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Brian Morgan ✍ In the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict, there were only two occasions when security forces were completely absent from IRA funerals. 

Figure 1: IRA Volunteer Charlie Hughes funeral 11-March-1971

The first was at the funerals of the Gibraltar 3. The second was on 19 March 1988, when Corporals Derek Wood and David Howes drove at high speed into the funeral cortege of IRA volunteer Caoimhin MacBradaigh, in West Belfast. The 1988 absences remain suspiciously deliberate, the result of a questionable secret 'stand-off' agreement between security forces and the Catholic Church, brokered for the Gibraltar 3 funerals and for Caoimhin MacBradaigh after loyalist Michael Stone's murderous attack at Milltown Cemetery three days earlier.

Too much weight is given to any agreement made with the Church. In the history of IRA funerals, the Church would have considered it unthinkable to ask the security forces to stay away completely - they would have simply asked that they keep a respectful distance. The alleged claim of an agreement to a complete absence is not credible. Figure 1 above shows how close both the security forces and mourners could be to each other without incident.

What followed remains one of the most contested incidents of the Troubles: were two British soldiers simply lost, or were they engaged in a covert operation when they met their deaths?

I do not know the Corporals' full intention but their presence at the funeral was not an accident. I will show the official account to be false. I will also show there is more evidence that they left Woodbourne RUC Barracks and not North Howard Street Barracks.

By the 1980s, IRA funerals had become flashpoints. The RUC, increasingly given front-line roles in nationalist areas, regularly engaged in aggressive sectarian confrontations with mourners, often triggered by Unionist/Loyalist aversion to the sight of Tricolours. Michael Stone's attack on 16 March 1988, which killed three and wounded over fifty at the Gibraltar 3's funeral, changed the dynamic entirely.

Cyril Donnan, then RUC Chief Superintendent, had planned the security operation for the Gibraltar 3 funerals, involving both RUC and Army personnel. In The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), he recalls: after his plan for the Gibraltar 3 had been approved, he was later told there was to be no security force presence.[1] This was the first time in the history of the Conflict where there would be no security force presence at an IRA funeral. Donnan says he was shocked by the decision.

The security forces agreed to stay away from the funerals in exchange for an IRA agreement not to fire volleys over the graves. When and with whom was this agreement made, and why was it not made with the senior officer responsible for the planning, Chief Superintendent Donnan?

Someone agreed to unprecedented conditions Donnan did not like. Donnan confirms he was operating under strict orders not to deploy after the Corporals launched what looked like an attack on the funeral.[2] Sight of a weaponised car, mounting the footpath and driving at high speed through mourners should have been all he needed to know. One occupant of the car firing a shot should have been enough to know. Donnan passively watched events unfold on a 10-inch heli-teli screen in real-time. His eventual intervention came too late and he would have known it.[3]

The heli-teli footage shows 12 minutes from start to execution. Father Alex Reid, who tried to intervene, later questioned: "There was a helicopter circling overhead and I don't know why they didn't do something, radio to the police or soldiers to come up."

The Chief Superintendent watched a speeding car drive directly into mourners, but did nothing. He watched the moment Wood fired a warning shot, but did nothing. He saw Wood being tackled to the ground and unarmed, but did nothing. He saw both soldiers being taken into Casement Park, but did nothing. He watched as both soldiers were stripped and thrown over a wall, but did nothing. He watched both soldiers being bundled into a black taxi, but did nothing. I assume he watched both soldiers being executed; he arrived afterwards and the IRA killers had long escaped.

One explanation for the Chief Superintendent's inaction: whoever told him not to intervene already knew what the Corporals' intentions were. The Chief Superintendent would have been astute enough to know, when he relayed the events to his superiors and was still told not to intervene, that it may have been a sanctioned operation.

Donnan claims he defied orders to deploy,[4] but only after fatal delay. The timeline conclusively confirms observation without intervention. Who told a Chief Superintendent with operational command on the ground not to intervene?

The Ministry of Defence maintained that Wood and Howes were Royal Corps of Signals communications technicians who had left North Howard Street base. They were supposed to drive along the M1 motorway to Lisburn. The story: Wood was 'showing around' his new colleague Howes, took a wrong turn from North Howard Street Military Base, and accidentally drove into the funeral. They should have turned left onto Westlink from North Howard Street but they turned right instead.[5]

Even the BBC would know that the claim that they could not access the motorway from the alleged route they took is false. After turning right (if they did leave North Howard Street), multiple other routes existed: Grosvenor Road, Broadway Road, Donegall Road, and Kennedy Way.

