It is thoughtful, generous in its treatment of my argument and, perhaps more importantly, recognises that Sinn Féin's electoral success and progress towards Irish unity are not necessarily the same thing. We agree on considerably more than we disagree.
I find the discussion about Sinn Féin gaining another four Assembly seats but securing no additional Executive ministries in 2027 rather beside the point.
Sinn Féin could become the largest party by an overwhelming margin. It could dominate the Assembly and, hypothetically, occupy every Executive ministry. None of that would, in itself, establish the conditions requiring a border poll.
The Good Friday Agreement does not make the distribution of ministries, the operation of d'Hondt or the number of Sinn Féin MLAs the determining factor in constitutional change. The relevant statutory test is whether it appears likely to the British Secretary of State that a majority voting in a border poll would support Irish unity. That is the test that Sinn Féin signed up to in 1998.
The distinction I have been making is that Sinn Féin can accumulate political power within the North without moving one inch closer to demonstrating the consent required to leave the United Kingdom.
Its success or lack thereof at administering the North cannot be mistaken for evidence that the electorate wishes to abolish it.
But the problem goes beyond ministerial arithmetic. There are three assumptions running through the argument that I think deserve closer examination, particularly if we are serious about establishing where the votes in a border poll might actually come from
The first is Alliance.
Alliance did not emerge from Irish nationalism. It emerged from moderate unionism, offering an alternative to the increasingly polarised politics of the early conflict. Its origins were firmly within the constitutional status quo, even though the party had a cross-community identity.
I accept that Alliance today presents itself as constitutionally neutral and that its electorate contains people who favour Irish unity. But I would be very careful about treating Alliance voters as a reservoir of untapped nationalist support. There is a substantial difference between abandoning the UUP and abandoning the Union.
I would contend that a considerable part of Alliance's appeal has been its ability to accommodate people who remain comfortable with the constitutional position but have become thoroughly uncomfortable with the political parties traditionally charged with either defending or deriding it.
The second weakness is the assumption that a vote for Sinn Féin or the SDLP can automatically be translated into a vote for Irish unity.
I am a republican. I believe in Irish unity. But I would not vote Yes in a border poll tomorrow.
Not because I have abandoned republicanism, but because I believe we have unfinished business in the North (First the North Must Work). We have not yet resolved the divisions that made the place a sectarian sink hole in the first instance. Changing the constitutional arrangements without addressing those divisions risks carrying them, unresolved, into whatever political entity replaces the present one.
My own reservations are primarily political and social, but there are others whose hesitation may have considerably more to do with their economic circumstances.
I am thinking particularly of the new Catholic middle class, the generation that has done rather well out of the North that emerged from the Good Friday Agreement. Civil servants, doctors, teachers, lawyers, business owners and other professionals who have acquired comfortable homes, substantial pensions, secure careers and a standard of living that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. The people once crudely described as the “new Catholic money”.
Many will have grown up in nationalist households, voted Sinn Féin or SDLP and regard Irish unity as a perfectly natural political aspiration. But they have also prospered within the Union.
How many would be prepared to put that prosperity at risk for a constitutional aspiration? The question is no longer simply one of national identity. The North now comfortably accommodates Irishness without requiring anyone to surrender their identity or their constitutional aspirations. The question then becomes a much more practical one, salaries, pensions, taxation, property values, healthcare and the future of their children's education. What, precisely, would a united Ireland offer them that they do not already enjoy, and what might they stand to lose?
There is a world of difference between wanting a united Ireland and being prepared to accept a reduction in your standard of living to achieve it. And I would be very reluctant to assume that every comfortable Catholic professional who votes Sinn Féin in an Assembly election would automatically vote Yes in a border poll.
That brings me to the third weakness, and perhaps the most significant, the people who are not voting at all.
We spend an extraordinary amount of time examining how votes move between the DUP, UUP, TUV, Alliance, Sinn Féin and the SDLP. We spend considerably less time asking why so many people have stopped participating in elections.
