An architect of bloody reprisals as an instrument of both Lloyd George's and Winston Churchill's tacit but determined policy against the IRA and the struggle for independence, that he eluded the crosshairs of both The Squad and history allows us a clearer insight into the mindset of frontline British thinking during the conflict.
At the heart of Tudor's reasoning is his absolute belief in, and fidelity to, British imperialism and the conflicts pursued in its maintenance. This imperial zeal is all the more amplified when set against his own declared indifference to the aspirations of indigenous people's who struggled under British colonialism. Ireland was no different. Having served in an artillery unit in WW1 he had displayed a bravery consistent with the perceived norms of imperial slaughter. His close association with the Minister for War, Churchill, allowed him to traverse the often blurred lines of military intervention and political approval and accountability.
The Royal Irish Constabulary was the frontline instrument in safeguarding British interests in Ireland. Whether it was agrarian agitation against an absentee landlord class, industrial disputes with wealthy business owners or republican activity in search of constitutional change the RIC formed the bulwark of Westminster's response. The reputation of the RIC amongst the Irish people was one of healthy scepticism as to whose interests they ultimately served. From an Irish republican perspective they were an enemy to be ostracised and isolated.
At the heart of this book is the recognition and exposure of Tudor's total unsuitability for the task which Churchill assigned to him as he had absolutely no concept of how to deal with a guerrilla campaign. Unlike the 1916 rising, which followed a recognisable military pattern, the conflict of the early nineteen twenties had all the frustrating hallmarks of using a fork to pick up the proverbial mercury.
Tudor's lack of suitability was only compensated for by his clear belief that he would succeed in defeating the IRA and he would do so by reorganising the RIC and redefining its role in the conflict. Both the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were paramilitary divisions of the RIC, allowed to use military tactics and reprisals not usually associated with any concept of policing. The relationship between RIC middle command and the new departure of Tudor is well explored as is the conflicting views of the British Military and political establishment when it came to dealing with the IRA.
The book offers a fascinating and detailed look into the evolving tactic of the use of reprisals and how individuals like Lloyd George and Churchill skilfully manipulated propaganda to deflect growing public and international criticisms of the practice. It also goes into considerable detail on the extent of reprisals and names many individuals who were directly involved. Any revisionist arguments of trying to rehabilitate the reputation of the RIC during the conflict fall foul of the well researched data presented in the book.
The old perceived notion that the Tans were a drunken undisciplined mob let loose on the Irish population is also turned on its head as the strategy employed by Tudor for them presents a very formidable enemy against the IRA. Collins was not the only protagonist in the conflict who recognised the value of first rate intelligence and he most certainly was not alone when it came to acting on it. The extent of reprisals further erodes the drunken mob concept because as a policy of intent it was guided from hands in Downing Street, the higher echelons of the British Military and Tudor and his chosen henchman in the RIC.
The author makes great use of access to the personal diaries of the key British players which reaches into that British mindset which is so essential for republicans to understand how and why certain political settlements were reached. Tudor was resolutely set against a truce as a means to begin exploring peace talks. He was joined in this by senior British military personnel who viewed such a truce as a respite for an increasingly stretched and pressurised IRA. This highlighted their fundamental apolitical stance as they were blindly ignorant of the ever increasing US pressure to cease reprisals and the conveyor belt acquittals of guilty Tans or Auxiliaries by military tribunals.
The book tantalisingly dangles the prospect that Tudor's strategy could well have resulted in the poor terms of the treaty set against what republicans were actually fighting for. And in equal measure, Lloyd George's threat of 'immediate and terrible' war if the treaty was not accepted may well have signalled to Collins that Tudor would lead the charge with an even more freehand to eliminate an IRA which in international eyes would be seen as having rejected an opportunity for peace.
Imperial politics prevailed over Tudor's paramilitary tactics and the Anglo Irish Treaty was signed; a Tudor type role was no longer necessary as the bulwark against republican forces was now the newly formed Free State army. But Churchill, now Minister for the Colonies was not quite finished with Tudor.
When Tudor left Ireland the one thing he took with him was the fear of assassination from an Irish hand which in itself was his own admission of the crimes he perpetrated against the Irish people. When General Wilson was executed in London and an informer clipped in New York Tudor recognised his potential vulnerability wherein he viewed his new posting in Palestine as a reasonably safe haven from Irish republicans.
Churchill brought the Black and Tan strategy to Palestine and entrusted Tudor to once again reprise his role as a leader of a local police force enforcing an imperial writ. But the murky politics of Ireland and the upper echelon conniving in the British military and Intelligence community also made its way to Palestine and Tudor was ultimately sacrificed on that altar.
