The author has compiled an astonishing record not only of the abuse but also the sinister intrigue surrounding the scandal that was and actually remains the Kincora Boys Home narrative.
What this book reveals is more than the vile behaviour of the paedophiles who used their position as staff in the home to assault vulnerable young boys in their ‘care’. Still more sinister was and remains the involvement of Britain’s deep state in covering up the long chapter of crime that was an ongoing feature of the Kincora institution.
The story, as originally reported by the local media in January 1980, was shocking albeit one that might have been uncovered in many supposedly respectable Irish institutions of the time. Men in positions of authority abusing their status to prey on vulnerable youngsters entrusted to their keeping. After initial reports in the Dublin based Irish Independent of abuse visited on juvenile boys, police investigations led to three members of staff, including house father William McGrath, being charged with violating boys in their care.
Interest in the sordid affair might well have eventually dissipated following their conviction and imprisonment in late 1981. However the fact that William McGrath was known as a significant figure in hard-line unionist circles gave rise to curiosity and speculation in media and political circles.
Among the media people determined to dig deeper was the author of this book, Chris Moore. Through diligent investigating he met with many valuable sources of information including former residents of the home, many of whom had been victims of the abusers. Over the course of decades-long persistent research he also made contact with people close to the perpetrators, as well as senior RUC officers and significantly, well-placed members of Britain’s Secret Service. What Moore has uncovered is explosive.
Having interviewed many residents of the home, the author has verified that all three staff members conducted an ongoing series of sexual assaults almost on a daily basis. More alarming, if possible, it emerged from talking with the victims that the boys were trafficked to other locations and forced to perform sex acts for other paedophiles. One of those availing of this cruel practice was Lord Louis Mountbatten.
For over two decades after the home opened in 1958 there was an absence of effective oversight by the authorities. In spite of frequent complaints from the residents, no action was taken to thoroughly investigate. Staff members were adept at persuading police and social services that issues arising were vexatious accusations being made as a result of a properly delivered admonition. More disturbing though, was the fact that senior members of the social services as well as Belfast’s town solicitor were close friends with the boys’ home staff.
Nevertheless, this era of silence and or complicity did not pass without challenge, albeit with no positive result.
In 1973 Roy Garland, a former close associate of William McGrath, made a detailed verbal report in an anonymous telephone call to the RUC recording his belief that criminal abuse was occurring. No action was taken and details of the phone call remained in police files for years.
That same year British Army intelligence officer Colin Wallace informed his chief of his findings about the nefarious behaviour in Kincora. Nevertheless and in spite of what should have appeared unquestionable evidence of the need for a serious police investigation, no intervention resulted.
Again in 1975 another army intelligence officer, Brian Gemmell, presented a report to his superiors of allegations of abuse he had received from his contacts within loyalist paramilitary circles. Gemmell was then ordered by the senior MI5 officer in the 6 Cos to stop looking into claims of abuse at Kincora Boys' Home.
Furthermore, during the early 1970s at least three RUC officers made telling reports about the boys’ home without any result. Detectives Scully and Cullen had lodged accounts that were to come to light again post-1981 and yet in spite of recording their view that criminal behaviour was happening their efforts failed to elicit follow-up at the time.
More ominous still was the report emanating from another RUC detective also in 1975. Having received reports of abuse in the home, he began to conduct his own surveillance of those visiting the premises. His suspicions intensified as he realised that men with no obvious connection were visiting at different and odd hours. Among this group were prominent business men, senior police officers, unionist politicians and senior English civil servants. He compiled a list of names, car registration numbers and some photographic evidence of the attendees. Once more, on submitting this report to his seniors, not only was no action taken but he was promptly ordered to drop his enquiries.
Had it not been for the publicity generated by the Irish Independent article in 1980, it is impossible to know for how much longer this obscenity would have continued.
What is no longer in doubt is the length the British state was prepared to go to cover up what had happened in Kincora and more especially the Secret Service’s connection with the home.
