Some of the designs they propose give the north an extensive veto over the form and content of a united Ireland. I have four major concerns with such designs. First, the proposed veto actually violates the constitutional provisions of the GFA. Second, the designs create a veto by stealth, obscuring the fact of veto either by couching it in opaque language or ignoring it altogether. Third, major advocates of Irish unity and a large part of the public, north and south, have embraced detailed-design approaches without realizing or addressing the accompanying veto. And fourth, the designs usurp the right of the Irish people as a whole to set the fundamental terms of their own governance, including whether any one group should have the right of veto over amendments to the constitution.
Colin Murray of Newcastle University and Aoife O’Donoghue of Durham University were among the first to propose that a GFA-mandated border poll, with its requirement of northern majority consent, can specify the detailed form of a united Ireland (Murray and O’Donoghue, 2019). The Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland—an eclectic collection of academics and researchers from northern, southern, British and American universities—extended this notion of holding a border poll on establishing key features of a united Ireland and thus granting the north a comprehensive veto over such features (Working Group, 2020 & 2021).[1] Both sets of authors operationalize the veto by suggesting that the border poll ask voters to agree not simply to the principle of Irish unity, but to the precise form of unification based on an exhaustive package of changes to the Irish constitution that appears on the border-poll ballot paper. The Working Group, for instance, suggests the following ballot wording: “Voters in Northern Ireland might be asked ‘Should Northern Ireland leave the United Kingdom and become part of a united Ireland on the terms set out in [specified document]?’ ...” (Working Group, 2021, para. 9.29).
I describe the veto as “comprehensive” because its scope is vast, with the package of constitutional amendments on the ballot paper possibly encompassing the following characteristics of a united Ireland: its basic structure of governance—unitary, fully federal or devolved—its flag, national symbols, anthem, official language(s), taxation and finance policy, health and welfare provision, education policy, rights and equality legislation, policing and justice system, and its place in international affairs and membership of international organizations. That is, none of these fundamental aspects of a united Ireland can be established without obtaining the approval of the north.
My first objection to the Murray-O’Donoghue and Working Group scheme is that it violates the GFA. The Agreement is clear that a border poll involves voting on the principle of unification, on whether voters “wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland” (Schedule 1(2)). Neither the GFA nor any of the precedents from which it sprung—including the 1972 Border Poll Act—give the slightest hint that a border poll involves setting the detailed arrangements of a united Ireland. The large literature on negotiating the Agreement contains no mention that the form and structure of a united Ireland are part of a unification referendum. Neither is there any reference to a detail-laden border poll during the Yes and No campaigns leading to the ratification of the Agreement in separate northern and southern votes. No one in 1998—the two governments, the northern parties, referendum voters or the general public—believed that a border poll was about the detailed governance and policy posture of a united Ireland. For the authors to insert into a border poll, some 20 years after the fact of agreement, an elaborate model and attendant comprehensive northern veto subverts the understanding reached in negotiations and undermines the democratic ratification of the GFA.
Judicial interpretation of the Agreement gives no comfort to these flawed accounts of a detailed model and overarching northern veto. In the Miller case, the UK Supreme Court ruled that the GFA’s border-poll provisions apply simply to the constitutional status of the north as part of the UK or part of a united Ireland (UKSC 5, 2017).[2] There is not a word about the complex architecture of a united Ireland. The High Court ruling in the McCord case is even more direct in its rejection of the Murray-O’Donoghue and Working Group proposition: it specifies that northern and southern border polls on the basic question of unification are held first, after which comes discussion of the nature, form, structure and governance of a united Ireland (NIQB 106, 2018).[3]
Academics plucked out of thin air their detailed-model design and blanket northern veto, using the justification that the GFA is unclear on the precise mechanics of carrying out a border poll. The Agreement is well known for its “constructive ambiguity”, but such vagueness does not give academics a licence to make shit up. Neither Murray and O’Donoghue nor the Working Group offers a single shred of evidence to support their claim that a detailed model of a united Ireland and hence a broad northern veto can be part of a border poll.
