Gearóid Ó Loingsigh ☭ writing in Substack on 21-January-2025.

Photo: Soldier in Catatumbo region.
Gearóid Ó Loingsigh

On many occasions I described Petro and his government as a remould of the liberalism of the 1990s, specifically the government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998). I even said so before he took over the presidency. It was obvious even before the election campaign. Petro proved me right time and again. I never thought that he would prove me right by showing the same appetite for the declaration of a State of Internal Unrest. But he did, just like Samper and to give it a more modern touch - in Trump-like fashion - he announced it on Twitter (or X if you prefer) instead of through official channels.

The argument waved about by Petro is the increase in violence in the Catatumbo region i.e. the failure of various state policies on drugs, peace, human rights and economic development, amongst others. However, Petro presents it all as down to a lack of a desire for peace on the part of the National Liberation Army (ELN). Whether the ELN has a desire for peace or not, we don’t know. The ELN knows. It is best that we look at the facts rather than subjective factors such as their willingness.

What is at stake in his announcement is his entire policy of Total Peace, a policy that was poorly thought through, designed and executed. Petro’s arrogance and megalomania, alongside that of the sycophants he is surrounded by, who fear to criticise him lest they supposedly play into the hand of the right-wing or simply lose their jobs do not make for fertile ground in which to design coherent national and international policies. Not even on an issue such as drugs. Those on the left supposedly understand something about the issue as they have campaigned against state policy on fumigations and analysed crop substitution programmes for three decades, at least since Samper’s government, if not before. But it would seem all the militants in the Historic Pact woke up with a profound amnesia on August 7th 2022 and remembered nothing. 

I have already dealt with the shortcomings of Petro’s drug policies in other articles,[1] and do not intend to go into detail here. However, Petro has not straightened himself out on the issue and continues to be erratic, incoherent and more. He does not listen, he does not learn, he surrounds himself with friends and sycophants guaranteeing a disproportionate number of inept fools, who drown out those who do know how to do their job. He recently came out with another piece of foolishness on drugs when he proposed buying the coca leaf from the producers in El Plateado, without taking into account national and international legal aspects, the real market for the coca leaf and what he is going to do in the area.[2] State policy can’t be the result of his love affair with Twitter. It is best to leave that to Donald Trump and not imitate him.

Drugs are a factor in the instability and violence in the whole country, particularly in the Catatumbo region. In 2018, the ELN and the EPL found themselves in a war without quarter precisely due to the attempt by the EPL (in reality a narco organisation) to expand the coca crops in the zone, which the ELN opposed. But Petro doesn’t have any serious proposals on the matter or any issue. In 2005, the Governorship of Norte de Santander spoke of an open cast mine of 71,000 hectares for the region.[3] This project was renewed under Duque and is still in force at the moment with some progress made. Petro did not stop it. The region is at the centre of various damaging policies for the population, monocultures, coal mines, and the Ruta de Sol road network to extract resources. However, the situation of the people is only of note when there is fighting, not when the multinationals and palm companies take real power in the area, left, right and centre.

If Petro is not capable of learning on drugs, neither is he when it comes to peace. Even before he took over the presidency he had said that he would demobilise the ELN in three months. The first of many mistakes. He thought they were a walk over. It seems incredible that there was no one in the government who could try to understand the dynamics of that guerrilla group.

Another mistake was to place the ELN on the same plane as narcos and paramilitaries such as the Clan del Golfo. That was never going to go down well. But he did it, nonetheless. In his megalomania Petro thought that he, and only he, could sort out all the problems of the country in less than four years. He had the option of looking at whether he could convince a political group to renounce violence and then later deal with the criminals or to throw them all into the same bag. He learnt nothing.

But perhaps his greatest mistake was that Petro thought that neither the ELN nor the political juncture would ever catch up with him for his breaking of what he agreed to with the ELN. He agreed to remove them from the list of organised armed groupings. Of course, acknowledging the ELN as insurgents i.e. an armed political force has consequences for society and also for his policy of Total Peace. However, it is what was agreed to. Otty Patiño, in a letter to the ELN stated that:

At the same time, the Central Command of the National Liberation Army asks to be designated as a political armed rebel organisation i.e. that there be a clear distinction drawn between them and the other groups which the government is currently talking to as part of the Total Peace policy.

The Central Command thus ignores that its recognition as a rebel organisation comes from society and not the law.[4]

If he is talking in terms of the opinion of wider society, it would have to be said that when he and his comrades in M-19 demobilised, many considered them to be war criminals, particular for the holocaust of the Palace of Justice. But this is not what it is about. It is the government that decides if its interlocutor is a criminal or a rebel and it has to do so, as this determines the type of agreement that can be reached.

