Caoimhin O’Muraile ✒ looks back on the most important industrial action in the UK post-World War 2.

The Question of a National Ballot

Many contributors to TPQ will remember the 1984/85 British Coal Miners' Strike, some as supporters of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), others perhaps a little less enthusiastic about the union case. 

The dispute lasted one year, from March 1984 until the same month the following year when it was officially called off on 3rd March 1985. After this date and even though the union leadership had called the strike off and organised a return to work, many miners, particularly in the militant areas, remained out until local union leaders had negotiated a no recriminations agreement with local National Coal Board (NCB) bosses. 

The strike will go down as one of the landmarks of industrial conflict in these islands during the 20th century, along with the 1913/14 Dublin Lockout, the 1926 General Strike and the less documented Dunnes Stores Strike against handling South African goods (the longest of them all lasting almost three years) during the days of Apartheid. The Miners' Strike was perhaps the most bitter, certainly over the longest period of them all. Even today in what is left of the mining areas people whose husbands, sons and boyfriends were on strike do not speak to the families of scabs such is the feeling even to this day almost thirty-six years after the ending of hostilities in the Pit Fields.

The NUM was led by what is sometimes referred to as the “tripartite leadership” consisting of Arthur Scargill, NUM National President, Peter Heathfield, NUM National Secretary and Mick McGahey - Vice president and the leader of Scotland’s miners. 

The roots of the dispute happened perhaps ten years previous when the NUM was instrumental in bringing down the government of Edward Heath in 1974. Margaret Thatcher was a member of Heath's cabinet and never forgave the NUM and in particular Arthur Scargill for heaping humiliation on her former boss and, as she saw it, herself. She and others accused the NUM of holding “the country to ransom”, taking advantage of the oil crisis. The miners had fallen behind in the pay stakes and for once they had a powerful bargaining chip, and used it which is what trade unions do when on the odd occasion the chips are in their favour. 

Thatcher succeeded Heath as the Conservative Party leader and held this grudge over the years. Her hatred for Scargill was despite the fact that the NUM National President back in 1974 was Joe Gormley. She saw Scargill who was the Yorkshire area President, as the organiser of the “flying pickets” and the chief planner in the fall of Heath. After the fall of Heath, a tripartite agreement, “The Plan For Coal” was drawn up and signed by the Labour Government, the NCB and the mining unions, primarily the NUM and NACODS (National Association of Colliery Overseers, Deputies and Shotfirers). 

When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 she had secretly been planning for some years a showdown with the miners in revenge for Heath. Nevertheless in 1981 she endorsed “The Plan For Coal”, having no intentions of standing by her endorsement. Like Hitler at the Munich Conference of 1938 Thatcher had every intention of breaking her word at the first opportunity. 

The Plan For Coal set out the future of the industry safeguarding many jobs yet tailoring capacity accordingly. Despite this endorsement by Thatcher the liar, when Arthur Scargill was elected to replace the retiring Joe Gormley as NUM National President in 1982 he was sent anonymously a copy of a secret plan prepared by NCB bosses earmarking 95 pits for closure with the loss of 100,000 jobs. This plan had been prepared on government instructions and was a clear breach of the “Plan For Coal” which Thatcher had endorsed. It followed the successful unofficial strike by miners, including Nottinghamshire (without a ballot, more on this later) in 1981. Thatcher had been planning a showdown since the mid-seventies and while in opposition she had right-wing MP Nicholas Ridley draw up a plan to defeat any challenge from the trade unions, with the NUM foremost on her mind. The plan included:

  • building up coal stocks at power stations
  • import coal from non-union foreign ports
  • non-union lorry drivers to be recruited by haulage companies
  • to train and equip a large mobile squad of police, ready to employ riot tactics in order to uphold the law against violent picketing

The “Ridley Plan” also recommended cutting off the money supply to strikers and make their union finance them. Thatcher also privately planned to sequestrate union funds, as she did with the NUM during the 1984/85 strike. This way strikers could not claim state benefits and neither could their union finance or support them in any way!

