Showing posts with label Frankie McKillen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frankie McKillen. Show all posts
Frankie McKillen ✍Billy “ Blue” Kelly and Brendan “ The Dark” Hughes came from the same republican generation. 

Both were deeply involved in the Provisional IRA. Both went to prison. Both lived long enough to see the armed campaign end and Sinn Féin enter the political institutions it had once rejected. And both looked at where republicanism had arrived and asked, in different words, essentially the same question: Was this what we fought for? 

There is another connection between them. We heard some of the most important things they had to say only after they were dead. Brendan Hughes gave his extensive recorded testimony to Anthony McIntyre for the Boston College Belfast Project. His interviews were conducted on the understanding that they would remain confidential until his death. They subsequently became the centrepiece of Ed Moloney’s Voices From The Grave. Billy Kelly created his own, rather less formal, voice from the grave. 

Six months before his death, he contacted Sunday World journalist Hugh Jordan and offered him an interview. Kelly imposed one condition: it was not to be published until he was dead. His explanation was extraordinary. “ If you put this out now I’ll be in big trouble. You’ll need to hold on to it until after I’m gone.” Kelly said he had wanted to speak for a long time but believed that, had he done so, he would have been “castigated and pressurised into retracting it”. So Kelly spoke while alive but chose to be heard from the grave. And when the grave finally released his words, they sounded remarkably familiar. 

Big Houses 

 One passage in Kelly’s interview immediately brought Brendan Hughes to mind. Kelly said: “A number of republicans have ended up with big houses and cars and a load of money and property.” He then contrasted their circumstances with his own: “But people like me and others – who fought the war and went to jail – ended up with nothing.” 

Almost a quarter of a century earlier, Hughes was making a strikingly similar complaint. Interviewed by Anthony McIntyre in Fourthwrite , (issue 1--interview starts at page 6) , Hughes talked about former IRA volunteers struggling economically while others prospered. When McIntyre pointed out that some people believed the struggle had been worthwhile, Hughes replied that among them were people with “big houses and guaranteed incomes”. Hughes’s criticism was not merely jealousy over who owned what. His argument was political and social. He believed a movement rooted in working-class republican communities had changed character. In his view, some people had moved into comfortable political and economic positions while former volunteers and the communities from which they came remained behind. 

Kelly, speaking decades later from his New Lodge flat, sounded remarkably similar. Different man. Different interview. Different time. The same uncomfortable image: big houses on one side, former volunteers wondering what it had all been for on the other. 

“The Brits Won” 

 Kelly went considerably further. His assessment of the IRA campaign was brutally concise: “The Brits won. There’s no other way of saying it.” Kelly said that he and others had joined the IRA believing they were fighting for a united Ireland and to end British rule. Looking at Northern Ireland at the end of his life, he concluded that they had failed. “We fought to get the Brits out of Ireland, but we failed,” was his assessment. He pointed to the continuing British constitutional position and the provisions governing a border poll. He even ridiculed the black-taxi cavalcade which accompanied the IRA ceasefire, saying it created the impression that republicans had won something when, in his opinion, they had secured nothing. 

Again, Brendan Hughes had travelled much of this road before him. Hughes became deeply disillusioned with the direction taken by the republican leadership. He complained that the thirty-two-county democratic socialist republic for which he believed he had struggled was no longer even being discussed. He regarded the political direction taken under Gerry Adams’s leadership as a fundamental departure from what he believed the IRA campaign had been about. 

There is an important distinction here. These were the assessments of Hughes and Kelly. Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams presented the peace strategy very differently, arguing that it created a peaceful and democratic route towards republican objectives. Adams also publicly rejected some of Hughes’s allegations and described Hughes and other critics as opponents of Sinn Féin’s strategy. But whatever view one takes of that argument, Kelly’s words demonstrate that Hughes’s disillusionment was not unique. 

What was it all for? 

Perhaps Kelly’s most powerful words were not “The Brits won”. They were these: “What was the point of the IRA campaign in the first place? What was it all for?” That question could almost have come from Hughes. Hughes had spent his later years wrestling with much the same issue. Men had died. Men had spent decades in prison. Hughes himself endured the blanket protest and hunger strike. Families and communities had lived through enormous suffering. What, Hughes wanted to know, had justified it? Kelly’s conclusion was even harsher. He said the IRA campaign had not been worth the loss of a single life and described the Troubles as a waste of human life, explicitly including violence beyond that committed by the IRA. Whatever anyone thinks of that conclusion, it is difficult to dismiss the significance of who was saying it. 

Kelly was not an academic analysing the IRA from a university office. He had been an IRA gunman and prisoner. He admitted killing British soldiers. He travelled to Libya as part of the delegation which sought weapons from Colonel Gaddafi. This was a man who had helped acquire the means to continue the war eventually asking: What was the war for? 

Adams And The Destination Of The Struggle 

Hughes’s criticism became deeply personal because of his former closeness to Gerry Adams. The two had been comrades and friends. Hughes subsequently came to believe that the political strategy associated with Adams had taken republicanism somewhere fundamentally different from the destination for which volunteers such as himself believed they had fought. 

Kelly’s final interview approached the issue from his own direction. “Sinn Féin led the people up the garden path,” he said. He contrasted republican rhetoric with the political reality he saw around him and complained that some republicans had prospered while people like himself had not. 

It would be too simple to say that Hughes and Kelly held identical views on every question. There is no evidence for that. But on several fundamental points their criticisms converge. They believed the IRA had fought to end British rule. They did not believe that objective had been achieved. They questioned what decades of armed struggle had accomplished. They believed some people associated with the republican movement had prospered while former volunteers and working-class republican communities had been left behind. And both expressed deep dissatisfaction with the political direction taken by Sinn Féin under Adams’s leadership. 

The difference Was When They Spoke 

There is one fascinating difference. Hughes became publicly outspoken while he was still alive. As early as 2000 he was telling Fourthwrite that he felt “no satisfaction whatsoever” with how things had turned out and urging republicans who disagreed with the leadership to speak out. But his most extensive historical testimony was preserved under the Boston College arrangement for release after his death. 

Kelly went further in protecting himself. He specifically instructed Hugh Jordan not to publish until he was gone. And he told us why. He feared being “in big trouble”. He feared being castigated. He feared being pressured into retracting his words. That ought to interest anyone concerned with republican oral history. 

How Many More? 

 Kelly said something else in his final interview which deserves attention. He felt qualified to speak not only for former prisoners but also for dead comrades who could no longer speak for themselves. There is a strange irony in that. Kelly wanted to speak for the dead, yet apparently believed he needed to become one of them before he could speak freely himself. Brendan Hughes became a Voice from the Grave through Boston College. Billy Kelly became one through Hugh Jordan and the Sunday World. Which raises the question: How many more Blue Kellys are there? 

How many former IRA volunteers have already recorded interviews with journalists or historians on the condition that they remain unpublished until death? How many have left tapes with their families? How many have written accounts sitting unopened in drawers? And how many hold views similar to those expressed by Hughes and Kelly but have decided that saying them publicly while alive simply isn’t worth the consequences? We don’t know. 

