Q: Please tell us a little about yourself.
A: I am a communist. I worked in various proletarian and quasi-proletarian jobs. I support the Left For Peace Without Annexations coalition.
Q: Tell us about the coalition.
A: For me and some of my comrades, the full-scale war that started in February 2022 did not come as a surprise. But all the same, the war disrupted the left-wing movement. Not everyone took a correct position.
Pretty quickly, a “left” that supports Russian state power took shape. Moreover, it was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) that had initiated a vote in the Duma [parliament] calling on Putin to recognise the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” as independent states.[2]
 |
| The anti-war movement is semi-underground. In October 2025 the St Petersburg street singer Naoko hit the news, after being arrested for referring obliquely to the war in a song. Photo: Mediazona / screenshot from a Telegram video |
A few days after the all-out invasion, a declaration by “Socialists Against the War” appeared. It was fairly abstract, and many centrist organisations, such as the Trotskyist Workers Revolutionary Party signed it. (Note by Russian-Speaking Leftists (RL): “centrist” here signifies left-wingers, taking a mid-way position between revolutionaries and opportunists.) There were even a few members of the CPRF who signed it. But it did not lead to any serious joint activity.
After the first wave of repression came the designation of the Russian Socialist Movement as “foreign agents”,[3] and many activists emigrated. Practical anti-war activity by leftists in Russia ground to a halt, having hardly got started.
This situation was reflected in attitudes and policies – with the emergence of a tendency that equated Russia and Ukraine, and considered that there was no need to support Ukraine. As a rule, these organisations and activists did not consider the annexation of parts of Ukraine by Russia to be acceptable.
These centrists simply abandoned the anti-war declarations they had made at the start, and were completely separated from the anti-war movement. (An exception was the honest centrists of the Russian Communist Party (Internationalists).)
For myself, I was convinced from the start of the all-out war that Ukraine was waging a just, defensive war against revanchist Russian imperialism.
I tried to make contact with other defeatists in the Russian Federation. But the situation was such that we were unable to do anything effective. And then I was annoyed to learn that the left-wing centrist émigrés [in November 2024] were organising a forum of the left emigration in Köln [Cologne, Germany]. They wanted to present themselves as representative of the whole Russian left, including the defeatists. But at the same time I realised that this forum presented an opportunity to the revolutionary defeatists, to make our presence known and to join together.
And so the open letter by the Left for Peace Without Annexations appeared, addressed in the first place to the forum in Köln. Some activists inside the country, and some who had emigrated, both participated in putting it together. [See below for a translation of some key points. SP.]
It was important for us to show that, among leftists, there is a significant group who consider Russia’s war to be unjust, who do not accept annexations and who believe that Ukrainians have an immutable right to defend themselves.
The Left for Peace Without Annexations alliance brought together people from a range of political traditions, activists who are more or less radical. What unites us is the conviction that we will not connive with “our” imperialism, and that the struggle of an oppressed nation against aggression is a just one.
Q: Why did you decide to amplify the voices of people in Russia with regard to the supply of weapons to Ukraine? After all, Russian activists have practically no influence on European politicians.
A: The open letter was not really about weapons supply. Or to be accurate, weapons supply was mentioned, but that was not for us the main point. The letter was in the first place about solidarity – which means working people in Russia accepting Ukrainians’ pain and suffering as their own pain and suffering. It means the left in the oppressor nation recognising the rights of the oppressed nation to its own separate state and to defence of that state.
For those in emigration, that way of putting the question might seem a bit abstract, while in Russia – for obvious reasons – it is impossible to make public statements along those lines. So for activists in Russia, the [Köln] forum and the open letter gave us a way to present our position – for resistance to the Putin regime and support for the Ukrainian people – “from inside”.
To comrades in other countries we signalled that: in Russia there are left wingers who recognise that defeat is the best outcome; that the left in the west should not think that everything in Russia is fine and dandy; and that people should not think that in the Russian left unanimous support for, or acquiescence in, the so-called “special military operation”, holds sway.
