It is hard to imagine a more illogical or idiotic proposal than the recent suggestion from Keir Starmer (a prime ministerial equivalent of a fire extinguisher in a glass case labelled: “Break Only When It’s Too Late.”) and Emmanuel Macron (enthusiasm on parade, strategy on holiday) that European troops described as a ‘coalition force of the willing’ or more precisely the Grand Alliance of Strategic Loitering without Intent, could be deployed to Kyiv after a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. At face value, it sounds bold; on inspection, it collapses under its own contradictions. Together, they promise Europe can rest easy knowing that when danger passes, help is finally on its way.
First, the idea effectively puts the cart before the horse. If the war has ended, then the military phase is, by definition, over. What purpose would “boots on the ground” serve once there is no fighting to stop? Peacekeepers in occupied territories have a rationale, but deploying NATO-country troops into the capital of a sovereign state that is not occupied would be redundant at best, provocatively symbolic at worst. If Starmer and Macron believe a physical presence is necessary for Ukraine’s security, the logical moment to propose it would have been before or during the war—not when it is already hypothetically over.
This raises the obvious question: if they consider troop deployment so vital to Ukraine’s safety, why do they not do it now? The answer is very simple: they know the risk. They know full well that Russia has already warned that the presence of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil would constitute a direct act of war. Moscow has explicitly linked such a scenario to nuclear escalation. Starmer and Macron, then, appear to be proposing a policy they know will never be implemented in practice. It is theatre masquerading as strategy.
There is also a disturbing strategic absurdity embedded in their rhetoric: suggesting deployment after a ceasefire would do nothing to deter Russia when it matters—during the war. Worse still, by talking irresponsibly about postwar deployments, they risk undermining conditions for peace itself, giving Moscow arguments that NATO has designs on using Ukraine as a forward operating position. Whether this fear is justified or not is secondary to the fact that it is politically powerful. Diplomats should be de-escalating that narrative, not feeding it.
The entire suggestion smells of symbolism at the expense of diplomacy. It is a bizarre inversion reminiscent of trying to move the rubble of the Berlin Wall. Instead of building new structures of division, Starmer and Macron would be better served trying to build bridges for a diplomatic outcome that prevents Europe from sliding into a generations-long confrontation.
Finally, the tired claim that Russia harbour’s ambitions to conquer Europe must be challenged by evidence rather than emotion. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe has not expanded; it has shrunk dramatically. What has expanded, quite aggressively and by its own open admission, is NATO, moving steadily eastward since 1991. One can condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine without rewriting history into a simplistic morality tale about a supposed masterplan to march to Berlin.
If anything, the reckless rhetoric coming from European leaders reveals a deeper problem: Western policymakers are increasingly performing security rather than practicing it. Dramatic statements replace real diplomacy. Threats replace negotiations. Theatrics replace strategy.
Starmer and Macron do not need to send troops to Kyiv. They need to stop posturing and start talking about peace in a way that does not make peace harder to achieve.
If Europe were invaded by a herd of politely angry goats, this duo would respond with:
- Macron: “Send cavalry immediately… after they leave.”
- Starmer: “Let’s set up a commission to examine the goats’ legal status.”
So yes, European soldiers marching into Kyiv after peace is declared would be historic — historically pointless.
Let’s hope our EU / Brexit leaders spend less time preparing dramatic entrance music, and more time actually preventing the war from dragging on forever.
After all, nobody wants a sequel.
⏩ Cam Ogie is a Gaelic games enthusiast.
Cam Ogie. You leave out the part when Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 and then proceeded to occupy the
ReplyDeleteDonbass. What you call "NATO expansion to the East" was newly independent democratic nations formerly subjected nations or satellite states of the USSR making sovereign decisions to join NATO and the EU. Putin had the same designs on Ukraine as Hitler had on another democracy in 1938 - Chechoslovakia. You are spinning the narrative that Putin assets Trump and Farage spin.
Cam Ogie comments
DeleteBarry - You raise several points which, while important in their own right, do not contradict the argument I made. Acknowledging the illegality of Crimea’s annexation in 2014 and Russia’s involvement in Donbass is entirely compatible with recognising that the proposal by Starmer and Macron is strategically incoherent. A flawed Western policy does not become sound merely because Russia bears responsibility for initiating the conflict.
On NATO expansion, two things can be true at once:
1. Post-Soviet states exercised their sovereignty in choosing to join NATO and the EU;
2. NATO’s territorial reach expanded significantly eastward after 1991, and this expansion was consistently perceived by successive Russian governments—Yeltsin’s as much as Putin’s—as a breach of the implicit post-Cold War security assurances conveyed during negotiations in 1990–91.
This is not a fringe interpretation. It is documented in declassified US, German, and British archives, and acknowledged in the memoirs and interviews of officials such as James Baker, Jack Matlock, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and even George Kennan, who warned publicly in 1997 that NATO’s expansion would “inflame nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and prove “a fateful error.” One does not need to endorse Moscow’s actions to observe that these assessments were prescient.