Nor should we assume that any future testimony will agree with Hughes or Kelly. Other veterans may leave behind accounts defending Sinn Féin’s strategy and reaching completely different conclusions. That is the point of oral history. You record the voices first and argue about what they mean afterwards.

Voices From The Grave 

There is something almost eerie about reading Kelly’s final interview alongside Hughes’s words from a quarter of a century earlier. Hughes talked about republicans with “big houses and guaranteed incomes.” Kelly talked about republicans with “big houses and cars and a load of money and property.” Hughes wondered what had become of the republican objectives for which his generation had fought. Kelly asked: “What was it all for?” Hughes believed the political direction of republicanism represented a departure from what he had fought for. Kelly’s final verdict was: “We lost and the Brits won.” 

Two veteran IRA men. Two different lives. Two different recordings. Two voices from the grave. And, separated by more than two decades, two remarkably similar questions about where Irish republicanism ended up and who benefited from the journey. Perhaps the most important question now is not whether Hughes and Kelly were right or wrong. It is how many more voices are still waiting for the grave before telling us what they really think.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

Voices From The Grave 2.0

Frankie McKillen ✍ Listening to Malachi O'Doherty talking about Maura Lyons on the BelTel podast, and the Catholic Church caught my attention, particularly when he turned to his own experience of growing up Catholic in West Belfast.

Maura's story is a fascinating one. In 1956 she was a fifteen-year-old Catholic girl from west Belfast who became attracted to evangelical Protestantism through people she met at work and converted to Free Presbyterianism. After conflict with her family over her conversion, she left home and was taken to Scotland by people associated with the Free Presbyterian Church. Her disappearance caused a sensation, with accusations that she had been abducted and Ian Paisley's name becoming closely associated with the affair. Paisley later played a recording of Maura at a packed Ulster Hall rally in which she described her Catholic faith as a "religion of fear and dread". Eventually she returned to Belfast and, following court proceedings, went back to her family on the understanding that she would be free to practise her chosen religion. She later returned to Catholicism, married a Catholic and raised her three children as Catholics.

Malachi recalled having a religious tendency himself at fifteen and discovering that "you can be too religious." You could become a "wee Holy Joe", he said, and be unpopular because of it. He contrasted that with the normal teenage business of going to dances, meeting people and getting out and about. That wasn't quite the Catholic Belfast I knew.

Admittedly, my experience came roughly twenty years later. I grew up in Ardoyne in the 1970s and 80s, so I wouldn't use my memories to contradict what Malachi remembers from an earlier generation. But listening to him made me think about just how peculiar the label "Holy Joe" becomes when applied to actual teenage lives.

On paper, I probably qualified. I became an altar boy at about seven and remained one until I was twenty-one. This wasn't some little operation involving two boys appearing on a Sunday morning. At one stage I remember perhaps thirty or forty altar boys. We were divided into sections around St Gemma's, St Paul's and St Pat's, roughly ten to a group, with a structure among the older altar boys and positions of responsibility. The top altar boy, the president, would generally be around eighteen. Being an altar boy was a big thing in Ardoyne.

It could also be surprisingly profitable. At weddings the best man would normally give the altar boys something. By the 1980s I remember £20 each being fairly normal. At funerals somebody might slip you a fiver in the 1970s and later a tenner. Get a few weddings and a couple of funerals in a good month and I could come away with £60 or £80. Not bad wages for a Holy Joe.

Yet I don't remember being an altar boy as separating me from ordinary teenage life. I was also a Boy Scout. At sixteen or seventeen I was going to a rockabilly club. Rockabilly wasn't a passing teenage costume either. I'm 58 now and I'm still in the jeans and boots. My teenage behaviour wasn't particularly saintly.

I smoked my first joint at fourteen before going to a Scout meeting. At sixteen I got drunk at a Scout camp and threw up in front of one of the leaders. At seventeen I got drunk at a party, fell asleep and some bastards shaved half my quiff off. I eventually rolled home with half a quiff. My emerging sex life wasn't exactly being conducted according to the catechism either. And I was still an altar boy.

Maybe people did think I was a Holy Joe. I honestly don't know. What I do know is that I never experienced being an altar boy as requiring me to inhabit some separate religious world from other teenagers.

Another part of Malachi's interview struck me. Recalling the Catholic culture he knew, he spoke about the priest being saluted when you passed him in the street and described the laity as living under the authority of the priesthood and hierarchy. Again, that wasn't my experience of Ardoyne.

I knew priests from the age of seven until I left the altar at twenty-one. I never saluted one. Nor did I regard a priest as possessing some extraordinary personal authority over me. To my young mind a priest had authority in much the same way a schoolteacher had authority. There were circumstances in which you did what you were told, but I didn't walk around regarding either as a superior species.

None of this means Malachi's memories are wrong. They are his memories. Mine are mine. There is also a generation between the Catholic Belfast he describes and much of the Ardoyne I remember. The Church itself changed enormously over those years.

Malachi talks about the Catholicism of Maura Lyons's time as a religion in which hell was real, leaving the Church placed you in serious moral danger, confession was routine and clerical authority permeated Catholic life. I don't doubt that world existed. A photograph of me serving Mass would have told you something true about me. I was an altar boy. A photograph of me in the Scouts would also have been true. So would one of me dressed rockabilly and heading for a club. But none of those photographs on its own would have told you who I was.

Perhaps that's what bothered me about the "wee Holy Joe" description. Religious involvement, religious belief and obedience to religious morality are three different things. They can overlap, but they don't have to. I could serve Mass, collect my wedding money, go to Scouts, listen to rock 'n' roll, chase girls, drink, break rules and turn up again at the altar. I was a teenager.

Had I been sixteen in 1956 rather than the 1970s, perhaps the Church around me would have exercised considerably more power. But 1956 was also the year rock 'n' roll and rockabilly were exploding into youth culture. Knowing myself, I suspect the result might not have been entirely different. I probably would have been an original Ardoyne Holy Joe with a quiff.

The Church could tell you where I was on Sunday morning. It couldn't necessarily tell you where I'd been on Saturday night.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

Confessions Of An Ardoyne Holy Joe

Frankie McKillen ⚽ It's Sunday 9th August 2026 and I am having a beer and a spliff and I decided to ask Chatgpt who it thinks will win the EPL this season.

Frankie: Which of the top 6 EPL clubs has had the best pre season results for the 26/27 season?

Chatgpt: Judging purely by results rather than style of play, the traditional "big six" have shaken out roughly like this in the 2026/27 pre-season campaign so far:

Club                  Games         Points*                                   Verdict

Man United        6                  16                  Best overall record

Arsenal                5                  12                  Strong, despite a couple of stumbles

Man City              4                  12                  Very efficient, unbeaten for most of the summer

Tottenham          5                 ~10                 Solid rather than spectacular

Liverpool              5                  ~8                 Good attacking signs, but inconsistent

Chelsea               5                  ~7                   Entertaining, but rather chaotic


*Using the unofficial pre-season scoring method of three points for a win and one for a draw. Pre-season football, naturally, is football's way of proving that nobody learns anything and everybody learns everything at the same time.