Traffic on the Falls Road would have been significantly reduced that day. Once they were past Kennedy Way roundabout there was zero traffic. Both Wood and Howes would have been acutely aware of their surroundings and what was ahead of them.

Donnan questions the official route.[6] He stated that the soldiers would have known the area was out of bounds, that they would have been compelled to find out what areas were off-limits, and that checking routes was "like pulling a shirt on in the morning."

Former RUC officer 'Noel' adds:[7] "The army are good at routes, so when something happens they know where they are, plus they would have been warned going out the gate."

The Funeral Murders captures a critical revelation at [43:58].[8] An RUC inspector from Woodbourne Barracks told Chief Superintendent Cyril Donnan that the Corporals were driving "one of my unmarked patrol cars."

This contradicts the North Howard Street origin story entirely. The soldiers were initially identified by the RUC by a commanding RUC officer in Andersonstown because they were driving one of his unmarked cars from Woodbourne Barracks.

The implication is significant. They were already inside the republican heartland, having approached the Andersonstown Road from Kennedy Way, not ‘straying’ into it from the Falls Road direction.

Even after mounting the footpath, the Corporals could still have escaped had they turned up Slemish Way. Instead, they drove across the junction and continued to drive into mourners. They stopped when they drew parallel to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness but were separated by a steel pedestrian barrier on their left. They immediately reversed, driving across the junction of Slemish Way further than they needed if escape had been their intention. The car seems to straighten to make a repeat attempt to drive forward, this time keeping the barrier to their right. Two taxis moved forward to block their path.

Speculation among Republicans was that it was an assassination attempt on Adams and McGuinness - weaponising the car gave them a better chance than Stone's attack.

It was further speculated that the steel barrier's presence, visible at ground level but potentially missed on maps, suggests pre-planning that did not account for physical reality.

As an undercover car from Woodbourne, it was fitted with communication equipment. They could have made radio contact. Why didn't they receive radio warnings from the helicopter? Undercover operatives normally coordinate to avoid compromise.

The helicopter recorded the full 12 minutes of real-time events without intervention. Chief Superintendent Donnan was watching everything on his monitor. His "strict policy not to intervene" strains credibility given the live feed. They watched the soldiers being beaten, stripped and driven to waste ground before being killed.

Former Joint Communications Unit - NI technician Seán Hartnett, in his memoir Charlie One (2016), makes claims that are not credible.[9] He states: 

There was no special mission, no clandestine operation, and no cover-up, as has been suggested by some. Howes and Wood were the architects of their own demise.

Hartnett further claimed that the Corporals' car was civilian-registered and unflagged in police systems, creating fatal identification delays.[10]

Hartnett is not a first-hand witness and is repeating rumours he has heard. His claims are discussed in turn below.

An RUC Inspector identified the car as one of his. It was not a military car as Hartnett alleges, nor did it go unidentified because it was unmarked. If the helicopter crew relayed the car's registration to the control room, that would be even more damning for Donnan - because it would mean an RUC Inspector had confirmed to him that they were two soldiers as events were still unfolding. When Donnan makes that revelation in the documentary, a fire crew is extinguishing the burning car. Viewers are led to assume that the RUC only identified the car from being present at the scene while it burned.

Hartnett makes an additional unfounded claim regarding the magazine of Wood’s gun:[11]

As the vehicle was surrounded and Wood was being dragged out, he produced his pistol and fired a single warning shot in the air. While his restraint was admirable, it ultimately proved to be fatal. If you look closely at the image on the screen you can see that the magazine housing is empty. Either Wood had been sitting on his pistol for quick access while driving around and accidentally sat on the magazine ejector switch, or it was ejected during the scuffle to get him out of the vehicle. Either way, when he went to fire a second shot all he got was a dead man's click.

This account is contradicted by direct evidence. First, the IRA used the soldiers' own guns to kill them - Wood's gun was loaded. Second, and conclusively, I personally searched the driver's side of the car, including under the seat, and found no magazine.[12] Hartnett's account amounts to uninformed speculation or repeating rumours.