The authors seem sheepish about the flimsy and indirect rationales they do offer for introducing such an unprecedented and alien concept. Murray and O’Donoghue note that a border poll solely on the principle of unification “addresses the most minimal reading of the requirements of the GFA, constitutional and general international law” (p. 41). Surprisingly, they do not explicitly justify a reunification referendum on a detailed model, but presumably it would address “the most maximal reading” of those legal requirements. The authors are wrong on both counts. A vote on the principle of unification is not just a minimal reading but a faithful rendition of the GFA’s provisions on constitutional change; a vote on a detailed model is not a maximal interpretation but an egregious violation of the Agreement. Similarly, the Working Group authors rely on semantic sophistry in defending a unification referendum on detailed arrangements. They say that a simple vote on the principle of unification “clearly falls within the terms of the 1998 Agreement” (2021, para. 9.17). No one would disagree with that statement. But they go on to assert that a vote on a detailed design is equally acceptable even though it is merely “compatible” with the GFA, in the sense that “nothing in the Agreement precludes” such a vote (2021, para. 9.31) “Compatible” and “not preclude” are much weaker statements than is “clearly falls within the terms of”, and are in fact meaningless justifications. A border poll on a detailed model giving the north a comprehensive veto over the form of a united Ireland clearly falls outside the terms of the Agreement. Word games aside, it ruptures the GFA.
My second objection is to the stealthy manner in which the authors insert such a major departure from settled constitutional meaning. They have been less than forthright in acknowledging that a border poll on a detailed design involves a sweeping northern veto. Murray and O’Donoghue give the clearest exposition in saying that the complex model approach means “that Ireland’s post-unification constitution will be constructed by the will of two peoples rather than a single body of constituent power holders” (pp. 43-44). But this statement is not really that clear. To translate: the citizens of a unified Ireland (“single body of constituent power holders”) do not determine the constitution of their own polity; rather, voters in the north and south (“the will of two peoples”) must separately consent to the structures and policies of a united Ireland. This refined statement is still not that clear. To translate further: the north (and south) has a far-reaching veto over the form of a united Ireland. The northern veto is in fact the principal, precedent-breaking implication of Murray and O’Donoghue’s scheme, but the authors never use the term “veto”. Their failure plainly to acknowledge the fact of veto is highly misleading.
The clarity of the Working Group’s proposal is equally wanting. In describing the “maximum plan” design, the Working Group says: “The choice put to voters, north and south, in concurrent referendums" would involve “the model of unification, including the form of a united Ireland” (2021, para. 9.29). In proposing the ballot-paper wording, quoted above, the Working Group does not address the political implications of using a border poll to set out the precise terms of unification. There is no reference to a broad northern veto over the model and form of unity, even though that kind of veto is an integral component of the design and even though the Working Group freely employs the word “veto” in discussing other constitutional developments. They seem reluctant explicitly to attach the descriptor “veto” to their own design. This reluctance is again highly misleading.
My third concern is that all the major advocates of Irish unity call for the detailed plan of what a united Ireland would look like to be established in advance of a border poll, but none addresses the question of a thorough-going northern veto. Sinn Féin says: “When the referendums on Irish unity are held people should have maximum information on what they are voting for”. It wants the Irish government to develop a “coherent and all-encompassing plan” to deal with major issues including public services and “future constitutional arrangements post-unity” (Sinn Féin, 2022, pp. 4 & 7, respectively). Likewise, Ireland’s Future emphasizes that the shape of a united Ireland needs to be clarified before any border poll “to enable the electorate to make a fully informed decision” on “a definitive choice” (Ireland’s Future, 2024, p. 7). It too emphasizes that “the requisite planning” for new constitutional arrangements needs to be “detailed and comprehensive” (Ireland’s Future, 2020, n.p.). The Constitutional Conversations Group, whose report Ireland’s Future appends to its 2020 document laying out a principled framework for change, also calls for Dublin to create a plan—a programme for a new and united Ireland—which specifies what will happen should the northern and southern referendums support Irish unity. It accepts the legitimacy of a detailed-design approach saying that “it should be clear in advance of the referendums what model and arrangements people are opting for if they select the change option. In the event of votes for reunification it will then be a matter of implementing the proposals that have been democratically endorsed” (Ireland’s Future, 2020, p. 9). The recent report of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement recommends that preparation for a united Ireland begin immediately. In a forward to the report, Committee Chair Fergus O’Dowd explains why advanced planning is so important: “voters in referenda will need in-depth information on what the decision would mean for their daily lives, including answers on political institutions, healthcare, taxation, education, social welfare, and pensions. Providing detailed answers to these questions will require immense preparation, which will need to begin well in advance of referenda being called” (Joint Committee, 2024, p. 6). These various proposals are at one in calling for a fully comprehensive plan to be laid before border-poll voters in the north and south. But they all fail to acknowledge explicitly that this referendum design could mean that many public provisions affecting the daily lives of citizens in a united Ireland will require northern approval before they can be put in place.
