The proposals to eradicate coca always include some version of crop substitution. The debates are usually around how it is to be done and whether to include some proposal for the development of the regions, such as roads, schools and so forth. They rarely look at why there is an increase in illicit crops and how the proposal for substitution contributes to it.
The peasant didn’t choose the wrong crop. The decision to grow coca instead of manioc, for example, is not an erroneous decision by the peasant. It is an economic question. The peasant calculates which of the two crops has a greater market or is more profitable. This aspect is accepted by almost everyone. So the state proposes an alternative crop to compete with the profitability of coca. The state implicitly accepts that there are other factors to be borne in mind and acknowledges that the poor state of the roads is an important factor in most regions and often there is a lack of infrastructure relative to the crop, processing plants, wholesale collection points etc. But the proposals ignore a fundamental aspect. What bankrupted the Colombian countryside and impoverished the peasantry was neoliberalism.
In the history of the expansion of illicit crops and their use to make cocaine we can point to key moments in different countries. Many academic texts talk of the collapse of the price of tin in 1986 and the impact it had on the Bolivian economy. But it is not true. The price of tin did not collapse but rather it was collapsed. Until 1985 there was in place an international agreement that regulated the price. The termination of that agreement provoked the fall in the price of tin, and up to 20,000 miners went to the Chapare region to grow coca for purposes other than traditional use, amongst them one Evo Morales the future president of the country. And coca production took off, and Bolivia became, for a period, an important player in the cocaine business.
In Colombia the economic aperture of César Gaviria wrecked the countryside, and later came the collapse of the international agreement on coffee. The price of green coffee fell, whilst the price of roasted coffee rose. As Colombia, is even today, a producer of green coffee and not so much roasted coffee this impacted the Colombian countryside. It is the third largest producer of green coffee in the world in terms of volume and value after Brazil and Vietnam.
In 2024 Colombia exported 655,611 tonnes of green coffee, but the real profits are made with roasted coffee and Colombia barely exported 12,064.78 tonnes compared to Switzerland’s 111,185 tonnes, Italy’s 294,476 and Germany’s 258,672. Switzerland exported roasted coffee worth USD 3,91,239,000, Italy USD 2,748,238,000 and Germany 2,189,120,000. Colombia barely exported USD 105,998,000. This means that Colombia, the third largest producer of coffee in the world, exported coffee worth about 1.2% of the value of the three European countries where the only coffee plants are in the botanic gardens. In fact, the value of all Colombian exports of both green and roasted coffee is just 40% of the value of roasted coffee exports of those three countries in the north. But these countries, as strange as it seems, export green coffee that they obviously don’t produce. Their botanic gardens couldn’t even produce one sack of it. For example, Germany exported almost half the green coffee of Colombia. Its exports were the equivalent in value of 46% of Colombia’s exports (USD 1,609,535,000 compared to USD 3,439,384,000). In terms of volume, Germany exported 321,425,320 tonnes, almost half that of Colombia’s 655,611,110.[1] Berlin’s botanic garden must be very productive or better still the European companies dominate everything. I should point out that here I have not included figures from the USA as their production is for internal consumption, though it is the largest market.
It is worth remembering that coffee is one of the products that they say will save the peasant when he replaces the coca. The proposal makes no sense if you really believe that they aim to save the peasantry. It only makes sense when you realise that it is not about saving the peasantry but rather transforming the countryside. Francisco de Roux who was the head honcho at the Programme for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio was clear about it:
It is an ideological proposal to deepen the process that began under the government of César Gaviria: a countryside without peasants but rather rural workers. It is a proposal from the Colombian right including the paramilitary groups that set it out in their proposal Plan for Regional Macroeconomic Integration for Sustainable Human Development, the Substitution of Illicit Crops and Peace for the Municipalities that make up the Civil Association for Peace in Colombia, more popularly known as the Macroeconomic Integration Plan.[3] It is also a proposal from a wide range of foreign governments, NGOs, journalists and of course agribusiness companies.
Through the tale of crop substitution the PDPMM managed to establish large scale African palm crops in Southern Bolívar and expand cocoa, rubber, and coffee crops there and in other parts. Also in Tibú when the right wing paramilitaries supposedly demobilised they came in with full force to plant palm. Before the paramilitary demobilisation there was just 500 hectares in all of North Santander and now there are 43,859 hectares, mainly in Tibú. As much in Magdalena Medio, Tibú and other parts the beneficiaries of the crop substitution programmes were not necessarily coca growers. Palm, cocoa, rubber and other cash crops were imposed where there was no coca. It was just an excuse and in many cases they did not keep their word with the peasants as one peasant rubber farmer from Santander explains:
Nowadays, with or without the excuse of crop substitution, the promotion of cash crops is state policy. Petro never stops talking about it. When he proposed buying land from those who financed the right wing paramilitaries in order to share it out amongst the peasants he said it was so the peasant would grow cash crops. The idea is of a Colombian countryside full of rural workers producing those crops that are raw materials for northern multinationals. In exchange Colombia imports basic foodstuffs that it used to produce. The problem the country has is that Europe and the USA can stop consuming the produce of Colombia but Colombia cannot stop importing its food. Now with the crisis in the Persian Gulf, Europe can decide that that cash crops from Colombia are a luxury that it no longer needs, but Colombia needs rice, beans and other foodstuffs and it has to import them regardless of the price of fuel.