One would expect the passenger side window to be open if, Republican speculation was true, and Howes was to shoot Adams and McGuinness from the car. However, the footage shows a mourner smash the window to disarm Howes after his gun jammed. That the gun jammed follows Howes having attempted to fire through the closed window.

Within hours, IRA sources claimed the Corporals were two SAS members. Howes' ID was marked ‘Herford’ - a British Army base in Germany. This was allegedly misread as ‘Hereford’ - SAS headquarters. That may be true, but it is also possible the British authorities did not want the apparent attack associated with the same regiment that had unlawfully killed the Gibraltar 3. Regardless, as members of the Signals regiment with the Joint Communications Unit - NI, the Corporals were support personnel to the SAS.

Why were they using a local RUC unmarked car from Woodbourne? As an undercover vehicle, it was fitted with communication equipment from which they could have made radio contact. The absence of any communication like this, combined with the absence of any radio warning from the helicopter to the Corporals, remains unexplained on the official account. One explanation might be, undercover units practice radio silence at crucial moments of operations.

Why the Corporals Wood and Howes drove at speed into mourners has remained unresolved for nearly four decades. The official narrative - that two soldiers simply got lost - does not survive scrutiny. The Woodbourne vehicle identification places them already inside the republican heartland, in an unmarked RUC patrol car from a local barracks, approaching from a direction wholly inconsistent with a wrong turn from North Howard Street. The route analysis eliminates accident as a credible explanation. My first hand account directly contradicts the central factual claim advanced by Hartnett regarding the magazine from Woods gun. The behaviour of the vehicle - continuing past escape routes, drawing parallel to Adams and McGuinness, reversing and seeming to realign for a second pass - contradicts the actions of lost soldiers attempting to extricate themselves. Chief Superintendent Donnan’s inaction to a deadly incident he personally watched, sustained across 12 minutes of live overhead surveillance despite multiple observable triggers for intervention, is more consistent with prior knowledge than with institutional inertia alone. Taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Corporals were sent. I do not know what their intentions were, but they were determined to achieve something.

References

[1] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [16:26]

[2] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018):

[3] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:26]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n2AX4zm6R10

[4] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [41:00]

[5] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [51:57]

[6] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [52:33-53:18] 

[7] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [53:20] 

[8] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:58] 

[9] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One: The True Story of an Irishman in the British Army and His Role in Covert Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Ireland, Merrion Press, 2016, pp. 45-46.

[10] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[11] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[12] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One,, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

Additional Sources:

Irish Times, 'The funeral murders that changed Northern Ireland forever' (16 March 2018): 

Belfast Newsletter, 'Corporals' murders: I was operating under a policy not to deploy, says RUC commander' (11 March 2018):.

Two Corporals 🪶 19 March 1988 🪶 Did They Stray Or Were They Sent?

Brian Morgan ✍ In the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict, there were only two occasions when security forces were completely absent from IRA funerals. 

Figure 1: IRA Volunteer Charlie Hughes funeral 11-March-1971

The first was at the funerals of the Gibraltar 3. The second was on 19 March 1988, when Corporals Derek Wood and David Howes drove at high speed into the funeral cortege of IRA volunteer Caoimhin MacBradaigh, in West Belfast. The 1988 absences remain suspiciously deliberate, the result of a questionable secret 'stand-off' agreement between security forces and the Catholic Church, brokered for the Gibraltar 3 funerals and for Caoimhin MacBradaigh after loyalist Michael Stone's murderous attack at Milltown Cemetery three days earlier.

Too much weight is given to any agreement made with the Church. In the history of IRA funerals, the Church would have considered it unthinkable to ask the security forces to stay away completely - they would have simply asked that they keep a respectful distance. The alleged claim of an agreement to a complete absence is not credible. Figure 1 above shows how close both the security forces and mourners could be to each other without incident.

What followed remains one of the most contested incidents of the Troubles: were two British soldiers simply lost, or were they engaged in a covert operation when they met their deaths?

I do not know the Corporals' full intention but their presence at the funeral was not an accident. I will show the official account to be false. I will also show there is more evidence that they left Woodbourne RUC Barracks and not North Howard Street Barracks.