Likewise, voters in the north and south strongly endorse the detailed-design approach to unification referendums, with no apparent consideration for the implications of establishing a powerful northern veto over crucial aspects of a united Ireland. In 2022, academics Brendan O’Leary and John Garry asked survey respondents if the exact type of united Ireland should be decided before or after a border poll. Do they prefer a vote simply on the principle of unity, without any details, or a vote on the specific model of a united Ireland? The response is clear: large majorities in the north (69%) and south (59%) want the model specified beforehand. Equal numbers of Catholics (72%) and Protestants (71%) in the north choose the vote-on-detail option. Only 15 percent of respondents in the north and 31 percent in the south support a referendum on the basic principle of unification with the details to come later (O’Leary & Garry, 2022).
These survey results are deeply suspect and need to be put in context. If respondents were explicitly informed that getting all the details in the “before” option comes with a northern veto over many fundamental aspects of a united Ireland, I expect the numbers supporting such an approach would plummet in the south and among northern Catholics. Northern Protestant support for the detailed design model would probably increase. Here again is another example of a comprehensive northern veto by stealth. It’s not acceptable that the authors, who were members of the now expired Working Group, continually fail directly to address the veto attached to their detailed-design approaches.
Garry and O’Leary’s survey is indicative of a major feature inherent to the schemes of Murray and O’Donoghue and the Working Group. All the authors formulate a choice between, on the one hand, a referendum on just the principle of unification without any details of what Irish unity might look like and, on the other, a referendum with a fully-specified model of a united Ireland on the ballot paper. And all of them note that a main advantage of the model approach is that it gives voters enough details to make an informed choice in the referendum. Each advocate of unity examined above—Sinn Féin, Ireland’s Future and the Joint Committee—likewise underlines the importance of referendum voters having the opportunity to make a fully informed choice. It’s not surprising, then, that a large majority of survey respondents would prefer to make an informed decision rather than an uninformed decision, especially with the fiasco of the Brexit referendum still in mind.
The main problem is that these proposals offer people a false choice between casting an illiterate vote on the principle of unity or an educated vote on the detailed model of a united Ireland. There is another way. The 2014 Scottish referendum was a vote simply on the principle of independence—"Should Scotland be an independent country?”—but abundant details were available.[4] The Scottish government provided many of those details in its 670-page guide to an independent Scotland that was published ten months before the vote (Scottish Government, 2013). This document laid out the government’s vision and priorities for action that addressed at least as many issues as are contained in detailed-design models of Irish unity. The Scottish Electoral Commission found that voters had exceptionally high levels of knowledge of referendum issues. The vast majority felt that they had enough information to make an informed choice in the referendum (Scottish Electoral Commission, 2014).[5]
Pro-unity groups who endorse a border poll on the detailed model of a united Ireland need to think seriously about issues of process. Do they believe, like some academics, that the Agreement gives the north a comprehensive veto over the structure and form of a united Ireland? If so, how can they justify a position that it so at odds with what the Agreement actually says and the way in which it was negotiated and ratified? If not, will they consider some variant of the Scottish model that gives voters an opportunity to cast an informed vote on the principle of unification? Or will they move to some other referendum scheme that eliminates the northern veto and preserves what was agreed in 1998?
This discussion leads to my fourth and final objection to the detailed-arrangements approach to a border poll. The citizens of a unified Ireland have the right to set the constitutional terms and conditions of their own governance. The detailed-design model usurps that right and gives it separately to referendum voters in the north and south. The model also usurps the right of all Irish citizens voting as a unit to decide if there should be any vetoes over constitutional amendments in a united Ireland. The question of a northern veto is likely to be highly controversial and its advocates should expressly put that question to the citizens of a united Ireland. The veto should not be quietly slipped in by a group of academics who have designed bogus models of a border poll based on wrong-headed readings of the constitutional provisions of the GFA.
Something akin to the Scottish experience would allow the Irish people as a whole to set a new constitution after successful unification votes. The Irish government could publish a detailed guide to a united Ireland well in advance of the referendums. This guide, and any other proposals made in the lead up to the border polls, would provide voters with sufficient information to make an informed choice on the principle of unification. Voters would have had before them detailed proposals of the range of possible consequences associated with a decision to unify. These proposals would also form the basis for an all-Ireland discussion on amendments to the Irish constitution, a discussion that would occur in the immediate post-unification period. From this discussion, there could of course emerge new or revised proposals to alter the constitution. The citizens of the newly reunified state would then vote on the finalized package of constitutional amendments. In short, this admittedly skeletal design achieves two important objectives: it provides ample information to people voting in the unification referendums, and it eliminates the comprehensive northern veto by ensuring the Irish people as a whole—that “single body of constituent power holders”—has the final and definitive say on the basic governance and policy structures of a unified Ireland.