I have long suspected that a substantial section of middle-class unionism has simply withdrawn from electoral politics. Not because those people have become nationalists, but because they no longer recognise themselves in the vulgar politics of the parties claiming to represent them.
For many, the DUP’s and TUV’s brand of unionism has become something they want no association with. They have not necessarily changed their constitutional convictions. They have simply stopped voting for politicians they find objectionable.
That is a hypothesis rather than a measured voting bloc and it deserves further examination. But it is precisely why I would be cautious about projecting Assembly election results onto a constitutional referendum.
In 2022, Assembly election turnout was approximately 64%. In the 1998 Agreement referendum, it was approximately 81%. We cannot assume that those additional voters would divide in any particular direction, but we certainly cannot pretend they do not exist.
A border poll would not be another Assembly election. It would ask a question fundamentally different from which party should administer Stormont for the next five years.
Someone who cannot bring themselves to vote DUP/TUV might nevertheless have very definite views about remaining within the United Kingdom. Just as someone who votes Sinn Féin might have considerable reservations about the economic, political and social consequences of immediate constitutional change.
Both possibilities complicate the neat arithmetic of electoral blocs.
And this is where I think my original argument remains relevant.
Unionism has fragmented electorally, but fragmentation is not constitutional conversion. Sinn Féin has consolidated the nationalist vote, but consolidation is not the same as expansion. Alliance has attracted people from both traditions, but voting Alliance does not tell us with certainty what those people would do in a referendum.
The mistake is to assume that the votes required for Irish unity are simply sitting somewhere waiting to be harvested, whether within Alliance, among the undecided or within a nationalist electorate whose constitutional commitment is taken for granted.
And this is why the argument cannot be settled by examining where the votes currently sit. The real question is what has been done to persuade those who are not already committed to constitutional change.
There is a wider failure here, and it goes to the heart of Sinn Féin's entire border poll strategy.
The Good Friday Agreement, which Sinn Féin signed up to almost thirty years ago, made consent the determining factor in the North’s constitutional future. It did not promise Irish unity, nor did it establish some historical inevitability that would eventually deliver it. It provided a subjective mechanism through which constitutional change could occur, but only when sufficient numbers of people were persuaded to support it.
There is another misconception worth addressing. Louth Forever suggests that the Agreement permits another border poll seven years after a defeat, describing the provision as both a mercy and a trap.
But the Agreement does not say that another border poll must be held after seven years. It says that one cannot be held within seven years of the previous poll. That is a minimum interval, not a timetable, and certainly not a guarantee of another opportunity.
Scotland should provide a sobering lesson. In 2014, 44.7% of Scottish voters supported independence. More than twelve years later, despite continuing support for independence and repeated demands for another referendum, there has been no second vote.
Why should anyone imagine that a defeated border poll in the North, even by the narrowest of margins, would automatically be followed by another seven years later?
A generation could pass before the question was put again. That is not a legal certainty, but Scotland demonstrates the political difficulty of securing another referendum after defeat.
This is why I regard the enthusiasm for a border poll now with considerable caution. The Agreement provides a mechanism for constitutional change, not an endless series of opportunities to keep asking the question until the desired answer is obtained.
Those advocating for a border poll now do not seem to understand the consequences of putting the question before the electorate without first doing the difficult work of persuasion.
The Agreement made persuasion the key to Irish unity. Sinn Féin has spent the intervening years behaving as though demographics would do the persuading for them.
Rather than convincing those who do not already support Irish unity of its merits, Sinn Féin has concentrated on consolidating its own position, displacing the SDLP and celebrating the electoral fragmentation of unionism.
And that is the contradiction at the heart of the Sinn Féin border poll strategy.
You cannot sign an agreement that makes consent the foundation of constitutional change and then spend almost three decades treating the people whose consent you require as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a community to be persuaded.
The Agreement arguably re-offered constitutional nationalists a peaceful and democratic route to their constitutional objective. But that route required something more demanding than Sinn Féin’s electoral success. It required Sinn Féin to make a convincing case to people who had never shared their constitutional ambitions.
