Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts
Barry Gilheany ✍  The world’s self-proclaimed No.1 Disruptor-in-Chief is now back in office after the glitz of his victory procession at the Inaugural Ceremony and the tsunami of Executive Orders that he has issued.

Never let it be said that Donald Trump does things by half measures. From freeing virtually all of the January 6 rioters; to marching the US out of the World Health Organisation and Paris Climate Accord; ending DEI programmes and proclaiming that there are only two genders; declaring a national emergency at the border with Mexico; resumption of the era of “drill baby, drill and dozen Biden era executive actions (out of 78) supporting racial equity and combating discrimination against LGBT+ people in order to end policy “trying to socially engineer race and gender into every aspect of public and private life.”[1] ; he certainly livened most of the erogenous zones of his MAGA base. 

Conversely, those outside the nexus of MAGA and their global far right kith and kin could only look on bemusement, horror and disgust at the sheer triumphalism of Trump’s crowning moment and the roll call of international far right celebrities who attended this love-in from Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy to President Javier Milei of Argentina to leading luminaries of the German AfD to Nigel Farage leader of Reform UK accompanied by a motley crew of defeated British politicians such as Liz Truss and Suella Braverman and culture warriors like failed actor Lawrence Fox and the “Rev” Calvin Robinson of GB News. Dark days indeed for those who believe in the durability of liberal democracy and the progressive values that it underwrites. So how do the defenders of these secular faiths deal with the crumbling liberal geo-political order and the universalist values sustained by it in the face of the transnational national populist, anti-establishment insurgency for which Trump is the global poster boy?

Before answering this question, it is worth drilling down (if that is not an unfortunate phrase!) to these opening salvoes into Trump’s war on woke to appreciate the potential full scope of his Executive orders. First of all, the executive order issued by Trump on Inauguration Day ordering “the termination of all discriminatory programs, including illegal DEI and ‘diversity, equity, and accessibility (DEIA) mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities in the federal government under what name they appear”, effectively, in the verdict of civil rights campaigners, negates a 1965 order issued by President Lyndon Johnson to enforce the landmark Civil Rights Act of the previous year which prohibited government contractors from discriminating in employment practices on the basis of race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.[2] It is fair to say that Trump’s DEI order will likely remove similar protections from people with disabilities.

Next the two genders executive order have set alarm bells ringing among abortion rights supporters who note that it quietly incorporates two key cornerstones of the foetal personhood ideology intrinsic to “pro-life” beliefs; the legal doctrine that life begins at conception and that embryos and foetuses are entitled to full legal rights and protections. For, according to the order,” “female” means a person belonging, at conception, to the sex that produces the large reproductive cell while “male” means a person belonging, at conception, to the sex that produces the small reproductive cell.” Full legal enactment of foetal personhood would outlaw abortion and lead states and even the federal government to treat abortion as murder and those undergoing termination of pregnancy as murderers.

Despite Trump’s denial that he wants to implement a national abortion ban; the 2024 Republican platform stressed its commitment to “the issue of life” and suggesting that foetuses are included in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that “no person can be denied life or liberty without due process”. It is an ambition of anti-abortion activists to bring a case to the Supreme Court leading to its declaration that the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed apply from the moment of conception. For reproductive rights advocates such as Dana Sussman, senior vice-president of Pregnancy Justice which follows efforts to legally guarantee foetal personhood, the wording of the ‘Two Genders’ order demonstrates an intention to normalise the principle that embryos are people. However, some reassurance is offered by Professor Mary Ziegler of University of California law school who studies the legal history of reproduction and who says that the new order does not institute new legal protections or status for foetuses and that Trump is not progressing “towards bolder steps on abortion of IVF.”[3]

Nevertheless, to reduce matters of philosophical complexity such as abortion, assisted reproduction and transgender physiognomy and developmental paths to a two-sentence declaration of executive fiat is a preposterous way of deliberating over the ethical minefields involved in these issues.

On another signature Trump policy, immigration and promise to launch “the largest domestic deportation operation in American history,” state and local officials who resist this programme could be targeted by federal prosecutors under a directive issued by the acting deputy attorney general, Emil Bove. He has instructed prosecutors nationwide to investigate and potentially bring criminal charges against officials in “sanctuary” justifications for “harbouring” undocumented immigrants or withholding immigration information from federal authorities. In a document obtained by the Washington Post and the Associated Press, Bove wrote:

Federal law prohibits state and local actors from resisting, obstructing and otherwise failing to comply with lawful immigration-related commands.[4]

The directive goes on to announce that the justice department had created a “sanctuary cities enforcement working group” to identify local laws blocking Trump’s immigration agenda, while ordering its civil division to challenge these policies in court. Any refusal to prosecute cases involving “resistance, obstruction or other noncompliance” must now be reported as “urgent” to department heads.[5]

If implemented on such a scale, then this would represent a declaration of war on alternative power centres and civil society institutions by the Trump administration. This directive immediately sets up a clash with Democrat led cities like Chicago, which recently reaffirmed its limits on cooperating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and to where Trump has pledged to send more than one hundred law enforcements. On top of the constitutionally outrageous plan to deny citizenship to those born in the US of non-native parentage, has been the suspension of a refugee programme for people fleeing war and persecution, meaning that thousands of refugees including more than 1,600 Afghans who had assisted the US war effort there who had gone through a sometimes years-long vetting process to start new lives in the US are now stranded at various locations around the world.[6]

Mixed in with this kulturkampf by decree have been the personally vindictive and arguably contra-legal measures taken by Trump just as the mass pardoning of those participants in the January 6th 2021 riots at the Capitol and the removal of security protection for former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeii, and National Security Adviser, John Bolton and the bete noire/ folk devil for the anti-vax conspiracists, former Public Health Chief Anthony Fauci. If blood does not drip metaphorically from Trump’s hands for his actions on 6th January, then should anything happen to these enemies of the Trump court, especially Dr Fauci because of the deranged demonology surrounding him, then he will surely be culpable.

Planet Trump And How To Deal With And Defeat It

It is hard for liberals and progressives to ignore and stomach the triumphalism of Trump and his global acolytes. For Victor Orban, Hungarian Prime Minister and poster boy for Europe’s nationalist right, the return of Trump has given him the green light to “launch the second phase of the offensive that aims to occupy Brussels.” Orban triumphantly bellows out that Hungary’s six-month presidency of the Council of the EU’s rotating presidency “was the start of the new era” with Trump and the far-right Patriots for Europe Group in the European Parliament that he is the co-founder of “driving the transformation of the western world.” While Orban did not attend Trump’s inauguration, Georgia Meloni, described by Trump as a “fantastic woman” who is “really taking Europe by storm” was the most senior European leader to attend as Italian PM. Also in attendance was Argentina’s far-right leader, Javier Milei, whose “chainsaw” campaign of fiscal balance and deregulation has provided the inspiration for Elon Musk’s led “department of government efficiency, championing the slashing of government wages and equality focused departments. [7]Milei also salivates about a global battle on feminism and “woke.”

In response, democratic leaders in Europe have sounded high decibel levels of alarm about the return of Trump. Francis Bayrou, the French Prime Minister, has warned that France and Europe would be “crushed” and “marginalised” if they fail to stand up for their interests against a United States:

that has decided to embark upon an extremely domineering form of politics, via the dollar, via its industrial policy, via the fact that it can capture the world’s investment and the world’s research.

Hours before Trump formally assumed power, Pedro Sanchez called for Europe to stand up to and defend democracy against a big tech “class” trying to influence western governments and public debate through its “absolute power over social media.”[8]

So how does the democratic left respond to the triumph of a radical right-wing revolution in the USA and the far-right nationalist insurgency in the rest of the Euro-American world? Whether in government or in opposition, the left/centre are on the horns of a very problematic dilemma. Traditional social democratic parties are perceived to be by default the defenders of the established order under siege from populist forces; globalised economies to which free movement of capital, trade and labour are axiomatic and in which power is held and wielded by major financial institutions; a homogenising global culture dominated by largely American titans of light entertainment and filmic production; insecure or vanishing employment and social and public spheres dominated by identity or woke issues around race, gender and sexuality. For labour or social democratic movements which by reputation are meant to be transformative agents of change; these are awkward if not crippling places to be in.

The direction of travel in which progressive movements should go has been the subject of much scholarly debate and agonised, soul-searching debate. To prevent further haemorrhaging of electoral support among its traditional working-class base to forces like MAGA or UK Reform, do centre left parties offer a more sustained critique of contemporary capitalism and advocate more interventionist and redistributive fiscal and economic policies? How do they deal with their electorate’s concerns over immigration and hot button issues around diversity and gender without alienating its more liberal and middle-class voters? Can, for example, the current UK Labour government tell the truth about the baleful effects of Brexit without alienating its constituents in the so-called Red Wall seats? It appears that Keir Starmer and his Chancellor Rachel Reever are unwilling to take such a departure because of precisely such risks (real or imagined). Such is the crippling effect of electoral short-termism on long term societal good.

