As an historian, as well as the grandson of one of the founding members of the SDLP (Paddy Devlin), I would like to add briefly to Hugh Logue’s recent exchange with John Swift, published in the Dublin Review of Books.
Hugh should be aware that, whatever his equivocations, his quote was seized on by Loyalists opposed to Sunningdale and the power-sharing Executive. It was a serious misstep because it allowed such Unionists, some of whom did indeed object to power-sharing in and of itself, to justify their rejection of Sunningdale. Politics so often concerns framing, optics, persuasion and delivery. It was a gift to those who said ‘no’, and to this extent Swift was correct to pinpoint the speech in his initial review.
On May 19th, 2014, a conference on the UWC Strike took place at Queen’s University Belfast, with speakers including the late Glenn Barr (de facto leader of the stoppage), Ken Bloomfield, the late Maurice Hayes, Austin Currie and Nell McCafferty among others. As a co-organiser of the event, I arranged for the recording of the talks and discussions that followed, during which Barr commented:
Every time I got into any form of difficulty with the television interviewers about the Council of Ireland meaning nothing, I just used to point towards Hugh Logue. I said why don’t you ask Hugh Logue what the Council of Ireland means to him? It’s the ‘vehicle that’s going to trundle Unionists into a United Ireland’.
With characteristic insight and humour, Maurice Hayes immediately followed:
You know the interesting thing I often thought about that Glenny? Brian Faulkner came back from Sunningdale and said this was our bulwark for the Unionist people; “our bulwark” against being sucked into a united Ireland. Then Hugh Logue came out and said this is “the vehicle that will trundle us into a united Ireland” [sic]. You know the sad thing about it is? The Catholics believed Faulkner and the Loyalists believed Hugh Logue! (laughter). (Recordings available).
For what it’s worth, my grandfather was the SDLP minister most wary of the Council of Ireland, in large part because he was aware that it would weaken Faulkner’s ability to sell the agreement to the Unionist base: “Look, we’ve got to catch ourselves on here. Brian Faulkner is being nailed to a cross. There is no way Faulkner can sell this” (Paddy Devlin, quoted in Barry White, John Hume [1984], p152). Hugh’s comment demonstrably made Faulkner’s position harder, hampering the settlement that Faulkner, Hume and my grandfather, among many others, helped negotiate.
1973 in Northern Ireland was a trying time for anyone, especially in public life. It is understandable that errors were made on all sides. As a man with a distinguished career of public service, Hugh Logue should be able to own his historical mistake.
See also Sunningdale and the Council of Ireland: an Exchange.
⏩Connal Parr is a Lecturer in History, Northumbria University.
From reading Hugh's letter, I get the impression that he is more annoyed at being misquoted and I can understand. Such a quote, when weaponised by your political opponents, will live on in infamy and will be used to portray the speaker as some kind of arrogant, out of touch elitist. Take Eamon Collins' comment to Gerry Adams that his speech "was like something the Sticks would say", which then translated to "did you call Gerry Adams a Sticky."
ReplyDeleteAt the same time, Connal is right to say that Hugh should at least reflect that his words (despite being twisted out of context) were used to galvanise anti-Sunningdale feelings. Politicians know all too well that their own words will be used against them in some shape or form, so should be vigilant of using language that is easily twisted. Once it begins, no amount of explanation will suffice.
Sunningdale was no more about trundling the unionists into a united Ireland than the GFA was.
ReplyDeleteTo be fair to the SDLP they pursued a vision they believed in while we killed poeple to stop it being implemented.
Now we end up celebrating that which we killed to prevent coming into being two decades earlier.
The SDLP did not build political careers from the tombstones of those they killed.
Dirty old world.
Realistically, would it have been possible for the Provos to support Sunningdale? Surely that would have driven a further wedge between the two communities and compromised the Provos?
ReplyDeleteNo less realistic than their support of the GFA which did the same thing.
DeleteIt is not their lack of support for it but their outright opposition to it that makes support for the GFA seem all the more absurd.
Had they have tried to build a political party then (even to oppose Sunningdale) rather than later go for the Adams Long War strategy a lot of lives would not have been lost needlessly. We could have avoided the hunger strikes and the serious polarisation that led to.