That work should have begun in earnest in 1998. It did not.
I find the discussion about Sinn Féin gaining another four Assembly seats but securing no additional Executive ministries in 2027 rather beside the point.
Sinn Féin could become the largest party by an overwhelming margin. It could dominate the Assembly and, hypothetically, occupy every Executive ministry. None of that would, in itself, establish the conditions requiring a border poll.
The Good Friday Agreement does not make the distribution of ministries, the operation of d'Hondt or the number of Sinn Féin MLAs the determining factor in constitutional change. The relevant statutory test is whether it appears likely to the British Secretary of State that a majority voting in a border poll would support Irish unity. That is the test that Sinn Féin signed up to in 1998.
The distinction I have been making is that Sinn Féin can accumulate political power within the North without moving one inch closer to demonstrating the consent required to leave the United Kingdom.
Its success or lack thereof at administering the North cannot be mistaken for evidence that the electorate wishes to abolish it.
But the problem goes beyond ministerial arithmetic. There are three assumptions running through the argument that I think deserve closer examination, particularly if we are serious about establishing where the votes in a border poll might actually come from
The first is Alliance.
Alliance did not emerge from Irish nationalism. It emerged from moderate unionism, offering an alternative to the increasingly polarised politics of the early conflict. Its origins were firmly within the constitutional status quo, even though the party had a cross-community identity.
I accept that Alliance today presents itself as constitutionally neutral and that its electorate contains people who favour Irish unity. But I would be very careful about treating Alliance voters as a reservoir of untapped nationalist support. There is a substantial difference between abandoning the UUP and abandoning the Union.
I would contend that a considerable part of Alliance's appeal has been its ability to accommodate people who remain comfortable with the constitutional position but have become thoroughly uncomfortable with the political parties traditionally charged with either defending or deriding it.
The second weakness is the assumption that a vote for Sinn Féin or the SDLP can automatically be translated into a vote for Irish unity.
I am a republican. I believe in Irish unity. But I would not vote Yes in a border poll tomorrow.
Not because I have abandoned republicanism, but because I believe we have unfinished business in the North (First the North Must Work). We have not yet resolved the divisions that made the place a sectarian sink hole in the first instance. Changing the constitutional arrangements without addressing those divisions risks carrying them, unresolved, into whatever political entity replaces the present one.
My own reservations are primarily political and social, but there are others whose hesitation may have considerably more to do with their economic circumstances.
I am thinking particularly of the new Catholic middle class, the generation that has done rather well out of the North that emerged from the Good Friday Agreement. Civil servants, doctors, teachers, lawyers, business owners and other professionals who have acquired comfortable homes, substantial pensions, secure careers and a standard of living that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. The people once crudely described as the “new Catholic money”.
Many will have grown up in nationalist households, voted Sinn Féin or SDLP and regard Irish unity as a perfectly natural political aspiration. But they have also prospered within the Union.
How many would be prepared to put that prosperity at risk for a constitutional aspiration? The question is no longer simply one of national identity. The North now comfortably accommodates Irishness without requiring anyone to surrender their identity or their constitutional aspirations. The question then becomes a much more practical one, salaries, pensions, taxation, property values, healthcare and the future of their children's education. What, precisely, would a united Ireland offer them that they do not already enjoy, and what might they stand to lose?
There is a world of difference between wanting a united Ireland and being prepared to accept a reduction in your standard of living to achieve it. And I would be very reluctant to assume that every comfortable Catholic professional who votes Sinn Féin in an Assembly election would automatically vote Yes in a border poll.
That brings me to the third weakness, and perhaps the most significant, the people who are not voting at all.
We spend an extraordinary amount of time examining how votes move between the DUP, UUP, TUV, Alliance, Sinn Féin and the SDLP. We spend considerably less time asking why so many people have stopped participating in elections.
I have long suspected that a substantial section of middle-class unionism has simply withdrawn from electoral politics. Not because those people have become nationalists, but because they no longer recognise themselves in the vulgar politics of the parties claiming to represent them.