The next part of the series examines how recent calls for “constitutional change” and reforming the GFA are marginalizing conversations about a united Ireland.
Notes
[1] For the most part, I restrict my discussion to the reports of the Working Group as a whole. Individual members of the (now-defunct) Working Group have separately proposed a border poll on the detailed model of a united Ireland that gives the north a far-reaching veto, and are therefore subject to the same criticisms I make here. See, for example O’Leary (2022 & 2024) and Doyle (2022). I include a separate discussion of the survey results of former Working Group members John Garry and Brendan O’Leary to show how widely accepted the Working Group proposal has become.
[2] The Supreme Court was ruling on the Northern Ireland Act 1998 but notes the Act’s consent and border-poll provisions “arose out of the Belfast Agreement” (para. 135). Murray and O’Donoghue recognize the Supreme Court decision but go on to ignore it in their modelling of a united Ireland.
[3] The court raises but leaves open the question of whether the agreement on detailed arrangements would require the consent of a northern majority. In any case, this agreement and any vote on it are subsequent to a successful border poll on the principle of unification. In the text, I argue that it is up to the people of a united Ireland to decide if the north or any other groups gets a veto on amendments to the Irish constitution.
[4] The Working Group explicitly rejected the Scottish model, I think unfairly (Burke, 2021).
[5] As academic John Doyle told the Oireachtas Joint Committee, a major criticism of the Scottish referendum “was that not enough information was provided including on issues such as currency and pensions” (Joint Committee, 2024, p. 58). The Scottish case set an exceedingly high standard for information provision but nevertheless did not satisfy everyone. It’s difficult to imagine that any referendum design, including the detailed models the various authors propose, could be wholly exempt from the charge of providing insufficient information.
References
Burke, M. (2021). “Further Deepening the Unionist Veto: The Final Report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums.” The Pensive Quill. 24 July. Retrieved from.
Doyle, O. (2022). “Addressing the question of unity; Two new books exploring the path to Irish reunification offer valuable and complementary approaches.” Irish Times. 3 September. Retrieved from the Factiva (Dow Jones) electronic database of news articles.
Ireland’s Future. (2020). The Conversation on Ireland’s Future: A Principled Framework for Change. 3 December. Retrieved from.
Ireland’s Future. (2024). Ireland 2030: Proposals for the Period Between 2024 and 2030. 4 March. Retrieved from.
Joint Committee. (2024). Perspectives on Constitutional Change: Finance and Economics. Houses of the Oireachtas. Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. 16 July. Retrieved from.
Murray, C.R.G., and A. O’Donoghue. (2019). “Life after Brexit: Operationalising the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement’s Principle of Consent.” Dublin University Law Journal 42:1 (October): 147-189. Retrieved from.
NIQB 106. (2018). In the matter of an application by Raymond McCord for leave to apply for judicial review and in the matter of Section 1 and Schedule 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. In the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench Division (Judicial Review). Rt Hon Sir Paul Girvan. 28 June. Retrieved from.
O’Leary, B. (2022). Making Sense of a United Ireland: Should It Happen? How Might It Happen? Sandycove an imprint of Penguin Books.
O’Leary, B. (2024). “2030—The Tipping Point.” Presentation to Ireland’s Future Conference, Pathway to Change. SSE Arena. Belfast. 15 June. Podcast retrieved from.
O’Leary, B., and J. Garry. (2022). “Avoiding a rerun of Brexit by planning ahead: Voters want to know what a united Ireland means before any referendum, but unionist politicians won’t want any such discussions until after a referendum.” Irish Times. 10 December. Retrieved from.
Scottish Electoral Commission. (2014). Scottish Independence Referendum: Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014. ELC/2014/02. December. Retrieved from.
Scottish Government. (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Edinburgh. November. Retrieved from.
Sinn Féin. (2022). Our Future: Let’s Plan for It ... Why the Irish Government Must Establish a Citizens’ Assembly on Irish Unity. Discussion Document. November. Retrieved from.
UKSC 5 (2017). Judgment. R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant). ... Before Lord Neuberger, President; Lady Hale, Deputy President; Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes, Lord Hodge. 24 January. Retrieved from.