On 1st March 1984, acting on government instructions NCB directors in four areas announced the immediate closure of five pits: Cortonwood and Bullcliffe Wood in Yorkshire, Snowdown in Kent and Polmaise in Scotland. Cortonwood became perhaps the best known of these pits and the pivot where the strike started on 3rd March 1984. Margaret Thatcher had shown clearly she was a deceitful liar with a hit list for the coal industry. Unfortunately, many people believed her when she said no such list existed and accused Scargill of lying. It was, then as now, Arthur Scargill and the NUM who were being honest and the British Prime Minister a compulsive liar. It must be made clear here that, contrary to some people’s misguided beliefs based on media lies, the NUM did not declare war on the Thatcher Government - it was her and the right-wing junta she led who wished to obliterate the NUM.

Thatcher drafted in Ian McGregor to head the NCB. This man had already butchered the steel industry as head of the British Steel Corporation and it was now the turn of the coal industry, something Thatcher had been edging for since the mid-seventies. Like Thatcher, McGregor was a capable liar and followed his boss in Number 10 to the letter. The Ridley Plan, drafted back in the mid-seventies, was now to be put into action including a large mobile police force, amounting in real terms to a national force, who would prevent picket line violence while exercising a large amount of aggression themselves. Many of these police officers were believed to be military personnel as they wore no numbers on their lapels, a legal requirement I believe, and had a level of fitness over and above that expected of a police officer. Perhaps because these fellas were used to running ten miles per day with a 50 kilo kit bag on their back! Curfews were imposed on coal mining areas as a form of martial law descended on whole swathes of Britain. Restrictions of movement were imposed on miners travelling to picket other areas as the battle lines were drawn between the miners and their supporters - including football managers Jack Charlton and Brian Clough - and the British state.

After the decision at Cortonwood and other pits earmarked for closure to strike “Flying Pickets” began fanning out from Yorkshire, the North East and Kent to close pits in other areas, through persuasion, where miners were working. Yorkshire “Flying Pickets” closed the Lancashire coalfield as the Lancashire lads refused to cross Yorkshires picket lines. Police set up road blocks, including the Blackwall Tunnel preventing the Kent miners from travelling north to picket. In some areas miners were banned from NCB property and some were arrested on motorway slip-roads. It can only be imagined NCB property by then covered the country’s motorway network! Over 140,000 miners were now out on strike in defence of “jobs, pits and communities.” There were, however, loud voices demanding a national ballot before they would join the strike. The loudest of these was the Nottinghamshire area, Britain’s second largest coalfield, and they would be a leading factor, but not in my view the leading factor, in the strike being defeated.

On 19th April 1984 a special delegates conference of the NUM was held to discuss the strike and the possibility of a national ballot. All the evidence suggested the vote would go in favour of the said ballot. The Nottinghamshire delegates, Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, argued - as instructed by their members - passionately for a ballot. The two Nottinghamshire delegates had done their job to the letter as instructed and were prepared to accept the vote no matter which way it went. Arthur Scargill and Peter Heathfield, National President and General Secretary respectively did not get a vote as they were not delegates. Mick McGahey, Vice President, did receive a vote as a delegate for the Scottish Miners. To everybody’s surprise and after much debates where arguments for and against a ballot were heard the vote opted to reject the call for a ballot and enforce rule 41 of the NUM rule book (read Striking Similarities by Kevin Morley page 128 for rule 41 in full) allowing for strike action on an area-by-area basis, with NEC approval, to take place without a ballot thus allowing pickets to persuade other miners as to why they should be on strike.

By 19th November 1984 around upwards of 75% of miners were out on strike. Nottinghamshire, despite the delegate conference which included their own representatives voting against holding a ballot in line with union rules in the majority of cases, worked. Around 20% of Notts. Miners were out on strike and stuck it out for a year, but the majority, and not for the first time, scabbed. This was a tradition in Nottinghamshire dating back to the 1926 General Strike and even before, where these miners broke the strike. In Scotland around 90% were out, Lancashire: almost 70% were out on strike, Yorkshire: over 95% were out, North Derbyshire: 60% on strike, South Derbyshire who followed the Notts lead: only around 11% answered the call, South Wales: 99% were out, and the tiny Kent coalfield was 99% solid, while in the cokeworks the figure was 96%. 