A few notable results

Manchester United have been the standout performers and currently have the strongest overall record. Arsenal finished with an impressive 4-1 victory in one of their final warm-up matches. Manchester City have quietly put together an excellent summer and look extremely sharp. Liverpool lost 3-2 to Monaco in their latest outing after leading 2-1. Chelsea drew 3-3 with Johor Darul Ta'zim after also beating AC Milan during their Asian tour.

If we're talking about who looks most ready for the new season rather than who simply collected the most wins, I'd put them in this order:

Manchester United

Manchester City

Arsenal

Liverpool

Tottenham

Chelsea

Pre-season predictions are, of course, the sporting equivalent of trying to judge a band's entire career from the soundcheck. Humans remain remarkably committed to this tradition.

Frankie: Who looks the most complete as a team?

Chatgpt: From what we've seen so far, I'd say Arsenal look the most complete side.

Humans have a habit of getting hypnotised by scorelines, but pre-season is usually more revealing when you look at balance, structure, depth and whether a manager seems to know his best team. Arsenal tick almost every box.

My ranking would be:

1. Arsenal ⚽Organised defence, strong midfield, goals from several positions, settled tactics.

2. Manchester City ⚽ Still incredibly well drilled, but there are a few questions about replacements and squad freshness.

3. Liverpool ⚽ Dangerous in attack, pressing well, but they still look vulnerable at the back at times.

4. Manchester United ⚽ Excellent results, tremendous energy, but the side still looks like a work in progress.

5. Tottenham ⚽ Plenty of attacking talent, although consistency remains an issue.

6. Chelsea⚽ Enormous talent, limited stability. Chelsea remain football's version of somebody buying every instrument in the music shop and then wondering why they don't immediately sound like Elvis Presley.

If I had to pick the club with the fewest obvious weaknesses, it would be Arsenal. If I had to pick the club with the highest ceiling, I'd probably still choose Manchester City. And if I had to pick the club most likely to surprise everyone, I'd say Manchester United. Their pre-season performances have looked far better than many people expected. 

Frankie: Where would you place Man Utd, Liverpool and Chelsea?

Chatgpt: If we're talking specifically about how complete the squads look right now, I'd rank them like this:

Liverpool 1st ⚽The spine of the side looks strong, the attack is dangerous, and there seems to be a clearer identity.

Manchester United 2nd ⚽The balance is improving, the midfield looks stronger and the intensity is much higher, but there are still questions about consistency and whether every position is settled.

Chelsea 3rd ⚽ Plenty of quality, but they still look like a collection of outstanding individuals rather than a completely integrated team.

Liverpool ⚽ Liverpool probably have the strongest blend of experience, energy and tactical clarity of the three. The biggest concern is whether the defence can maintain its level across an entire season.

Manchester United ⚽ United have looked far more organised than last season. Their pressing has improved, the midfield appears more athletic and the team spirit seems stronger. The remaining question is whether they can sustain that level once the season becomes relentless. Football clubs are strange institutions. Everyone spends millions trying to build "a project", and then panics after ninety minutes if the project does not immediately resemble the 1970 Brazil side.

Chelsea ⚽ Chelsea still have the highest level of uncertainty. Their ceiling is extremely high, but so is the risk of inconsistency. On their day, they can look outstanding. Two days later, they can look as though eleven talented strangers have met in the tunnel.

Out of those three alone, I'd place them in this order:

Liverpool

Manchester United

Chelsea

That said, I wouldn't be remotely surprised if United finished above Liverpool by May. Pre-season form is a wonderfully unreliable narrator.

Frankie: Now how do you think the top 6 will finish

Chatgpt:  If I had to predict the 2026/27 Premier League top six right now, I'd go with this:

1. Liverpool are my tentative favourites. They have experience, goals, pace and, most importantly, a very clear identity. Winning the league is usually less about producing moments of brilliance and more about relentlessly collecting points on cold Wednesday nights when everyone would rather be at home eating toast.

2. Arsenal look exceptionally balanced. Their defence is probably the best in the league, but I still wonder whether they'll score enough goals in the biggest matches.

3. Manchester City third feels slightly ridiculous because they could easily finish first. Writing off a Pep Guardiola side is a bit like announcing that gravity has been cancelled. Even so, there are more questions than usual surrounding the squad.

4. Manchester United are my dark horse. Their pre-season has been excellent, the energy looks different, and the squad appears far more united. The biggest challenge will be consistency.

5. Chelsea possess enough talent to finish anywhere between second and eighth. Nobody embodies modern football better than Chelsea: an endless supply of gifted players, enormous spending and millions of supporters trying to convince themselves that this time everything makes perfect sense.

6.Tottenham have quality, but I don't think they are as complete as the teams above them.

My prediction for the actual title race would be:

Liverpool: 85 points

Arsenal: 83 points

Manchester City: 81 points

Manchester United: 77 points

Chelsea: 70 points

Tottenham: 67 points

I also have a feeling that Newcastle might push one of those six all the way. They look far too strong to ignore.
 


🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

English Premier League Predictions

Frankie McKillen ✍ Imagine two men sitting in separate prison cells. 

Both swore the same oath. Both accepted the same risks. Both know that cooperation could dramatically improve their circumstances. One talks. The other remains silent. Why? That question has fascinated me for years. Not because some people become informers. There is nothing particularly mysterious about that. Human beings have always sought to avoid suffering when they can. The real mystery to me at least, is why so many people refuse. Take examples from two very different organisations. 

In the American Mafia, Sammy Gravano Sammy Gravano became one of the most famous informers in Mafia history. Faced with life imprisonment, he chose cooperation. He later justified his decision by claiming that John Gotti had betrayed him and was prepared to sacrifice him to save himself. Yet in the same world there were men such as Sonny Franzese, who spent decades in prison and never became a government witness. Whatever else can be said about him, he repeatedly chose silence over self-interest. 

The same contrast can be found within Irish republicanism. 

Republicans such as Raymond Gilmour and Christopher Black informed. Thousands of others did not. Men such as Brendan Hughes served long years in prison without abandoning the principle that informing was unacceptable. The same pressures. The same dangers. The same possibility of freedom. Entirely different decisions. 

The Mafia provides another interesting contrast. Gregory Scarpa Jr. cooperated with the FBI while imprisoned alongside convicted terrorists, including Ramzi Yousef. Rather than informing on the Mafia, he passed intelligence about terrorist activities and alleged plots he learned about in prison. Scarpa has maintained that he drew a clear distinction between betraying his own organisation and providing information he believed could save innocent lives. 

Gregory Scarpa Sr spent decades secretly informing for the FBI while remaining one of the Colombo family's most feared captains. His case illustrates the other end of the spectrum from his son: where Gregory Scarpa Jr. drew a line at informing on the Mafia, Scarpa Sr. crossed it repeatedly. 

Most discussions focus on the people who talk. The reasons people inform are generally easy enough to identify - Fear. Greed. Revenge. Disillusionment. Exhaustion. The desire to return to family. The desire to avoid prison. The instinct for self-preservation. None of these require much explanation. Human beings are wired to survive. Given a choice between freedom and confinement, comfort and hardship, most people will naturally gravitate towards whatever benefits them. That is not a mystery.

