Almost forty years ago, in the 1987 Free State (that’s what we called it then) general election, Sinn Féin secured 1.9 per cent of the vote.
The two figures measure different things. One is the priority voters attach to the issue of unification; the other is electoral support for a political party. While nobody is seriously suggesting that only 2 per cent of people in the South support Irish unity, (Fianna Fail and Fine Gael both do), the drill down lesson for Sinn Féin, is difficult to ignore.
Sinn Féin has successfully escaped the 2 per cent club but the issue of Irish unity has not.
To the people of Ireland and Britain and their Governments, the northern problem is settled, and the northern natives have been pacified.
But it wasn't supposed to be like this.
Indeed, the present position is almost the antithesis of the republican strategy advocated by Gerry Adams as Sinn Féin began its serious move into electoral politics after ending abstentionism in 1986.
In The Politics of Irish Freedom, also published in 1986, Adams acknowledged the shortcomings of any campaign for Irish unity that depended upon Sinn Féin alone. Achieving the Republic could not simply wait for Sinn Féin to accumulate sufficient votes, seats and political influence to deliver the Republic. The task was much broader, Adams, argued. Sinn Féin's role was to help create the conditions in which a mass political and social movement, extending far beyond the party itself, could be built across Ireland around the demand for national self-determination.
That difference is important because it gives us a contemporary benchmark against which the subsequent strategy can be judged. The objective was not to build a mass Sinn Féin. It was to build a popular mass movement for radical constitutional change. Electoralism was a means towards that end. By engaging with the everyday political, social and economic concerns of ordinary people, republicans could escape their traditional isolation and broaden the republican constituency.
Nearly forty years later, the outcome is markedly different.
Sinn Féin has undoubtedly built a formidable electoral machine. A party that struggled to secure 2 per cent of the Southern vote in the 1980s now commands around a fifth of the electorate. It has dozens of TDs, is the largest party in the Northern institutions, occupies the office of First Minister and has arguably developed the organisational capacity to compete seriously for government in the South.
Measured as a project to build Sinn Féin, the strategy has been remarkably successful. Measured against the strategy Adams himself articulated, the verdict is considerably less flattering. The mass movement for Irish unity never materialised and seems unlikely to do so.
That is what makes the latest Ireland Thinks figure so interesting. After four decades of political engagement, electoral expansion and the normalisation of Sinn Féin as a mainstream political party, just 2 per cent of Southern voters identify Irish unity as a political priority.
The obvious response is that far more people support unity when asked directly whether they favour it. They do. But Adams was not arguing for the creation of a population passively sympathetic to the aspiration of Irish unity. Such a sentiment already existed in the establishment parties. The strategic challenge was to turn that sentiment into a national mobilisation, to create a mass constituency actively demanding irrevocable change.
On that measurement, it is difficult to present 2 per cent as a success. What Sinn Féin has built instead is Sinn Féin. People now vote Sinn Féin for many of the same reasons they vote for every other political party: housing, health, wages, taxation, public services and the cost of living. That is an extraordinary achievement for a party that spent much of the 1980s on the margins of Southern political life.
But a Sinn Féin voter is no longer necessarily a republican voter, still less a voter for whom Irish unity never mind a Republic is a pressing political priority.
The ballot box strategy was intended to use electoral politics to broaden republicanism beyond Sinn Féin. Instead, Sinn Féin broadened itself beyond republicanism.
