As can be seen around three quarters of the country's miners were out on strike using Rule 41 of the NUM's rules. Nottinghamshire had their say at the conference and were outvoted which should have been an end to the question of a ballot. Perhaps what the Notts area should have done was come out on strike, accepting the democratic decision of the conference, and after it was over put a motion to an AGM asking for the removal of Rule 41. This way the subject could be voted on and decided accordingly and Notts would have had their say. Strike breaking should not even have been considered an option. Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, having campaigned for a ballot, accepted the delegates decision and got behind the strike along with 20% of Notts men who were out. 

Noticeable to see was that the unofficial strike action back in 1981 had no ballot yet Nottinghamshire were out to a man, no arguments. This time it is my opinion that more sinister elements from the Conservative right-wing were at work behind the scenes, not least Margaret Thatcher’s right-hand advisor, David Hart (further reading is needed on Mr Hart, see Striking Similarities by Kevin Morley or/and The Enemy Within by Seamus Milne). When the strike ended in March 1985 over 56% of miners were still out after one year. Many stayed out until local agreements could be reached against any recriminations.

There were many reasons as to why the NUM lost, and the ballot was perhaps the least important as that issue had been settled under union rules. Nottinghamshire, or a majority of, working was a leading factor in keeping the power stations operating and the lack of TUC support getting behind the NUM was another major factor. The British state of Thatcher showed its true colours outside the six counties, as they had done in 1926 where once again the TUC left the miners to fight alone. All these played a major part in defeating the NUM but for me the ultimate factor was the decision by the NACODS leadership to call off their strike despite being mandated by over 82%. That is another story for another day, possibly next week.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist


The 1984/85 British Coal Miners' Strike ➖ Destroying The Myths & Highlighting The Truth

Caoimhin O’Muraile ✒ looks back on the most important industrial action in the UK post-World War 2.

The Question of a National Ballot

Many contributors to TPQ will remember the 1984/85 British Coal Miners' Strike, some as supporters of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), others perhaps a little less enthusiastic about the union case. 

The dispute lasted one year, from March 1984 until the same month the following year when it was officially called off on 3rd March 1985. After this date and even though the union leadership had called the strike off and organised a return to work, many miners, particularly in the militant areas, remained out until local union leaders had negotiated a no recriminations agreement with local National Coal Board (NCB) bosses. 

The strike will go down as one of the landmarks of industrial conflict in these islands during the 20th century, along with the 1913/14 Dublin Lockout, the 1926 General Strike and the less documented Dunnes Stores Strike against handling South African goods (the longest of them all lasting almost three years) during the days of Apartheid. The Miners' Strike was perhaps the most bitter, certainly over the longest period of them all. Even today in what is left of the mining areas people whose husbands, sons and boyfriends were on strike do not speak to the families of scabs such is the feeling even to this day almost thirty-six years after the ending of hostilities in the Pit Fields.

The NUM was led by what is sometimes referred to as the “tripartite leadership” consisting of Arthur Scargill, NUM National President, Peter Heathfield, NUM National Secretary and Mick McGahey - Vice president and the leader of Scotland’s miners. 

The roots of the dispute happened perhaps ten years previous when the NUM was instrumental in bringing down the government of Edward Heath in 1974. Margaret Thatcher was a member of Heath's cabinet and never forgave the NUM and in particular Arthur Scargill for heaping humiliation on her former boss and, as she saw it, herself. She and others accused the NUM of holding “the country to ransom”, taking advantage of the oil crisis. The miners had fallen behind in the pay stakes and for once they had a powerful bargaining chip, and used it which is what trade unions do when on the odd occasion the chips are in their favour. 

