Jim McVeigh writes the apologia for Martin McGuinness’s life, while Danny Morrison’s revised memoir is emotional, sometimes mawkish.
Regardless of his actions in the IRA – ones he proudly admitted to, unlike some – Martin McGuinness was blessed with the gift of likeability, even by those who would have happily seen him dead in his earlier years.
In Our Martin, Jim McVeigh has written the apologia for the Derry man’s life, presenting the increasingly visible argument “that there was no alternative” – one directed primarily at a generation who were not born to see the horrors of the Troubles.
The book knows on which side of history it stands. “What politicised me was the Civil Rights protest. It wasn’t anything I heard in the house, or even in my grandmother’s house in Donegal,” McGuinness is quoted saying.
His political awakening is put down to an interview he had to become an apprentice mechanic in 1965, one McGuinness believed he did not get because he was asked which school he had attended.
Its defence of the IRA’s actions is absolute. There is no mention of Patsy Gillespie, forced to drive a car bomb into a British army checkpoint . . .
Continue @ Irish Times.
The only thing that interests me -is the question of economic coercion. The book states that “the bombing attacks on London’s financial district in 1992 drove the British to negotiate, under pressure from major financial firms threatening to relocate to Frankfurt.”
ReplyDeleteBut then one must ask: Who actually made the political decision to “settle,” and on what internal projections? Did UK policymakers consciously weigh the economic cost of maintaining military occupation in the 6 Counties against the systemic risk of ongoing attacks on their financial core?
At the same time, did the IRA, having just perfected a shift from roughly 30% to 100% military-grade explosive capability, underestimate their strategic leverage, or, conversely, did London recognize that it could not credibly maintain occupation under continued high-yield bombing threats?
This is the most crucial moment in the Conflict's history but, as yet, remains elusive.
The title of the book coupled with the reviewer's description of it as an apologia leads me to think it is a hagiography. If so it is unlikely to be a robust political analysis. Hagiography is not designed for that purpose.
DeleteI spoke with John Chilcott at a book launch in London twenty years ago about that period. Surprisingly, he told me (and everybody else at the event) that by 92 the IRA had shifted down the priority list of the Brit state as it was by that stage aware of the Provisional direction of travel. Basically the Brits felt they had it in the bag and were prepared to negotiate because the parameters of the negotiations ruled out a Brit withdrawal leading to a united Ireland. In the end the Brits got the political result they wanted and we got the one we had sought to evade - unity only by consent of a majority in the North.
If anybody who has read either book wants to review them feel free.
Am
ReplyDeleteI don't think Chilcott would publicly admit the Brits were as concerned as they were about the full potential of just a handful of Canary Wharf size bombs going off in their financial centers. The leap from 30% to 100% grade military explosives elevated a paramilitary group to state level warfare -with more accuracy -the IRA were parking their bombs outside their targets -more accurate than the same size bomb being dropped from 60,000 feet.
That's a possibility but it works just as well if flipped.
DeleteHe could easily have said the Brits were very worried because of the threat to civilians (cite Warrington) and opted to find a way to stop the IRA campaign without conceding anything on the core constitutional issue.
They were feeling out the IRA well in advance of the bombings referred to in the book and by 92 knew where the leadership wanted to go or at least knew it was up for serious compromise on the fundamental ideological issue.
That said, Jonathan Powell seemed somewhat amazed at how easily slippage took hold and SF agreeing to settle for considerably less than the Brits expected.
I had another conversation with a senior British official (Think it was earlier than the Chilcot one) in which I made the charge that 'you shafted republicans'. He smiled at me and said 'No, Anthony, republicans shafted republicans.' I told him that much we could agree upon. I found that telling. Because it opens up the possibility for the type of perspective held by John Crawley - that the IRA had the capacity but were undermined by certain leaders intent on going off in a different direction.
In 95, I asked Brian Keenan as to why there was no more pressure exerted by way of the type of attacks in the early 90s. His response was a grumpy - if the IRA could have sustained the England campaign it wouldn't be on ceasefire. (not verbatim).
In a world of smoke and mirrors, Christy, we never really know if what we are being told is the truth or just a position.
Ultimately, we will never know. The files on these matters will only see the light of day long after the spreading of our ashes.
That said,