The origins of the conflict lay in the terms of an agreement signed on 6th December 1921 between representatives of the British Government, including Prime Minister David Lloyd George and an Irish delegation headed by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. The agreement fell short of The Republic which the IRA had been fighting for, as proclaimed at Easter Week 1916 and reaffirmed and established on 21st January 1919, but was a hell of a lot more than any of the previous Home Rule Bills had offered and slightly more than the other dominions had secured from the imperial government.
This agreement would not become a treaty until passed by the Houses of Parliament and the insultingly named “House of Commons of Southern Ireland”. The British Parliament passed the “terms of the agreement” on 16th December 1921 by 401 to 58 in the Commons and 166 to 42 in the Lords. The Second Dail, or “House of Commons of Southern Ireland” began debating the Agreement on 14th December and voted marginally in favour of it on January 7th 1922 by 64 votes in favour to 57 against.
Eamon de Valera was the voice of opposition and also President of the Dail while the main spokespersons in favour were Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. The debate, often heated, was chiefly, though not exclusively, between these three and it was in this debate that de Valera introduced his Document No. 2 which was in effect an alternative treaty. The terms of this document had already been rejected by the British but de Valera wanted it debated in the Dail. It basically offered an external association between Britain and Ireland bringing Ireland out of the British Empire.
Eamon de Valera was the voice of opposition and also President of the Dail while the main spokespersons in favour were Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. The debate, often heated, was chiefly, though not exclusively, between these three and it was in this debate that de Valera introduced his Document No. 2 which was in effect an alternative treaty. The terms of this document had already been rejected by the British but de Valera wanted it debated in the Dail. It basically offered an external association between Britain and Ireland bringing Ireland out of the British Empire.
This was too much for the British who had already given ground on a number of issues. Their initial offer was to hold on to republican Prisoners of War and the demand the IRA disarm before talks could begin. This was rejected earlier in the year by de Valera who had, after the ceasefire of July 1921, met with Lloyd George in London so he knew exactly what was on the table. One of the main sticking points for de Valera was the oath of perceived allegiance to the British Crown. Article four of the Agreement read:
I ------------ do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to HM King George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
This de Valera had huge problems with and was the primary source of the split within Sinn Fein and resulted, with a little help from Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, in the Irish Civil War 1922-23.
It was and is the popular impression that the oath is of allegiance to the British King but a cursory glance will see that is not strictly the case. The oath of allegiance is to “the constitution of the Irish Free State” and only fidelity to the British Monarch. Does this cast the anti-Treaty republicans in an unreasonable light? When the agreement was negotiated the British had moved, for ulterior motives known to themselves but it would not have been for nothing. So, negotiations meant exactly that. The Irish side set out demanding ten, ie the republic, the British offered two the first set demanding keeping republican prisoners in jail and the IRA surrendering their arms before any talks could begin. This was a nonstarter and months later the two sides finished up with a compromise which gave the Irish delegation much of what they wanted, though well short of The Republic. Perhaps the Irish delegates could come away claiming to have got seven of the ten. They were never going to get their ten - things do not work like that particularly when negotiating with the primary global military power of the day.
On the other hand, the republicans had a valid point over the part which stated Irish citizens will hold “by virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain.” The question here must be, did the citizens of Great Britain hold by the same virtue “common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain”? No, they did not, so why should it apply to Irish citizens? This weakened the relevance of Irish citizenship as citizenship of Great Britain would be the main point. The oath of allegiance may well have been primarily to the Irish Free State but, at Churchills insistence, the 1922 Free State constitution must contain the allegiance to the terms of the Treaty. This makes the oath of “faithful to HM King George V” much more potent as a constitutional point! So, when looked at through this lens were the republicans being “unreasonable”?
So now what did de Valera’s Document No. 2 propose as an “alternative Treaty”. The main issue appears to have been the oath. De Valera’s Document No. 2 article six advocates; "That, for purposes of Association Ireland shall recognise His Britannic Majesty as the Head of the Association”. Put plainly the British Monarch, according to de Valera’s alternative Treaty would be Head of the Association in line with external relations but not the Head of State. Was this wording worth all the bloodshed of Civil War? De Valera’s Document No.2 was very convoluted and long winded with only articles two to six of any relevance. Even they were too convoluted to print in their entirety as only article six, reference to the British Monarch was of any importance to the difference between the Pro and Anti-Treaty supporters. This alternative Treaty was not of any use to either Free Staters or republicans and was voted down in the Second Dail.
In preparation for the General Election of 1922 Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera made an electoral pact to ensure Sinn Fein won, and in an attempt to stave off Civil War. Lloyd George, fearing a reunited Sinn Fein told Collins this pact was in breach of the Treaty, which it most certainly was not, and ordered Collins to break it. This was a clear interference with internal Irish political affairs and, if anybody was in breach of the Treaty it was Lloyd George. Collins, however and, in my view fatally, obeyed the British PM and nullified the pact, thus splitting Sinn Fein. The Pro-Treaty candidates won a landslide, thus giving Collins his electoral mandate.