Thatcher succeeded Heath as the Conservative Party leader and held this grudge over the years. Her hatred for Scargill was despite the fact that the NUM National President back in 1974 was Joe Gormley. She saw Scargill who was the Yorkshire area President, as the organiser of the “flying pickets” and the chief planner in the fall of Heath. After the fall of Heath, a tripartite agreement, “The Plan For Coal” was drawn up and signed by the Labour Government, the NCB and the mining unions, primarily the NUM and NACODS (National Association of Colliery Overseers, Deputies and Shotfirers). 

When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 she had secretly been planning for some years a showdown with the miners in revenge for Heath. Nevertheless in 1981 she endorsed “The Plan For Coal”, having no intentions of standing by her endorsement. Like Hitler at the Munich Conference of 1938 Thatcher had every intention of breaking her word at the first opportunity. 

The Plan For Coal set out the future of the industry safeguarding many jobs yet tailoring capacity accordingly. Despite this endorsement by Thatcher the liar, when Arthur Scargill was elected to replace the retiring Joe Gormley as NUM National President in 1982 he was sent anonymously a copy of a secret plan prepared by NCB bosses earmarking 95 pits for closure with the loss of 100,000 jobs. This plan had been prepared on government instructions and was a clear breach of the “Plan For Coal” which Thatcher had endorsed. It followed the successful unofficial strike by miners, including Nottinghamshire (without a ballot, more on this later) in 1981. Thatcher had been planning a showdown since the mid-seventies and while in opposition she had right-wing MP Nicholas Ridley draw up a plan to defeat any challenge from the trade unions, with the NUM foremost on her mind. The plan included:

  • building up coal stocks at power stations
  • import coal from non-union foreign ports
  • non-union lorry drivers to be recruited by haulage companies
  • to train and equip a large mobile squad of police, ready to employ riot tactics in order to uphold the law against violent picketing

The “Ridley Plan” also recommended cutting off the money supply to strikers and make their union finance them. Thatcher also privately planned to sequestrate union funds, as she did with the NUM during the 1984/85 strike. This way strikers could not claim state benefits and neither could their union finance or support them in any way!

On 1st March 1984, acting on government instructions NCB directors in four areas announced the immediate closure of five pits: Cortonwood and Bullcliffe Wood in Yorkshire, Snowdown in Kent and Polmaise in Scotland. Cortonwood became perhaps the best known of these pits and the pivot where the strike started on 3rd March 1984. Margaret Thatcher had shown clearly she was a deceitful liar with a hit list for the coal industry. Unfortunately, many people believed her when she said no such list existed and accused Scargill of lying. It was, then as now, Arthur Scargill and the NUM who were being honest and the British Prime Minister a compulsive liar. It must be made clear here that, contrary to some people’s misguided beliefs based on media lies, the NUM did not declare war on the Thatcher Government - it was her and the right-wing junta she led who wished to obliterate the NUM.

Thatcher drafted in Ian McGregor to head the NCB. This man had already butchered the steel industry as head of the British Steel Corporation and it was now the turn of the coal industry, something Thatcher had been edging for since the mid-seventies. Like Thatcher, McGregor was a capable liar and followed his boss in Number 10 to the letter. The Ridley Plan, drafted back in the mid-seventies, was now to be put into action including a large mobile police force, amounting in real terms to a national force, who would prevent picket line violence while exercising a large amount of aggression themselves. Many of these police officers were believed to be military personnel as they wore no numbers on their lapels, a legal requirement I believe, and had a level of fitness over and above that expected of a police officer. Perhaps because these fellas were used to running ten miles per day with a 50 kilo kit bag on their back! Curfews were imposed on coal mining areas as a form of martial law descended on whole swathes of Britain. Restrictions of movement were imposed on miners travelling to picket other areas as the battle lines were drawn between the miners and their supporters - including football managers Jack Charlton and Brian Clough - and the British state.

After the decision at Cortonwood and other pits earmarked for closure to strike “Flying Pickets” began fanning out from Yorkshire, the North East and Kent to close pits in other areas, through persuasion, where miners were working. Yorkshire “Flying Pickets” closed the Lancashire coalfield as the Lancashire lads refused to cross Yorkshires picket lines. Police set up road blocks, including the Blackwall Tunnel preventing the Kent miners from travelling north to picket. In some areas miners were banned from NCB property and some were arrested on motorway slip-roads. It can only be imagined NCB property by then covered the country’s motorway network! Over 140,000 miners were now out on strike in defence of “jobs, pits and communities.” There were, however, loud voices demanding a national ballot before they would join the strike. The loudest of these was the Nottinghamshire area, Britain’s second largest coalfield, and they would be a leading factor, but not in my view the leading factor, in the strike being defeated.