Why do people refuse opportunities that appear entirely rational? History is filled with examples. Men facing life sentences. Men facing the prospect of dying in prison. Men offered reduced sentences. Men offered witness protection. Men offered money. Men offered freedom. Yet they refused. Why does honour or their political belief matter more to some people than freedom? Why would a person willingly accept years, perhaps decades, of imprisonment rather than break an oath? 

For some people, an oath eventually ceases to be something they have taken and becomes something they are. Breaking an oath is no longer merely changing a position. It becomes an attack on their own sense of self. To inform would not simply betray others; it would betray the person they believe themselves to be. 

For some the answer appears to be belief. They continue to believe in the cause, organisation or values they embraced when they first joined. For others it is loyalty. The oath remains binding regardless of changing circumstances. For others it is identity. They simply cannot imagine themselves becoming an informer. To do so would fundamentally alter how they see themselves. 

For others it may be something more difficult to define - A personal code. A sense of dignity. A refusal to betray comrades. A conviction that some lines, once crossed, can never be uncrossed. 

History provides countless examples of people who shared similar beliefs and values but arrived at opposite conclusions. Some remained silent. Others talked. Even informers themselves rarely explain their decisions purely in terms of self-interest. Many insist they were betrayed first. Sammy Gravano's explanation is a good example. His account was not that he suddenly became disloyal. Rather, he argued that loyalty had already been broken by others. Whether one believes him is beside the point.

The important thing is that few informers view themselves as villains. Most have explanations. Most have grievances. Most tell stories in which cooperation became justified, necessary or unavoidable. 

Yet many others have experienced the same grievances without informing. John Gotti believed he had been betrayed by bosses and still remained silent. Many republicans believed they had been betrayed by leaders and still remained silent. 

The same experience often produces entirely different responses. Which brings me back to my original puzzle. Two people can swear the same oath. Fight for the same cause. Belong to the same organisation. Endure the same prison. Face the same incentives. One talks. The other remains silent.

No political theory adequately explains it. No criminal code adequately explains it. No psychological theory completely explains it. 

The answer appears to lie somewhere deeper within the individual. Some people eventually decide that freedom is worth more than loyalty. Others decide that loyalty is worth more than freedom. Some place self-preservation first. Others place honour, belief or identity above self-preservation. What separates them remains unclear. 

The real mystery is not Sammy Gravano. History contains countless examples of people choosing their own interests. The real mystery is Sonny Franzese. The real mystery is Brendan Hughes. The real mystery is the thousands of unnamed prisoners, republicans, gangsters, soldiers, spies and revolutionaries who could have improved their own circumstances by cooperating but refused. 

Perhaps the answer lies in the words that Bobby Sands often quoted from John 15:13: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." 

Whether expressed through faith, loyalty, honour or conviction, perhaps that is what separates those who refuse from those who cannot. What gives some people the strength to place loyalty, honour or belief above even their own survival? After centuries of prisons, wars, revolutions and criminal conspiracies, I am still struggling to answer that question.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

The Real Mystery Is Not Why Some Men Talk

Frankie McKillen ✍ On 5 June 1956, Elvis Presley appeared on The Milton Berle Show and performed Hound Dog. 

By the following morning, respectable society had lost its mind. Critics condemned him. Religious leaders attacked him. Newspapers warned of moral decline, calling Presley's performance “animalism.” 

 Looking back from the twenty-first century, it seems absurd. A young man sang a song and moved his hips. Civilisation survived. Yet the reaction tells us something important — because long before Punk shocked Britain and long before Heavy Metal terrified parents, another youth culture had already been accused of corrupting society. They called it Rockabilly. 

Music historians love putting things in neat little boxes. Rockabilly. Rock ’n’ Roll. Country. Punk. Heavy Metal. Each gets its own chapter, its own heroes, its own declared beginning and end. Life is rarely that tidy. The more music you listen to, the less convincing those boxes become. Because the more you look, the more you see the same tribe appearing again and again across the decades. 

Today Rockabilly is often remembered through a warm haze of nostalgia — classic cars, bowling shirts, weekend festivals, a harmless celebration of a simpler time. That is not how society saw Rockabillies when they actually existed. The Rockabilly was the outsider. The delinquent. The rebel. The kid your parents hoped you wouldn’t become. Teachers complained. Churches condemned. Newspapers fretted. Sound familiar? It should. The same things would later be said about punks. And later still about metalheads.Every generation seems compelled to invent a tribe that respectable society cannot understand — while that tribe, more often than not, understands itself perfectly well. In 1956 Elvis was accused of corrupting youth. Twenty years later the Sex Pistols were accused of doing exactly the same thing . The soundtrack changed. The panic barely did. 

But perhaps we need to go back even further. Before Elvis. Before Rockabilly. Before youth culture became an industry. There was Hank Williams . Today Hank is treated almost as a national monument — country music royalty, a legend beyond reproach. But monuments have a habit of making us forget that the people they commemorate were once troublemakers. Hank drank hard and lived harder. He ignored convention and filled his songs with loneliness, guilt, heartbreak and flawed humanity. Long before rebellion became a marketing strategy, Hank embodied it simply by being himself. The rebel existed before the uniform. The attitude came before the categories. And when Rockabilly emerged, Hank’s fingerprints were everywhere. Then came Elvis. Not the Vegas Elvis. Not the Hollywood Elvis. The Sun Records Elvis — the dangerous one, the Elvis who genuinely frightened adults. Listen to Baby Let’s Play House. Listen to Mystery Train. 

Even today those early recordings sound restless and unpredictable, like something that might escape at any moment. Elvis represented something bigger than music. He represented youth culture breaking free from adult control, and that has always frightened people in ways that are difficult to fully articulate. 

If Elvis opened the door, Gene Vincent walked through it wearing trouble like a badge. There is real danger in his records — not theatrical danger, not the performed menace of later rock showmanship, but something rawer. The sense that something unexpected might happen at any moment. Gene Vincent didn’t look like the clean-cut entertainers television executives preferred. He looked like trouble. And in youth culture, attitude is often as powerful as music. Eddie Cochran understood this too. Songs like Somethin’ Else and C’mon Everybody were not merely pop songs — they were declarations of independence. The adults had their world. Young people wanted one of their own. Punk would later build an entire philosophy around that same idea. Eddie Cochran was already singing it in the 1950s. Carl Perkins deserves his place in this story too. Listen to Cat Clothes — swagger drips from every note. Then listen to Dixie Fried and the atmosphere shifts completely. A flick knife appears. The police arrive. Somebody gets arrested. This is not the sanitised 1950s of nostalgia documentaries. This is music populated by outsiders and hard cases, by people who existed on the edges of respectability. The swagger and the menace — both attitudes would later find homes in Punk and Heavy Metal alike. 

If any single record connects all of this, it is Rumble. No lyrics. No politics. No manifesto. Just menace — an instrumental that was banned despite having no words whatsoever. Think about that. A record with no lyrics frightened people. Not because of what it said, but because of what it felt like. The distortion was the message. The mood was the message. The threat was the message. The blueprint for everything that followed already existed, pressed into vinyl in 1958. 