By the 1980s, IRA funerals had become flashpoints. The RUC, increasingly given front-line roles in nationalist areas, regularly engaged in aggressive sectarian confrontations with mourners, often triggered by Unionist/Loyalist aversion to the sight of Tricolours. Michael Stone's attack on 16 March 1988, which killed three and wounded over fifty at the Gibraltar 3's funeral, changed the dynamic entirely.

Cyril Donnan, then RUC Chief Superintendent, had planned the security operation for the Gibraltar 3 funerals, involving both RUC and Army personnel. In The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), he recalls: after his plan for the Gibraltar 3 had been approved, he was later told there was to be no security force presence.[1] This was the first time in the history of the Conflict where there would be no security force presence at an IRA funeral. Donnan says he was shocked by the decision.

The security forces agreed to stay away from the funerals in exchange for an IRA agreement not to fire volleys over the graves. When and with whom was this agreement made, and why was it not made with the senior officer responsible for the planning, Chief Superintendent Donnan?

Someone agreed to unprecedented conditions Donnan did not like. Donnan confirms he was operating under strict orders not to deploy after the Corporals launched what looked like an attack on the funeral.[2] Sight of a weaponised car, mounting the footpath and driving at high speed through mourners should have been all he needed to know. One occupant of the car firing a shot should have been enough to know. Donnan passively watched events unfold on a 10-inch heli-teli screen in real-time. His eventual intervention came too late and he would have known it.[3]

The heli-teli footage shows 12 minutes from start to execution. Father Alex Reid, who tried to intervene, later questioned: "There was a helicopter circling overhead and I don't know why they didn't do something, radio to the police or soldiers to come up."

The Chief Superintendent watched a speeding car drive directly into mourners, but did nothing. He watched the moment Wood fired a warning shot, but did nothing. He saw Wood being tackled to the ground and unarmed, but did nothing. He saw both soldiers being taken into Casement Park, but did nothing. He watched as both soldiers were stripped and thrown over a wall, but did nothing. He watched both soldiers being bundled into a black taxi, but did nothing. I assume he watched both soldiers being executed; he arrived afterwards and the IRA killers had long escaped.

One explanation for the Chief Superintendent's inaction: whoever told him not to intervene already knew what the Corporals' intentions were. The Chief Superintendent would have been astute enough to know, when he relayed the events to his superiors and was still told not to intervene, that it may have been a sanctioned operation.

Donnan claims he defied orders to deploy,[4] but only after fatal delay. The timeline conclusively confirms observation without intervention. Who told a Chief Superintendent with operational command on the ground not to intervene?

The Ministry of Defence maintained that Wood and Howes were Royal Corps of Signals communications technicians who had left North Howard Street base. They were supposed to drive along the M1 motorway to Lisburn. The story: Wood was 'showing around' his new colleague Howes, took a wrong turn from North Howard Street Military Base, and accidentally drove into the funeral. They should have turned left onto Westlink from North Howard Street but they turned right instead.[5]

Even the BBC would know that the claim that they could not access the motorway from the alleged route they took is false. After turning right (if they did leave North Howard Street), multiple other routes existed: Grosvenor Road, Broadway Road, Donegall Road, and Kennedy Way.

Traffic on the Falls Road would have been significantly reduced that day. Once they were past Kennedy Way roundabout there was zero traffic. Both Wood and Howes would have been acutely aware of their surroundings and what was ahead of them.

Donnan questions the official route.[6] He stated that the soldiers would have known the area was out of bounds, that they would have been compelled to find out what areas were off-limits, and that checking routes was "like pulling a shirt on in the morning."

Former RUC officer 'Noel' adds:[7] "The army are good at routes, so when something happens they know where they are, plus they would have been warned going out the gate."

The Funeral Murders captures a critical revelation at [43:58].[8] An RUC inspector from Woodbourne Barracks told Chief Superintendent Cyril Donnan that the Corporals were driving "one of my unmarked patrol cars."

This contradicts the North Howard Street origin story entirely. The soldiers were initially identified by the RUC by a commanding RUC officer in Andersonstown because they were driving one of his unmarked cars from Woodbourne Barracks.

The implication is significant. They were already inside the republican heartland, having approached the Andersonstown Road from Kennedy Way, not ‘straying’ into it from the Falls Road direction.