Working Group. (2020). Interim Report. Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London. November. Retrieved from.
Working Group. (2021). Final Report. Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London. May. Retrieved from.
Colin Murray of Newcastle University and Aoife O’Donoghue of Durham University were among the first to propose that a GFA-mandated border poll, with its requirement of northern majority consent, can specify the detailed form of a united Ireland (Murray and O’Donoghue, 2019). The Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland—an eclectic collection of academics and researchers from northern, southern, British and American universities—extended this notion of holding a border poll on establishing key features of a united Ireland and thus granting the north a comprehensive veto over such features (Working Group, 2020 & 2021).[1] Both sets of authors operationalize the veto by suggesting that the border poll ask voters to agree not simply to the principle of Irish unity, but to the precise form of unification based on an exhaustive package of changes to the Irish constitution that appears on the border-poll ballot paper. The Working Group, for instance, suggests the following ballot wording: “Voters in Northern Ireland might be asked ‘Should Northern Ireland leave the United Kingdom and become part of a united Ireland on the terms set out in [specified document]?’ ...” (Working Group, 2021, para. 9.29).
I describe the veto as “comprehensive” because its scope is vast, with the package of constitutional amendments on the ballot paper possibly encompassing the following characteristics of a united Ireland: its basic structure of governance—unitary, fully federal or devolved—its flag, national symbols, anthem, official language(s), taxation and finance policy, health and welfare provision, education policy, rights and equality legislation, policing and justice system, and its place in international affairs and membership of international organizations. That is, none of these fundamental aspects of a united Ireland can be established without obtaining the approval of the north.
My first objection to the Murray-O’Donoghue and Working Group scheme is that it violates the GFA. The Agreement is clear that a border poll involves voting on the principle of unification, on whether voters “wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland” (Schedule 1(2)). Neither the GFA nor any of the precedents from which it sprung—including the 1972 Border Poll Act—give the slightest hint that a border poll involves setting the detailed arrangements of a united Ireland. The large literature on negotiating the Agreement contains no mention that the form and structure of a united Ireland are part of a unification referendum. Neither is there any reference to a detail-laden border poll during the Yes and No campaigns leading to the ratification of the Agreement in separate northern and southern votes. No one in 1998—the two governments, the northern parties, referendum voters or the general public—believed that a border poll was about the detailed governance and policy posture of a united Ireland. For the authors to insert into a border poll, some 20 years after the fact of agreement, an elaborate model and attendant comprehensive northern veto subverts the understanding reached in negotiations and undermines the democratic ratification of the GFA.
Judicial interpretation of the Agreement gives no comfort to these flawed accounts of a detailed model and overarching northern veto. In the Miller case, the UK Supreme Court ruled that the GFA’s border-poll provisions apply simply to the constitutional status of the north as part of the UK or part of a united Ireland (UKSC 5, 2017).[2] There is not a word about the complex architecture of a united Ireland. The High Court ruling in the McCord case is even more direct in its rejection of the Murray-O’Donoghue and Working Group proposition: it specifies that northern and southern border polls on the basic question of unification are held first, after which comes discussion of the nature, form, structure and governance of a united Ireland (NIQB 106, 2018).[3]
Academics plucked out of thin air their detailed-model design and blanket northern veto, using the justification that the GFA is unclear on the precise mechanics of carrying out a border poll. The Agreement is well known for its “constructive ambiguity”, but such vagueness does not give academics a licence to make shit up. Neither Murray and O’Donoghue nor the Working Group offers a single shred of evidence to support their claim that a detailed model of a united Ireland and hence a broad northern veto can be part of a border poll.
The authors seem sheepish about the flimsy and indirect rationales they do offer for introducing such an unprecedented and alien concept. Murray and O’Donoghue note that a border poll solely on the principle of unification “addresses the most minimal reading of the requirements of the GFA, constitutional and general international law” (p. 41). Surprisingly, they do not explicitly justify a reunification referendum on a detailed model, but presumably it would address “the most maximal reading” of those legal requirements. The authors are wrong on both counts. A vote on the principle of unification is not just a minimal reading but a faithful rendition of the GFA’s provisions on constitutional change; a vote on a detailed model is not a maximal interpretation but an egregious violation of the Agreement. Similarly, the Working Group authors rely on semantic sophistry in defending a unification referendum on detailed arrangements. They say that a simple vote on the principle of unification “clearly falls within the terms of the 1998 Agreement” (2021, para. 9.17). No one would disagree with that statement. But they go on to assert that a vote on a detailed design is equally acceptable even though it is merely “compatible” with the GFA, in the sense that “nothing in the Agreement precludes” such a vote (2021, para. 9.31) “Compatible” and “not preclude” are much weaker statements than is “clearly falls within the terms of”, and are in fact meaningless justifications. A border poll on a detailed model giving the north a comprehensive veto over the form of a united Ireland clearly falls outside the terms of the Agreement. Word games aside, it ruptures the GFA.
