect of the revenge of power – post-truth. 

The concept of post-truth goes far beyond the standard lying, dissimulation and econome d’actualite always associated with politicians. It is the denial of the existence of a verifiable independent reality. It is the realm of philosophical impossibilities such as “alternative facts” being given credence by a White House chief of staff. It is the vista of “staged attacks” used by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to explain away atrocities committed by his country’s armed forces in Ukraine. It is the denial of scientific objectivity that dismisses Covid-19 as a mere seasonal flu not the respiratory virus that it is. Many of the elements of post-truth are to be found in classic conspiracy theories or narratives and some of its features have intellectual ancestry in the post-structuralist, post-modern theories of knowledge from the 1960s onwards in academe that dispensed with grand narratives and sought to relativise knowledge by linking it to dominant power structures in society.

But post-truth is not primarily about getting lies accepted as truth but about creating such linguistic and epistemological confusion that it becomes harder to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the first place. This is a lesson that has been taken to heart by those intelligence services who have deployed “active measures” over the last century; from the secret police forces of the former USSR and GDR; to the CIA and Brigadier Frank Kitson of Low Intensity Operations Fame and Putin’s contemporary disinformation agents.

The 3 P Playbook

Levitsky and Ziblattt develop the following early warning signals for the rise of aspirant authoritarian leaders. Alarm bells should ring if they display any one of these four signs: when a politician (1) disavows, in words and action, the democratic rules of the game, (2) denies the legitimacy of their opponents, (3) tolerates or encourages violence or (4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media.[11]

Populist outsiders claim to be fighting on behalf of an amorphous mass – the “people”- against an undifferentiated entity – the corrupt, out of touch or theaconspiratorial “elite.” To put it very simply, the ubiquitous “us” against the ubiquitous “them” They proclaim to voters that they do not really live in a democracy at all but that the existing system has been hijacked or rigged by the elite. They promise to bury that elite and return power to the people. When populists do win elections, they often assault democratic institutions and procedures. In Latin America, for example, of all fifteen presidents elected in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2012, five were populist outsiders: Albert Fujimori, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, Lucio Gutierrez, and Hugo Chavez. All five proceeded to weaken democratic institutions.[12]

Death by Stealth

If democracy does die in a populist paradise, it will most likely not be through an act of force majeure like the Nazis Enabling Act in 1933 or by a military coup by a latter-day Franco or Pinochet. It will be through stealth; through the steady hollowing out of its guardrail institutions and checks and balances leading to multiple organ failure. It will be through changing the rules of the game by the steady and progressive capture of the referees; those intermediaries between the citizen and the state; those guardians of democratic culture and practice.

21st century autocrats work through the revenge of power: the steady erosion of the strategic safeguards or checks and balances that protect democracy, limit leaders’ opinions, and guarantee fair competition for power. At various times they attack the oversight powers of the legislative branch, other times the watchdog role of the press, judicial independence, or key checks on untrammeled executive power.[13]

The first rule of 3P is to always maintain the visible trappings of legality and constitutional order. They then corrode the law from inside through the strategy of pseudo-law: a corrupt facsimile of the rule of law that is, in fact its mortal enemy. Just as special interests such as the fossil fuel, tobacco and soft drinks industries adopt pseudoscience to cast doubt rather than directly refute mainstream science in order to undermine public health and environmental authorities (something similar is part of the strategies of anti-vaccination and anti-abortion choice campaigners) so pseudo-law appropriates the impression and trappings of the law to empty it of its meaning.[14]

Pseudo-law Making

Pseudo-law is Donald Trump’s executive order in January 2017 banning travel; from seven Muslim-majority countries on alleged national security grounds. It is Argentinian President slapping a ban on the export of Argentine beef on “food security” grounds when it was obvious that it was a means of punishing her critics in the beef industry. It is the Thai constitutional court in May 2103 ordering the popular but autocratic prime minister and her entire cabinet and concede power to a military junta. It is Brazil’s congress, in which three out of four deputies were under investigation for corruption in 2016 but was still able to impeach President Dilma Rousseff. It is the approval by Hungary in 2017 of a new law affecting branch campuses of foreign universities that was written in such a way as to only effect the Central European University (CEU), technically a US-registered university whose main campus operated in Hungary, but an academic institution in the crosshairs of Victor Orban’s regime because of its funding by George Soros which provided a secure livelihood to independent ac academics out of tune with Orban’s developing 3P regime.

