I won’t repeat my analysis here except to say that such attempts continue, completely immune to rational argument or democratic logic, and seemingly fuelled by the unionist sense of entitlement and supremacy or by the unfounded fear of widespread political instability emerging in the wake of a pro-unity referendum outcome.[1] Resistance to a unionist veto must continue as well.
Two recent developments are worthy of brief comment, both for what they say and what they imply. Last spring Alex Kane, former UUP director of communications and well-known media commentator, manufactured a unionist veto over the May 1998 referendum ratifying the Good Friday Agreement. He said that in the north, there was a “unionist/pro-union threshold required for the referendum to pass” (Kane, 2023)[2]. Kane should know better. There was no such threshold. The GFA says clearly that the referendum passes if a majority of those voting choose ‘Yes’. And it applies the same simple majority rule to the referendum in the south. Kane’s egregious mistake is not innocent. By inventing a unionist veto in the 1998 northern referendum, he establishes an historical precedent for contemporary proposals demanding a unionist veto in any upcoming border poll.
The second development occurred at the end of January 2024. In a parliamentary discussion of the Safeguarding the Union command paper, Conservative MP Richard Drax asked Secretary of State Chris Heaton-Harris to assure the House and the country that the north will always be part of the UK. Heaton-Harris responded:
He too should know better. The Secretary here displays an incredible ignorance of his own brief, even though he wants to be “very careful” about a “very important” part of the GFA, and even though one month later he (sort of) corrected himself in Parliament.[3] The Secretary is simply wrong to suggest that the Agreement requires both communities to consent to a united Ireland. There is no unionist (or nationalist) veto over constitutional change. The GFA requires only a simple majority of those voting in a border poll.
What do Kane’s and Heaton-Harris’s statements tell us? They indicate how ingrained among unionists and British politicians is the notion that the unionist community deserves a veto over constitutional change.[4] Kane alters history to justify a present-day veto, Heaton-Harris alters the GFA to create one. I should also single out poor Drax, who carries on as if the GFA’s provisions on constitutional change do not even exist: there’s no need for a veto because the north will always be a part of the UK. The Kane and Heaton-Harris statements are of course consistent with British policy since partition—from 1920 and arguably from 1912, the British government has supported a northern unionist veto over Irish unity, deceptively cloaked in the democratic language of majority consent. Now that the democratic deception is in danger of being exposed, Britain, unionism and their allies find yet another means to achieve a veto, even while feinting deference to the Agreement.
The real danger is that, in exercising authority over calling a border poll, the Secretary of State internalizes the presumption of a unionist right of veto. The GFA says that the Secretary must order a poll if he believes it likely that there is a majority in favour of a united Ireland. Should the Secretary presume a unionist veto, he would not order a constitutional vote in the face of significant unionist opposition to reunification, even if the threshold of a “likely majority” for unity has been met. And, of course, we’ll never know if the unionist veto blocked a poll because the Secretary’s power in this area is mysterious, arbitrary and unaccountable.
Thus far, constitutional narratives signify that the Secretary will order a border poll if enough unionists agree to a united Ireland or, as I argued in the first installment, if the British government finds a constitutional vote expedient. These two conditions—unionist consent and British self-interest—may not always be in harmony, as the Brexit experience repeatedly demonstrated. British (English) self-interest easily overrides any concern with unionist constitutional sensibilities. But the two conditions may remain somewhat harmonious if the overall state of the union, especially fear of reviving the now-humbled independence movement in Scotland, becomes a real concern. In any case, the conditions of unionist consent and British expedience violate the plain meaning of the GFA in that they ignore the overall state of public opinion on the constitutional status of the north. They pay no heed to what could be a likely majority for unity, which should trigger a border poll. Supporters of Irish reunification need to remain acutely aware of any attempts to impose such conditions and be ready to resist them.
Unfortunately, current constitutional narratives are not yet finished with the idea and importance of veto, as the next installment in the series will show.
Notes
[1] In two articles in recent issues of the Jesuit journal Studies, former Taoiseach John Bruton rehashes many of the specious arguments favouring a unionist veto over constitutional change (Bruton, 2021 & 2023). Dr. John Bowman, in his attempt to refashion Bruton as a crucial peacemaker, refers to one of these articles as “a remarkable essay” that is “thoughtful, reasonable and among the best-judged writings on the agreement” (Bowman, 2024). Bowman does not specify which of the two articles he has in mind, but it doesn’t matter because neither is worthy of the praise Bowman heaps upon it. Both of Bruton’s pieces are exceedingly superficial, convoluted, contradictory and one-sided accounts that misinterpret the major documents of the peace process and fail to engage any of the countless works on the GFA.
[2] All direct quotations for which I do not cite a page or paragraph number are from internet documents that do not use a numbering system. Otherwise, I indicate the page, paragraph or column number of direct quotations.