My second objection is to the stealthy manner in which the authors insert such a major departure from settled constitutional meaning. They have been less than forthright in acknowledging that a border poll on a detailed design involves a sweeping northern veto. Murray and O’Donoghue give the clearest exposition in saying that the complex model approach means “that Ireland’s post-unification constitution will be constructed by the will of two peoples rather than a single body of constituent power holders” (pp. 43-44). But this statement is not really that clear. To translate: the citizens of a unified Ireland (“single body of constituent power holders”) do not determine the constitution of their own polity; rather, voters in the north and south (“the will of two peoples”) must separately consent to the structures and policies of a united Ireland. This refined statement is still not that clear. To translate further: the north (and south) has a far-reaching veto over the form of a united Ireland. The northern veto is in fact the principal, precedent-breaking implication of Murray and O’Donoghue’s scheme, but the authors never use the term “veto”. Their failure plainly to acknowledge the fact of veto is highly misleading.
The clarity of the Working Group’s proposal is equally wanting. In describing the “maximum plan” design, the Working Group says: “The choice put to voters, north and south, in concurrent referendums" would involve “the model of unification, including the form of a united Ireland” (2021, para. 9.29). In proposing the ballot-paper wording, quoted above, the Working Group does not address the political implications of using a border poll to set out the precise terms of unification. There is no reference to a broad northern veto over the model and form of unity, even though that kind of veto is an integral component of the design and even though the Working Group freely employs the word “veto” in discussing other constitutional developments. They seem reluctant explicitly to attach the descriptor “veto” to their own design. This reluctance is again highly misleading.
My third concern is that all the major advocates of Irish unity call for the detailed plan of what a united Ireland would look like to be established in advance of a border poll, but none addresses the question of a thorough-going northern veto. Sinn Féin says: “When the referendums on Irish unity are held people should have maximum information on what they are voting for”. It wants the Irish government to develop a “coherent and all-encompassing plan” to deal with major issues including public services and “future constitutional arrangements post-unity” (Sinn Féin, 2022, pp. 4 & 7, respectively). Likewise, Ireland’s Future emphasizes that the shape of a united Ireland needs to be clarified before any border poll “to enable the electorate to make a fully informed decision” on “a definitive choice” (Ireland’s Future, 2024, p. 7). It too emphasizes that “the requisite planning” for new constitutional arrangements needs to be “detailed and comprehensive” (Ireland’s Future, 2020, n.p.). The Constitutional Conversations Group, whose report Ireland’s Future appends to its 2020 document laying out a principled framework for change, also calls for Dublin to create a plan—a programme for a new and united Ireland—which specifies what will happen should the northern and southern referendums support Irish unity. It accepts the legitimacy of a detailed-design approach saying that “it should be clear in advance of the referendums what model and arrangements people are opting for if they select the change option. In the event of votes for reunification it will then be a matter of implementing the proposals that have been democratically endorsed” (Ireland’s Future, 2020, p. 9). The recent report of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement recommends that preparation for a united Ireland begin immediately. In a forward to the report, Committee Chair Fergus O’Dowd explains why advanced planning is so important: “voters in referenda will need in-depth information on what the decision would mean for their daily lives, including answers on political institutions, healthcare, taxation, education, social welfare, and pensions. Providing detailed answers to these questions will require immense preparation, which will need to begin well in advance of referenda being called” (Joint Committee, 2024, p. 6). These various proposals are at one in calling for a fully comprehensive plan to be laid before border-poll voters in the north and south. But they all fail to acknowledge explicitly that this referendum design could mean that many public provisions affecting the daily lives of citizens in a united Ireland will require northern approval before they can be put in place.