At a recent event convened by the think tank British Futures to discuss the lessons to be learnt for progressives for Trump’s resounding win, the problem of how to deal with right wing culture warriordom was put into sharp relief by former Kamala Harris adviser Frank Sharry. His stark warning to his transatlantic friends in the Labour Party was that ignoring far-right wedge issues simply does not work. As an example, Sharry said the Biden administration simply ducked the argument that record numbers of immigrants crossing into the US had created a border crisis. When it did develop an effective response – a combination of border enforcement, opening of more legal visa routes and deals with neighbouring countries – it didn’t even defend its own record for fear of alienating the liberal elements of the Democrat electoral coalition. Sharry, with a decades long career with refuge charities, had tried to craft “tough but fair” messages on immigration in line with the US mainstream for Harris but prolonged silence on her part enabled her opponents to portray her as an open borders fanatic even as the right wing media ecosystem began to air conspiracy theories about Democrats encouraging immigrants to come so that they could vote for them. The brutal reality is thus that if governments cannot seize the narrative on hot-button issues like immigration and dramatize what they are doing, then the truth will be submerged in the consequent ocean of falsehoods, fake news, and disinformation.[9]

Language Matters

In nearly every discussion about the rise of Donald Trump and homologous movements globally, certain words have attained dominant explanatory currency for participants depending on their standpoint. For the contemporary right, it is “woke” or “wokeness” and “patriots” are reclaiming or taking back control their country in the name of common sense from liberal “elites.” For left-liberal commentators, the menace is “populism” usually with the descriptor “nationalist” or “authoritarian.” Some of that number regret or mourn the demise of “ILO” or “International (Rules Based) Liberal Order.” More radical leftist critique the prevailing definition of “populism” and the power of “elites. They decry the effects of “globalisation” and “neoliberalism” and call for a new progressive politics based on “equality.”

Wokeness

Few words are uttered with more contempt in conservative (and some left wing) spaces than “woke.” The election of Doanld Trump has seen gleeful proclamations of the death of “wokeness.” In the Times, Lionel Shriver declared that “Donald Trump’s emphatic victory is a woke watershed” and that “progressive lunacy” faced extinction. In the Mail, Leo McKinstry wrote that “wokery is in retreat. The creed has lost its ugly potency.” In the elegant words of the President himself: “Woke is bullshit.”[10]

In reporting that the gross exaggeration of the death of woke, Matthew D’Ancona begs to differ with these triumphalist obituaries. “Woke isn’t dead. It’s just pining for the fjords.[11] Woke, for him, is shorthand for the social justice movements that emerged in the 2010s such as Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion and #MeToo and the particular types of identity politics they represent. For its detractors, woke became a battle cry to attack anyone involved in antiracist activity much as the meanings of “identity politics” and “political correctness” were turned inside out to stigmatise earlier generations of activists. To understand the toxic associations of “woke” it is necessary to briefly divert into some etymological history.

The first recorded use of the phrase stay woke was in the bluesman Lead Belly’s 1938 song “Scottsboro Boys”, dedicated to the nine Black teenagers whose execution for rapes was only prevented by years of international protest. But from in its initial meaning, rooted in the experiences of African Americans in the segregated southern US states, of being alert to the signs of discrimination, woke became a byword for divisiveness which the right fully exploited.[12]

In her attempt to define woke, Susan Neiman states that it begins with concern for marginalised persons and ends by reducing each to the prism of their marginalisation. The woke left’s idea of intersectionality or connection between marginalised or oppressed people could have emphasised the ways in which human beings have plural identities. Instead, it led to focus on the most marginalised parts of identities and transforms them into waves of trauma. Woke stresses the ways in which particular groups have been denied justice and seeks to redress and fix the damage. While these may be admirable and noble pursuits, in the focus on power inequalities, the concept of justice is often disregarded. Woke demands that nations and peoples face up to their criminal histories. In the process it often concludes that all history is criminal.[13]

The greatest defect of woke is that it has been become a politics of symbols rather than social change.[14]. The obsession with symbolism and ideological performativity explains how social justice movements became so damagingly obsessed by procedural rows about who could speak about what; by “de-platforming,” “speech codes,” “cancel culture” and purity tests. [15] There was too much performance - rallies, social media frenzy and collective indignation – and not enough action. It was almost as if they were trapped in student union mode in terms of their political developmental paths.

The strategic impotence of this type of student politics was laid out by Barack Obama in 2019:

If I tweet or hashtag about how you didn’t do something right or used the wrong verb, then I can sit back and feel pretty good about myself because ‘Man did you see how woke I was? I called you out!’… If all you’re doing is casting stones, you are probably not going to get that far.[16]

Unfortunately, the performative gesturing associated with wokery has had damaging real-world effects. Trans activists persecuted feminists for saying that biological sex was real and, in some cases, drove them from employment. The author J.K. Rowling and the former Labour MP Rosie Duffield (sexual assault and domestic violence survivors respectively) became high profile casualties trans cancel culture. In April 2024, the Cass Report revealed the shocking extent to which medical science was disregarded in the cause of radical trans ideology at the Tavistock Centre to the detriment of the safety of young people and the health needs of young trans people.[17]

On campuses, in publishing houses, in NGOs and in the human resource departments of corporations, a cult like illiberalism took hold which stifled originality and challenging creativity in book publishing; lead to cancellations and personal threats to speakers at campuses who opposed woke orthodoxies and a ‘tick box’ approach to diversity in organisations , which paid consultants millions to “woke-wash” their public image while not making any systemic alterations to their employment practices.[18]

Such righteous intolerance and tone-deaf ignorance of the effect on the general populace of woke word wars presented a series of open goals to the Right. According to research since 5th November, one of Trump’s most effective but cruel slogans was: “Kamala Harris is for they/them. President Trump is for you.” Worse still, it has fuelled a victim culture narrative on the Right in which white Christian men suffer systematic discrimination and marginalisation (at any given time) at the hands of the Deep State, Big Pharma, feminism, the CIA, and secularism.[19]

But yet, there is a place for the initial energy of the social justice movements for a renewal of the left in the era of Trump 2.0 particularly when at present, centre left governments are stuck in a rut of technocracy and what Martin Luther King called “the tranquilising drug of gradualism”. In his rallying cry for a new progressivism in Britain, Matthew D’Ancona calls on Labour to eschew the narrative of steady incrementalism – “milestones, “fix the foundations, “smash the gangs” – and replace it with a confident pluralist patriotism which takes a compassionate and evidence based approach to immigration; argues the case or rejoining the EU single market; takes an approach to racial justice and enduing violence against women which does not ignore disadvantages experienced by white working class people or the fact that suicide is the biggest killer of men under 45. A progressive patriotism will resolutely protect the freedom to worship and crack down on incitement to hatred and violence while extending rather than restricting freedom of speech (including the abolition of blasphemy) and will not tolerate a situation where a teacher from Batley Grammar School in West Yorkshire is still in hiding after his lessons infuriated a group of Muslim parents.[20]

Populism

In his discussion with the American philosopher Michael Sandel, the French economist Thomas Piketty takes issue with the negative connotations associated with populism. He actually refuses to use the term at all, whether in relation to nativist, anti-immigrant nationalist responses to the excesses of globalisation a la Trump and Le Pen or the ‘democratic socialist’ response of Bernie Sanders. He states that the term “populism” and its derogatory associations, belongs to the rhetoric of people who claim to be in the centre but who were largely winners of the market process and who like to delegitimise their opponents, whether from the right or left, as populist. For him socialism, nationalism and liberalism are legitimate ideologies which all have something to bring to the deliberative process.[21]

Sandel notes that the origin of the term “populist” to the coming together in the 19th century in America of industrial workers and agrarian workers in the Southern and Western states to win power from economic elites, typically north-eastern elites who controlled north-eastern railroads and later the oil companies. He describes it as a progressive movement although, even then, with nativist, racist and antisemitic features[22] which was not untypical of labour and radical movement. The Populists formed a political party also known as the People’s Party in the 1890s which was later subsumed in the Democratic Party after 1896. He argues correctly that “populism is not mainly about redistribution … but mainly about reclaiming power for the people from the elites”.[23] Populists on the left polemicise a lot about a “rigged system” at the top but tend to be relatively lacking in analysis about income and wealth inequality and practical redistributive proposals.

But where both Sandel and Piketty agree is that the right-wing authoritarian nativist version of populism (notwithstanding the latter’s refusal to name it) has arisen as a symptom of the failure of progressive or social democratic politics. The taxpayer bailout of Wall Street during the first Barack Obama administration without any attempt to seek accountability for the behaviour of the banks during the 2008 Crash destroyed the hopes for a revival of progressive and social democratic politics that his candidacy had inspired. This disappointment compounded the acquiescence of the centre-left politicians – Blair, Clinton and Schroeder who ruled in the wake of Reagan and Thatcher - in the economic orthodoxy of the time, namely that market mechanisms are the primary instruments for defining and achieving the public good and were content merely to tinker with the hard edges of laissez-faire capitalism. Over time, the foundations were laid for the right wing of populism.[24].