The most ambitious[15] and infamous methods of pseudo-law concern extension of Presidential term-limits, gerrymandering of electoral boundaries and interference with or “packing” of the judicial organs of state. In true viral fashion these trends are replicated across the world.

Probably the most brazen way of circumventing Presidential term limits was Vladimir Putin’s arrangement with his long-serving Prime Minister, Dimitri Medvedev in 2008. Nearing the end of his second Presidential term; Putin was not permitted to run for a thirds term under Russia’s 1993 constitution. However, the constitution only limited consecutive terms so Putin decided to swap jobs with Medvedev for the 2008-12 term after which they would reverse roles but not before approving a constitutional amendment to extend the president’s term from four years to six. In March 2020 he had the Duma pass a law by 383 votes to nil allowing him to run for two more terms until 2036. The proposal was then endorsed by the electorate: with A 65 per cent turnout, 78 per cent of Russia’s voters agreed to it.[16]

So, in skillful pseudo-legal practice, this arrangement gutted the spirit and intention of the rule (to prevent excessive accumulation of power by a ruler) while not technically breaking it. One study has found that since the year 2000, presidential time limit evasion has become “exceedingly common” with two-thirds of the one third cohort of presidents who have attempted overstay successful in their attempts. The amendment strategy proved particularly popular in Africa where since 2015 where leaders in Burundi, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda declaring intentions to abolish or extend their countries’ term limits and President Sisi had notional term limits removed in 2019 [17] in another symbolic milestone in the Arab world’s regression from Spring to Winter.

In Latin America both Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez kept asking the same referendum question (in the case of the latter) to lift term limits until he got the desired answer in 2009 and, in the case of the former, getting his hand-picked constitutional tribunal to rule in 2107 , that the constitution was itself unconstitutional because its term limits violated the president’s innate human right to stand for election![18]

Possibly the clearest case of democratically elected leaders attempting to terminate term limits in the aftermath of electoral victory concerns the recently deposed Rajapaksa brothers in Sri Lanka. In mid-2020 the party of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the People’s Front, won a majority in Parliament which meant that the president’s brother, Hahinda, could continue as prime minister. The two brothers then proceeded to use their parliamentary supermajority to pass the Twentieth Amendment. This granted them the power to abolish a two-year term limit on the president; guaranteed the president immunity from prosecution and annulled parliamentary oversight of presidential appointments.[19] The chaos resulting from their catastrophic mismanagement of the economy put a premature end to this Putinesque operation as they were forced to flee the island.

Gerrymandering

America’s most award-winning entry into the canon of pseudo-law is gerrymandering. – the art of drawing election district lines to maximise one party’s representation over another. Named after Elbridge Gerry (a signatory to the Declaration of Independence) who as governor of Massachusetts between 1810 and 1812 put together a district map for the state senate that gave a huge electoral advantage to his own party’s candidate, it is achieved by “packing and cracking” the opposing party’s supporters which, if skillfully applied, can convert a minority of voters into a comfortable majority of elected seats.[20]

Gerrymandering is not unique to the US; redrawing of parliamentary constituencies in the UK often draws complaints from opposition parties that the process is designed to help the incumbent governing party stay in office. In Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972; local government electoral districts in predominantly Catholic/Nationalist cities and town like Derry and Omagh were redrawn to guarantee safe Protestant/Unionist majorities. Gerrymandering was one of the animating forces behind the NI Civil Rights movement in the late 1960s.