Likewise, voters in the north and south strongly endorse the detailed-design approach to unification referendums, with no apparent consideration for the implications of establishing a powerful northern veto over crucial aspects of a united Ireland. In 2022, academics Brendan O’Leary and John Garry asked survey respondents if the exact type of united Ireland should be decided before or after a border poll. Do they prefer a vote simply on the principle of unity, without any details, or a vote on the specific model of a united Ireland? The response is clear: large majorities in the north (69%) and south (59%) want the model specified beforehand. Equal numbers of Catholics (72%) and Protestants (71%) in the north choose the vote-on-detail option. Only 15 percent of respondents in the north and 31 percent in the south support a referendum on the basic principle of unification with the details to come later (O’Leary & Garry, 2022).
These survey results are deeply suspect and need to be put in context. If respondents were explicitly informed that getting all the details in the “before” option comes with a northern veto over many fundamental aspects of a united Ireland, I expect the numbers supporting such an approach would plummet in the south and among northern Catholics. Northern Protestant support for the detailed design model would probably increase. Here again is another example of a comprehensive northern veto by stealth. It’s not acceptable that the authors, who were members of the now expired Working Group, continually fail directly to address the veto attached to their detailed-design approaches.
Garry and O’Leary’s survey is indicative of a major feature inherent to the schemes of Murray and O’Donoghue and the Working Group. All the authors formulate a choice between, on the one hand, a referendum on just the principle of unification without any details of what Irish unity might look like and, on the other, a referendum with a fully-specified model of a united Ireland on the ballot paper. And all of them note that a main advantage of the model approach is that it gives voters enough details to make an informed choice in the referendum. Each advocate of unity examined above—Sinn Féin, Ireland’s Future and the Joint Committee—likewise underlines the importance of referendum voters having the opportunity to make a fully informed choice. It’s not surprising, then, that a large majority of survey respondents would prefer to make an informed decision rather than an uninformed decision, especially with the fiasco of the Brexit referendum still in mind.
The main problem is that these proposals offer people a false choice between casting an illiterate vote on the principle of unity or an educated vote on the detailed model of a united Ireland. There is another way. The 2014 Scottish referendum was a vote simply on the principle of independence—"Should Scotland be an independent country?”—but abundant details were available.[4] The Scottish government provided many of those details in its 670-page guide to an independent Scotland that was published ten months before the vote (Scottish Government, 2013). This document laid out the government’s vision and priorities for action that addressed at least as many issues as are contained in detailed-design models of Irish unity. The Scottish Electoral Commission found that voters had exceptionally high levels of knowledge of referendum issues. The vast majority felt that they had enough information to make an informed choice in the referendum (Scottish Electoral Commission, 2014).[5]
Pro-unity groups who endorse a border poll on the detailed model of a united Ireland need to think seriously about issues of process. Do they believe, like some academics, that the Agreement gives the north a comprehensive veto over the structure and form of a united Ireland? If so, how can they justify a position that it so at odds with what the Agreement actually says and the way in which it was negotiated and ratified? If not, will they consider some variant of the Scottish model that gives voters an opportunity to cast an informed vote on the principle of unification? Or will they move to some other referendum scheme that eliminates the northern veto and preserves what was agreed in 1998?
This discussion leads to my fourth and final objection to the detailed-arrangements approach to a border poll. The citizens of a unified Ireland have the right to set the constitutional terms and conditions of their own governance. The detailed-design model usurps that right and gives it separately to referendum voters in the north and south. The model also usurps the right of all Irish citizens voting as a unit to decide if there should be any vetoes over constitutional amendments in a united Ireland. The question of a northern veto is likely to be highly controversial and its advocates should expressly put that question to the citizens of a united Ireland. The veto should not be quietly slipped in by a group of academics who have designed bogus models of a border poll based on wrong-headed readings of the constitutional provisions of the GFA.
Something akin to the Scottish experience would allow the Irish people as a whole to set a new constitution after successful unification votes. The Irish government could publish a detailed guide to a united Ireland well in advance of the referendums. This guide, and any other proposals made in the lead up to the border polls, would provide voters with sufficient information to make an informed choice on the principle of unification. Voters would have had before them detailed proposals of the range of possible consequences associated with a decision to unify. These proposals would also form the basis for an all-Ireland discussion on amendments to the Irish constitution, a discussion that would occur in the immediate post-unification period. From this discussion, there could of course emerge new or revised proposals to alter the constitution. The citizens of the newly reunified state would then vote on the finalized package of constitutional amendments. In short, this admittedly skeletal design achieves two important objectives: it provides ample information to people voting in the unification referendums, and it eliminates the comprehensive northern veto by ensuring the Irish people as a whole—that “single body of constituent power holders”—has the final and definitive say on the basic governance and policy structures of a unified Ireland.