The centre-left’s acceptance of the value neutrality of market mechanisms lie, in Piketty’s opinion, in a fear of democratic deliberation, a fear of what he refers to in his book, Capital and Ideology, as opening the Pandora’s Box of redistribution as well as the revaluation of what we do; of our working lives; of our public lives. Piketty trumpets the aspiration for self-government; for the extension of democracy to the lowest level of decision making especially strong representation of workers on the boards of companies. He also calls for the “decommodification” of public goods such as universities and public health systems.[25]

To conclude, Sandel prescribes the following political vision for the left: one “that combines populism as patriotism (to paraphrase Samuel Johnson, it is nationalism, not patriotism ‘that is the last refuge of the scoundrel’) – a radical critique of inequality and unaccountable, concentrated economic power (the populism) and a greater emphasis on community, solidarity and the mutual obligations of human beings as citizens (the patriotism; something that the left should never cede to the right. Sandel hopes that Trump’s “plutocratic populism;” his love in with Musk, Bezos and Zuckerberg, will finally disappoint the working people who supported him. But will have progressives have a more inspiring offer to make?[26] After all, it’s the economy, stupid.

References
  
[1] Guardian, 22nd January 2025, p. 15

[2] Robert Tait Shock as Trump halts new civil rights cases. Guardian 24th January 2024 p. 1, 13

[3] Carter Sherman Abortion. Gender decree raises fears over ‘foetal personhood’. Guardian 24th January 2025.

[4] Joseph Gedeon Immigration. State officials who resist deportation drive may face federal prosecution.

[5] Ibid

[6] Oliver Holmes Key Executive order. A lot has happened this week; what will it mean? Guardian 25th January pp 16-17

[7] Trump’s return will help the right ‘occupy Brussels,’ says Hungarian PM. Guardian 20th January 2025.

[8] Ibid

[9] Gaby Hinsliff The nightmare begins – but this is no time to abandon hope. Guardian Journal p.2

[10]Matthew D’Ancona How to Wake up Woke. The New European Issue 419 January 9-15, 2025, pp.12-13.

[11] Ibid, p.12

[12] Susan Neiman (2023) Left Is Not Woke. Cambridge: Polity Press p.4

[13] Ibid, p.5

[14] Ibid, p.5

[15] D’Ancona, p.12

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid

[21] Thomas Piketty and Michael Sandel, The Left after Trump. New Statesman 24-30 January 2025 pp.26-31.

[22] Ibid, p.29.

[23] Ibid, p.31.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid

[26] Ibid, p.26

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter.

The Day After 🪶 How Do Liberals And Progressives Deal With Planet Trump?

Barry Gilheany
✒ In the first of a series of articles for TPQ concerning the crisis of democracy, or more accurately, the liberal representative model that has been dominant in the Western world for roughly the past century and a half, I examine the threats to its long-term survival. 

These include the wave of illiberal populism that has swept various parts of the world over the last decade or so; the harmful effects of Big Tech on the quality of information flows and deliberation in democracies and the anomie created by growing disconnect between the governed and the governing classes and the associated distrust of ‘elites’ and ‘experts. I will also later pose the question whether it is possible to conceptualise the end of democracy as we have known it. But in this first article, I discuss, in the shadow of the centennial of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Anne Appplebaum’s model of the illiberal one-party state spawned by the Bolsheviks and how two ex-Marxist Leninist countries, Poland and Hungary, have become exemplars albeit from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. I discuss the role of clercs, writers, intellectuals, journalists, bloggers etc., in servicing the legitimation needs of these states and how the governance of Brexit Britain is being moulded by them.

US Democracy’s Near Death Experience

President Joe Biden’s powerful inaugural address was peppered by the frequent use of three words: “democracy”, “truth” and “unity”[1]. Spoken in the aftermath of American democracy’s near-death experience of the Trump presidency; his first statement after taking the oath of office was “This is democracy’s day. The will of the people has been heard … Democracy has prevailed”.[2] The problems with using “democracy” and “will of the people” in the same sentence, of seeing these notions (at least in the abstract) as interchangeable and with positing ‘democracy’ as a natural sequitur from ‘truth’ and ‘unity’ are that it sidesteps the question of what exactly democracy is and the starkly different perceptions of democracy that are held by many. For the founders of America thought that too much democracy would imperil unity and truth.[3] For them the point of establishing a republic rather than a democracy was to ensure that there were safeguards against populism, the base passions of the ill-informed, suggestible ‘crowd’, in all its forms.[4] James Madison, one of the founders, stated that the American constitution he helped to write would mean “the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share [in the government].[5]

Biden was invoking the minimalist theory of democracy whereby democracy is defined by the peaceful transfer of power whereby it is sufficient for democracy if incumbents, who control the armed forces, hand over power to those who have defeated them at the ballot box.[6] The developing world is replete with examples where this minimal criterion for democracy has not been met; the military coups which overthrew elected left-wing governments in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973 and most recently in Honduras as well as Myanmar in 2021 serve as four particularly egregious examples. That the USA came so close to failing this criterion after the Presidential election of November 2020 and the insurrection at Capitol Hill on 6th January 2021 lends urgency to the task of taking seriously the threats of populist demagoguery and persons of ill-character that so occupied the minds of the US founders.

The Illiberal One-Party State

Unlike ways of governing society such as monarchy, oligarchy and democracy that have been around for over two thousand years; what the writer and journalist Anne Applebaum describes as the illiberal one-party state has been with us for little more than a century. It was first developed by Lenin after the Second Russian Revolution (or more accurately the Winter Palace coup). It is a mechanism for holding power, not a philosophy although it happily functions as an accompaniment to many ideologies. It works because it clearly states who is to be the elite and maps out their pathway to it – the political elite, the financial elite, the cultural elite (Applebaum, 2020).

Lenin’s one-party state and its replica models were based on different values to those of meritocracy (notwithstanding the persistence of social hierarchies), electoral competitiveness, civil society autonomy, free press and political neutrality of the judiciary and civil service. It overthrew the aristocratic order but did not replace it with a competitive model. As well as being antithetical to democracy, it was also hostile to competiveness and meritocracy. University places and appointments in government and industry were awarded, not on talent or industry, but based on loyalty to and adherence to the rules of the party. These rules usually excluded the former ruling elite and their children, as well as suspect ethnic groups. They favoured the children of the working classes. Above all, they favoured the committed party member and the most obsequious participant in public displays of enthusiasm for the party; attracting, as Arendt observed in the 1940s, the resentful and unsuccessful types most enamoured to authoritarianism which led to the replacement of:

all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty.[7] (Applebaum: pp.23-24).

Lenin’s contempt for the idea of a neutral state, for apolitical civil servants and for any notion of an independent and objective media, was intrinsic to his one-party system. He wrote that freedom of the press “is a deception.” Freedom of assembly was a “hollow phrase”. Parliamentary democracy was no more than “a machine for the suppression of the working class.” Freedom of the press and fair and just public institutions could only occur under the control of the working class – via the vanguard of the party. (Applebaum: p.24).

The far left’s mockery of the competitive institutions of “bourgeois democracy has had many far-right counterparts from Nazi Germany, Franco’s Spain, Pinochet’s Chile and other Latin American right-wing dictatorships like Argentina under Generals Videla and Galtieri from 1976 to 1983 and Apartheid South Africa, (Applebaum, p.24). Currently, there are many versions of the illiberal one-party state around the world from Putin’s Russia to Duterte’s Philippines to most of the African continent. Illiberal parties have formed parts of ruling coalitions in Italy and Austria and have monopolies of power in Poland (Law and Justice) and Hungary (Fidesz) where both have steadily eroded the independence of institutions such as the judiciary, academe and the print media and have delivered much largesse to their members consequently (Applebaum: p.26).

For example not only did Law and Justice change the civil service law, making it easier to fire professionals and hire heads of Polish state companies. People with experience running large companies were replaced by party members, as well as their friends and relatives. Typical is Janina Goss, and old friend of Kaczynski’s from whom the prime minister once borrowed a large sum of money, to pay for a medical treatment for his mother and who had held low-level party jobs before being nominated to the board of directors of Polsksa Grupa Energetyxczna, the largest power company in Poland employing 40,000 people. 

Some one-party states do license limited opposition, if only for window-dressing purposes. Many of the communist parties which ruled the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989, allowed opponents – peasant parties, pseudo-Christian Democrats, or in the case of Poland, a small Catholic party, to perform roles in the state, in the rigged legislatures, or in public life. More recently, de facto one-party states such as Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela that controlled state institutions and circumscribed freedom of speech and association did permit a token opposition to exist, provided that that opposition no threat to the ruling party (Applebaum: p.25)

Rule of the Clercs

Drawing on the work of the French essayist Julien Benda, Applebaum explores the role of a group of intellectual and artistic functionaries known as clercs in providing the bureaucratic backbone to one-party states. In his 1927 book La trahison des clercs – loosely translated as The Treason of the Intellectuals or sometimes The Betrayal of the Intellectuals who sought to promote either “class passion”, in the form of Soviet Communism, or “national passion”, in the form of fascism and scorned their betrayal of the mission of the intellectual, the pursuit of truth, in favour of particular political causes. He sarcastically called these fallen intellectuals clercs or “clerks”, a word whose etymology leads back to the category “clergy”. Benda tragically foresaw the role of the clercs in the forthcoming cataclysms of Nazism and Stalinism; these writers, journalists, and essayists who were to morph into the political entrepreneurs and operatives who incited whole civilisations into acts of violence (Applebaum: p.18).