On 19th April 1984 a special delegates conference of the NUM was held to discuss the strike and the possibility of a national ballot. All the evidence suggested the vote would go in favour of the said ballot. The Nottinghamshire delegates, Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, argued - as instructed by their members - passionately for a ballot. The two Nottinghamshire delegates had done their job to the letter as instructed and were prepared to accept the vote no matter which way it went. Arthur Scargill and Peter Heathfield, National President and General Secretary respectively did not get a vote as they were not delegates. Mick McGahey, Vice President, did receive a vote as a delegate for the Scottish Miners. To everybody’s surprise and after much debates where arguments for and against a ballot were heard the vote opted to reject the call for a ballot and enforce rule 41 of the NUM rule book (read Striking Similarities by Kevin Morley page 128 for rule 41 in full) allowing for strike action on an area-by-area basis, with NEC approval, to take place without a ballot thus allowing pickets to persuade other miners as to why they should be on strike.

By 19th November 1984 around upwards of 75% of miners were out on strike. Nottinghamshire, despite the delegate conference which included their own representatives voting against holding a ballot in line with union rules in the majority of cases, worked. Around 20% of Notts. Miners were out on strike and stuck it out for a year, but the majority, and not for the first time, scabbed. This was a tradition in Nottinghamshire dating back to the 1926 General Strike and even before, where these miners broke the strike. In Scotland around 90% were out, Lancashire: almost 70% were out on strike, Yorkshire: over 95% were out, North Derbyshire: 60% on strike, South Derbyshire who followed the Notts lead: only around 11% answered the call, South Wales: 99% were out, and the tiny Kent coalfield was 99% solid, while in the cokeworks the figure was 96%. 

As can be seen around three quarters of the country's miners were out on strike using Rule 41 of the NUM's rules. Nottinghamshire had their say at the conference and were outvoted which should have been an end to the question of a ballot. Perhaps what the Notts area should have done was come out on strike, accepting the democratic decision of the conference, and after it was over put a motion to an AGM asking for the removal of Rule 41. This way the subject could be voted on and decided accordingly and Notts would have had their say. Strike breaking should not even have been considered an option. Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, having campaigned for a ballot, accepted the delegates decision and got behind the strike along with 20% of Notts men who were out. 

Noticeable to see was that the unofficial strike action back in 1981 had no ballot yet Nottinghamshire were out to a man, no arguments. This time it is my opinion that more sinister elements from the Conservative right-wing were at work behind the scenes, not least Margaret Thatcher’s right-hand advisor, David Hart (further reading is needed on Mr Hart, see Striking Similarities by Kevin Morley or/and The Enemy Within by Seamus Milne). When the strike ended in March 1985 over 56% of miners were still out after one year. Many stayed out until local agreements could be reached against any recriminations.

There were many reasons as to why the NUM lost, and the ballot was perhaps the least important as that issue had been settled under union rules. Nottinghamshire, or a majority of, working was a leading factor in keeping the power stations operating and the lack of TUC support getting behind the NUM was another major factor. The British state of Thatcher showed its true colours outside the six counties, as they had done in 1926 where once again the TUC left the miners to fight alone. All these played a major part in defeating the NUM but for me the ultimate factor was the decision by the NACODS leadership to call off their strike despite being mandated by over 82%. That is another story for another day, possibly next week.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist


11 comments:

  1. Tony Maguire comments

    An excellent account of that landmark dispute and pretty much as I recall the events. I was a wet behind the ears trade Union representative during that time. To the shame of two Labour governments since then, the laws passed and enacted by the Conservatives to defeat the NUM remain on the statute books today as a warning to any Union thinking about running a strike ballot.