The next part of the series examines how recent calls for “constitutional change” and reforming the GFA are marginalizing conversations about a united Ireland.
Notes
[1] For the most part, I restrict my discussion to the reports of the Working Group as a whole. Individual members of the (now-defunct) Working Group have separately proposed a border poll on the detailed model of a united Ireland that gives the north a far-reaching veto, and are therefore subject to the same criticisms I make here. See, for example O’Leary (2022 & 2024) and Doyle (2022). I include a separate discussion of the survey results of former Working Group members John Garry and Brendan O’Leary to show how widely accepted the Working Group proposal has become.
[2] The Supreme Court was ruling on the Northern Ireland Act 1998 but notes the Act’s consent and border-poll provisions “arose out of the Belfast Agreement” (para. 135). Murray and O’Donoghue recognize the Supreme Court decision but go on to ignore it in their modelling of a united Ireland.
[3] The court raises but leaves open the question of whether the agreement on detailed arrangements would require the consent of a northern majority. In any case, this agreement and any vote on it are subsequent to a successful border poll on the principle of unification. In the text, I argue that it is up to the people of a united Ireland to decide if the north or any other groups gets a veto on amendments to the Irish constitution.
[4] The Working Group explicitly rejected the Scottish model, I think unfairly (Burke, 2021).
[5] As academic John Doyle told the Oireachtas Joint Committee, a major criticism of the Scottish referendum “was that not enough information was provided including on issues such as currency and pensions” (Joint Committee, 2024, p. 58). The Scottish case set an exceedingly high standard for information provision but nevertheless did not satisfy everyone. It’s difficult to imagine that any referendum design, including the detailed models the various authors propose, could be wholly exempt from the charge of providing insufficient information.
References
Burke, M. (2021). “Further Deepening the Unionist Veto: The Final Report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums.” The Pensive Quill. 24 July. Retrieved from.
Doyle, O. (2022). “Addressing the question of unity; Two new books exploring the path to Irish reunification offer valuable and complementary approaches.” Irish Times. 3 September. Retrieved from the Factiva (Dow Jones) electronic database of news articles.
Ireland’s Future. (2020). The Conversation on Ireland’s Future: A Principled Framework for Change. 3 December. Retrieved from.
Ireland’s Future. (2024). Ireland 2030: Proposals for the Period Between 2024 and 2030. 4 March. Retrieved from.
Joint Committee. (2024). Perspectives on Constitutional Change: Finance and Economics. Houses of the Oireachtas. Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. 16 July. Retrieved from.
Murray, C.R.G., and A. O’Donoghue. (2019). “Life after Brexit: Operationalising the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement’s Principle of Consent.” Dublin University Law Journal 42:1 (October): 147-189. Retrieved from.
NIQB 106. (2018). In the matter of an application by Raymond McCord for leave to apply for judicial review and in the matter of Section 1 and Schedule 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. In the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench Division (Judicial Review). Rt Hon Sir Paul Girvan. 28 June. Retrieved from.
O’Leary, B. (2022). Making Sense of a United Ireland: Should It Happen? How Might It Happen? Sandycove an imprint of Penguin Books.
O’Leary, B. (2024). “2030—The Tipping Point.” Presentation to Ireland’s Future Conference, Pathway to Change. SSE Arena. Belfast. 15 June. Podcast retrieved from.
O’Leary, B., and J. Garry. (2022). “Avoiding a rerun of Brexit by planning ahead: Voters want to know what a united Ireland means before any referendum, but unionist politicians won’t want any such discussions until after a referendum.” Irish Times. 10 December. Retrieved from.
Scottish Electoral Commission. (2014). Scottish Independence Referendum: Report on the referendum held on 18 September 2014. ELC/2014/02. December. Retrieved from.
Scottish Government. (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Edinburgh. November. Retrieved from.
Sinn Féin. (2022). Our Future: Let’s Plan for It ... Why the Irish Government Must Establish a Citizens’ Assembly on Irish Unity. Discussion Document. November. Retrieved from.
UKSC 5 (2017). Judgment. R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant). ... Before Lord Neuberger, President; Lady Hale, Deputy President; Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes, Lord Hodge. 24 January. Retrieved from.
Working Group. (2020). Interim Report. Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London. November. Retrieved from.
Working Group. (2021). Final Report. Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London. May. Retrieved from.
⏩ Mike Burke has lectured in Politics and Public Administration in Canada for over 30 years.
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