For many, the DUP’s and TUV’s brand of unionism has become something they want no association with. They have not necessarily changed their constitutional convictions. They have simply stopped voting for politicians they find objectionable.
That is a hypothesis rather than a measured voting bloc and it deserves further examination. But it is precisely why I would be cautious about projecting Assembly election results onto a constitutional referendum.
In 2022, Assembly election turnout was approximately 64%. In the 1998 Agreement referendum, it was approximately 81%. We cannot assume that those additional voters would divide in any particular direction, but we certainly cannot pretend they do not exist.
A border poll would not be another Assembly election. It would ask a question fundamentally different from which party should administer Stormont for the next five years.
Someone who cannot bring themselves to vote DUP/TUV might nevertheless have very definite views about remaining within the United Kingdom. Just as someone who votes Sinn Féin might have considerable reservations about the economic, political and social consequences of immediate constitutional change.
Both possibilities complicate the neat arithmetic of electoral blocs.
And this is where I think my original argument remains relevant.
Unionism has fragmented electorally, but fragmentation is not constitutional conversion. Sinn Féin has consolidated the nationalist vote, but consolidation is not the same as expansion. Alliance has attracted people from both traditions, but voting Alliance does not tell us with certainty what those people would do in a referendum.
The mistake is to assume that the votes required for Irish unity are simply sitting somewhere waiting to be harvested, whether within Alliance, among the undecided or within a nationalist electorate whose constitutional commitment is taken for granted.
And this is why the argument cannot be settled by examining where the votes currently sit. The real question is what has been done to persuade those who are not already committed to constitutional change.
There is a wider failure here, and it goes to the heart of Sinn Féin's entire border poll strategy.
The Good Friday Agreement, which Sinn Féin signed up to almost thirty years ago, made consent the determining factor in the North’s constitutional future. It did not promise Irish unity, nor did it establish some historical inevitability that would eventually deliver it. It provided a subjective mechanism through which constitutional change could occur, but only when sufficient numbers of people were persuaded to support it.
There is another misconception worth addressing. Louth Forever suggests that the Agreement permits another border poll seven years after a defeat, describing the provision as both a mercy and a trap.
But the Agreement does not say that another border poll must be held after seven years. It says that one cannot be held within seven years of the previous poll. That is a minimum interval, not a timetable, and certainly not a guarantee of another opportunity.
Scotland should provide a sobering lesson. In 2014, 44.7% of Scottish voters supported independence. More than twelve years later, despite continuing support for independence and repeated demands for another referendum, there has been no second vote.
Why should anyone imagine that a defeated border poll in the North, even by the narrowest of margins, would automatically be followed by another seven years later?
A generation could pass before the question was put again. That is not a legal certainty, but Scotland demonstrates the political difficulty of securing another referendum after defeat.
This is why I regard the enthusiasm for a border poll now with considerable caution. The Agreement provides a mechanism for constitutional change, not an endless series of opportunities to keep asking the question until the desired answer is obtained.
Those advocating for a border poll now do not seem to understand the consequences of putting the question before the electorate without first doing the difficult work of persuasion.
The Agreement made persuasion the key to Irish unity. Sinn Féin has spent the intervening years behaving as though demographics would do the persuading for them.
Rather than convincing those who do not already support Irish unity of its merits, Sinn Féin has concentrated on consolidating its own position, displacing the SDLP and celebrating the electoral fragmentation of unionism.
And that is the contradiction at the heart of the Sinn Féin border poll strategy.
You cannot sign an agreement that makes consent the foundation of constitutional change and then spend almost three decades treating the people whose consent you require as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a community to be persuaded.
The Agreement arguably re-offered constitutional nationalists a peaceful and democratic route to their constitutional objective. But that route required something more demanding than Sinn Féin’s electoral success. It required Sinn Féin to make a convincing case to people who had never shared their constitutional ambitions.
That work should have begun in earnest in 1998. It did not.
⏩Muiris Ó Súilleabháin was a member of the Republican Movement until he retired in 2006 after 20 years of service. Fiche bhliain ag fás.


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