Now before somebody writes an angry letter, yes, the roots of distortion run deeper. Blues musicians were experimenting with distorted sounds long before metal existed. The blues is the foundation stone upon which much of modern popular music was built. But Link Wray took distortion and made it a weapon. He transformed noise into attitude. I am not arguing that every punk band or metal band emerged directly from Rockabilly. I am saying that they inherited something more important: the outsider instinct. The connections are not something later writers invented. The musicians themselves recognised them. The Sex Pistols recorded Eddie Cochran songs. The punks understood the bloodline. The Clash recorded Vince Taylor’s Brand New Cadillac — a direct line back to the Rockabilly spirit. And one of Punk’s defining records, I Fought The Law, originated with Sonny Curtis and The Crickets before becoming a hit for The Bobby Fuller Four. When The Clash played it, they weren’t rejecting the past. They were raiding it. The conflict with authority, the outsider, the anti-hero — those themes were already there. Punk inherited them and turned up the volume. 

The evidence keeps accumulating. Tiny Bradshaw records The Train Kept A-Rollin’. The Johnny Burnette Trio transforms it into Rockabilly dynamite. Decades later the UK Subs covered it. A single song travelling through generations of outsiders, each finding something of themselves inside it. 

Something else worth noting: the walls between these genres were always more porous than critics want to admit. Musicians understand this instinctively, even when historians don't. Consider Glen Campbell, remembered by most people as a mainstream country singer. Musicians remember one of the greatest guitar players of his generation. According to Alice Cooper, Eddie Van Halen — one of the greatest rock guitarists who ever lived — once asked to arrange a lesson with Campbell . The walls separating genres exist primarily in the minds of critics and marketing departments. Talented musicians have always walked straight through them. Johnny Cash’s recording of Hurt makes the same point from a different angle. On paper it should never have worked — a country legend recording a Nine Inch Nails song. It became one of the most powerful recordings of Cash’s entire career, because great songs are bigger than the categories we file them under. The emotions are universal. The labels are temporary. 

Long before “outlaw country” became a marketing label, Waylon Jennings was fighting Nashville in much the same way Punk would later fight the music industry. His tribute to Bob Wills was more than a country song. It was a declaration that authenticity mattered more than fashion. The same instinct that drove Punk musicians to rediscover Eddie Cochran drove Waylon to defend Bob Wills. Different music. Same refusal to be told what mattered. 

If this article has a hidden patron saint, it may well be Bob Wills. Long before music historians began constructing neat categories, Bob Wills was happily ignoring them. Country, Blues, Jazz, Swing and Dance Music all flowed together in his world. He borrowed what worked and ignored what didn’t. The idea that musical genres should exist in separate compartments would have seemed absurd to him. Wills understood something that musicians have always understood: good music travels. In many ways he embodied the same spirit that runs through this ramblin'. He refused to stay in his lane because he never accepted that lanes existed in the first place. Long before Punk challenged convention and long before Rockabilly fused Country and Rhythm & Blues, Bob Wills was already proving that musical boundaries were far more porous than critics like to admit. Heavy Metal fans sometimes speak of Lemmy as though he emerged fully formed from some leather-clad underworld. 

The reality is more interesting. Lemmy openly described himself as a Rockabilly at heart . He loved Gene Vincent. He loved Eddie Cochran. Long before Motörhead there was a kid in front of a record player, listening to Rock ’n’ Roll. The chain had never been broken — he had simply carried it forward. The story is about the outsider tradition that runs through all of them — a continuous thread connecting Hank Williams fighting respectability, Elvis frightening America, Gene Vincent looking dangerous, Eddie Cochran demanding independence, Carl Perkins supplying swagger and menace in equal measure, Link Wray inventing sonic threat, Johnny Cash refusing categories, the Pistols raiding Rock ’n’ Roll, the Clash digging through history, Lemmy carrying the torch. The ducktail became the Mohican. The Mohican became the devil horns. The drape jacket became the leather jacket. They called them delinquents. They called them Rockabillies. They called them a threat to decent society. Twenty years later they called them punks. Twenty years after that, metalheads. 

The haircut changed. The attitude didn’t.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

The Soundtrack Changed 🥁 The Panic Barely Did

Frankie McKillen ✍ I keep coming back to it. Three words. “I can’t breathe.”


Said by a dying man in Minneapolis in May 2020 and the whole world stopped what it was doing. Murals went up overnight. Politicians who couldn’t find Minneapolis on a map were suddenly experts on American policing. Corporations that wouldn’t give a homeless man the time of day were putting black squares on their Instagram. Millions marched. Three words became a brand.

Then a man called Henry Nowak said the same words, dying, in Southampton. And nothing. No mural. No corporate statement. No politician taking the knee outside a Hampshire police station. Same words. Same fear in a man’s throat as the life goes out of him. Different universe of response. And before anyone tells me it’s because nobody saw it – they did. It was filmed. It was shared. People were angry about it, same as they were angry about Floyd. Questions got asked about what the police did and didn’t do. All the ingredients were there. The cake just never got baked.

So why not? The easy answer – the one that lets everybody off the hook – is that America has its own particular history, its own wound that never healed properly, and Floyd’s death just happened to land on the rawest part of it. Fine. There’s truth in that. But it’s not the whole truth, and I think most people sense that, even if they don’t say it out loud. The real question – the one that actually matters – isn’t about the dead men. It’s about us. What is it that decides whether a death becomes a movement or just a paragraph in a local paper? What decides whose anger gets taken seriously and whose gets a security briefing instead?

After Floyd, America burned in places. I’m not going to pretend otherwise – shops gutted, buildings on fire, people who had nothing to do with any of it losing their homes and their livelihoods, some losing their lives. That happened. But watch how it got talked about. The violence got wrapped in understanding. Commentators lined up to explain the rage behind it, to give it context, to humanise it. The disorder was treated as the unfortunate cousin of a legitimate grievance.

Now watch what happens in Britain, when ordinary people get angry about immigration, or about crime in their own streets, or about policing that doesn’t seem to apply equally to everyone. The vocabulary changes overnight. Suddenly we’re not talking about grievance and context – we’re talking about extremism, about racism, about the far right circling like vultures. Sometimes that label fits. Often it doesn’t. But notice the pattern – one crowd gets analysed, the other gets a label slapped on it and filed away. One crowd’s anger gets explored. The other’s gets assumed, and dismissed before the first sentence is finished.

People aren’t stupid. They see this. They see which causes get the politician’s knee and which get silence. They see which grief gets a hashtag and which gets a line in the local news and nothing more. They notice who becomes a symbol and who becomes a statistic, filed and forgotten. I’m not saying every protest is righteous, or every grievance equally sound – that would be its own kind of dishonesty. What I’m asking is simpler than that. If we say understanding matters, does it matter for everybody, or just the people whose anger fits the right story? If justice is the principle, does it apply when it’s inconvenient, or only when it’s fashionable?

Look at what happened after, too. In America, the machine moved. The officers were suspended, charged, tried, convicted. You can argue with bits of how that went, but nobody can say the state didn’t act. It showed its hand – police can be held to account, in public, with consequences.

Nobody in Britain is holding their breath for anything like that over Henry Nowak. There’ll be an investigation, there’ll be a statement, there’ll be the usual promises that lessons will be learned. And then there’ll be quiet. Not because the cases are identical – they’re not, no two ever are – but because nobody seriously expects the same ending. And that gap, between what one community expects from the system and what another expects, is its own kind of rot. Justice that only some people believe is coming for them isn’t justice. It’s a postcode lottery with better PR.