[3] In mid-February, SDLP leader Colum Eastwood called for Heaton-Harris to correct the parliamentary record by noting the GFA’s simple majority rule for constitutional change. In Parliament on February 26, NIO Minister of State Steve Baker confirmed the simple majority rule; Heaton-Harris did the same two days later. Neither mentioned that they were explicitly correcting the record at the request of Eastwood (McClements, 2024; Hansard, 2024b; Hansard, 2024c).
[4] The language of unionist veto is so ubiquitous that it can infiltrate the thought of those who strongly support a united Ireland. Brian Feeney, for instance, in his critique of unionism’s anti-protocol campaign, employs confusing language that leaves the impression that the GFA provides for a unionist-specific veto over constitutional change (Feeney, 2021, 2022 & 2024).
References
Bowman, J. (2024). “John Bruton was ‘his own man’ whose role in the peace process gets overlooked.” Irish Times. 27 December. Retrieved from the Factiva (Dow Jones) electronic database of news articles.
Bruton, J. (2021). “Careful Thought Needed on Border Polls.” Studies 110:439 (Autumn): 309-314.
Bruton, J. (2023). “Partition: Are There Two Nations on the Island of Ireland, and Could They Be Fused into One?” Studies 111:444 (Winter 2022-2023): 418-426.
Feeney, B. (2021). “Once again, unionists are selling their gullible supporters a false prospectus.” Irish News. 24 February. Retrieved from.
Feeney, B. (2022). “The DUP is in control of nothing.” Irish News. 14 May. Retrieved from.
Feeney, B. (2024). “Dull DUP summit offered no evidence of new thinking.” Irish News. 25 September. Retrieved from.
Two recent developments are worthy of brief comment, both for what they say and what they imply. Last spring Alex Kane, former UUP director of communications and well-known media commentator, manufactured a unionist veto over the May 1998 referendum ratifying the Good Friday Agreement. He said that in the north, there was a “unionist/pro-union threshold required for the referendum to pass” (Kane, 2023)[2]. Kane should know better. There was no such threshold. The GFA says clearly that the referendum passes if a majority of those voting choose ‘Yes’. And it applies the same simple majority rule to the referendum in the south. Kane’s egregious mistake is not innocent. By inventing a unionist veto in the 1998 northern referendum, he establishes an historical precedent for contemporary proposals demanding a unionist veto in any upcoming border poll.
The second development occurred at the end of January 2024. In a parliamentary discussion of the Safeguarding the Union command paper, Conservative MP Richard Drax asked Secretary of State Chris Heaton-Harris to assure the House and the country that the north will always be part of the UK. Heaton-Harris responded:
I have to tread slightly more carefully on that particular issue, because as Secretary of State I am responsible for making an independent assessment of the conditions that might lead to the border poll to which my hon. Friend alludes. I have to be very careful, but I am comfortable suggesting that, certainly in my lifetime, Northern Ireland will be a strong and wonderfully prosperous part of the United Kingdom. However, it is very important to outline the parts of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement that allow for all these things to happen, and any change would absolutely depend on the consent of both communities at the time. I certainly do not think anybody judges that to be in place at this point - Hansard, 2024a, cols. 885-86.
He too should know better. The Secretary here displays an incredible ignorance of his own brief, even though he wants to be “very careful” about a “very important” part of the GFA, and even though one month later he (sort of) corrected himself in Parliament.[3] The Secretary is simply wrong to suggest that the Agreement requires both communities to consent to a united Ireland. There is no unionist (or nationalist) veto over constitutional change. The GFA requires only a simple majority of those voting in a border poll.
What do Kane’s and Heaton-Harris’s statements tell us? They indicate how ingrained among unionists and British politicians is the notion that the unionist community deserves a veto over constitutional change.[4] Kane alters history to justify a present-day veto, Heaton-Harris alters the GFA to create one. I should also single out poor Drax, who carries on as if the GFA’s provisions on constitutional change do not even exist: there’s no need for a veto because the north will always be a part of the UK. The Kane and Heaton-Harris statements are of course consistent with British policy since partition—from 1920 and arguably from 1912, the British government has supported a northern unionist veto over Irish unity, deceptively cloaked in the democratic language of majority consent. Now that the democratic deception is in danger of being exposed, Britain, unionism and their allies find yet another means to achieve a veto, even while feinting deference to the Agreement.
The real danger is that, in exercising authority over calling a border poll, the Secretary of State internalizes the presumption of a unionist right of veto. The GFA says that the Secretary must order a poll if he believes it likely that there is a majority in favour of a united Ireland. Should the Secretary presume a unionist veto, he would not order a constitutional vote in the face of significant unionist opposition to reunification, even if the threshold of a “likely majority” for unity has been met. And, of course, we’ll never know if the unionist veto blocked a poll because the Secretary’s power in this area is mysterious, arbitrary and unaccountable.