And of course all this is important in explaining the situation to working people in the western countries.
Q: What processes going on in Russian society currently do you think are important to highlight?
A: In Russia there is a process of mounting contradictions, and to some extent a thaw (of political life, on the basis of increasing economic problems, the lack of progress at the front and the authorities’ crude interference with the internet – RL).
Instability is mounting. And that has started in the Z-osphere (the active supporters of the war – RL), which, it seems, can in the fifth year of all-out war no longer envisage victory built on mountains of dead bodies.
Ilya Remeslo (a well-known enemy of the opposition, who recently sharply criticised Putin – RL), Igor Strelkov-Girkin and Pavel Gubarev (leaders of the so-called “Russian spring” of 2014 in the Donbass, who are now blaming the Kremlin for its failure to win the war – RL)[4] have all had their say. And now we are hearing political and quasi-political statements from public figures who previously stayed out of politics, such as the blogger Victoria Boni, the actor Dmitry Nagiev and others.
The blocking of the internet and restrictions on the use of Telegram are causing serious discontent throughout society. And the authorities have clamped down brutally on attempts to protest – not only by forbidding public gatherings, but also by arresting those who announce their intention to organise such gatherings on trumped-up charges (for example, “disobeying police officers”).
Another big scandal resulted from the large-scale slaughter of farm animals in Siberia, conducted without any clear explanation. In other words, the state is allowing, or creating situations – quite apart from the war – that cause dissatisfaction across the whole of society.
Putin’s popularity rating consequently fell in the first months of this year, before VTsIOM (a state agency that conducts opinion polls – RL) changed the methodology of their surveys.
Q: How has Russian society reacted to the more frequent attacks by Ukrainian drones, for example those that we saw recently in Tuapse, Perm and the Moscow region?
A: There wasn’t much of a reaction. Such attacks are not new. And of course the state gives the impression that everything is fine. After the escalation of drone attacks in mid-May, one could hear people talk about the fact that they were not going to change their plans and did not feel threatened.
Obviously, even though the Ukrainian drones aim for military targets, and targets related to Putin’s war economy, there can be, and have been, civilian victims. The three deaths resulting from the drone strikes in Moscow region were, of course, a tragedy. But in Kyiv at the same time more than 50 people were killed.
There is a massive difference between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, not only in the logic, but also in the precision, of drone strikes behind the front lines. Russia pays no attention to “collateral damage” to the civilian population; it actually flaunts it and uses it as an instrument of terror.
We all saw how the Russian government, having demanded from Ukraine the right to hold its military parade on 9 May[5] undisturbed, threatened to bomb Kyiv if this demand was rejected. And, so that there could be no doubt as to the criminality of such bombing under humanitarian law, they added that the population of Kyiv would need to evacuate.
 |
| Podil’ shopping centre in Kyiv after Russian shelling in March 2022. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine |
Q: Are you not worried that your position on the supply of weapons to Ukraine might alienate even those Russians who are against the war?
A: In my view, excessive attention to this question of weapons supply to Ukraine is an intra-left and émigré phenomenon. For those in emigration, it is indeed a real political issue: we see European populists, centrists and pro-Putin elements using the narrative about weapons supply to win electoral support from reactionary voters.
Q: What do you think of sanctions? In my view, this is a complex issue. On one hand, there is an inter-imperialist trade war, which hits ordinary Russians hard; on the other, sanctions is a way of weakening Russia’s military capability.
A: I think that sanctions should, above all, be focused on the military industrial complex. But sanctions on other parts of the economy is also not a simple question. If propaganda can link people’s deteriorating living standards to sanctions, and not to the war, to bad policies, and to the capitalists’ greed, then dissatisfaction can to some extent be used [by the state] to strengthen anti-western prejudices.
Moreover, sanctions that “disentangle” the Russian and western economies from each other could increase the danger of a large-scale war. And this problem could get even more serious if there are restrictions on travel by Russian citizens to EU countries, further complications in receiving visas, and so on. Instead of undermining xenophobia, this could drive Russians further into isolation.