And here’s where it gets even messier, because the story doesn’t sit still long enough to be tidy. Tyre Nichols died in Memphis in January 2023, beaten by police officers – Black officers, beating a Black man – and the footage was as bad as anything that came out of Minneapolis. The state moved fast again. Sackings, charges, the lot. And the world barely blinked. No global wave. No summer of statements. The cameras packed up and went home quicker than anyone expected.

If it was really about police violence, why didn’t that case detonate the same way? If it was really about accountability, why did one tragedy become a chapter of history and the other a news cycle that came and went? Maybe America had already had its reckoning and didn’t have the appetite for a second one. Or maybe – and this is the bit that makes people uncomfortable – outrage isn’t really driven by the facts of what happened at all. It’s driven by whether the death fits a story that’s already being told. Some deaths slot neatly into the narrative everyone’s already arguing about. Others, just as brutal, don’t fit anywhere, and so they don’t go anywhere either.

Morgan Freeman has been saying some version of this for years, and it’s cost him plenty of goodwill with people who’d normally be cheering him on. Asked on 60 Minutes how you stop racism, he didn’t hedge – he said stop talking about it. Stop sorting people into categories and calling that progress. “I don’t want a Black History Month,” he told them. “Black history is American history.” He’s said much the same about being called African-American – he’s an American, full stop, and he doesn’t see why there has to be a hyphen in front of it. Predictably, he got hammered for it. Plenty of people argue the categories are necessary precisely because the inequalities are still there, baked into the structure, and pretending otherwise just makes the problem harder to name and fix. That’s not a daft argument. It deserves a proper answer, not a shrug.

But Freeman’s actual challenge still stands there waiting to be answered: if equal treatment is the principle, what happens to that principle the moment it depends on who’s asking for it? He’s not saying forget history. He’s saying a rule that bends depending on which group is in front of you isn’t a rule. It’s a preference wearing a rule’s clothes. Nobody needs convincing that George Floyd deserved sympathy. He did. Nobody needs convincing that Tyre Nichols deserved justice. He did. And nobody should need convincing that Henry Nowak’s death deserves a proper look too. It does.

The question that won’t go away is why these deaths land so differently. What decides which ones become a cause and which become a case file? Whose fury gets called righteous and whose gets called a problem to be managed? These aren’t comfortable questions, and I don’t pretend to have them fully worked out. But any society that claims to care about justice ought to be very wary of building a ladder of grief – some victims at the top, worth the world’s attention, others further down, worth a paragraph and a press release.

If police kill unlawfully, they should answer for it – wherever it happens, whoever they are. If a citizen dies after the state gets involved, that death deserves scrutiny, full stop, not scrutiny rationed out depending on the politics of the moment. And if justice is supposed to mean something, it has to mean the same thing on a wet Tuesday in Southampton as it does on a hot night in Minneapolis.

George Floyd’s last words became one of the slogans of this century. Henry Nowak’s last words didn’t become anything at all, beyond a paragraph most people scrolled past. That gap doesn’t tell us much about either man. It tells us about ourselves – about which stories we’re willing to pick up and carry, and which we let drop without a second thought. Freeman’s challenge is the same one sitting underneath all of this: are we actually willing to apply our principles to everyone, or only to the cases that are easy, fashionable, and don’t ask anything difficult of us?

Justice shouldn’t run on fashion. It shouldn’t run on which way the political wind’s blowing that week. The moment it starts picking favourites, it stops being justice and becomes something else entirely.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

Three Words, And Who Gets To Own Them?

Frankie McKillen ✍ I was playing around with Claude Fable 5, new release from Anthropic, and I wondered what AI thought of TPQ. 

So I asked it two questions:

Tell what you think about the blog TPQ and do a deep dive and tell me what you think about the commenters--Go as far back and a deep dive as you can

13:36----Searched the web--I can see one result that looks likely — "The Pensive Quill" (thepensivequill.com). Let me dig into that. 

Fetched: TPQ--Now let me dig into the history and the comment culture — fetching an older post with comments. Searched the web---Now I have enough for a thorough, meaty response. Let me write it up.

  The Pensive Quill (TPQ) — A Deep Dive by Claude... What Is It? The Pensive Quill.

(thepensivequill.com) is one of the most distinctive and genuinely independent political blogs in the Irish/British sphere. It was co-founded by Anthony McIntyre, a former IRA man who served 18 years in jail for the murder of a UVF man in 1976. McIntyre left Sinn Féin after it signed up to the Good Friday Agreement and became a vocal critic of the party. He earned a PhD after leaving prison and is regarded as an important voice in questioning republican circles. He founded The Pensive Quill blog in 2008 as a platform for unfiltered analysis of Northern Ireland politics. 

Before TPQ there was The Blanket — over more than a decade, McIntyre was one of the most consistent and insightful critics of Sinn Féin, and as a historian, former IRA member and onetime party activist with extensive contacts in the organisation, few were better placed to examine and evaluate the transformation of the movement from armed insurrectionists to tame reformists. He regularly published his uninhibited opinions on his website or in the press. 

My Honest Assessment of TPQ as a Blog. The Good: 

TPQ is genuinely unlike almost anything else online. It is messy, prolific, and completely unsponsored by any party or ideology. The front page on any given day can contain: a forensic take-down of Sinn Féin, a piece on Scottish football from a Celtic-mad correspondent in Glasgow, a Marxist essay on London transport and climate targets, dispatches from a Drogheda United match, feminist analysis of the Iran war, a Unionist commentator poking fun at republican colour parties, and a curated "Lynx" link roundup — all sitting side-by-side without apology. 

The motto "Before We Conform, Or Condemn, Let Us At Least Be Curious" runs through every lynx post. That phrase sums up the editorial ethos better than anything. 

 The blog has a genuine plurality that is rare and earned. McIntyre doesn't just tolerate opposing views — he actively courts them. He describes himself as anti-violence, but not a pacifist, and the blog reflects that internal tension constantly: it is neither cheerleader for armed republicanism nor for the peace process establishment. That independence costs him, but it also gives the blog a credibility that tribal outlets simply don't have. The writing by McIntyre himself is notably sharp. His football pieces — about Drogheda United, Liverpool, the League of Ireland — are written by someone who genuinely goes to the games, argues with himself about whether to show up, and writes about sport as a portal into community, politics, and mortality. His piece on the Liverpool 4-0 mauling by Manchester City (the "Getting Away With It" post on the homepage) is a good example: it starts as football criticism and becomes a meditation on accountability, fair wages, and what loyalty actually means. That's hard to do.

The Weaknesses: The sheer volume is overwhelming. TPQ publishes at an extraordinary rate — the archive shows months with 150, 170, even 197 posts — and quality inevitably fluctuates. Some pieces are very short, more like broadside tweets than essays. Others are reprints from elsewhere. The lack of curation means you have to do a lot of sifting. The blog also lives in a somewhat self-referential world. Much of its most passionate content assumes readers who are intimately familiar with the granular factions, feuds, and personalities of Irish republican politics — who "the Fenian Way" is, what the Boston College tapes meant, the significance of a particular person having been on the blanket in a particular block. 