However, it is in the USA that its darkest legacy is to be found; namely the disenfranchisement of the African American Southern states in the post-Civil war, post - Reconstruction era. Under the 1867 Reconstruction Act and the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited suffrage limitations on account of race. African-Americans suddenly constituted a majority of the electorate in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana and a near-majority in Alabama, Florida, Georgia and North Carolina. Nationwide, the percentage of black males eligible to vote rose from 0.5 percent to 80.5 percent two years later.[21]

This mass enfranchisement of African Americans constituted a major threat of southern white control and to the political dominance of the Democratic Party. So, they changed the rules – and abolished democracy. “Give us a [constitutional convention] and I will fix it so that … the Negro shall never be heard from,” former Georgia senator proclaimed as Reconstruction neared its end. Between 1885 and 1908, all eleven post-Confederate states reformed their constitutions and electoral laws to disenfranchise African Americans. To comply with the letter of the law as laid out in the Fifteenth Amendment, no mention of race could be made in efforts to limit voting rights, so states introduced ostensibly “neutral poll taxes, property requirements, literacy tests, and complex written ballots. The intention and cumulative effect of these restrictions was to keep poor and illiterate blacks from the polls. And because African Americans were overwhelmingly Republican, their disenfranchisement could virtually guarantee the restoration of the Democrats’ electoral dominance. And on both counts these measures succeeded. Black turnout in the South plummeted from 61 percent in 1880 to just 2 percent in 1912. The Republican Party in the South disappeared locking in Jim Crow and one-party states in the South for nearly a century.[22].

A century later with voting rights granted to all regardless of race and the Democrats post-1968 having become the party of preference for most African Americans; the “good ole south” still has some useful tricks up their collective sleeves in the area of “packing and cracking”. For example, Mississippi’s Second Congressional District is two-thirds black, and Texas’s Fifteenth District is 80 percent Latino. When Democratic-voting minorities are packed or concentrated at such densities, the rest of the state is left with many more reliably Republican districts. North Carolina’s partisan gerrymander converted the Republicans’ 53 percent of the popular vote in the 2016 House of Representatives into 77 percent of the state’s seats in the of the state’s seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, with the Republicans winning ten of those thirteen seats. So, a state that is 22 per cent ended up with a congressional delegation that was less than 8 percent black. Worse, not even one of North Carolina’s thirteen congressional districts was decided by less than 12 percentage points.[23].

Such flagrant abuses of electoral procedures should make it plain that democracy is not safe anywhere even in its pioneer nation. As stark are the lessons from its history and present comes one from its near future in the form of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and its Trump 2.0 masterplan[24]. Addressed recently in Washington by Donald Trump replete with the familiar themes of cities overrun by violent crime, invasion by illegal aliens, the deep state, the media, and liberal elites, the AFPI is led by Brooke Rollins, a former domestic policy adviser in the White House. Rollins has boasted how the 15-month-old organisation has put “boots on the ground in 32 states on issues from “election integrity to school choice, patriotic education to healthcare transparency and taxes, border security to big-tech censorship”

The institute has 150 staff, including nine former Trump administration cabinet officials and more than 50 former senior staff and officials including Kelly Conway, former senior counsellor to the president who views the AFPI and its planned 22 “policy centres” as a way to preserve the Trump legacy and to “make sure that the entire body of work of the America First movement is all in one place.”

The summit basked in apocalyptic portraits of Biden and the Democrats as an existential threat to the American way of life. A “parent toolkit” warned of the perils of “wokeness, “critical race theory” and “the 1619 Project” [relating to slavery}. “Just rejoice at that news” was Rollins’ response to the overturning of Roe v Wade by the Supreme Court.

During one panel session Rick Perry, a former energy secretary, insisted that the next Republican administration would not be “genuflecting at the altar of environmentalism." Plans were discussed as to develop what Steve Bannon, former White House chief strategist, described as “the deconstruction of the administrative state,” centralizing power in the presidency power in the presidency as with other strongman leaders around the world.

The Axios website has also reported that Trump’s aides are aiming to transform federal government by replacing thousands of civil servants with devotees to him [or ideological soulmate] and America First. These plans include potentially stripping layers at the justice department, including the FBI, and reaching into national security, the State Department, and the Pentagon.