At the heart of Tudor's reasoning is his absolute belief in, and fidelity to, British imperialism and the conflicts pursued in its maintenance. This imperial zeal is all the more amplified when set against his own declared indifference to the aspirations of indigenous people's who struggled under British colonialism. Ireland was no different. Having served in an artillery unit in WW1 he had displayed a bravery consistent with the perceived norms of imperial slaughter. His close association with the Minister for War, Churchill, allowed him to traverse the often blurred lines of military intervention and political approval and accountability.
The Royal Irish Constabulary was the frontline instrument in safeguarding British interests in Ireland. Whether it was agrarian agitation against an absentee landlord class, industrial disputes with wealthy business owners or republican activity in search of constitutional change the RIC formed the bulwark of Westminster's response. The reputation of the RIC amongst the Irish people was one of healthy scepticism as to whose interests they ultimately served. From an Irish republican perspective they were an enemy to be ostracised and isolated.
At the heart of this book is the recognition and exposure of Tudor's total unsuitability for the task which Churchill assigned to him as he had absolutely no concept of how to deal with a guerrilla campaign. Unlike the 1916 rising, which followed a recognisable military pattern, the conflict of the early nineteen twenties had all the frustrating hallmarks of using a fork to pick up the proverbial mercury.
Tudor's lack of suitability was only compensated for by his clear belief that he would succeed in defeating the IRA and he would do so by reorganising the RIC and redefining its role in the conflict. Both the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were paramilitary divisions of the RIC, allowed to use military tactics and reprisals not usually associated with any concept of policing. The relationship between RIC middle command and the new departure of Tudor is well explored as is the conflicting views of the British Military and political establishment when it came to dealing with the IRA.
The book offers a fascinating and detailed look into the evolving tactic of the use of reprisals and how individuals like Lloyd George and Churchill skilfully manipulated propaganda to deflect growing public and international criticisms of the practice. It also goes into considerable detail on the extent of reprisals and names many individuals who were directly involved. Any revisionist arguments of trying to rehabilitate the reputation of the RIC during the conflict fall foul of the well researched data presented in the book.
The old perceived notion that the Tans were a drunken undisciplined mob let loose on the Irish population is also turned on its head as the strategy employed by Tudor for them presents a very formidable enemy against the IRA. Collins was not the only protagonist in the conflict who recognised the value of first rate intelligence and he most certainly was not alone when it came to acting on it. The extent of reprisals further erodes the drunken mob concept because as a policy of intent it was guided from hands in Downing Street, the higher echelons of the British Military and Tudor and his chosen henchman in the RIC.
The author makes great use of access to the personal diaries of the key British players which reaches into that British mindset which is so essential for republicans to understand how and why certain political settlements were reached. Tudor was resolutely set against a truce as a means to begin exploring peace talks. He was joined in this by senior British military personnel who viewed such a truce as a respite for an increasingly stretched and pressurised IRA. This highlighted their fundamental apolitical stance as they were blindly ignorant of the ever increasing US pressure to cease reprisals and the conveyor belt acquittals of guilty Tans or Auxiliaries by military tribunals.
The book tantalisingly dangles the prospect that Tudor's strategy could well have resulted in the poor terms of the treaty set against what republicans were actually fighting for. And in equal measure, Lloyd George's threat of 'immediate and terrible' war if the treaty was not accepted may well have signalled to Collins that Tudor would lead the charge with an even more freehand to eliminate an IRA which in international eyes would be seen as having rejected an opportunity for peace.
Imperial politics prevailed over Tudor's paramilitary tactics and the Anglo Irish Treaty was signed; a Tudor type role was no longer necessary as the bulwark against republican forces was now the newly formed Free State army. But Churchill, now Minister for the Colonies was not quite finished with Tudor.
When Tudor left Ireland the one thing he took with him was the fear of assassination from an Irish hand which in itself was his own admission of the crimes he perpetrated against the Irish people. When General Wilson was executed in London and an informer clipped in New York Tudor recognised his potential vulnerability wherein he viewed his new posting in Palestine as a reasonably safe haven from Irish republicans.
Churchill brought the Black and Tan strategy to Palestine and entrusted Tudor to once again reprise his role as a leader of a local police force enforcing an imperial writ. But the murky politics of Ireland and the upper echelon conniving in the British military and Intelligence community also made its way to Palestine and Tudor was ultimately sacrificed on that altar.
The final chapters deal with Tudor's drift into obscurity both in geographic terms - he moved to Newfoundland - and in political terms as his close association with Churchill waned. The last paragraph of the book sums it up well:
He chose instead to bury himself in a place where he would be left alone, where he could pretend that time was standing still, where he could enjoy the comfort and security of respectable irrelevance while avoiding the consequences of a brief political significance.
Ireland still suffers from the legacy of that brief political significance!
Linden MacIntyre, 2025. An Accidental Villain: Sir Hugh Tudor, Churchill's Enforcer in Revolutionary Ireland. Merrion Press. ISBN-13: 978-1785375750
⏩ The Fenian Way was a full time activist during the IRA's war against the British.
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