Even after mounting the footpath, the Corporals could still have escaped had they turned up Slemish Way. Instead, they drove across the junction and continued to drive into mourners. They stopped when they drew parallel to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness but were separated by a steel pedestrian barrier on their left. They immediately reversed, driving across the junction of Slemish Way further than they needed if escape had been their intention. The car seems to straighten to make a repeat attempt to drive forward, this time keeping the barrier to their right. Two taxis moved forward to block their path.

Speculation among Republicans was that it was an assassination attempt on Adams and McGuinness - weaponising the car gave them a better chance than Stone's attack.

It was further speculated that the steel barrier's presence, visible at ground level but potentially missed on maps, suggests pre-planning that did not account for physical reality.

As an undercover car from Woodbourne, it was fitted with communication equipment. They could have made radio contact. Why didn't they receive radio warnings from the helicopter? Undercover operatives normally coordinate to avoid compromise.

The helicopter recorded the full 12 minutes of real-time events without intervention. Chief Superintendent Donnan was watching everything on his monitor. His "strict policy not to intervene" strains credibility given the live feed. They watched the soldiers being beaten, stripped and driven to waste ground before being killed.

Former Joint Communications Unit - NI technician Seán Hartnett, in his memoir Charlie One (2016), makes claims that are not credible.[9] He states: 

There was no special mission, no clandestine operation, and no cover-up, as has been suggested by some. Howes and Wood were the architects of their own demise.

Hartnett further claimed that the Corporals' car was civilian-registered and unflagged in police systems, creating fatal identification delays.[10]

Hartnett is not a first-hand witness and is repeating rumours he has heard. His claims are discussed in turn below.

An RUC Inspector identified the car as one of his. It was not a military car as Hartnett alleges, nor did it go unidentified because it was unmarked. If the helicopter crew relayed the car's registration to the control room, that would be even more damning for Donnan - because it would mean an RUC Inspector had confirmed to him that they were two soldiers as events were still unfolding. When Donnan makes that revelation in the documentary, a fire crew is extinguishing the burning car. Viewers are led to assume that the RUC only identified the car from being present at the scene while it burned.

Hartnett makes an additional unfounded claim regarding the magazine of Wood’s gun:[11]

As the vehicle was surrounded and Wood was being dragged out, he produced his pistol and fired a single warning shot in the air. While his restraint was admirable, it ultimately proved to be fatal. If you look closely at the image on the screen you can see that the magazine housing is empty. Either Wood had been sitting on his pistol for quick access while driving around and accidentally sat on the magazine ejector switch, or it was ejected during the scuffle to get him out of the vehicle. Either way, when he went to fire a second shot all he got was a dead man's click.

This account is contradicted by direct evidence. First, the IRA used the soldiers' own guns to kill them - Wood's gun was loaded. Second, and conclusively, I personally searched the driver's side of the car, including under the seat, and found no magazine.[12] Hartnett's account amounts to uninformed speculation or repeating rumours.

One would expect the passenger side window to be open if, Republican speculation was true, and Howes was to shoot Adams and McGuinness from the car. However, the footage shows a mourner smash the window to disarm Howes after his gun jammed. That the gun jammed follows Howes having attempted to fire through the closed window.

Within hours, IRA sources claimed the Corporals were two SAS members. Howes' ID was marked ‘Herford’ - a British Army base in Germany. This was allegedly misread as ‘Hereford’ - SAS headquarters. That may be true, but it is also possible the British authorities did not want the apparent attack associated with the same regiment that had unlawfully killed the Gibraltar 3. Regardless, as members of the Signals regiment with the Joint Communications Unit - NI, the Corporals were support personnel to the SAS.

Why were they using a local RUC unmarked car from Woodbourne? As an undercover vehicle, it was fitted with communication equipment from which they could have made radio contact. The absence of any communication like this, combined with the absence of any radio warning from the helicopter to the Corporals, remains unexplained on the official account. One explanation might be, undercover units practice radio silence at crucial moments of operations.

Why the Corporals Wood and Howes drove at speed into mourners has remained unresolved for nearly four decades. The official narrative - that two soldiers simply got lost - does not survive scrutiny. The Woodbourne vehicle identification places them already inside the republican heartland, in an unmarked RUC patrol car from a local barracks, approaching from a direction wholly inconsistent with a wrong turn from North Howard Street. The route analysis eliminates accident as a credible explanation. My first hand account directly contradicts the central factual claim advanced by Hartnett regarding the magazine from Woods gun. The behaviour of the vehicle - continuing past escape routes, drawing parallel to Adams and McGuinness, reversing and seeming to realign for a second pass - contradicts the actions of lost soldiers attempting to extricate themselves. Chief Superintendent Donnan’s inaction to a deadly incident he personally watched, sustained across 12 minutes of live overhead surveillance despite multiple observable triggers for intervention, is more consistent with prior knowledge than with institutional inertia alone. Taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the Corporals were sent. I do not know what their intentions were, but they were determined to achieve something.