AM
ReplyDeleteAll good points on Sunningdale v GFA. If we go back a little further -what if the civil rights movemment had been left to continue? It actually was effective, making progress but just collapsed as the Republican Movement (which was not very big or effective) wanted to take over the civil rights movement openly rather than strategically. In many ways the RM's botched handling of things appears to have given the Unionists and Brits what they wanted -put a stop to a popular non-violent mass movement that was having a real impact. Even Unionists were divided; Paisley ousted O'Neill claiming O'Neill had lost touch with the Unionist people (maybe Trump has taken a few tips from Paisley) whereas, in reality O'Neill was narrowly defeated. The Civil Rights Movement could have made a lot more gains -which even the RM could have capitalised on at a later stage. I think the Republican leadership may have incorporated defeat into the Troubles before they even started.
Christy - the CRM I think had it continued could have achieved major equality reforms within the Northern state. But there was too much against it having success. The UVF bombings were a serious attempt pre August 69 to undermine it. Had the IRA never existed the unionists would have had to create one. The Provos arose out of somewhat different circumstances and then the dialectic between them and the British state allowed them to grow. MacStiofain's neat planned three stage strategy never in fact existed and all the elements overlapped. He was following events rather than creating them. I was always impressed by the observation of the Belfast founder of the that had the British stood down Stormont the day they brought the troops in the PIRA would never have been formed. That tells us something about both the dynamics of the conflict/insurrection and the type of measures that it would require to end it. It certainly wasn't a united Ireland. I think we made the wrong choices but that we were able to make them and seize the initiative up until 73 at the latest was because of the reservoir of support the Brits created for us within the nationalist community. My view is that the energy that created and sustained the PIRA was not the Brits in Ireland but how the Brits behaved while in Ireland. The solution to that particular problem therefore lay in not in a British withdrawal but a substantial restructuring of Northern politics. But by the time the Brits made the key move, because it came after Bloody Sunday, rather than before it, the point of no return had been reached. The IRA campaign has more going for it as a response to British state policy and terrorism than it did as a war for a united Ireland. Ireland wide support for an armed campaign was never going to last particularly since the change of emphasis placed on what constituted the nation and statehood post Whitaker in the late 50s. It was not for nothing that Garret Fitzgerald said the roots of partition had dug deep into the mindset of a wide section of the Southern political class, to such an extent that found strong opposition to even minor moves that would have been more supportive of the Northern nationalist position.
DeleteI have no time for ideologies that are so arrogant they tell you they can endow you with the right to kill people.
AM
ReplyDeleteThanks for that and yes I think the CRM was highly effective because even within Unionism equality was being discussed -I can't recall which unionist but at a meeting in Belfast Castle said that Nationalists could not be blamed for rioting in Derry given the levels of discrimination against them. In some cases even RUC regional commanders wanted to move against the unionist mobs and not civil rights marchers. It is difficult not to suspect that the CRM was not delibrately sabotaged because of its potential. A number of Unionists were prepared to give in to CRM demands -that's what really boosted Paisley's status -but it was a close enough battle
And yes the Brits established the PIRA as underdog defenders within the Nationalist communities -but was it from inconsiderate heavy handedness? or by design? Maulding's statement in 1971 about 'an acceptible level of violence' has always struck me as one with a long term view in mind and not one in hope of an early end to the conflict as it was just starting.
I enjoyed the comments more than the article. Don't know how you can debate Republicanism, it depresses me just thinking about it.
ReplyDeleteWorking on something else I just came acroos the following on CAIN Website --looks like devolution was on the cards from 1972 at the latest:
ReplyDeleteMonday 25 - Thursday 28 September 1972
A conference was held at Darlington, England on the issue of devolution with power-sharing. The Darlington meeting consisted of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), and William Whitelaw, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) refused to attend because of the continuing operation of Internment. Some hard-line Unionists also refused to attend. [There was no agreement on the shape of any future Northern Ireland government.]
Jack Lynch, then Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), met Edward Heath, then British Prime Minister.
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/intern/chron.htm
it was towards the end of 72 if memory serves me right that the Irish Dimension started to feature in public discourse - with people like Julian Critchley seeking to put a security twist on it.
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