A senior RUC officer, George Caskey, was appointed in 1980 to investigate the scandal that was Kincora. He quickly grew to suspect that there had been a cover-up and that British intelligence had long been aware of happenings in the boys's home. Yet in spite of strenuous efforts to interview the senior MI5 officer stationed in the North at the time, all his attempts failed and he was denied access to all available Intelligence Service evidence. This was confirmed by Caskey while in conversation with the author when he told Moore that ‘MI5 were all over it’.
In spite of the British establishment’s best efforts to contain ‘fall-out’ from the scandal, it proved impossible to resist widespread calls for greater transparency.
Faced with loud and persistent demands for a public enquiry, the British government agreed but only after imposing cleverly crafted conditions. Access to the intelligence services was denied by refusing to compel them to give evidence. Therefore, both the Hughes and Harte enquiries returned the desired, anodyne reports. Blame was confined to staff members already convicted and reference made to a policing failure to investigate thoroughly. Conveniently for the state apparatus no evidence was uncovered of wrong-doing or cover-up by the secret service or its masters.
Therefore, was the extensive cover-up designed to protect the royal family and in particular Lord Louis Mountbatten? Let's frame the question differently. Was it necessary as late as 2015 to stage such a exercise, risking accusations of cover-up, all carried out to protect a reputation that had long been tarnished? The Mountbatten story was no great secret and his perversities were known as far off as the US intelligence network. Moreover a relatively distant royal, 25 years dead and not remotely in line for the throne involved in a sex scandal was hardly unheard of and certainly no threat to the monarchy.
The Mountbatten angle may add titillation to the story but does not explain why the persistent refusal by the British state and its Intelligence agency to reveal what it knew and why.
Let’s consider the facts as revealed by Moore.
William McGath was an MI5 asset from the 1960 and his sexual proclivities were known to many in Belfast and most certainly also to the spooks. In a surprise move, he was appointed to lead up Kincora in mid-1971, weeks before the seminal event that was internment without trial. McGrath advocated a fiery brand of Protestant fundamentalism coupled with an aggressive interpretation of Ulster unionism that ran to paramilitarism. He was an associate of John McKeague, MI5 agent and leader of the Red Hand Commandoes. He was too, the author of the founding charter of the Ulster Defence Association. The ‘Beast of Kincora’ was moreover, a close acquaintance of many senior and influential members of the unionist political class.
Several questions arise in light of this.
One, why did British Intelligence take such strong action to prevent investigation of systematic abuse prior to 1980 and what reason has the agency to continue exerting such pressure to prevent disclosure to the present day?
Two, did British Intelligence allow and even encourage the sexual abuse of the victims in order to deliberately and cynically create a ‘honey-trap’ so as to compromise influential members of the unionist community?
Three. If the above point two was the case, to what end was this done? Was it to simply build a picture of the unionist community or was it to gather what may be described as ‘operational intelligence’ in order to actively impact events on the ground?
The latter query, impacting events in the 6-Cos, may not be as outlandish as one might imagine. As we say, collusion is no longer an illusion and if the wily old Empire’s agents are involved, it is not unreasonable to speculate that orchestration rather than even collusion was on the agenda.
Such a scenario that is truly frightening. Nevertheless, we have reached a stage in our history when these questions have to be asked and simply must be answered. That we now have sufficient evidence to demand these answers is due in no small measure to the sterling work of journalists like Chris Moore and his momentous masterpiece.
Surely it is time to consider creating a special literature award for such vital work.
Chris Moore, 2025, Kincora: Britain's Shame: Mountbatten, MI5, the Belfast Boys’ Home Sex Abuse Scandal and the British Cover-Up. Merrion Press. ISBN-13: 978-1785375545
 |
Tommy McKearney is a left wing and trade union activist. He is author of The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament. Follow on Twitter @Tommymckearney |
No comments