References

[1] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [16:26]

[2] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018):

[3] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:26]: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n2AX4zm6R10

[4] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [41:00]

[5] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [51:57]

[6] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [52:33-53:18] 

[7] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [53:20] 

[8] The Funeral Murders (BBC, 2018), [43:58] 

[9] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One: The True Story of an Irishman in the British Army and His Role in Covert Counter-Terrorism Operations in Northern Ireland, Merrion Press, 2016, pp. 45-46.

[10] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[11] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

[12] Hartnett, Seán, Charlie One,, Merrion Press, 2016, p. 45.

Additional Sources:

Irish Times, 'The funeral murders that changed Northern Ireland forever' (16 March 2018): 

Belfast Newsletter, 'Corporals' murders: I was operating under a policy not to deploy, says RUC commander' (11 March 2018):.
Brian Morgan Corporals Killings Provisional IRA

15 comments:

  1. Steve R10:34 PM, March 19, 2026

    I think the British Army could have come up with a far better attack than this fuck up if they wanted too. Why wouldn't they have simply used a land drover or bigger vehicle if it was an attack? What soldier would agree to such a kamikaze mission? Particularly after Milltown? Don't assume maliciousness when incompetence can more than suffice.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Stuart11:58 AM, March 20, 2026

      Pretty much agree with Steve here tbh. I mean, if this was a ‘mission’ to take out Adams and/or McGuinness, it was a remarkably risky and stupid one to undertake given the circumstances of a prominent funeral attended by many people. I wasn’t there of course so not pretending I’m in the know but always struck me as a huge error by the two corporals and given the Stone attack only days earlier, at the time, I’m sure the crowd who tackled the two corporals would have thought it was another Loyalist attack. I don’t think it goes much more beyond that tbh. Just one of those tragic incidents that can occur in a conflict and highly charged environment that was prevalent at the time

      Delete
  2. AM4:24 PM, March 20, 2026

    Brian Morgan comments

    Steve /Stuart

    The Corporals proved proof of concept of their plan (if it was to assassinate Adams and Guinness).

    Everything flowed perfectly, they successfully drew level with Adams and McGuinness in the cortege with no problems. Had they assassinated them, they successfully reversed to the junction of Slemish Way to make good their escape.

    Brian suggests a steel barrier may have ruined their plan... They do reverse past the junction back out onto the Andersonstown Road as if to make a fresh run at it but for the 2 taxis moving to block them. What we know from the article -the car was still free to drive up Slemish Way where it was set on fire.

    What I took from the article, the Corporals mistake was trusting those above the rank of Chief Superintendent who clearly sacrificed them in full knowledge of what was happening to them.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Stuart7:06 PM, March 20, 2026

      Interesting Anthony. Well, I’ll hold my hand up, learn something new every day! I just always read of the incident (not in a particularly isolated manner, just as part of general reading on the conflict) and always thought of it as an incident born of several different factors coming together to result in a tragic situation, one of the most visceral images of the conflict. But, I’m not an expert and as well informed as some so if there were other factors at play and indeed, a more ‘sinister’ reason for the presence of the two corporals at that time, then happy to stand corrected and intrigued to learn more about what may have lead to those two BA personnel being present and what their purpose may also have been

      Delete
    2. AM9:24 PM, March 20, 2026

      Stuart - that is Brian Morgan you are responding to, not me.

      Delete
    3. Steve R12:05 AM, March 21, 2026

      And that makes even less sense given what we now know about British Intelligence cultivating the Adams group in the movement as he was clearly on a solely political path.
      And let's be honest, McGuiness was at the very least compromised in some shape or form. Not to mention they could have picked off both in far more advantageous circumstances to them than a bonkers attack on thousand mourners right after Stone went rambo.

      Delete
  3. Simon9:31 PM, March 20, 2026

    Interesting piece. We may never know the truth.