Thus far, constitutional narratives signify that the Secretary will order a border poll if enough unionists agree to a united Ireland or, as I argued in the first installment, if the British government finds a constitutional vote expedient. These two conditions—unionist consent and British self-interest—may not always be in harmony, as the Brexit experience repeatedly demonstrated. British (English) self-interest easily overrides any concern with unionist constitutional sensibilities. But the two conditions may remain somewhat harmonious if the overall state of the union, especially fear of reviving the now-humbled independence movement in Scotland, becomes a real concern. In any case, the conditions of unionist consent and British expedience violate the plain meaning of the GFA in that they ignore the overall state of public opinion on the constitutional status of the north. They pay no heed to what could be a likely majority for unity, which should trigger a border poll. Supporters of Irish reunification need to remain acutely aware of any attempts to impose such conditions and be ready to resist them.
Unfortunately, current constitutional narratives are not yet finished with the idea and importance of veto, as the next installment in the series will show.
Notes
[1] In two articles in recent issues of the Jesuit journal Studies, former Taoiseach John Bruton rehashes many of the specious arguments favouring a unionist veto over constitutional change (Bruton, 2021 & 2023). Dr. John Bowman, in his attempt to refashion Bruton as a crucial peacemaker, refers to one of these articles as “a remarkable essay” that is “thoughtful, reasonable and among the best-judged writings on the agreement” (Bowman, 2024). Bowman does not specify which of the two articles he has in mind, but it doesn’t matter because neither is worthy of the praise Bowman heaps upon it. Both of Bruton’s pieces are exceedingly superficial, convoluted, contradictory and one-sided accounts that misinterpret the major documents of the peace process and fail to engage any of the countless works on the GFA.
[2] All direct quotations for which I do not cite a page or paragraph number are from internet documents that do not use a numbering system. Otherwise, I indicate the page, paragraph or column number of direct quotations.
[3] In mid-February, SDLP leader Colum Eastwood called for Heaton-Harris to correct the parliamentary record by noting the GFA’s simple majority rule for constitutional change. In Parliament on February 26, NIO Minister of State Steve Baker confirmed the simple majority rule; Heaton-Harris did the same two days later. Neither mentioned that they were explicitly correcting the record at the request of Eastwood (McClements, 2024; Hansard, 2024b; Hansard, 2024c).
[4] The language of unionist veto is so ubiquitous that it can infiltrate the thought of those who strongly support a united Ireland. Brian Feeney, for instance, in his critique of unionism’s anti-protocol campaign, employs confusing language that leaves the impression that the GFA provides for a unionist-specific veto over constitutional change (Feeney, 2021, 2022 & 2024).
References
Bowman, J. (2024). “John Bruton was ‘his own man’ whose role in the peace process gets overlooked.” Irish Times. 27 December. Retrieved from the Factiva (Dow Jones) electronic database of news articles.
Bruton, J. (2021). “Careful Thought Needed on Border Polls.” Studies 110:439 (Autumn): 309-314.
Bruton, J. (2023). “Partition: Are There Two Nations on the Island of Ireland, and Could They Be Fused into One?” Studies 111:444 (Winter 2022-2023): 418-426.
Feeney, B. (2021). “Once again, unionists are selling their gullible supporters a false prospectus.” Irish News. 24 February. Retrieved from.
Feeney, B. (2022). “The DUP is in control of nothing.” Irish News. 14 May. Retrieved from.
Feeney, B. (2024). “Dull DUP summit offered no evidence of new thinking.” Irish News. 25 September. Retrieved from.
Hansard. (2024a). House of Commons debates vol 774 cols 876-892. 31 January. Retrieved from.
Hansard. (2024b). House of Commons debates vol 746 cols 54-98. 26 February. Retrieved from.
Hansard. (2024c). House of Commons debates vol 746 cols 311-314. 28 February. Retrieved from.
Kane, A. (2023). “Unionists needs to start talking.” Irish News. 19 May. Retrieved from.
McClements, F. (2024). “UK government ‘undermining’ Belfast Agreement with pro-union stance, SDLP leader says.” Irish Times. 12 February. Retrieved from.
⏩ Mike Burke has lectured in Politics and Public Administration in Canada for over 30 years.
Hypothetically, say the SoS did call for a vote...what would happen if the Unionist community en masse refused to partake in it?
ReplyDeleteSteve - if they did not take part the vote would be regarded in the same way as the boycott by many nationalists in 1973. The non votes amount to nothing either way while the votes cast would amount to something, either for or against.
DeleteThere would be a united Ireland, geographically, but not a united people. But that exists with or without a border poll. It is hardly a reason for not proceeding with such a poll. If 50+1 can maintain the union why should 50+1 not be enough to end it? Unless nationalists are to be told they are second class citizens, the GFA means nothing and their votes do not have the same weight as unionist votes.
Then their vote won't count.
ReplyDelete.
Then is it really a "United" Ireland?
DeleteThat's democracy baby
ReplyDeleteThe will of the majority of the people
There were minorities in other British colonies who wished to hold onto their privileged positions
They learned to live in decolonised countries, as will your unionist friends