It is around the role of modern-day clercs that Applebaum focuses her anxiety for the future of liberal democracy. The collapse of the idea of the West; “the Western liberal order” will require such an elite to bring it about. She envisions how thinkers, intellectuals, journalist, artists, bloggers and writers will undermine the liberal democratic value system and acts as midwives for a future new order. While the cultural power of the authoritarian left has grown in the Twitter sphere and on certain campuses and reached partial fruition in the rise and fall of the Corbyn project in the British Labour party, it has only been within governments of the right that the new clercs have found their calling (Applebaum: pp.18-19). And it has been a particular complexion of the right that has become hegemonic in Poland and Hungary and, arguably, to a lesser extent in Brexit Britain (and most definitely in the Trump presidency). A particular complexion that so alarms Applebaum in its less than coincidental resemblance to the Leninist project, that she calls its leaders or spear carriers “Neo-Bolsheviks”.

Rise of the Neo-Bolsheviks.

Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen and Jaroslav Kaczynski (and possibly Gerd Wilders and Matteo Salvino as well) are frequently referred to as belonging to the “far-right” or “alt-right”. However, there is little resemblance between them and the tradition or conventional right that has been such an important part of post-1945 European politics. They disparage the Christian Democratic parties of continental Europe. Nor do they endorse any aspect of Anglo-Saxon conservatism, which advocated free markets, free speech and a Burkean small-c conservatism that is suspicious of radicalism and believes in the importance of conserving institutions and values;[8] beliefs that spring from an essentially pessimistic view of human nature. Whether German or Dutch Christian Democrats, British Tories, American Republicans, former East European dissidents or French Gaullists, post-war Western conservatives have all shared commitments to representative democracy, religious toleration, ethnic and cultural diversity (in stages), economic integration and the institutions of the post-1945 international order including the EU and NATO.[9]

It is because that the leading figures of the Alt-Right do not want to conserve or to preserve what exists that Applebaum terms them “neo-Bolsheviks”. The neo-Bolsheviks are not Burkeans but radicals who want to overthrow existing institutions[10] or “drain the swamp” as former President Trump promised to do in his inaugural address in January 2017. Just as Lenin and Trotsky offered a false and misleading future in their bogus trilogy of promises of “Peace, Land and Bread" to the Russian masses in 1917, their offer of “peace” cloaked their belief in the coming world revolution and their determination to use force to bring it about; their offer of “land” concealed a plan to keep all property in state hands and their offer of “bread” masked an ideological obsession with centralised food production that would starve millions to death in the coming decades, so the Alt-Right offer a false and misleading image of the past. A fairy-tale past composed of volkisch, ethnically or racially pure nations, the factory, traditional gender relations and hierarchies and sealed borders. Their enemies are LGTBQ+ communities, racial and religious minorities, human rights advocates, the media, and the courts. They often use “Christianity” as a tribal identifier against usually either “Muslims” or “liberals”.[11]

In the world view of the Alt-Right; the checks and balances and formal separation of powers of liberal democracies are to be spurned in the manner of Lenin’s refusal to compromise and his hostility to parliamentary institutions. Just as Lenin elevated the “working class” over all other social groups and demonised his “illegitimate” opponents so the ruling Polish Law and Justice Party has divided its compatriots into “true Poles” and “Poles of the worst sort”. Trump spoke of “real” Americans as opposed to the “elite”. Trump’s speech writer, Stephen Miller in response from a reporter’s searching question, used the term ‘cosmopolitan’ with its echoes of Stalin’s “rootless cosmopolitans” epithet for Jews.[12]

Triumph of the “People”

The most ominous linguistic device used by the neo-Bolsheviks is the invocation of “The People”. Donald Trump notoriously used the expression “enemy of the American people” on one of his countless Twitter rants. While he himself may have been unaware of the historical context, the clercs in his immediate circle such as Steve Bannon, Miller, and several others, were perfectly cognisant of the path that the delegitimisation of political opponents as “un-American” and elitist and of the media as “fake news” leads to – in Bannon’s own words “Lenin wanted to destroy the state, and that’s my goal to. I want to bring everything down and destroy today’s establishment.” This “insurgent” movement would “hammer this city (Washington DC), both the progressive left and the institutional Republican Party.”[13] The current state of the Republican Party, captured as it has by the Trumpian movement, would indicate that he and his acolytes have achieved one-third of this revolutionary agenda.

In his semi-apocalyptic inaugural address, much of it penned by Miller and Bannon, Donald Trump, who had lost the popular vote in 2016, proclaimed a transfer of “power from Washington DC and … back to you, the American People” as if foreign occupiers had controlled the capital city until 2017. The “People” is a mystical construct, quite different from the actually existing US populace but with strong resonances with the “crowd” that Leon Trotsky would address in St Petersburg ; the capital’s “oppressed under-dogs” comprised of workers, soldiers, hard-working mothers, street urchins”; the “stern inquisitiveness” of which “that had become merged into a single whole” in which “other arguments, utterly unexpected by the orator but needed by these people, would emerge in full array from my subconsciousness.”[14] The un-American idea of “The People” flaunted by arguably the globe’s greatest living narcissistic public figure in recent history smacks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in its feeling of oneness with the masses; the sense of its living embodiment that Trotsky felt in such a bizarrely narcissistic fashion.[15] All this bluster, of course, concealed the facts that Lenin, Trotsky and Trump were/are pathological liars.

An even more ominous parallel between the neo-Bolsheviks and the original Bolsheviks is the romanticism of violence, real or imagined. Having persuaded a fanatical and devoted minority (the English translation of “Bolshevik” is minority after all), to kill for their cause in the chaos that followed the abdication of the Czar, the Bolshevik party leadership came to power through the Petrograd Winter Palace coup in October 1917 by as Stalin recalled by disguising “its offensive action behind a smoke screen of defences." Using their modus operandi of psychological warfare, the Bolsheviks convinced a mob of supporters that they were under attack and directed them to seize the Winter Palace where the ministers of the Provisional Government which had come to power in the revolution of February 1917 were meeting. From then onwards, the Bolsheviks began to consummate the mass violence in the class warfare they always envisaged leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands in the Russian and Ukrainian civil wars between 1918 and 1921 with millions more to die in the Holodomor famine and waves of terror in the subsequent decades.[16]

Yet many in Russia, in the belief that the “system” was so corrupt and so resistant to reform that it had to be smashed, welcomed the cleansing power of violence in this cataclysmic era. “Let them be thousands, let them drown themselves in their own blood … let there be floods of the bourgeoisie – more blood, as much as possible” implored Krasnaya Gazeta, the newspaper of the Red Army.[17]

The blood curdling polemicism from a century ago in Russia is reincarnated in the “Ultra Violence” threads on Reddit, the white nationalist groups seeking “race war” and the NRA videos urging Americans to arm themselves to the coming apocalyptic struggle to “save our country”[18] all of which strands were consecrated in the Capitol Hill insurrection of 6th January 2021 at the prompting of a President as determined to thwart the will of actually existing voting public in the manner of a latter day General Franco or Pinochet.

Even more apocalyptic has been Steve Bannon’s visions of a coming war either with China or Radical Islam that will purify the West and restore its supremacy. “We’re gonna have some dark days before we get to the blue sky of morning again in America” he opined in 2010. In the HuffPost in 2011 he pronounced that “Against radical Islam, we’re in a 100-year war” and in 2016 he forecast “We’re going to war in the South China Seas in the next five to ten years, aren’t we.”[19] Fortunately with Joe Biden at the helm in the White House and with Bannon himself under arrest for fraud (a not uncommon outcome for Alt-Right rabble-rousers as Tommy Robinson’s arrest for similar offences shows) the active possibility of such scenarios has hopefully receded somewhat.

