At the time in 1992, in statements from the SAS soldiers stated that the use of lethal force was justified to protect their lives and those of their colleagues from the danger the IRA gang presented.
However, coroner Mr Justice Michael Humphreys found the use of lethal force cannot have been reasonable - a judgement that has sparked considerable anger in the Unionist community.
Ironically, it was Michael Collins as a key strategist for the IRA during the War of Independence in 1919/20 who transformed the IRA from a supposed ‘army’ into a terrorist organisation.
Collins recognised that a head to head military confrontation with the British forces would always end in an unmitigated disaster for the rebels.
From the defeat of the United Irishmen at the Battle of Antrim during the 1798 rebellion to the equally crazy mess of the Easter Rising in 1916, the republican cause has always come off second best when it comes to set-piece battles.
For example, when James Connolly gave the green light to the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army (ICA) to stage the Easter Rising during the heat of the Great War, he probably reckoned the British forces would be so preoccupied with the trench war in mainland Europe, that a military coup in Dublin would be a prime time to strike for Irish independence.
Just as the charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava during the Crimean War in 1854 is viewed as one of the greatest disasters in British military history, so too, can the Easter Rising be seen as republicanism’s version of that fateful charge.
The Irish Volunteers and ICA may have viewed themselves as the army of the nationalist people in 1916, but they were no match for British forces already seasoned by the horrors of World War One.
While the opening shots of the War of Independence can be attributed to Dan Breen and the ambush of Royal Irish Constabulary officers at Soloheadbeg in Co Tipperary in January 1919 - around a month after Sinn Fein had secured over 70 of the 105 Commons seats in Ireland during the December 1918 Westminster General Election - it was Collins who devised the terror strategy of ‘hit and run’ ambushes against the British in Ireland.
There were to be no more army-style military, face to face confrontations as in 1798 and 1916. It was all to be ambushes with little or no warnings. Gone would be the days of the Irish Volunteers and ICA occupying and holding key buildings for as long as possible.
Terror tactics would be the order of the day for Collins’ new look IRA. Ironically, it was to be this surprise ambush strategy which was to claim Collins’ own life in 1922 during the Irish Civil War between his pro-Treaty Free State forces and the anti-Treaty IRA.
The key element of the ambush strategy is the notion of surprise. Put bluntly, your opponent - or victim - does not know when the terrorist will strike. This has been at the heart of IRA tactics ever since 1919.
Looking back on the Troubles, how many victims were given a warning before an IRA ambush? So in 1992, when the East Tyrone IRA Brigade launched its attack on the police station, did the IRA terrorists shout a warning to the security forces to get out?
And given the weaponry being used by the IRA when they arrived at the church car park at Clonoe, did they really think if the SAS shouted ‘hands up boys’ that the East Tyrone unit would surrender?
In February 1984, two members of the IRA’s North Antrim Brigade - Henry Hogan and Declan Martin - ambushed the SAS in the republican stronghold of Dunloy, wounding one soldier and killing another before they were themselves shot dead by a second SAS unit.
Key question - did Hogan and Martin shout a warning for the undercover SAS men to surrender before they opened fire, or did they use the element of surprise to ambush the SAS look-out position?
Hogan, Martin and indeed the four IRA men shot dead at Clonoe were all following the tactics deployed by Collins so it should come as no surprise what the outcome would be when they encountered British forces when the IRA men were themselves ambushed.
Put generally, the British special forces policy in Northern Ireland was almost a carbon copy of that used against the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s. Those Mau Mau terrorists they could turn into informers were identified; those who could not be ‘turned’ were shot.
Meanwhile, republicanism cannot have its cake and eat it when it comes to a terror campaign. Collins in 1919 - and even during the later Irish Civil War - perfected the core element of the ambush strategy - ‘kill or be killed’.
If you decide to pursue your political agenda via a gun or bomb using terror tactics based on the Collins ambush method, you cannot complain when your opponent outwits you militarily and shoots you dead.
The real question which needs to be asked - how many lives were saved because the SAS eliminated terrorists? How many folk are alive today in 2025 because the SAS used lethal force against a well-armed terror unit?
Many of the world’s military powers have elite units or special forces who have been expertly trained in the art of confronting terrorists. Put bluntly, when you go up against the SAS, in the vast majority of occasions, there will only be one outcome for the terrorist.
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| Follow Dr John Coulter on Twitter @JohnAHCoulter John is a Director for Belfast’s Christian radio station, Sunshine 1049 FM. |