The anti-Treaty IRA were held up in the Four Courts building, still no shots being fired. Enter Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the colonies. He instructed Collins to bombard the rebels out, otherwise he would. Once again Britain interfering in an internal Irish affair. Liam Lynch, who became one of the anti-Treaty commanders, was, like Collins, opposed to Civil War. He was at this point neutral until the field artillery borrowed from the British opened fire on the Four Courts. This forced him towards the anti-Treaty side. Lloyd George and Churchill had secured their Civil War ensuring never again would there be a unified Sinn Fein party. The Irish Civil War had been the intentions of the British Government ever since the Collins/de Valera electoral pact. Now they had it. Whether Collins had repudiated the pact or not, Lloyd George and Churchill had been nudging the Free Sate Provisional Government towards this conclusion. Enter Winston Churchill, who, once Lloyd George had got away with calling the shots over the pact, he would start giving Collins orders about bombing the rebels in the Four Courts.
There was one more twist in the events leading to the Irish Civil War which again adds to speculation that this was what Lloyd George and Churchill had wanted. Evidence apparently in the British museum left by Lance Bombardier Percy Creek states the first shots fired at the Four Courts came from the British Army. He claimed he “fired two shells from his Howitzer at the building then retreated into the early morning darkness”. These shots were fired before the Free State Army opened up with their borrowed artillery. Was this another insurance of the British Governments to ensure a Civil War would break out?
My own opinion is once Michael Collins could not say no - one simple short word, No - to Lloyd George when the British Prime Minister lied about the electoral pact being in breach of the Treaty, which it was not. He failed to stand up to the Welsh Wizard, born in Manchester not Wales at all. Once this failure became apparent Lloyd George and Churchill were calling the shots all the way. It was the British who broke the Treaty, they broke article eight by allowing the Free State Army to reach the strength of 60,000 men for the Civil War when article eight states that:
It was and is the popular impression that the oath is of allegiance to the British King but a cursory glance will see that is not strictly the case. The oath of allegiance is to “the constitution of the Irish Free State” and only fidelity to the British Monarch. Does this cast the anti-Treaty republicans in an unreasonable light? When the agreement was negotiated the British had moved, for ulterior motives known to themselves but it would not have been for nothing. So, negotiations meant exactly that. The Irish side set out demanding ten, ie the republic, the British offered two the first set demanding keeping republican prisoners in jail and the IRA surrendering their arms before any talks could begin. This was a nonstarter and months later the two sides finished up with a compromise which gave the Irish delegation much of what they wanted, though well short of The Republic. Perhaps the Irish delegates could come away claiming to have got seven of the ten. They were never going to get their ten - things do not work like that particularly when negotiating with the primary global military power of the day.
On the other hand, the republicans had a valid point over the part which stated Irish citizens will hold “by virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain.” The question here must be, did the citizens of Great Britain hold by the same virtue “common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain”? No, they did not, so why should it apply to Irish citizens? This weakened the relevance of Irish citizenship as citizenship of Great Britain would be the main point. The oath of allegiance may well have been primarily to the Irish Free State but, at Churchills insistence, the 1922 Free State constitution must contain the allegiance to the terms of the Treaty. This makes the oath of “faithful to HM King George V” much more potent as a constitutional point! So, when looked at through this lens were the republicans being “unreasonable”?
So now what did de Valera’s Document No. 2 propose as an “alternative Treaty”. The main issue appears to have been the oath. De Valera’s Document No. 2 article six advocates; "That, for purposes of Association Ireland shall recognise His Britannic Majesty as the Head of the Association”. Put plainly the British Monarch, according to de Valera’s alternative Treaty would be Head of the Association in line with external relations but not the Head of State. Was this wording worth all the bloodshed of Civil War? De Valera’s Document No.2 was very convoluted and long winded with only articles two to six of any relevance. Even they were too convoluted to print in their entirety as only article six, reference to the British Monarch was of any importance to the difference between the Pro and Anti-Treaty supporters. This alternative Treaty was not of any use to either Free Staters or republicans and was voted down in the Second Dail.
In preparation for the General Election of 1922 Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera made an electoral pact to ensure Sinn Fein won, and in an attempt to stave off Civil War. Lloyd George, fearing a reunited Sinn Fein told Collins this pact was in breach of the Treaty, which it most certainly was not, and ordered Collins to break it. This was a clear interference with internal Irish political affairs and, if anybody was in breach of the Treaty it was Lloyd George. Collins, however and, in my view fatally, obeyed the British PM and nullified the pact, thus splitting Sinn Fein. The Pro-Treaty candidates won a landslide, thus giving Collins his electoral mandate.
The anti-Treaty IRA were held up in the Four Courts building, still no shots being fired. Enter Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the colonies. He instructed Collins to bombard the rebels out, otherwise he would. Once again Britain interfering in an internal Irish affair. Liam Lynch, who became one of the anti-Treaty commanders, was, like Collins, opposed to Civil War. He was at this point neutral until the field artillery borrowed from the British opened fire on the Four Courts. This forced him towards the anti-Treaty side. Lloyd George and Churchill had secured their Civil War ensuring never again would there be a unified Sinn Fein party. The Irish Civil War had been the intentions of the British Government ever since the Collins/de Valera electoral pact. Now they had it. Whether Collins had repudiated the pact or not, Lloyd George and Churchill had been nudging the Free Sate Provisional Government towards this conclusion. Enter Winston Churchill, who, once Lloyd George had got away with calling the shots over the pact, he would start giving Collins orders about bombing the rebels in the Four Courts.