Power Speaks to Truth

Before he became an intellectual beneficiary of Orban’s regime largesse, the philosopher Roger Scruton pronounced a verdict on Bolshevism that could be the eventual epitaph for contemporary populist movements and governance. He observed that it had eventually became so cocooned in layers of dishonesty that it lost touch with reality. He wrote that:

Facts no longer made contact with the theory, which had risen above the facts on clouds of nonsense, rather like a theological system. The point was not to believe the theory, but to repeat it ritualistically and in such a way that both belief and doubt became irrelevant… In this way the concept of truth disappeared from the intellectual landscape and was replaced by that of power.[20]

In conversation with Applebaum, Nick Cohen states that she ‘offers an overdue corrective’ to standard “root causes” narratives of populist moments such as Brexit and Trump be they those of the left around austerity and inequality or those of the right who blame woke politics and excessive immigration. Rather the answers are to be found in politicians hungry for office, plutocrats wanting the world to obey their commands, second-rate journalists sniffing a chance of recognition after years of obscurity, and Twitter mob-raisers and fake news/conspiracist fraudsters, who find a sadist’s pleasure in humiliating their opponents, propelled causes that would satisfy them.[21]

But the dominant characteristic of the virtual one-party states that Poland and Hungary have become is mediocrity. Cohen states that one-party states represent the anti-meritocratic society in its purest form. He then notes that among Applebaum’s friends who became servants of authoritarian movements, she sees the consequences of the lust for status among resentful men and women, who believe the old world never gave them their due.[22]

One of the most striking examples of this self-pitying vanity in Applebaum’s experience was when one of her closest friends, the godmother of one of her children, moved from comfortable obscurity to become a celebrated Warsaw hostess and a confidante to Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party by endorsing the conspiracy myth around the Smolensk plane crash in April 2020 in which Lech Kaczynski, the Polish president who controlled the party along with his twin brother, Jaroslaw, was among the dead. The plane had been taking the delegation to a ceremony to mark the 60th anniversary of the massacre of thousands of Polish army officers by the Soviets in Eastern Poland in 1940 and the flight recorder showed that the plane had come in too low in thick fog. A seemingly open-and-shut case. However, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his minions insist that the Russians were behind the crash, or that political rivals in Warsaw, including her husband – onetime Foreign and Defence Minister Radek Sikorski – allowed the president to fly in a faulty plane, or that it was an assassination. As a consequence, repetition of the lie became the admission price to Law and Justice’s ruling orbit and the public sector jobs they controlled. As Applebaum herself notes: “Sometimes the point isn’t to make people believe a lie – it’s to make people fear the liar.”[23] Acknowledge the liar’s power, and your career takes off without the need to pass exams or to display an elementary level of competence.

Other friends from the halcyon occasion of the Millennium party she hosted at her Polish home on New Year’s Eve 1999 demonstrated their loyalty to the new order by promoting antisemitic conspiracy myths; the darker they became the more airtime they were afforded by Polish state broadcasters. Eventually, because of her critical pieces in the international press and because her husband was a political opponent of Law and Justice, Applebaum became a target for the propaganda sites that her erstwhile friends happily worked for and was turned into the clandestine Jewish coordinator of “anti-Polish activity”.[24]

Britain’s Brexit Revolution

In his accusatory polemic about the assault on truth in Trump’s America and Brexit Britain under PM Boris Johnston, Peter Oborne makes a striking contrast between traditional British conservatism and the neo-Bolshevik character of the current Tory government clothed as it is in the populist, (English) nationalist garb of Vote Leave. Oborne cites the importance which Edmund Burke placed on institutions which, in tune with the traditional conservative view of humanity as frail, imperfect, corruptible and, sometimes, capable of great evil, embodied wisdoms and truths beyond the comprehension of ordinary individuals. He notes the observation of Michael Oakeshott, the towering conservative thinker of the 20th century, that there was no Conservative ideology. Instead, there was a Conservative disposition which ‘understands it to be the business of government not to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed on, but to inject into the activities of already passionate men an ingredient of moderation; to restrain, to deflate, to pacify and to reconcile.”[25] (Oborne, 2021).

It has been the tearing apart of this fabric of traditional conservatism by the Brexit warriors in the shape of Vote Leave and Boris Johnson’s embrace of them with such insouciant instrumentalism which has so upended British politics and has, in the opinion of Peter Oborne, had such deleterious effects on probity in public life; the operation of parliamentary democracy and regard for truth. Just as in Trump’s America, they have sown division by waging culture wars draped by ostentatious flag-waving and, just as in Poland and Hungary, have tried to create nationalist populist folk devils in independent minded judges, “saboteur” MPs who merely sought parliamentary oversight of the Brexit process; “Remoaner” liberal metropolitan elites and wokeism.

Upon Boris Johnson becoming PM, Downing Street was at once captured by Vote Leave, a tiny organization with no members, a handful of executives a powerful donor base. This group despised the Conservative Party and hated British institutions. They had their claque of clercs including Dominic Cummings, Vote Leave director and former Special Adviser (SPAD) in the Department of Education, who became senior adviser to Johnson and Lee Cain, Downing Street director of communications. Cummings denounced non-compliant MPs as narcissist, delusional[26], and idly speculated about ‘bombing Parliament’[27] (Oborne: p.144)

Under the Johnson/Cummings regime, ‘Whatever it takes’ became the motto in Downing Street. In that context that meant lie, cheat, bully, threaten. Loyalty to the Vote Leave project became the only criterion for promotion (Oborne: p.145). A dissenting Spad in the Treasury then headed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Sajid Javid was dismissed and escorted out of her office by armed police (she was subsequently compensated for unfair dismissal at an Employment Tribunal). 21 Tory MPs were either sacked or resigned for their opposition to a no-deal Brexit. There was an outrageous attempt by No.10 to prorogue Parliament which was eventually adjudged to be unlawful by the Supreme Court.

At the core of the Vote Leave project was its willingness, in true Leninist fashion, to put ends before means; to ignore due process, willingness to mislead and an obsession with ideological purity. Cummings, who had spent a few years in Russia after leaving university, was smitten with the Leninist propagandist Willi Munzenberg and his aphorism ‘lying for the truth’; the truth for him being the communist cause. Munzenberg sought to ‘instill the feeling like a force of nature,’ that any serious objection to Soviet policy ‘was the unfailing mark of a bad … and probably stupid person’, while support was conversely ‘infallible proof of a forward-looking mind committed to all that was best for humanity and marked by an uplifting refinement of sensibility.’[28]

The Brexiteer clerc par excellence is David Frost who in February 2021 was elevated as Baron Frost of Allerton to the rank of cabinet minister with responsibility for dealing with the EU. In his potted biography of Frost, Nick Cohen paints a picture of ‘the frustrated middle manager whose resentment of a world that overlooks him gnaws at his pride. His performance as UK Ambassador to Denmark is described by John Kerr, former head of the diplomatic service, as ‘very diligent and conscientious, good at carrying out instructions, not always as good at querying institutions’. This non-compliment characterizes every man or woman who has ascended a hierarchy by sucking up to the boss.[29]

Brexit opened doors to Frost, He curried favour with the Tory Brexiteer right after the EU referendum by writing pieces in The Telegraph which called for the government to ‘stop flapping around about Brexit’ and realise that ‘this great country would be successful whatever we do’. As Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson recognized a useful servant and appointed “Frosty” as a special adviser in 2016. His subsequent ennoblement of “Frosty” in 2020 was an extraordinary breach of the constitutional principle that a government adviser should not have a place in the legislature.[30]

Rafael Behr writes that:

Euroscepticism is a machine for generating perpetual grievance. It works by making Brussels the enemy, spoiling relations and serving up the sour mood to a domestic audience as proof that the other side does not want to be friends.[31] 

David Frost’s rapid elevation was propelled by dogmatic Euroscepticism (I prefer “Europhobia”) and devotion to the PM. He truly worships at the altar of the cult of sovereignty. He was converted when his career in the Foreign Office stalled then made zealous by the pursuit of an alternative career clinging to Boris Johnson’s contrails. Nowhere did his record speak of subtle diplomacy; the consequences of appointing true believers such as “Frosty” has been the strangling of British export led businesses in such Kafkaesque dimensions of bureaucracy as the 71 pages of paperwork that British fisherman and women to export one lorry of fish to the EU.[32]

Conclusion: Liberal Nostalgia Betrayed?

Anne Applebaum’s grief at the descent of Poland and Hungary into at least “illiberal democracies”, if not full blown “illiberal one-party” states and her alarm at the rise of their neo-Bolshevik, populist nationalist Alt-Right counterparts in Western Europe is part alarm for the future of liberal democracy globally; part a cri de Coeur at the journey that many of her guests at her new millennium party have taken towards the zeitgeist of Trump, Brexit and the anti-liberal counter-revolution in Poland and Hungary[33] (as well as the loss of their personal friendships).

Anne Applebaum is a classic ‘89er. For her the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold war was a moral story, a verdict pronounced by history itself. Her political identity was made by her moral courage of East European dissidents and her belief in the capacity of the United States to make the world a better place. Just as the events of 1968 represented a time of inspiring heroism and moral clarity for the ‘68ers the Cold war represented the same for the ‘89ers. She tends to see the post-Cold War world as an epic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, between freedom and oppression.[34]

However, the moral clarities of 1989 no longer apply; nor does the certainty of linear progress of liberal democracy. The angst of Anne Applebaum’s brilliant writings do challenge Western liberals to confront these questions – how to uphold Western universalism while Western power is in decline. Will the West remain emboldened to free markets as non-Western economies become more competitive? Will the West continue to uphold free elections if they bring to power anti-Western governments? Is the democratic majoritarianism of leaders like Orban anti-democratic- or does it represent the dark side of democracy that the founders of the US constitution feared?[35]

These questions are even more relevant in the era of the Covid-19 pandemic which is blurring the distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes in that the exigencies of lockdown reveal the priorities of politics are ultimately about power and order no matter the political and ideological complexion of a country is and that the pandemic has further polarized societies. The pandemic has made it clear that return to the ideals of 1989 cannot be the point of departure when it comes to reforming the world.[36]

Bibliography

(1) Applebaum, Anne (2020) Twilight of Democracy. The Failure of Politics and the Parting of Friends. London: Penguin Random House

(2) Oborne, Peter (2021) The Assault on Truth. Boris Johnson, Donald Trump, and the Emergence of a New Barbarism

[1] David Runciman “In the US, unity and democracy have always been in conflict” Guardian 25th January 2021.