    "the result of a questionable secret 'stand-off' agreement between security forces and the Catholic Church".

    The agreement wasn't a secret, Republicans spoke to the Church before the funerals. I don't remember which of them brought up the idea first but an agreement was sought to avoid trouble. As someone barely into his teens, on the day of the first funerals I knew that an agreement was in place and why. An agreement was welcome due to the usual bashing of heads, plastic bullets or live rounds. These were big funerals and more of the same would've been a disaster. People's blood was up. The IRA stuck by their promise not to bring weapons.

    As for MacBradaigh's funeral, to all intents and purposes the incursion looked, especially with hindsight, to be a blunder. The helicopter could be heard on the ground so people knew that a rescue attempt was possible and if the British sent in a large body of men all hell would have broken loose. They were unlikely to save the corporals no matter what they did. Republicans weren't going to let two more attackers get away after Stone got picked up.

    The British soldier who fired the warning shot looked like he did so out of desperation. Who brings photo identification, military ID or any other type, to an assassination? Stumbling on the cortege was a blunder. If it was an assassination gone wrong that would just be another blunder. Which blunder is more likely?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AM9:43 PM, March 21, 2026

      Brian Morgan comments

      Simon

      From the available evidence we can now rule out the 'official' line that they 'accidently strayed'. The jury is still out on what they intended to do?

      The church has played a mediating role, between families and Brits, in funerals since the start of the Conflict. The 'secret' is what was actually agreed on these 2 occasions? I think it is an almost certainty the church did not secure an absolute absence. That is a Brit invention. And, it was common place for the IRA to pay their respects by firing a volley the night before funerals and not at gravesides.

      The real 'church' agreement was probably, the coffins would not be draped with Tricolours and the Brits would observe at close proximity - as always.

      What would have happened had the IRA broken whatever the agreement was? Do you really think the Brits would not have come in in full force to get a Tricolour -never mind a gun? BIG FAT FACT: A gun was produced, and discharged, and a Chief Superintendent was told not to intervene.

      And do you really think they'd give a shit who got hurt if they decided to intervene? They never did before. Where is your evidence they were considerate of Nationalists / Republicans getting hurt?

      Look at the facts and not your assumptions -- the official line has been conclusively blown out of the water as false.

      Re: Woods firing the warning shot --look at the facts - people were struggling to disarm his partner in the passenger seat -he could as easily hit Howes if he fired from inside the car - he got out the window to fire across the car at those struggling with Howes.

      The only mistake they made at the scene was, after reversing - instead of escaping up Slemish Way they decided to complete whatever their mission was. And as I said before -2 taxis blocked their car from driving into the cortege again -but a mourner drove it up Slemish Way - I shouted for people to step aside and let the car through. It was an exit route open to them had they wanted to escape.

      Who brings their ID? Is that a real question? Counter the case I set out with facts and evidence if you can, not superficial minutia.

      Delete
    2. Simon10:31 PM, March 21, 2026

      Brian- I didn't say they "accidentally strayed". They were up to something. We'll probably never know what that was. I called it a blunder.

      You said "The real 'church' agreement was probably, the coffins would not be draped with Tricolours and the Brits would observe at close proximity - as always." It wasn't the usual agreement, there was much discussion on the day of the first funerals that a new agreement was reached that the security forces wouldn't have a presence. At that stage there was no idea a second funeral would be needed. It wasn't the usual agreement. I believe it was struck the night before but I could be wrong, that's what I heard. Trouble was expected and they agreed to stay away. It wasn't a secret. The Church was worried about Trouble.

      I didn't say the police were worried about Nationalists getting hurt. BIG FAT FACT: You misunderstood most of what I said, quoted me as saying things I didn't say and I think you've done the same thing with the rest of your "evidence".

      You're sticking with your idea that they went in, in front of the world's TV cameras to assassinate Adams and McGuinness?

      Delete
    3. AM8:23 AM, March 23, 2026

      Brian Morgan comments

      Simon

      Sorry if I am picking you up wrong. I am not distinguishing any difference between 'strayed' or 'blundered'.

      While my analysis involves some hindsight ut overall revolves around facts as they are now known ... the evidence debunks any suggestion they strayed or blundered into the path of the funeral.