The central argument for crop substitution is that the peasant chose the wrong crop before falling on hard times. He grew manioc or some other foodstuff and couldn’t survive on the sale of those crops and opted for coca as a very profitable crop. They say there are other crops that are profitable and don’t bring with them the social problems of coca, such as violence, prostitution, pollution and the disintegration of the social fabric etc. The softest version of this accepts that there are some structural factors such as the lack of quality roads, education, health services, etc. in the regions and they promise to do something about it. However, they ignore the central problem.
Neoliberal policies caused the crises in the Colombian countryside and in other countries. The plan was to turn Colombia into a pantry of exotic products for Europe and the USA. The plan has met with some success, as nowadays 70% of the arable land in Colombia is under six crops with coffee and palm accounting for 27.9%. The country imports basic foodstuffs that it used to produce and the regions are increasingly specialised in a small number of crops exposed to the ups and downs of the market, the rapid advance of infections in the monocultures, the loss of biodiversity and the complete absence of participation in value-added processes. They propose to speed up this process, inserting the Colombian countryside to a greater degree in the international market in exchange for little or nothing. If neoliberalism pushed the peasantry towards coca, the solution according to these nutcases is more neoliberalism.
Every country in the world exports a part of its agricultural production. It is normal and even desirable, depending on the conditions in which it is done. But if you want to substitute coca with other crops, not only do you need roads in good condition, but also native crops and a local, regional and national economic circuit where the crops are transformed within the country and what is exported is, insofar as possible, the final product. It is incredible that Colombia does not dominate the roasted coffee market or that it imports refined sugar, or that its rubber production is not of sufficient quality for the car industry. Having so much land, it is incredible that it imports basic foodstuffs. The required changes in the countryside are more than giving out free seeds or chickens to peasants but rather changes to the free trade agreements, that the food needs to be processed in the country. In other words the countryside just like industry requires a vision and real planning to meet the needs of the country and not those of the international monopolies of a handful of products. The countryside is for Colombians not for Nestlé or Unilever. Neither is it for the national monopolies in Colombia. Any half measure is another victory for neoliberalism and those who pushed the peasants into coca production with all the problems this has brought to the country.
Of course, to struggle against neoliberalism is to struggle against capitalism itself. There is no nice capitalism and the options are not between a neoliberal capitalism and one from some other golden age. Of course, those who talk of crop substitution never talk of socialism. This is not surprising. What is strange is the social organisations and the left don’t talk about socialism either in the context of drugs, illicit crops and the challenges to the peasantry and the working class. They believe that drugs and crop substitution is far removed from class struggle: naïve fools.
It is worth remembering that coffee is one of the products that they say will save the peasant when he replaces the coca. The proposal makes no sense if you really believe that they aim to save the peasantry. It only makes sense when you realise that it is not about saving the peasantry but rather transforming the countryside. Francisco de Roux who was the head honcho at the Programme for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio was clear about it:
The peasant has to associate with the large scale processes that make the land of Magdalena Medio interesting for large investments. And those projects are the permanent tropical products. If the peasant doesn’t get into this, he is going to leave the region.[2]
It is an ideological proposal to deepen the process that began under the government of César Gaviria: a countryside without peasants but rather rural workers. It is a proposal from the Colombian right including the paramilitary groups that set it out in their proposal Plan for Regional Macroeconomic Integration for Sustainable Human Development, the Substitution of Illicit Crops and Peace for the Municipalities that make up the Civil Association for Peace in Colombia, more popularly known as the Macroeconomic Integration Plan.[3] It is also a proposal from a wide range of foreign governments, NGOs, journalists and of course agribusiness companies.