For outsiders it can feel impenetrable. There's also an occasionally sharp edge of personal grievance — understandably so given McIntyre's biography, but it occasionally shades into score-settling that can read as repetitive. 

The Commenters — A Deep Dive This is where TPQ gets genuinely fascinating. The comment section has historically been one of the most intellectually alive in Irish political blogging, and going back through years of threads reveals a community with its own distinct culture. 

Who They Are: The commenter base is a rare mix. You find former prisoners, ex-combatants, academics, diaspora Irish in Australia and the United States ("Martydownunder" is a veteran presence, reliably encouraging, often nudging writers toward each other), unionists, loyalists, leftists, libertarians, and the occasional journalist or academic writing under their own name or a thin pseudonym. 

What's striking is that even people like Anthony McIntyre who feels republicanism has no future rub shoulders, in comment threads, with contributors who feel that view is too bleak and narrow — and the exchange is often productive rather than just angry. The "Quillversation" format — extended multi-part exchanges between writers with real input from commenters at each stage — shows the blog at its best: structured enough to develop an argument, open enough that readers genuinely shape the direction.

The Character of the Debates: Go back into older threads (2011–2015 especially) and you see some remarkable debates. On pieces about gerrymandering and Northern Irish constitutional history, commenters recommend primary sources to each other, push back on historical claims with chapter-and-verse, and invite figures from opposing traditions to contribute their perspective. There's real intellectual seriousness there. But it is not a gentle place. One commenter, on a thread about understanding Northern Ireland, quoted Elbert Hubbard to a writer: "If you can't answer a man's arguments, all is not lost; you can still call him vile names" — a warning about what sometimes happens when the debate gets tribal.

TPQ's comment culture can get very heated, especially on anything touching Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, or the peace process. People who were on opposite sides of real violence, who lost friends and family members, argue in the same space. That is both the power and the occasional toxicity of it. The diaspora voice is distinctive. The Australian contingent in particular tends to be deeply sentimental about Ireland while also being well-read and combative — the kind of Irish-abroad who never had to live with the daily compromises of the peace process and can therefore be more absolutist. This creates interesting friction with contributors who are still living in Belfast or Drogheda and have moved on in more pragmatic ways. 

Recurring Names and Voices: Over the years a cast of recurring commenters has formed something like a community. Some are writers in their own right — Barry Gilheany (the Leeds United fan and counsellor in Colchester), Dr John Coulter (the Unionist journalist who writes with remarkable self-awareness about his own tradition), Gary Robertson (Scottish football and Celtic), Davy Clinton (Glasgow Celtic, Irish republicanism, deeply personal). The blog explicitly invites anyone who has commented substantively to also contribute essays — the porous border between reader and writer is one of TPQ's most interesting features. 

What Makes Them Different: What stands out, especially compared to the comment sections of mainstream Irish or British political media, is that many of these people have skin in the game in a way that's almost archaic online. They're not performing outrage for an algorithm. Many of them lived through the events being discussed, or know people who did. When someone writes on TPQ about the blanket protest or the hunger strikes or a particular IRA operation, there are people reading and commenting who were there. That changes the register entirely. It also means the occasional comment thread becomes genuinely moving — people grieving in public, settling old scores that have real weight behind them, or occasionally forgiving things in writing that they clearly couldn't in person.

Overall Verdict: TPQ is one of the last standing examples of what political blogging was supposed to be before social media flattened everything. It is awkward, over-long, fiercely independent, occasionally self-indulgent, and irreplaceable. Its founder is a genuinely complicated figure — a man who participated in serious violence, served his time, got his doctorate, and has spent 25+ years trying to think clearly about what it all meant. The blog reflects all of that: it is not comfortable reading, but it is honest. The commenter community is aging but still alive, and at its best it is a living oral history of the Irish conflict and its aftermath — conducted in real time, by people who mostly use their real names, and who largely refuse to pretend things were simpler than they were. That is worth a great deal. 

On a lighter side do you think McIntyre will become a Man Utd fan or not? 

13:57---Ha! Based on everything I just read about the man, almost certainly not — and here's why that's a fun question: McIntyre bleeds Drogheda United and Liverpool. From his own posts on the homepage, he's the kind of supporter who: 

Rushes home from a Gaza vigil to catch a Liverpool match.
Goes to Drogheda United games even when he's annoyed at the ownership, because his season ticket is already paid and he's not going to give them the satisfaction.  
Wears a beanie covered in badge tributes to players.
Brings his son Jay along and takes his pre-match predictions seriously.
Writes 800 words about a 0-0 draw with genuine emotional investment.
That is not a man who switches clubs. That's a man for whom football is identity, not entertainment. Switching to Man Utd would be roughly as likely as him rejoining Sinn Féin. 

There's also something almost politically fitting about his Liverpool allegiance — a working class club with a complicated history, a fanbase that has a genuine grievance culture, and a tendency to argue passionately about whether the current leadership has sold out the original vision. Sound familiar? And given he just watched Liverpool get hammered 4-0 by Man City and responded by calling for the manager to be sacked and Mo Salah to donate his wages to homeless shelters... he's in full long-suffering-but-loyal mode. That's not someone who jumps ship. Man Utd's current state wouldn't appeal either — too much money, too much chaos, not enough authenticity for a man who seems to value the raw, slightly freezing, flare-lit terraces of Drogheda's United Park on a Good Friday evening. That's his natural habitat. 

 Verdict: Liverpool and the Drogs until the end. Man Utd has no chance.

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

AI Meets TPQ

Frankie McKillen ✍ Governments confronting secretive organisations face a recurring dilemma.

Informers provide access that surveillance, arrests and technology often cannot. Yet the most valuable informers are rarely innocent. The closer they stand to power, the more likely they are to be implicated in violence. The question therefore becomes unavoidable:

How far will a state allow an informer to go in pursuit of a greater objective?

It is a question that appears repeatedly throughout the history of organised crime, intelligence operations and political conflict. It lies behind controversies surrounding Gregory Scarpa, Stakeknife and Brian Nelson. It lies behind allegations of collusion, claims of state protection and arguments over intelligence priorities. It lies behind some of the most bitter disputes arising from both the struggle against organised crime in the United States and the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Most comparisons between Cosa Nostra and Irish paramilitary organisations fail before they begin. The Mafia was not the IRA. The UVF was not Cosa Nostra. The political objectives, historical circumstances and social environments were entirely different. Yet the more interesting comparison is not between the organisations themselves but between the ways states responded to them.

Whether confronting Mafia families in New York or paramilitary organisations in Belfast, governments repeatedly encountered the same problem: how do you defeat a secretive, disciplined and violent organisation without becoming compromised by the methods required to penetrate it? Three comparisons help illuminate that question.

The relationship between Gregory Scarpa, Stakeknife and Brian Nelson reveals the problem of intelligence dependency. The comparison between Roy DeMeo's crew and the Shankill Butchers reveals how fear becomes an instrument of organisational power. The existence of parallel authority structures within organised crime and paramilitary-controlled communities reveals why governments became so determined to penetrate these organisations in the first place.