“Slow” sanctions, to which the Putin regime is successfully adapting, are of little use. I think that the EU is preparing for a situation in which it is necessary to wage war with Russia, rather than increasing aid to Ukraine to a level sufficient to end this war.
The problem is that neither the USA nor the EU wants a Ukrainian victory. They want to preserve the Russian Federation. Being afraid of a serious confrontation with Russia and of Russia drawing closer to China, Ukraine’s western allies are actually bringing such prospects closer, with their half-measures.
Q: What is the state of the anti-war movement in Russia?
A: It is in an illegal, or semi-underground, state. On one hand, the majority of people who pay at least some attention to politics are against the war. On the other, the left has been rendered impotent. It has been crushed. It can not organise anything substantial. But there remain hopes in the emergence of new generations of activists, who are able to work even in these conditions.
The liberals are relying on the prospect of a high-level coup in which those elites that want to make peace with the west stop the “special military operation”. If you compare that prospect to the continuation of the war and of Putin’s rule, that would be some sort of improvement from a left-wing point of view too.
But the only serious chance of the left movement developing is to find a way to connect with the mass of people who are dissatisfied and disillusioned as a result of the impoverishment, the deaths and injuries and the shame of a lost war.
Q: Are activists in Russia ready for a complete shutdown of the internet? How could activists in emigration help?
A: We are not ready. Convince [Pavel] Durov [the owner of Telegram] to enable messaging via Telegram with bluetooth and wi-fi direct? Use Starlink in some way that it is not blocked for activists?
If you consider the possibility of a complete shutdown, then support could mean: we need good VPNs, and good agitators on social media who are not at risk of prosecution; we need spaces in which activists inside Russia can safely speak out; and we need spaces for the publication of material that is illegal in Russia.
Maybe a Youtube channel could be set up. Money is needed too, because it is difficult to combine active political work with earning money full time. In my opinion, providing these conditions for activists in Russia is the duty of émigrés, who of course live in relative safety.
Q: What else should Russian-speaking activists in Germany do?
A: Collect donations and send them to those in struggle, and to support political prisoners. Undertake a consistent battle against the centrists and pro-Putin elements. Explain to German people that, today, the solidarity of working people means supporting the resistance by Ukrainians, and supporting Russia’s left-wing anti-war opposition. And inform people of the real state of affairs in Russia.
==
Our decisions and actions
Excerpt from the open letter by the Left for Peace Without Annexations, 31 October 2024.
🔴Russia started this war, and ending it depends on Russia withdrawing its forces from Ukrainian territory.
🔴 Therefore Russian leftists must concentrate on bringing about this end to the war. A real struggle for peace by Russians must consist, in the first place, of the struggle to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine, for Russia to stop this war.
🔴 It is impermissible to demand from the Ukrainian people a ceasefire, capitulation or surrender of any part of Ukrainian territory, even – or rather, all the more – under cover of slogans about a speedier peace.
🔴 We recognise, unconditionally, the right of the Ukrainian people to defend themselves from Russian imperialism. Only the Ukrainian people have the right to decide how, and how long, they will continue the struggle.
🔴The left must not obstruct aid for Ukraine (including armaments). We should criticise the USA and the European Union for their inadequate support, for their readiness to surrender Ukraine for their own benefit, for secret diplomacy with Russia behind Ukraine’s back.
🔴The left and the working people of the west should increasingly check on the delivery of aid to Ukraine by the labour movement, by society, with the aim of making it more effective and to obstruct the profiteering by capital from these deliveries.
🔴 The left must demand the cancellation of all Ukraine’s debts and the payment of reparations by the Russian Federation, in the first place at the expense of capital, which was involved in unleashing this war.
🔴 We fight to bring down Putin’s dictatorial state-monopoly regime.
🔴 We work among all Russia’s citizens to bring them into anti-war, left organisations, by explaining the reasons for this war and the way to end it.
Download this article as a PDF
No comments