      I am not saying they were there to assassinate Adams and McGuinness but that is a real possibility that cannot be ruled out. I'm at a loss for other credible scenarios? But I do rule out​ they accidently or blundered into the funeral. It has been fixed in minds that they panicked and mounted the footpath - the evidence no longer supports that - the fatal mistake they made did not occur until they reversed back onto Andytown road --they seem intent to drive forward again but 2 taxis blocked their path --even then they could still have escaped up Slemish Way. I say that because a mourner was able to drive their car past the taxis and up Slemish Way to set it on fire.

      Delete
    4. Simon9:14 PM, March 24, 2026

      Brian, thank you for your well thought-out and reasoned reply.

      "Accidentally strayed" makes it sound like they were out for a reason unconnected to the funeral. When I say blundered I mean they were extremely likely to have been out and about in connection to the funeral (it was the biggest news story of the day even prior to the time of the corporals' capture- they would've been aware of the day's significance and were supposed to be intertwined in it).

      They planned to be in proximity but made a blunder when they stumbled directly in front of the cortège. They planned to be close but not that close. People underestimate the significance of incompetency which can arise anywhere and with anyone. Maybe the British plan put in place to keep a distance consisted of an new and untested approach security-wise particularly after Stone's attack, and the unfamiliarity with this unpracticed approach brought mistakes? The move away from a heavy presence must have been alien to them.

      I don't believe getting too close was part of the plan and I don't believe the plan was to assassinate Adams and McGuinness. I'm not saying the car's maneuvers were down to nerves alone but they were definitely under pressure. Suggestions have been they were in a surveillance or a logistical role. Who knows? We can only speculate.

      The authorities would have been more likely to have attempted intervening if it was preplanned but I think everyone was taken aback by the pace and upheaval of the situation.

      Adams was talking to Hume in January 1988 and directly before that the Republican leadership was talking to the British. It is highly likely that by this stage the British thought Adams/McGuinness could be people they could negotiate with. The British would have been reluctant to jeopardise this opportunity and another point is they'd be keenly aware of the dangers of creating martyrs. They would be acutely aware of the power of martyrdom.

      Taking out the leadership would only harden the Republican outlook and approach. It is commonly understood that the Republican movement was a hierarchical group with a precise structure and strict discipline. Not a simple case of killing the snake by taking off it's head. It would probably make matters worse for the British as mindsets hardened. Maybe Stakeknife, Donaldson or any number of others were whispering a few words in the ears of their handlers about a desire for change?

      The British were used to extra-judicial killings (just look at Gibraltar). However, they preferred killings they could argue away with excuses (like remote control devices that went beyond the technology of the time as they claimed in Gibraltar). A televised preplanned double-assassination of leadership figures by their foot-soldiers isn't their style. If they wanted to, they would've arranged something more low-key and probably with proxies.

      Back to the title of your piece, I'd say they were sent but they also blundered. All good to speculate. That's how we come up with possible explanations. As I said, it was an interesting piece. Someone knows the detailed truth and I doubt either of us will ever be party to it.

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    5. AM8:39 AM, March 25, 2026

      Brian Morgan comments

      Simon,

      The facts allow for informed judgment beyond mere speculation. Chief Superintendent Donnan's lack of prior knowledge doesn't rule out that they were sent, he confirms he was ordered not to intervene. Somebody knew more than he did.

      Your idea that they panicked when faced with a wall of four taxis and stewards advice to turn back, then mounted the footpath, doesn't hold for multiple reasons. Not least you acknowledge they knew they were driving toward the funeral which means they were prepared.

      After mounting the footpath, when Woods saw he couldn't proceed, he reversed at speed with impressive precision, steering back onto Andersonstown Road. That took skill beyond most drivers ability - with no threat present. He could have safely turned or reversed slowly the way they came from the start; he chose not to.

      Their motive remains unclear but you dismiss all the evidence by noting no proven motive for attacking the funeral therefore no facts hold. That is not an honest consideration of, now uncontested, established facts.

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    6. AM8:44 AM, March 25, 2026

      I marvel a bit at how this discussion keeps going. After two or three comments/exchanges on anything my own interest wanes. I don't have that concentration stamina anymore - even got on the wrong bus in town yesterday despite the destination being clearly displayed!! There are only two town service buses operating from the main street FFS.

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  4. Stuart10:03 PM, March 20, 2026

    Sorry AM, I’ll get the hang of this one day

    ReplyDelete

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