[2] Ibid


[3] Ibid


[4] Ibid


[5] Ibid


[6] Ibid.


[7] Hannah Arendt, 2017, The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Penguin Classics


[8] Anne Applebaum, '100 years later, Bolshevism is back. And we should be worried.' Washington Post 6th November 2017.

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19]Ibid

[20] Ibid

[21] Nick Cohen. 'Interview. Anne Applebaum: how my old friends reveals how her former friends and colleagues paved the way for Trump and Brexit.' The Guardian, 12th July 2020.

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] Ibid

[25] Richard Cockett, ‘Oakeshott's lessons for a warring party - Standpoint, 30 May 2019.

[26] Sam Coates, Leave campaign chief Dominic Cummings in tirade at ‘narcissist-delusional’ Brexiteers | News | The Times. 27th March 2019.

[27] Jonathan Heawood, ‘Monster or guru? What Dominic Cummings’ blog tells us about him | Dominic Cummings | The Guardian’. 15th August 2019.

[28] Stephen Koch, “Lying for the truth: Münzenberg and the Comintern | The New Criterion’, November 1993, pp.16-35.

[29] Nick Cohen, “ How David Frost’s dizzying ascent of the greasy pole damaged Britain.” The Observer, 21st February 2021

[30] Ibid

[31] Rafael Behr “Brexit is a machine for perpetual grievance. It’s doing its job perfectly” Guardian 23rd February 2021


[32] Nick Cohen “How David Frost’s dizzying ascent of the greasy pole damaged Britain” The Observer. 21st February 2021


[33] Ivan Krastev, “The Tragic Romance of the Nostalgic Western Liberal” The Atlantic, 15th August 2020.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter. 

Democracy In Peril ➖ The Breach Of Its Defences By The Revolutionaries Or Neo-Bolsheviks Of The Early 21st Century

Barry Gilheany develops his thoughts on the theme of populism. 

The rise of nationalist populism and the election of charismatic “strongmen” in many democracies across the world has alarmed defenders of the concept and practices of liberal democracy of the institutions of the post-war liberal internationalist order. Two events in particular, Brexit and the election in the US of Donald Trump and his ongoing multivehicular crash of his presidency, have caused especially acute angst. These phenomena which have mostly been of the cultural nationalist far or Alt-Right sphere have largely been the outcome of the co-option or appropriation of the language of Identity Politics from the citadels of wokeness be they from the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculties of academe; the consciousness raising activities of the women’s movement, black civil rights/liberation movements , gay rights and other new social movements spawned by the 1960s revolution. 

Arguably, the greatest driver behind mini Kulturkampf has been the rearticulating of Identity Politics’ central component, dignity, by the supposed losers in the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s - cultural conservatives, be those of religion, nation and gender. Cultural traditionalists’ feelings of indignity and disrespect became much more potent when fused with economic grievances. The greatest lesson of all to learn from the successive waves of reactionary nationalist bacilli that has been sweeping the democratic world in recent years has been that an understanding of human motivations of the human condition beyond the rational, utility maximising agent of economists’ imaginary is essential (Fukuyama: 2019). For it was the use of the discourse of the latter that proved so fatal to the Remain side in the Brexit campaign and in Hillary Clinton’s defeat in the US Presidential election the same year.

The Meaning of Lives

But as important as understanding the motivations of human beings and their quest for meaning beyond the desiccated calculating machines of Homo Economus caricature, it is important to recognise the perils of liberal democracy and society being organised around the orbit of competing identity groups. For unlike competition between interest groups for economic resources and access to decision-makers which are open to bargaining and compromise that between competing identity groups are almost inherently non-negotiable because of the biological determinism of social recognition for race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality (Fukuyama: p.122). Competing demands based around assertion of rights around access to or celebration of cultural totems have a similar zero-sum character (as any amount of disputes around the display of flags and rights and routes of parades in Northern Ireland, rights to worship in Jerusalem’s major religious shrines and demands for the censoring of arts and literary works deemed to offend religious sensibilities such as Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses and the Danish cartoons proves).

Despite the insistence of certain advocates on both Right and Left, identities are not set in concrete. One may be born into certain racial or ethnic groups with a received ethos around gender roles and behaviour, religious beliefs and customs and national and constitutional affiliations. But transcendence from these identities (even the most seemingly primordial) is always a possibility and is a necessary option for one’s journey into adulthood and maturation.

The health and harmony of society requires the possibility that lived experience can become shared experience. Societies need to protect the marginalised and to help the socially excluded, but they also need to arrive at common goals through deliberation and consensus. Liberal democracy requires a unifying but not uniform common narratives and shared acceptance of state institutions and symbolic moments. The shift in both left and right away from economics and overarching High politics towards the protection of ever narrow group identities will have a long-term corrosive impact on societal coherence (Fukuyama: p.122)

Identity is rooted in thymos, which is experienced emotionally through feelings of pride, shame and anger (Fukuyama: p.131). The new social movements that grew from the “generation of 1968” emerged in societies already geared to think in identity terms, and whose institutions were adopting the therapeutic agenda of enhancing people’s self-esteem. Up until the 1960s, concern with identity lay largely in the domain of individuals who wished, in the style of Abraham Maslow and Erik Erickson to realise their potential and to shape their destiny. With the rise of these social movements, many people naturally came to formulate their own aims and objectives in terms of the dignity of the group to which they believed. The feminist mantra that ‘the personal is political’ is supported by research showing that in ethnic movements around the world individual self-esteem is proportional to the esteem bestowed on the larger group with one is associated[1]. Each movement represented people who hitherto had been invisible and suppressed; each resented that invisibility and wanted public recognition of their inner worth. These ‘new’ identity groups were, in fact, were replicating the outlooks and battles of earlier nationalist and religious identity movements. (Fukuyama: p.107).

Each marginalised group had an ideological and strategic choice to follow. Either demand equal treatment from state and society on an integrationist or assimilationist basis: that its members be treated in an identical manner to members of the dominant group. Or assert a separate identity for its members and demand respect for them as different from the mainstream society. Over time, the latter strategy tended to prevail (Fukuyama: p.107) causing some in the commentariat to express concern about the implications for societal cohesion by “separate but equal” demands for group rights and to question the viability of and perhaps the dangers of what was to become known as “multiculturalism.”

What’s in an Identity

The early civil rights movement of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., simply demanded that American society treat African-American people it treated white people. It didn’t question the legitimacy of US democratic institutions or demand their overhaul. Dr King’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech in Washington in 1963 couched his assertion of the dignity of African Americans and call for its public recognition in the language of American patriotism. By the end of the 1960s, groups such as the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam emerged asserting the distinctive traditions, heritage and consciousness of African Americans. Like today’s Black Lives Matters movement, they articulated authentic inner selves and unique lived experiences shaped by racism, violence, lynchings and police brutality which could never be those of whites (Fukuyama: p.108).

A similar process developed within the feminist movement. Liberal, mainstream women’s rights campaigns were focused, like those for African-American civil rights, on equal treatment for women in employment, education, the justice system and in the public sphere generally. But from the outset radical and socialist feminists argued that because of the patriarchal nature of society and its policing of women’s bodies, the consciousness and lived experiences of women were so intrinsically different from men that the movement should not be focused on enabling women to behave and think like men or to buy into the dominant masculine culture. This philosophy propelled the demands for reproductive rights (including free, legal and safe abortion), reform of rape laws (including the criminalisation of rape within marriage) and those on domestic violence. More controversial were assertions by radical feminist scholars such as the legal theorist Catherine McKinnon who argued that existing laws on rape were written by ‘a member of the group who do [rape] and who do for reasons that they share in common even those who don’t, namely masculinity and their identification with masculine norms.”[2].

In a similarly reductive sense, McKinnon argues that the right to abortion is framed by the ways men arrange among themselves to control the reproductive consequences of intercourse. In her account “civilisation’s” prerogatives fuses women’s reproductivity with their attributed sexuality in its definition of what a woman is. Women are defined as women by the uses, sexual and reproductive, to which men wish to put them. Therefore, the right to abortion has been sought as freedom from the unequal reproductive consequences of sexual expression, with sexuality centred on heterosexual genital intercourse.[3]

With such diversity within feminist thought, unitary women’s movements inevitably fragmented into particularist agendas. The British women’s movement split in 1978 over whether lesbian separatism was a lifestyle or revolutionary political strategy. The Irish Women’s Liberation Movement, founded in 1970, was to split a year later over whether housing was a socialist or feminist issue. Successor movements throughout the 1970s were to split over abortion (then an utterly taboo subject even for most Irish progressives), the ‘anti-maleness’ of the movement and the ‘national’ question/Northern Ireland.