There was one more twist in the events leading to the Irish Civil War which again adds to speculation that this was what Lloyd George and Churchill had wanted. Evidence apparently in the British museum left by Lance Bombardier Percy Creek states the first shots fired at the Four Courts came from the British Army. He claimed he “fired two shells from his Howitzer at the building then retreated into the early morning darkness”. These shots were fired before the Free State Army opened up with their borrowed artillery. Was this another insurance of the British Governments to ensure a Civil War would break out?
My own opinion is once Michael Collins could not say no - one simple short word, No - to Lloyd George when the British Prime Minister lied about the electoral pact being in breach of the Treaty, which it was not. He failed to stand up to the Welsh Wizard, born in Manchester not Wales at all. Once this failure became apparent Lloyd George and Churchill were calling the shots all the way. It was the British who broke the Treaty, they broke article eight by allowing the Free State Army to reach the strength of 60,000 men for the Civil War when article eight states that:
If the Government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to that of Great Britain.
In other words, the Free State Army must be no larger per capita than that of the British Army. Therefore, the Free State Army should not have exceeded around 17,000 troops. It suited the British to ignore article eight which breached the terms of the Agreement, now a Treaty. A precedent had been set for the British to break the Treaty any time it suited, a Treaty they had ambiguously drafted in the first place perhaps allowing themselves sufficient scope. Perhaps for this reason they, the British side, could afford to make certain concessions to the Irish plenipotentiaries?
Collins should have told the British Prime Minister that the electoral pact was not in any way a breach of the Treaty and that it was an internal Irish affair. He should have said, politely but firmly, no Prime Minister I will not repudiate this pact. Once Colins went belly up over this the rest was probably, and in hindsight, a racing certainty. The British had tried and succeeded in calling the shots of how internal Irish elections would be organised and run. This was, in my view the beginning of the road which led to the Irish Civil War.
Footnote: In reference to Lloyd George, born in Manchester, being referred to as the “Welsh Wizard” there was only one Welsh Wizard in Manchester during the 1920s. His name was Billy Meredith, a Welsh winger who played for Manchester United! Just thought I’d mention it.
Collins should have told the British Prime Minister that the electoral pact was not in any way a breach of the Treaty and that it was an internal Irish affair. He should have said, politely but firmly, no Prime Minister I will not repudiate this pact. Once Colins went belly up over this the rest was probably, and in hindsight, a racing certainty. The British had tried and succeeded in calling the shots of how internal Irish elections would be organised and run. This was, in my view the beginning of the road which led to the Irish Civil War.
Footnote: In reference to Lloyd George, born in Manchester, being referred to as the “Welsh Wizard” there was only one Welsh Wizard in Manchester during the 1920s. His name was Billy Meredith, a Welsh winger who played for Manchester United! Just thought I’d mention it.
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Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent Socialist Republican and Marxist |
You are looking a little too inward Caoimhin. In 1922 Britain was still reeling from the end of WW1 four years earlier. They looked toward Ireland and saw a potentially huge issue if hostilities in Europe flared up again. This was the main driver behind British policy in Ireland in the 1920's. Once Lloyd George looked like he was going to stuff this up they sent in Churchill for his sheer bastardry.
ReplyDeleteSee your point Steve, but it is a complex period. Yes Britain was "still reeling from the end of WW1" but also was aware that the total surrender of Ireland may be seen as a defeat, for the point you make about seeing Ireland as "a huge issue if hostlitilities in Europe flared up again" which is why they insisted on keeping hold of the "treaty ports."
ReplyDeleteYou are right enough about Lloyd George, who may have given more than neccessary, as the more aggressive Churchill and worse FE. Smith ( Lord Birkenhead) were in their team. I am no supporter of the treaty but neither was Collins, Barton, Gavan Duffy and Dougan. Griffith probably, in fact undoubtedly was a supporter. Remember he was not a rebublican, he was a monarchist, "the Hungarian way" referring to Austro Hungary of the time.
I still believe once Collins surrendered the pact, and repudiated it, gave Churchill the green light to bring about the Civil War which the British wanted. The last thing they needed was a unified republican movement. Then we should look at the credibility of Lance Bombadier Percy Creeks claim that he fired two rounds at the Four Courts thus guaranteeing civil war became innevitable. Whose orders was he acting on? My guess is Churchills amd Smiths. Even General Macready advised Lloyd George not to take military action in the Free State because it could reunify Sinn Fein of the day. Did Churchill, Secretary for the Colonies, ignore this advice? Either way the Collins de Valera electoral pact, from the British point of view, had to be boroken permanently and they succeeded.
Caoimhin O'Muraile