    ReplyDelete
  2. A great piece Kevin.
    My own view is that the only way to prevent any union leadership shafting people is for the right to have internal democracy shape the union rather than internal bureaucracy - and that has to include a national ballot for strike action.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I agree, Anthony. The NUM leadership were fully correct in their analysis of Thatcher's intentions towards the coal industry and the union. A national ballot would have given the strike the full seal of legitimacy in the eyes of most of the public but Scargill's syndicalist approach to industrial action made that option well-nigh impossible.

    But a great piece nevertheless, Caoimhin

    ReplyDelete
  4. It wasn't Scargill which was against a ballot it was the NUMs National Executive which voted against it. At the start of the strike Scragill had gone as far has having flyers and posters printed in favour of a nation ballot. Towards the end of the strike their was an NUM National Executive vote which was split on calling the strike off. The casting vote was down to Scargill which he refused to cast because he said the future of some many workers should not be down to a single vote.

    Also another fact which has been lost in the mists of time is that ACAS, the conciliatory employment body, put forward three separate deals which the NUM agreed to but the Thatcher government rejected.

    I would highly recommend the book Look Back in Anger: The Miners' Strike in Nottinghamshire 30 Years for further reading on the truth and what the media reported at the time.

    The miners strike was an heroic struggle. They had just about every branch of the state acting against them and yet the managed a year long strike.

    ReplyDelete
  5. I have to point out lads, Arthur Scargill had no say on the issue of a ballot, the delegates from every area decided that. Neither Scargill or Heathfield, as full time officials of the NUM, got a vote on the ballot question. That decision was taken by the delegates conference.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
  6. Caoimhin - it is not about this or that individual having no say but about the fact that a mechanism is in place for overriding an essential component of any democratic structure. I am not one for trusting Delegate conferences. At the same time I followed the strike avidly from the jail, rooting always for the miners.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Fair point Anthony, which is why Notts should have abided by the delegates decision to enact Rule 4l.After the strike, which
    MAY have been won with Nottinghamshire and other minorites coming out, they could have put a motion to the NUM AGM proposing the deletion of said rule 41. There are arguments for its deletion but equally for its retention. The reason I stated Scargill and Heathfield never got a vote on the ballot issue is because many people were/are saying "Scargill should have held a national ballot", he had no say in the outcome of the vote on the ballot. I'll put forward this week what, in my and others views, was the main factor in the defeat of 1984/85, NACODS leadershp betrayal of the NUM.

    Tony is correct, not one piece of Tebbits industrial relations, anti trade union, laws have been reversed. Blair could have done it, he did for GCHQ, but did not. Why? Because he was not a labour PM in its traditional sense (he even abolished clause 1V) he was what he styled "new Labour". The reason "new" does not begin with a capital is because Blair did not want it to be an official title. It was/is a warning to other unions not to fight. The late Bob Crowe, RMT, was the last to really fight. He died mysteriously during the strike which brought London to a standstil.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Caoimhin - I have two books in the house here about the strike: one about Scargill and the other by MacGregor - this piece has given me the motive to get to them sooner rather than later.
      Having been a trade unionist for more than 20 years I have learned not to trust national leaderships. I believe in them rather than believe them.
      I think when people say Scargill should have held a national ballot, I think they are using his name as a synonym for the NUM leadership.
      Mark Hayes & Mick Hall each wrote obituaries for Bob Crowe on TPQ.

      Delete
  8. Fair and valid point Terry. The media and the so-called labour supporting Daily Mirrior in particular, printed lie after lie about the NUM leadership. You are right ACAS did put forward "three separate deals" which Thatcher rejected.

    I will briefly look this week at the NACODS sellout. Stab in the back is an understatement!!

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
  9. Anthony, read Seamus Milnes book The Enemy Within, it reinforces what was going on on the picket lines, the second half of my own book, Striking Similarities comparing the lockout of 1913/14 with the miners strike of 1984/85.

    Caoimhin O'Muraile

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Caoimhin - yes, I heard it is very good. I think I could have it on Kindle. I intend to read Striking Similarities as well.

      Delete