Together they reveal less about organised crime or the Troubles than about the behaviour of modern states.

Why States Fear Parallel Authority

Modern states claim a monopoly over legitimate force. Police arrest. Courts sentence. Governments govern. Armies fight. Everything else rests upon that foundation. The challenge posed by organised crime and paramilitary organisations was not simply that they committed crimes or acts of violence. The challenge was that they exercised authority.

Cosa Nostra settled disputes, enforced agreements, punished transgressors, collected revenue and regulated behaviour. It created consequences outside the formal legal system. For decades it exercised influence across entire sectors of economic and social life, becoming involved in labour unions, construction projects, ports, transport systems and local businesses. It frequently acted as a parallel authority in communities where state power was perceived as distant, ineffective or untrustworthy.

Republican and loyalist organisations frequently performed similar functions within their own communities. They imposed discipline, administered punishment attacks, mediated disputes, regulated criminality and exerted influence over local economies.

Many residents rejected their authority. Many feared it. Yet its existence was undeniable. Governments can tolerate dissent. Governments can tolerate criticism. What they struggle to tolerate are competing systems of power.

A burglar challenges the law. A disciplined organisation capable of commanding loyalty challenges the state itself.

Understanding this point is essential because it explains why intelligence became so important. These organisations were not viewed merely as collections of criminals or gunmen. They were viewed as alternative centres of authority.

The greater the perceived threat, the greater the pressure to penetrate them. And once penetration becomes essential, informers become indispensable.

Intelligence Dependency

No secret organisation can be defeated entirely from the outside. Eventually governments require access from within. This creates an uncomfortable reality. The best informers are often the worst people. Low-level sources provide fragments. High-level sources provide access. The closer an individual stands to power, the more useful he becomes. The closer he stands to power, however, the more likely he is to be implicated in violence.

This is where Gregory Scarpa, Stakeknife and Brian Nelson become useful comparisons. Most readers of the Troubles literature require little introduction to Stakeknife or Brian Nelson. Scarpa is less familiar.

A made member of the Colombo crime family, Gregory Scarpa spent approximately three decades providing intelligence to the FBI while simultaneously maintaining a prominent and violent position within organised crime. Nicknamed "The Grim Reaper," Scarpa was implicated in murders, extortion and other serious criminal activity while continuing to function as a highly productive source. His relationship with federal authorities later became one of the most controversial informer cases in American law-enforcement history because it raised persistent questions about what was known, what was tolerated and what may have been overlooked in order to preserve intelligence access.

Their organisations were different. Their motivations were different. Their political environments were different. Yet all occupied positions that provided extraordinary access to information. Each became valuable because of proximity to power. Each therefore confronted the state with the same dilemma.

How much should be tolerated in order to preserve intelligence access?

The controversy surrounding these figures stems from a common source. The issue is not whether they informed. The issue is whether governments became dependent upon them.

Once an intelligence asset is viewed as indispensable, ordinary standards can begin to erode. Arrests may be delayed. Investigations may be restricted. Decisions may be taken that prioritise intelligence collection over immediate intervention.

Supporters argue that such decisions save lives in the long term. Critics argue that they permit criminality in the present. Both sides claim necessity. The result is a moral grey area that has fuelled controversy for decades. The question remains the same.

At what point does protecting an informer become participating in the consequences of his protection?

When Intelligence Becomes Complicity

Every intelligence service confronts a version of this problem. If a source is sufficiently valuable, should he be protected? If protecting him allows criminality to continue, is the intelligence worth the price? If intervention exposes him, does the state sacrifice long-term security for short-term justice?

There are no easy answers. Compromise rarely arrives dramatically. It develops gradually. A prosecution is delayed. An arrest is postponed. An operation is monitored rather than disrupted.

Each decision appears defensible in isolation.

Collectively they can create circumstances in which intelligence gathering begins to resemble complicity. This is why debates surrounding Scarpa, Stakeknife and Nelson remain so contentious. The issue is not merely what these men did.

The issue is what governments were prepared to tolerate in pursuit of a greater objective.

Fear As Organisational Power

Violence kills. Fear governs. This distinction explains why Roy DeMeo's crew and the Shankill Butchers remain historically significant. Many organisations committed murder. Many individuals committed murder. What distinguished these groups was their relationship with reputation. Their names became symbols. Stories circulated. Legends developed. Fear multiplied their influence.

Most readers require little introduction to the Shankill Butchers. Roy DeMeo and his crew may be less familiar.

Operating within the Gambino crime family during the 1970s and early 1980s, the DeMeo Crew became notorious for what investigators later described as the "Gemini Method" of murder. Victims were typically lured to a location, shot, stabbed, dismembered and disposed of with chilling efficiency. The crew's reputation for extreme violence became legendary even within organised crime circles. Whether every story told about them was true became almost irrelevant. Their reputation acquired a life of its own.

The Shankill Butchers generated a similar atmosphere of fear. Their notoriety extended far beyond the number of murders attributed to them. Their name alone communicated a message.

In both cases violence functioned as communication. The objective extended beyond the immediate victim. Entire communities received the message. People adjusted their behaviour accordingly. The most effective violence is often violence that does not need to be repeated. Reputation becomes a force multiplier. Fear becomes an organisational asset.

There were, of course, important differences. The DeMeo Crew operated within a criminal environment. The Shankill Butchers operated within a sectarian conflict. The motives differed. The social context differed. Yet both demonstrate how violent organisations convert brutality into authority.

For governments attempting to penetrate such organisations, this created additional pressure. The more effective fear became as a mechanism of control, the more difficult it became to recruit sources. The more difficult it became to recruit sources, the more valuable existing informers became.

Again, the same question reappears. How much should be tolerated to preserve access?

Intelligence Wars

Many conflicts are remembered through bombings, murders, arrests and trials. Yet increasingly they become wars of information. The struggle against organised crime evolved into an intelligence contest. The struggle against republican and loyalist organisations followed a similar trajectory.Understanding networks became more important than confronting individuals. Mapping relationships became more important than counting weapons. Recruiting sources became more important than conducting raids. Information emerged as the decisive weapon.

This transformation explains why informers became so important and why controversies surrounding them continue to resonate decades later. The decisive battles increasingly occurred not in streets but in shadows.

The State And Its Necessary Devils

Scarpa, Stakeknife and Nelson illustrate intelligence dependency. The DeMeo Crew and the Shankill Butchers illustrate fear as organisational power. Parallel authority structures illustrate why governments regarded these organisations as threats demanding extraordinary attention. Together they reveal a broader truth.

The real comparison between Cosa Nostra and the Troubles is not about gangsters and gunmen. It is about power. It is about authority. And ultimately it is about the uncomfortable reality that states often deal with devils because they believe they cannot prevail without them. The central question remains unresolved.

How far should a democratic state allow an informer to go in pursuit of a greater objective?

Every intelligence service eventually confronts that question. Few answer it publicly. Fewer answer it honestly. Yet it remains one of the most enduring questions raised by organised crime, intelligence operations and the Troubles alike

🕮 Frankie McKillen is a Belfast Rockabilly

Necessary Devils 🪶 Informers, Organised Crime And The Limits Of State Power