If nothing else the AFPI are producing in one place the ultimate 3P manual.

[1] Naim, Moises (2022) The Revenge of Power. How Autocrats Are Reinventing Politics for the 21st Century New York: St Martin’s Press

[2] Naim pp. XIV - XV

[3] Naimp.xv

[4] Naim pp. xv-xvi

[5] Muller, Jan-Werner (2021) Democracy Rules London: Allen Lane

[6] Naim, p.9

[7] Muller p.8

[8] Naim, pp. XVII - XVIII

[9] Naim, p.XVII

[10] Naim, p.XIX

[11] Levitsky, Steven &Ziblatt, Daniel (2019) How Democracies Die. What History Reveals About Our Future New York: Penguin pp.21-22

[12] Ibid, p.22

[13] Naim, p.4

[14] Naim, p.7

[15] Study published in 2020 in The Columbia Law Review by Mila Versteg, Tim Horley and Anne Meng et al

[16] Naim p.12

[17] Naim, pp.12-13

[18] Naim, p.13

[19] Naim

[20] Naim pp.14-15

[21] Levitsky and Ziblatt, p.89

[22][22] Ibid, pp.89-91

[23] Naim, p.15

[24] The Observer, 31st July 2022 Trump 2.0 masterplan. More extreme, more authoritarian, more ruthless.

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter. 

Threats To Democracy ✑ The Triple P Virus Of Populism, Polarisation And Post-Truths And Their Effective Antidotes

Barry Gilheany ✒ Much alarm and pessimism has been expressed about the future of democracy across the globe by commentators. 

The hubris about the triumph of liberal democracy and its “End of History” permanence which gushed from perennial optimists like Francis Fukuyama after the end of the Cold War has been replaced by anxiety about the waves of authoritarian, faux anti-establishment populism that have swept across the world in the second and third decades of the 21st century. Authors such as David Runciman[1] have seriously considered a terminus for democracy in an era where the pragmatic authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party replaces the liberal or representative democratic model of governance of the superpower whose role of supreme global hegemon, namely the United States, as the template for future governance. 

Others see the “illiberal democracy” as a lodestar; polities like Hungary, Poland and the Philippines where the principal of electoral mandates survives but where power is held exclusively by a latter day Caudillo (Bolinasario in Brazil or Duterte in the Philippines) or by ideological autocrats (like Fidesz in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland or the “Bolivarian” socialism of Nicholas Maduro in Venezuela) who maintain control through crippling the judiciary, independent media and civil society institutions and by packing key utility providers and enterprise agencies with party or personal cronies.

However, all may not be lost. The US democratic system has survived the near-death experience of the Trump presidency and the attempt by his followers in the insurrection on Capitol Hill on 6th January 2021 to thwart the transfer of power to the victor in the US Presidential Election of 2020, Joseph Biden. In Hungary, the opposition parties look like sinking their differences, anti-Fascist Popular Front style, and getting behind the Mayor of Budapest, Gergely Karascony, as a unity candidate in opposition to Victor Orban in the April 2022 general election.[2] In Brazil tens of thousands of protestors have taken to the streets in response to Bolinasario’s catastrophic handling (like Trump’s) of the Covid-19 pandemic. Ominously though this Trump protégé has hinted at a “Stop the Steal” campaign against the likely victory of his “illegitimate” and “anti-national” left-wing opponents in the forthcoming Presidential election and is summoning mobs of supporters for just that purpose.

Since it was the double earthquake that hit the Anglo-American political world in 2016; namely the vote to leave the European Union by UK voters in that year’s referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US President that has catalysed this all-pervasive angst about the future survival of democracy, it is appropriate to examine the defects in the British and US polities that have produced such upheavals. Specifically, it was shortcomings in the UK ‘s unwritten or, more exactly, uncodified constitution and in the written constitution of the US that sowed the seeds for the twin tremors. 