 Lived Experiences

A central core to group identity is that of lived experience which has been a permanent fixture in popular culture since the 1990s. The distinction between experience and lived experience has its origins in the difference between the German words Erfahrung and Erlebnis which exercised the minds of a number of thinkers in the 19th century. Erfahrung referred to experiences that could be shared, such as the viewing of chemistry experiments in different laboratories. Erlebnis (which subsumes the word Leben, or “life”), by contrast meant the subjective perception of experiences, which may not be shareable, or accessible to all. The writer Walter Benjamin in a 1939 essay warned that the “new kind of barbarism” created by what he saw as the series of “shock experiences” had militated against individuals from seeing their. lives as a whole. As a consequence, it was difficult to convert Erlebnis into Erfahrung. (Fukuyama: p.110).

The distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis is synonymous with the distinction between experience and lived experience. The latter term entered the English language with the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s second volume of The Second Sex which was entitled L’experience vecue or “lived experience”. She argued that the lived experience of, men was not that of women. Women’s subjective experiences brought into focus the phenomenon of subjectivity itself which was then applied to other hitherto marginalised groups such those based on race, ethnicity, sexuality, disability etc. Within each of these categories, life experiences of individuals differed (Fukuyama: p.110). Feminist and other radical Identarian theorists have more recently formulated the concept of intersectionality in order to build links based on solidarity and common experiences of oppression. The sharing of feelings and experiences across group boundaries however has been made progressively more difficult by the exponential growth of lived experiences and, thus, identities in the digital era; You Tube stars, bloggers, vloggers and the rest (Fukuyama: pp.110-11).

Multiculturism: Celebration of Difference or Division

Assisted by the adoption of the discourse and practice of the therapy culture by educational, health and social service institutions which meant greater than ever before ministrations to the psyches of people, and by the honing of the consciousness of women and black and other minority ethnic groups in the 1970s and 1980s identity became the property of groups that were seen as having their own cultures shaped and validated by their own lived experiences. Multiculturalism, although widely seen as a synonym for diversity actually became the tableau for a political programme that sought to validate each culture and lived experience equally and to treat each equally regardless of the risk of impeding the autonomy and the right to dissent of individuals within these groups. 

The term was originally used to refer to large cultural groups such as Canadian francophones, Muslim immigrants or African-Americans. However, these groups separated out into smaller and more specific groups with distinct experiences to articulate as well as groups formed by the cross-cutting or intersection of different types of discrimination, such as women of colour, whose lives could not be understood by reference to either race or gender alone (Fukuyama: p.111). The Southall Black Sisters and the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Organisation are examples of two BAME campaigning organisations in the UK set up to campaign on misogyny issues within minority groups such as ‘honour’ killings, domestic violence and discriminatory application of Sharia Law as well as on external racism.

With the decreased salience of class-based politics due partly to deindustrialisation and the hegemony of neoliberal or market based discourse across particularly the Anglophone world in the late 20th century, the Left began to mobilise or campaign around identity issues with certain marginalised cultural groups e.g. French Muslims or revolutionary movements in the Global South becoming the new proletariat or agents of change. The mainstream, social democratic left began to rely on the community leaders of certain first- and second-generation immigrant groups to “deliver” votes in return for satisfying demands for specific cultural resources and upholding certain community “values”. Examples were the dependence of the British Labour Party on “baradari” networks of kinship among groups of South Asian heritage which did lead to localised municipal corruption in areas like Tower Hamlets and the support given to clerical demands for the banning of the novel Satanic Verses by the renowned British-Asian author Salman Rushdie by certain Labour MPs such as Max Madden (the “book burner of Bradford West” as one Guardian columnist cryptically referred to him). Similarly the Dutch Labour Party in its desire to uphold multicultural harmony in the Netherlands refusal to stand up for the Somalian refugee Ayaan Hirst Ali who in her best seller Infidel, describes the escape of a young Somali woman from sexual slavery to a new life in the Netherlands and then to fresh exile in the US after the murder of her friend Theo van Gogh by Islamist extremists who had threatened her life.[4].

The degree to which dissenting voices within certain “protected” cultural groups should be supported by liberal-left opinion and actions constitutes one of the major fault lines that emerged within liberal and left intellectualism in the post 9/11 world. In his defence of Ayaan Hirst Ali against the views of two prominent liberal intellectuals, Timothy Garton Ash and Ian Buruma”” who described her and her defenders as “Enlightenment fundamentalist [s] and as “absolutist, Hitchens quotes the following from her book:

I left the world of faith, of genital cutting and forced marriage for the world of reason and emancipation. After making this voyage I know that one of these two worlds is simply better than the other. Not for its gaudy gadgetry, but for its fundamental values.

And asserts that as an African victim of, and escapee, from this system, she feels that she has acquired the right to say so. What is “fundamentalist” about that?[5]

In his critique of Garton-Ash, Buruma and a subsequent article by a Lorraine Ali in February 26 2007 edition of Newsweek stating that “it is ironic that this would-be ‘infidel’ often sounds as single-minded and reactionary as the zealots she’s worked so hard to oppose.”; questions why their human rights considerations grants exemption from criticism to ‘Islam, which is simultaneously the ideology of insurgent violence and of certain inflexible dictatorships?”. Hitchens then puts the questions that are at the heart of negotiating relationships with minority groups in multicultural societies. “Is it because Islam is a “faith”? Or is it because it is the faith in Europe of at least some ethnic minorities.”. He replies to his own questions by stating categorically that “In neither case would any special protection from criticism be justified. Faith makes huge claims, including huge claims, including huge claims to temporal authority over the citizen, which therefore cannot be exempt from scrutiny. And within these “minorities”, there are other minorities who want to escape from the control of their ghetto leaders.’[6]

Hitchens thus makes the definitive argument for rights of the individual to freedom of expression and conscience to trump the majority ethos and (sometimes self-proclaimed) leadership of given ethno-cultural groups. It is a stance that Hitchens adhered to all his life and courageously upheld over the death threats to Salman Rushdie from the Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor Iranian mullahs (sheltering the beleaguered author in his New York residence) and his support for Denmark in the face of Islamic world inspired violent hostility to and boycott of that country’s goods because of the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed in a satirical magazine.

On the radical left, in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the amorphous Global War on Terror Muslims (if not the entire ulema then certainly in Western countries) became the new subjective agent for revolutionary change; the new proletariat to replace the old proletarians which the left had been progressively marginalising since the late 1960s.

This was concretised in the Stop the War Coalition in the UK and its later party political manifestation, Respect, which was an alliance of far left organisations like the Socialist Workers Party and the Communist Party of Britain and the Muslim Association of Britain, the UK franchise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hooking up with such forces of clericalist reaction did not appear to faze veteran activists such as the Stop the War convenor Lindsay German, who when challenged on the attitude of Islamists to homosexuality told an SWP conference that ‘I am in favour of defending gay rights, but I am not prepared to have it as a shibboleth’ or its first chair, Andrew Murray, who while finding gender-segregated meetings ‘uncomfortable’ but agreed in order to facilitate the attendance of Muslim women.[7] . It was in the post 9/11 era coinciding with the Second Intifada in the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that the Palestinian cause became a leitmotiv identity issue for many on the left.

How the Right Bit Back

One of the most ironic, if not astonishing, features of the resurgence of cultural conservatism in the USA especially and its articulation of identity discourse through Alt-Right nationalism has been the co-option of the language of the counter-culture; of that of anti-elitism and anti-establishmentarianism. The 2016 Presidential election witnessed the astonishing spectacle of the Republican Party, the traditional party of Cold War and national security posturing and a party and candidate running on a strong law-and-order platform dismiss the dangers of Russia’s meddling in American elections and some its Congressional representatives talking about secret cabals in the FBI and the Department of Justice. Paranoia about government and its secret agendas has migrated from the concerns about the military-industrial complex that the anti-Vietnam war Left of the 1960s to the Trumpian Right now blaming the so-called deep state for plotting against the President (Kakutani,2019).

The Trump campaign depicted itself as an insurgent, revolutionary force, battling on behalf of its marginalised constituency and summoning language associated with 1960s radicals but also with the contemporary tub-thumping populism of Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn with their invocation of “The Many not the Few”. “We’re trying to disrupt the collusion between the wealthy donors, the large corporations, and the media executives,” Trump declared at one rally. And in another he called for replacing this “failed and corrupt political establishment.” (Kakutani: p.45). The “Drain the Swamp” strapline of the Trump campaign could have been that of any populist campaign, left or right.

The genius of the Alt-Right has been their appropriation of identity maxims of the counter-cultural right and their use of dumbed-down interpretations of the works of Derrida, Baudrillard and Lyotard that have crept into popular culture. During the first round of culture wars in the US in the 1960s, many of the new left rejected Enlightenment ideals such as rationality and science. As Shawn Otto wrote in The War on Science[8], the postmodern disqualification of the scholarly and neutral bona fides of scientists on the basis that they were formed by a specific cultural particularity, led to the views taking hold amongst left-leaning humanities academics that science was “the province of a hawkish, pro-business, right-wing power structure – polluting, uncaring, greedy, mechanistic, sexist , racist, imperialist, homophobic, oppressive, intolerant.” This litany of the mortal sins of wokedom added to “A heartless ideology that cared little for the spiritual or holistic well ness of our souls, our bodies, or our Mother Earth.” (Kakutani: p.54).