Through the tale of crop substitution the PDPMM managed to establish large scale African palm crops in Southern Bolívar and expand cocoa, rubber, and coffee crops there and in other parts. Also in Tibú when the right wing paramilitaries supposedly demobilised they came in with full force to plant palm. Before the paramilitary demobilisation there was just 500 hectares in all of North Santander and now there are 43,859 hectares, mainly in Tibú. As much in Magdalena Medio, Tibú and other parts the beneficiaries of the crop substitution programmes were not necessarily coca growers. Palm, cocoa, rubber and other cash crops were imposed where there was no coca. It was just an excuse and in many cases they did not keep their word with the peasants as one peasant rubber farmer from Santander explains:
It came here as crop substitution but in this area there wasn’t any [coca]. They came along with the tale, saying in the workshops that it was the pension for the people that planted it. That it was one of the most profitable crops in the world… They guaranteed its sale, something which never happened, those who extract rubber have to see where they can sell it and those who sell it have to wait three months for payment.[4]
Nowadays, with or without the excuse of crop substitution, the promotion of cash crops is state policy. Petro never stops talking about it. When he proposed buying land from those who financed the right wing paramilitaries in order to share it out amongst the peasants he said it was so the peasant would grow cash crops. The idea is of a Colombian countryside full of rural workers producing those crops that are raw materials for northern multinationals. In exchange Colombia imports basic foodstuffs that it used to produce. The problem the country has is that Europe and the USA can stop consuming the produce of Colombia but Colombia cannot stop importing its food. Now with the crisis in the Persian Gulf, Europe can decide that that cash crops from Colombia are a luxury that it no longer needs, but Colombia needs rice, beans and other foodstuffs and it has to import them regardless of the price of fuel.
The central argument for crop substitution is that the peasant chose the wrong crop before falling on hard times. He grew manioc or some other foodstuff and couldn’t survive on the sale of those crops and opted for coca as a very profitable crop. They say there are other crops that are profitable and don’t bring with them the social problems of coca, such as violence, prostitution, pollution and the disintegration of the social fabric etc. The softest version of this accepts that there are some structural factors such as the lack of quality roads, education, health services, etc. in the regions and they promise to do something about it. However, they ignore the central problem.
Neoliberal policies caused the crises in the Colombian countryside and in other countries. The plan was to turn Colombia into a pantry of exotic products for Europe and the USA. The plan has met with some success, as nowadays 70% of the arable land in Colombia is under six crops with coffee and palm accounting for 27.9%. The country imports basic foodstuffs that it used to produce and the regions are increasingly specialised in a small number of crops exposed to the ups and downs of the market, the rapid advance of infections in the monocultures, the loss of biodiversity and the complete absence of participation in value-added processes. They propose to speed up this process, inserting the Colombian countryside to a greater degree in the international market in exchange for little or nothing. If neoliberalism pushed the peasantry towards coca, the solution according to these nutcases is more neoliberalism.
Every country in the world exports a part of its agricultural production. It is normal and even desirable, depending on the conditions in which it is done. But if you want to substitute coca with other crops, not only do you need roads in good condition, but also native crops and a local, regional and national economic circuit where the crops are transformed within the country and what is exported is, insofar as possible, the final product. It is incredible that Colombia does not dominate the roasted coffee market or that it imports refined sugar, or that its rubber production is not of sufficient quality for the car industry. Having so much land, it is incredible that it imports basic foodstuffs. The required changes in the countryside are more than giving out free seeds or chickens to peasants but rather changes to the free trade agreements, that the food needs to be processed in the country. In other words the countryside just like industry requires a vision and real planning to meet the needs of the country and not those of the international monopolies of a handful of products. The countryside is for Colombians not for Nestlé or Unilever. Neither is it for the national monopolies in Colombia. Any half measure is another victory for neoliberalism and those who pushed the peasants into coca production with all the problems this has brought to the country.
Of course, to struggle against neoliberalism is to struggle against capitalism itself. There is no nice capitalism and the options are not between a neoliberal capitalism and one from some other golden age. Of course, those who talk of crop substitution never talk of socialism. This is not surprising. What is strange is the social organisations and the left don’t talk about socialism either in the context of drugs, illicit crops and the challenges to the peasantry and the working class. They believe that drugs and crop substitution is far removed from class struggle: naïve fools.
References
[1] All figures are taken from faostat.org
[2] Interview with Francisco de Roux April 2002.
[3] Ó Loingsigh, G. (2002) La estrategia integral del paramilitarismo en el Magdalena Medio. España.
[4] Cited in Ó Loingsigh, G. (2019) Extractivismo y muerte en el nororiente de Colombia. EJP. Bogotá. pp. 131 y 132.
[1] All figures are taken from faostat.org
[2] Interview with Francisco de Roux April 2002.
[3] Ó Loingsigh, G. (2002) La estrategia integral del paramilitarismo en el Magdalena Medio. España.
[4] Cited in Ó Loingsigh, G. (2019) Extractivismo y muerte en el nororiente de Colombia. EJP. Bogotá. pp. 131 y 132.
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