The philosopher A.C. Grayling in asking what a democratic order look should like and how it delivers for its citizens, proposes a rewriting of the principles and practices of democracy, and stipulates that good government needs to be fireproofed from the effects of partisan political conflict. He finds that the ‘Westminster Model, examples of which – exist in the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zeeland, India, Republic of Ireland, and nearly fifty other states including the US and other countries which have modified the Westminster Model into a presidential or hybrid form[3], is no longer fit for purpose. Why and how it can be refashioned for the 21st century is the subject of this article. But first it is necessary to clarify or restate what the concepts of democracy and democratic government is.

Democracy and its Principles

For Grayling, democracy is a political system in which the people appoint a government and instruct it to legislate and administer on their behalf, protecting and promoting their interests by responsible and informed action. The concept of democracy requires that government be viewed as the servant of the people, accountable to them and removable by them if it fails to fulfil its function appropriately and adequately[4].

Flowing from this elucidation of the concept of democracy are the following five points. (1) Democratic government is for all the people, not for a group, class, interest, or faction consisting only of part of the populace and acting primarily in their interests. This means (2) that democratic government is neither majoritarian or minoritarian, but inclusive in its aims, duties, and purposes because of the diversity of society in terms of individuals and minorities. A ‘majority’ is basically a temporary coalition of minorities relative to some issue. Democratic government is not majoritarian because not even a large majority can be permitted to violate minority and individual rights. Democratic government is not minoritarian as it is unacceptable for a particular group or faction to monopolise the drawing and administration of law and policy for all of society in its totality. In the event of consensus not being achieved, majority agreement is accepted as the way forward, unless it infringes minority rights.[5].

Despite the necessity of majority agreement in the absence of consensus, the condition of (1) that the first duty of government is to govern in the interests of all of the demos means that the government has to effectively transcend politics, in that political disagreement between different parties and interest groups about public policy choices has to be subordinated to the public interest once the public has decided its preferences at election time, concerning what they have heard in policy debates and what they desire to have deliberated on, implemented or altered.[6]

Because an electoral system (3) preferably of a Proportional Representation type for reasons that should become obvious, giving an accurate reflection of peoples’ preferences is required, the eventual electoral outcome will most likely result in a legislature in which no party has an overall majority. The compromises and agreements `needed to secure what is most likely to be a coalition executive are how government transcends narrow and partisan political desires. (4) Independent audits of the likely impact of legislation, under a constitutional mandate that the effect on all in the state should be explicitly evaluated, will help to ensure that the government itself is not hostage to faction but lives up to the democratic purpose of its existence: to serve all and the public good.[7]

The combined effects of these checks and balances are to prioritise the business government over the partisan rivalries of party politics which have their place in the electoral and deliberative processes but not to the extent that they render government hostage to partisan interests or negate its duty to the public. Since some of the Westminster Model systems are likely to be resistant towards the formal and physical separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, proportional system of representation will likely militate against the risks of one-party partisan rule such as the machinations of the more ideological actors of the ruling party[8]; the shrill voices of the Brexiteer ideologues in the ruling Conservative Party in the UK being a seminal case in point.

Whereas the formal duties and functions of the institutions of government can be formally codified in a written constitution, the latter can only partially regulate the informal aspects of politics – the main actors in politics and government and the news, information, and opinion media. While the duties and behaviour of representatives may be itemized explicitly in Codes of Conduct, the absence of full monitoring of the behaviour of representatives may render such mechanisms ineffective. The role of political activists and party machines in selecting and controlling representatives also requires scrutiny and transparency[9] as is evidenced by the rise to party leadership of controversial and divisive personalities such as PM Boris Johnson and former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn.

An independent fact checking agency would be an essential innovation.[10] Such a body would not censor the output of the print, broadcast and online media but would mandate the publishing of its findings on all platforms in order to give effective antidotes to the notoriously partisan nature of the British print media and the tsunami of misinformation (not least on Covid-19 and vaccination) and inflammatory content on Facebook, Twitter etc.[11]

To summarise: the principal flaw of contemporary Westminster Model democracies is the absence of a separation of powers, which turbo-charges the power of the executive, and therefore any force with influence in or on the executive. When buttressed by a First Past the Post (FPTP) voting system it is calamitous.