Regarding historical analogies, comparing Putin with Hitler and Ukraine with Czechoslovakia in 1938 is rhetorically powerful but analytically weak. Analogies are not evidence. No Western intelligence assessment has presented credible documentation of a Russian plan or capacity for large-scale territorial conquest beyond Ukraine. If such evidence exists, it should be cited, rather than inferred through metaphor.
The core issue remains: Starmer and Macron’s proposal to deploy a European force to Kyiv after a cessation of hostilities is strategically incoherent. Troop deployments are instruments of deterrence and defence, not retrospective symbolism. Introducing NATO-aligned forces only after military operations have ceased would carry maximal political risk with minimal strategic benefit. Worse, the public discussion of such a plan risks feeding the very Russian narrative that Western leaders claim to oppose—that NATO intends to use Ukraine as a forward operating base. Whether justified or not, perception shapes diplomacy.
Finally, I’ll keep my argument focused on the point at hand: Starmer and Macron proposed a policy that would only occur after a war has ended, when it has the least strategic meaning and the highest symbolic risk. You don’t deter an aggressor retrospectively.
If we want peace, diplomacy matters more than theatrics. And that remains true regardless of which side of the broader historical narrative one prefers.
They spent too little energy exercising what influence they had over the imperialist and colonialist machinations of the US. Too little, too late.
ReplyDeleteIt is Russia who is the imperialist and colonialist power in this context, Henry Joy.
DeleteBarry we hold different positions on this, most likely irreconcilable ones. Geopolitical considerations thrump moral and democratic norms, especially so when nuclear powers are involved.
DeleteDo you remember the Bay of Pigs?
Cam Ogie. Your arguments do have some logic and validity but did Russia itself not want to join NATO at the start of the millenium? Putin has made little secret of his desire to restore the territory of the former USSR as his interventions in Georgia and Moldova prove.
ReplyDeleteBarry - the rights should lie with Ukraine, not Russia or NATO,both of whom demonstrate a willingness to inflict massive harm for aggressive purposes.
DeleteCam Ogie Comments
DeleteIt’s true that in the early 2000s Putin floated the idea of Russia joining NATO — Putin’s inquiry was exploratory and explicitly conditional on Russia being accorded the status of an “equal partner.” This was incompatible with NATO’s institutional design, and the matter was not pursued. He didn’t submit an application, and it underscores that Russia’s strategic objection has consistently concerned NATO enlargement, not NATO’s existence per se but that point actually reinforces my argument, not yours. The archival and diplomatic record shows that:
1/ Russia’s interest in potential NATO membership was conditional and exploratory, not a formal application.
2/ Putin asked whether Russia would be considered “as an equal partner,” which no NATO member was prepared to offer, and the discussion went no further.
3/ The episode demonstrated something important: Russia’s objections were never about NATO existing, but about NATO expanding into what Russia considered its strategic buffer zone. That distinction is well-documented in transcripts of meetings between Putin and NATO leaders from 2000–2002.
This isn’t speculation; it’s in the presidential archives and corroborated by NATO officials who were present at those conversations.
On the claim that Putin wants to “restore the USSR,” again the evidence is more complicated than the slogan. Russia’s interventions in Georgia (2008) and Moldova/Transnistria (1992 onward) show a willingness to apply pressure in former Soviet space — but there is no credible intelligence assessment suggesting a plan for territorial restoration on a USSR-scale. If such a master plan existed to reassemble fifteen sovereign states into a single polity, Western intelligence services would have published it as justification for a far more aggressive NATO posture. They haven’t.
Even the US Defence Intelligence Agency’s own threat assessments describe Russia’s approach as regional coercion, not Soviet-style reconquest. The two are not remotely equivalent.
If anything, Georgia and Moldova demonstrate that Russia seeks leverage in specific contested regions, not wholesale reincorporation.
So yes, your points contain fragments of truth. But none of them actually undermine what I said. They don’t even intersect with it.
And they certainly don’t change the fact that Starmer and Macron’s idea remains strategically nonsensical: you cannot deter a war by sending troops after it ends. That isn’t strategy — it’s theatre.
Europe doesn’t need theatrical flourishes. It needs diplomacy that actually works.
Cam - has Starmer ever had a good idea?
DeleteWhat a waste of space.
Cam and Henry Joy - there is a basic principle at stake here. No state is entitled to invade and swallow up the territory of a neighboring state as Russia is doing with Ukraine. Putin made in clear im his 2021 essay that hr believes that Ukraine is a part of the Russian Empire. Since admission of Ukraine to NATO was never on the agenda, NATO expansionisis a totak fig leaf.
ReplyDeletePutin has tried to destabilise Ge i. UKRSIBEorgia and Moldova by invasions and interference in their democratic elections as he has also done in Romania and across Europe. He does not like the threat of good examples
ReplyDeleteon his doorstep. He keeps testing the defences of Poland. He is the lodestar for far right racists like Farage, Le Pen and AfD. So, whataboutism about the Bay of Pigs does not cut the mustard. I don't give a flying fuck about Putin's security concerns. He must not succeeed un Ukraine.