Wiser counsels of course have totally debunked the case that a researcher’s cultural background could influence verifiable scientific facts. To paraphrase Otto again atmospheric CO2 or the Covid-19 pathogen are “the same whether the scientist measuring it is a Somali woman or an Argentine man”[9]. Unfortunately, the distrust in expertise which this risibly reductionist narrative of science along with the palpable distrust of representative institutions and professional elites created the climate for today’s antiscientists – the climate change deniers and antivaxxers with their demonic accounts of the evil empires of Big Pharma and Public Health bureaucracies.

Despite the optimism of authors like Fukuyama with his hubristic End of History ,metanarrative of the triumph of liberal democracy and free markets and Andrew Hartman who in his 2015 book, A War for the Soul of America[10] wrote that by the 21st century “a growing majority of Americans now accept and even embrace what at the time seemed like a new nation…” the culture wars came roaring back in the second decade of the 21st century. Hard-core constituents of the Republican base – the Tea Party, birthers, evangelical conservatives and fundamentalists, white nationalists – mobilised against President Obama and his policies. And, as has been so widely commented on, candidate and President Trump inflamed the partisan cleavages in American society by revving up the fears and insecurities of white working-class voters perplexed by a changing world through providing targets for their anger – immigrants, African Americans, women, Muslims. In many ways, the Democratic candidate in 2016 – Senator Hillary Clinton – was the perfect personal projection for “ordinary folk’s” resentment of the liberal, monied, East Coast networked elites. Appeals to rationality such as the prospect of a possible sexual predator in the White House with access to the nuclear codes fell on deaf ears; the same outcome for those who warned of the perils of Brexit and for British Labour Party grandees who warned of the unelectability of a party led by Jeremy Corbyn. In all three it was the emotions of people who felt locked out the decision-making circles of establishment elites that won the day. Trump’s rabble rousing about external threats to the US and his unashamed invocation of America First with all the dark, nativist underside of America that that slogan stands for is the classic populist authoritarian strategy of deflecting attention from policy failures.

The account given by Christopher Wylie of his time as a research director with the notorious and now defunct private British military contractor Cambridge Analytica (CA) is a classic case study in the production of a modern right-wing cultural identity (Wylie, 2019). Funded by the billionaire Robert Mercer on a crusade to start his own far-right insurgency, Cambridge Analytica combined psychological research with private Facebook data to make an invisible weapon with the power to change what voters perceived as real.

Wylie begins his dissection of the process of identity formation as it played out in his time with CA by discussing the importance of the symbiosis of politics and fashion with its core cycles of culture and identity. He observes that when a society lurches into extremism, so does its fashion. Extremism be it Maoism, Nazism, White Supremacism or Jihadism (and maybe Northern Irish paramilitarism) share a look in common. Extremism starts with how people look and how society feels. Sometimes it creates literal uniforms: olive tunics and caps with red stars, red armbands, white pointed hoods, polo shirts and tiki torches, MAGA hats. These uniforms become enmeshed with the wearer’s identity, converting their thinking from This is what I believe into This is who I am. Extremist movements utilise aesthetics because so much of extremism is about changing the aesthetics of society (Wylie: pp.44-46)

Enter stage right was Steve Bannon. On the death of its founder Andrew Breitbart (who had introduced Robert Mercer to Bannon) he assumed his place as senior editor and his philosophy. This was the Breitbart Doctrine which holds that politics flows from culture, and if conservatives wanted to successfully counteract left wing and liberal ideas in America, they would first have first challenge the culture. So, Breitbart was to be a vehicle for promoting a counter-culture of the Right (Wylie: p.61).

Bannon had already selected the gaming industry in Gamergate as a site for his cultural struggle. This involved the mass doxing and harassment (including death threats) by angry young men against the women who protested the gross misogyny of the gaming industry.  But he realised that the nihilistic anger and misogyny of an army of 'incels’ (involuntary celibates) and other supposedly disenfranchised young males needed another focus and he found it in CA (Wylie: p,62).

To Bannon, when anonymous users of Reddit and 4chan posted their unmediated rage and bile online, they were revealing their true selves, unfiltered by a ‘political correctness’ that was preventing them from speaking these ‘truths’ in public. He knew that there was a sub-culture of peopled by millions of intense and angry young men. Trolling and cyber-bullying were key calling cards of the Alt-Right but Bannon went further and made automated bullying and scaled psychological abuse modus operandi for CA. One of the most effective messages the firm tested was getting subjects to ‘imagine an America where you can’t pronounce anyone’s name. Another tactic was to promote the belief that ‘politically correct’ liberals were seeking new ways to mock and humiliate ‘regular’ white Americans by showing subjects blogs such as People of Walmart that made fun of them (Wylie: p.127).

CA used such content to frame the notion of race relations as a zero-sum game and to promote the doctrine of ‘race realism’. CA framed political correctness as an identity threat (that because of it “you cannot speak about it”) provoked a ‘boomerang’ effect in people where counternarratives would actually solidify, not weaken, the prior bias or belief. This means that when targets would see clips containing criticism of racist statements by candidates or celebrities, this exposure would actually further entrench the target’s racialised views. 

For Bannon, this tactic of framing racialised views through the prism of identity prior to exposure from a counternarrative in effect inoculated target groups from those counternarratives criticising ethno-nationalism. This reinforcement cycle in which subjects’ racial views would be strengthened may in part because the area of the brain that is most highly activated when we process strongly held beliefs is the same area that is triggered when we think about who we and our identity. This cycle may well have been at work when media criticism of Donald Trump’s allegedly racist or misogynist statements stiffened the resolve of his supporters who would internalise the critique as threatening to their identity, their very sense of self. Furthermore, CA discovered that anger put people in a frame of mind in which they were more indiscriminately punitive, particularly to out-groups and to underestimate the risk of negative outcomes such as the domestic economic damage that a hypothetical trade war with China could cause. For people in such angry frames of mind, such outcomes were acceptable since immigrant groups and urban liberals would also suffer (Wylie: pp.127-29)

A similar dynamic was at play during the Brexit campaign where poorer Leave voters were totally unreceptive to Remain arguments about the possible economic damage that Brexit could wreak as for them the ‘economy’ was something that globe-trotting elites employed in the City of London ‘worked’ in. Pride in national and cultural identity really did come before prosperity for such cohorts.

CA also began to develop some ‘truths’ around the ‘closet’ many Americans felt they lived in. Straight white men who due to the social privileges that went with the milieu and value set they grew up found the challenges to their speech around women or people of colour that accompanied changing social mores in Americas threatening to their identity as ‘regular men’. Wylie notes how the discourse that emerged from groups of angry straight white men resembled that of liberation discourse from gay communities. Despite the vast difference in the context of the closet, both groups felt the burden of the closet, and they did not like the feeling of having to change who they felt they were in order to measure up to what was now required in society. These straight white men felt a subjective experience of oppression in their own minds (just as out-groups like immigrants, gays, people of colour and women had or still felt). They were primed for a call to make “America Great Again” – for them. (Wylie: p.117)

Just as Islamist Jihadis sought to swim in the sea of the mass of humiliated Arab and/or Muslim masses by promising the restoration of the Caliphate and the Nazis exploited German people’s humiliation created by defeat in World War I and the Great Depression. While the identity conflicts created by the loss of social privileges, the loss of jobs to the not so hidden hands of globalisation and loss of trust in liberal democratic institutions in the US and Western Europe may not result in the cataclysms of an Adolf Hitler or an ISIS; contemporary history does give us stark reminders of what can happen when group identity is privileged ahead of shared societal identity.

Bibliography:



Fukuyama, Francis (2019) Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition. London: Profile Books

Kakutani, Michiko (2018) The Death of Truth. London: William Collins Books

Wylie, Christopher (2019) Mindf*ck. Inside Cambridge Analytica’s Plot to Break the World. London: Profile Books .

[1] Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) pp.141-43
[2] Stuart Jeffries, “Are Women Human?” (interview with Catherine MacKinnon), Guardian, 12th April 2006
[3] Catherine McKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1989), pp.189-190
[4] Christopher Hitchens She’s No Fundamentalist, in Slate, 5 March 2007) in In Christopher Hitchens (2011) Arguably London: Atlantic Books pp.712-15
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Dave Rich (2018) The Left’s Jewish Problem. Jeremy Corbyn, Israel and Antisemitism. London: Biteback Publishing, pp.181-82
[8] Shawn Otto (2016), The War on Science: Who’s Waging It, Why It Matters, What We Can Do About It (Minneapolis: Milkweed), pp.180-81
[9] Ibid
[10] Andrew Hartman (2015), A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (Chicago: Chicago University Press) The culture wars compelled Americans, even conservatives, to acknowledge transformations to American life. And although acknowledgement often came in the form of rejection, it was also the first step to resignation, if not outright acceptance.

⏩Barry Gilheany is a freelance writer, qualified counsellor and aspirant artist resident in Colchester where he took his PhD at the University of Essex. He is also a lifelong Leeds United supporter seeking the Promised Land of the Premiership!

To Be Or Not To Be: Identity Politics Part II