The UK and the ongoing Brexit debacle provides vivid proof of just how deleterious the system is. FPTP voting produces a majority in the House of Commons on minority not merely of the electorate as a whole but even of votes cast. The government is formed from this majority of MPs and, through the whipping system of party discipline and career dependency, controls it. The executive has total power because Parliament is sovereign, the House of Commons controls Parliament, and the executive controls the majority in the House of Commons.[12] Next the executive is controlled by the vigorous and partisan minority in the party itself, a power clique, self-selected and organised to advance an agenda[13]. The story of Brexit and how it upended the procedures and culture of liberal representative democracy is the story of how a rump of anti-EU MPs on the backbenches of the Conservative Party persistently undermined UK-EU relations and eventually persuaded former PM David Cameron to hold a binary referendum on EU membership. The Leave campaign won narrowly, transforming overnight a recalcitrant minority of obsessives into a power clique who with their control over the Tory grassroots and support from wealthy and partisan media interests have been able to secure a Hard Brexit without any proper Parliamentary scrutiny. For Grayling, democracy is the defence against the usurpation of power by some whose objectives (like those of Tory Brexiteers) are not consonant with what is optimal for all.[14]

Critical Infrastructure

In a similar vein to Grayling’s renewal agenda for democracy, Jan-Werner Muller proposes fundamental modifications to what he conceptualises as its “critical infrastructure” which like physical infrastructure facilitates the reaching of people and being reached by them.[15] Returning to the basic definitional roots of democracy, Muller discusses the dual nature or the two crucial sites of democracy. First, it requires a designated focus (and specified times) for collectively binding decision making – for the expression of political will through lawmaking; a majority getting its way, after the opposition has had its way. On the other hand, it requires a place for the dynamic formation of opinion preferences and political judgments in society at large; everyone has the right to express opinions and to participate at any level of decision making at any time.[16]

Decision making requires procedures, which always means clearly segmented time frames; elections are supposed to be held at regular intervals (in the case of the UK Parliament at fixed five-year intervals. Hence the first site of democracy is distinguished by a certain predictability. By contrast the realm of opinion formation or the public sphere can be, in the words of Jurgen Habermas, a space for “wild cacophonies”.[17]

The public sphere is independent of specific location and particular media technology developments. It can certainly be in special places, [18] be they the agora in ancient democratic Athens; the coffeehouses and salons of 18th century London or the sites of modern protest and revolution such as Tahrir Square, Maidan, and Tiananmen Square. By contrast the legislative site has a static locale; the office of Parliament which in the words of John Stuart Mill is:

… to be at once the nation’s Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion…[19]

It is through the interplay of the discourse of the public spere or civil society encompassing the media, interest groups, social movements etc., with the deliberative processes of Parliament that the two sites of democracy are connected.

Much anxiety has been expressed by proponents of liberal democracy about the corrosive effects of “misinformation,” “fake news” or “alternative facts,” often generated by populist movements or hostile actors weaponizing cyberspace with “sock puppets,” “bots” and conspiracy narratives. Public debate, it is feared, in what is becoming a Trumpian or Putinist dystopia is increasingly about objective “facts” themselves rather than on competing visions on policy and the public good. The starkest recent example of alternative reality was Donald Trump’s baseless claims to have won the 2020 US Presidential election and to have been subsequently cheated of his “victory”. Denial of climate change is another lethally damaging “alternative fact,” to say nothing of Q-Anon conspiracies and deliberate manufacture of Covid-19 stories.

It is thus important to make a fine but important distinction between “facts” and “truth.” As Hannah Arendt pronounced, opinions ought to be constrained by facts, but they are clearly partisan perspectives, and that is perfectly valid.[20]. Representative claims by parties that institute debates and conflicts are thus not principally claims about truth. Under conditions of pluralism, citizens arrive at different judgments depending on different life experiences, a different sense of how to assess facts and different subjective dispositions. Democracy thus can never be a project of establishing a single unitary whole truth in politics; a concept of the truth in politics is despotic and totalitarian in concept and application insisted Arendt[21]

As Christopher Lasch rightly points out:

What democracy requires is public debate, not information . . .  We do not know what we need to know until we ask the right questions, and we can identify the right questions only by subjecting our own ideas about the world to the test of public controversy”[22]

Civil society or intermediary institutions in order to promote the widest possible perspectives on the widest possible versions of reality need to enable both external and internal pluralism. External pluralism refers to the competiveness of the playing field where political parties, professional media and interest groups interact with each other . . .  The issue here is not whether one particular version of the truth wins out but the multiplication of creative representative groups in society; those who have innovative ideas about interests and identities ought to be able to test them out freely and find out if there are any takers.[23]

Internal pluralism refers to the desirability of having a diversity of viewpoints within individual intermediary institutions. Concretely this suggests that political parties ought to have proper internal democratic processes such as primaries or extensive debates preceding the election of party officers. Indeed, this practice is mandated in a number of constitutions. It is undeniable that internally democratic parties foster healthy democratic societies [24] but fixation on the mechanics of internal party democracy can enable “entryism;” the massive influx of people committed to changing its character completely as has happened with the entry of Trotskyists and other far left elements into the British Labour Party and other social democratic parties. [25] The experience of the Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn stands as a salutary lesson in that regard.

Also, parties must reach conclusive binding decisions and members must be willing to be a loyal opposition (which British Tory Eurosceptics have spectacularly failed to do with monumental consequences for the country at large) and the conundrum of, in the words of Aneurin Bevan, “having to listen to our own people” [26]to the detriment of the wider public interest.

Parties and media provide the essential infrastructure of democracy in that they facilitate association between citizens. Social media have been helpful for “platform parties while at the same time providing an existential threat to some forms of professional journalism and the quality of democratic discourse. Technology per se is not harmful to democracy but the utilization of it by surveillance machines aimed at predicting behaviour or even at making behaviour predictable and hardening resentment and polarization in the process.[27]

It has been the deficiencies of the Westminster model of democratic sovereignty that has helped to fuel the discontents of democracy and has contributed to the disaster of Brexit and its associated cultural divisions; an event which occurred because a small adamantine faction in the British Conservative party was able to bend the party and government to its will. Now that supposedly most pragmatic nation, the UK, is led by a government in thrall to the most extreme, revolutionary aspects of the Brexit project and mired in corruption and possibly law breaking. This must be a clarion call for the reform and renewal of liberal democracy for the 21st century.


Bibliography:

Grayling, A.C. (2021) The Good State. On the Principles of Democracy. London: Oneworld

Muller, Jan-Werner (2021) Democracy Rules. London: Allen Lane


[1] David Runciman (2019) “How Democracy Ends” London: Profile Books

[2] Nick Cohen “Meet the brave, consensual mayor set to face down Hungary’s autocrat” The Observer 19th September 2021

[3] A.C. Grayling (2021) “The Good State. On the Principles of Democracy2 London: Oneworld p.1

[4] Grayling, p.165

[5] Ibid, pp.165-66

[6] Ibid, p.166

[7] Ibid, p.166

[8] Ibid, p.167

[9] Ibid, p.168

[10]Ibid, p.169

[11]

[12] Ibid: pp.168-69

[13] Ibid: p170

[14] Ibid: p.170

[15] Jan-Werner Muller (2021) p.91

[16] Ibid, p.94

[17] Ibid, p.94

[18] Ibid, p.95

[19] John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” in On Liberty and other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p.282

[20] Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1977) pp.227-64

[21] Ibid.

[22] Christopher Lasch, “Journalism, Publicity, and the Lost Art of Argument”.” Gannett Center Journal (Spring 1990): pp.1-11

[23] Wener-Muiller, p.102

[24] Ibid, p.106

[25] Ibid, p.107

[26] Quoted in Adam Przeworski, Crises of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) p.63

[27] Werner-Muller, pp.137-38

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter. 

Crisis Of Democracy ✑ How To Repair A Broken Model