The FARC accepted that they were not rebels but criminals. The irrefutable proof is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). There are those who have sharply criticised the JEP and others who make positive assessments of it due to the various issues it has investigated, but no matter what they say, the JEP is a court of law and as such finds guerrillas guilty and sentences them. Only criminals voluntarily appear before a court. Petro thought that the ELN would do the same. Maybe they will later on, but for the moment their position is clear and a sensible coherent president who was not so arrogant, would have taken note. It is worth pointing out that neither Otty Patiño nor Petro went before a court for their actions in the M-19 insurgency. The treatment given to Patiño and Petro, if it is was valid for them, it will be so for everyone else. There are other breaches such as the regional dialogues, amongst others, but the point is that the handling by Petro brought us to a situation in which the cease fire was not renewed and here we are in the midst of the war, again.

Photo: Catatumbo. Gearóid Ó Loingsigh

The specific actions in the Catatumbo region

What is happening in Catatumbo is part of the legacy of other peace processes with the FARC and the paramilitaries. The Clan del Golfo are the paramilitaries that Uribe did not demobilise and the dissidents are what is left of the FARC and the process with Santos. What happened in Catatumbo and gave rise to this wave of violence is disputed. The government exclusively blames the ELN. This organisation for its part blames the dissidents. According to the ELN the ex-FARC (as they like to call them) front No. 33 murdered Miguel Ángel López, alongside his wife, Zulay Durán Pacheco and their small child Miguel Herney. As they rightly point out there is a long history of ex-FARC attacks against the civilian population. It couldn’t be otherwise. The FARC prior to their demobilization had committed numerous massacres against civilians the length and breadth of the country, such as the nine hikers murdered in the national park of Puracé in 2001 in the midst of the peace process.[5] It is worth pointing out that Petro did not call for the talks to be suspended back then. Or there is the massacre of nine town councillors in Rivera, Huila. It took the FARC 17 years to admit they were behind the massacre,[6] so you have to take with a pinch of salt what the dissidents say. They broke with the FARC politically, but not with their methods. The press speak of how the ELN entered into houses to murder peace signatories, i.e. FARC members who had signed up to the peace accord. The ELN responded to this with something that does not sound off the wall. In fact, the rearming of the FARC and paramilitaries is notable, public and criticised by human rights groups and functionaries of the government itself. To give just one example, in 2024, the signatory to the peace accord, Arlez Porras Gómez who enjoyed the benefits of a truck provided to him by the National Protection Unit, as a security measure was arrested transporting 74 kilos of cocaine in the same truck. He was a peace signatory, dissident guerrilla and drug trafficker at the same time.[7]

It is no secret in the country that the failure of these accords led to hundreds of former combatants rearming and joining different groups that operate in various regions of the country in the service of drug traffickers, gangs and state security forces etc.

The 33rd front of the ex-FARC is a product of that failed peace process and proof of that is that part of its leadership and combatants are demobilised former members of the FARC-EP that act as “peace signatories” at the same time they operate as combatants or militiamen of the 33rd.

Whilst the ELN has been very critical of what was agreed to with the FARC by the Santos government it has respected the implementation and development of those accords and the former combatants who were lawfully committed to them.

As happens in various regions of the country, and this is the case of Catatumbo, active members of the 33rd front of the ex-FARC continue to figure as “peace signatories” and receive benefits from the state as a result of the Havana Accord.

They played both sides, on the one hand they went before the JEP to receive benefits and on the other they were members of the 33rd, proof of this being the weapons, logistics and cocaine captured in operations against them. The people of the region know well the actions of these militiamen, but this is not the case with the functionaries and governors who opine from offices in Bogotá and ignore the reality of the regions.[8]

Petro and the media ignore this reality of Catatumbo whilst they do talk about the problems of rearming in other parts of the country. Although the social organisations in the zone have asked for a cessation of hostilities by all groups, Petro only talks about the ELN. It would seem to be the case, that given the failure of his policies he would like to fish in troubled waters to see what advantage he can gain from the violence and how of all the organisations involved, only the ELN represents an obstacle to his flagship policies at the moment. With the declaration of a state of internal unrest, he can blame the ELN for the failure of his Total Peace project. The former president Santos amongst others has stated that there is no justification for the state of internal unrest. It seems to be a manoeuvre by Petro, whilst he ignores the reality of the region and does little to resolve it.

The poor management of his economic, social and peace policies, the constant change in functionaries, whimsically naming friends, friends of friends, the lovers of friends, the children of friends and their lovers, everyone except qualified people, makes Petro entirely responsible for the failure of his government and the current situation in Catatumbo.

References

[1] Amongst my articles on the issue you can consult some of these:

[2] El Espectador (24/10/2024) Los cabos sueltos en propuesta de Petro para que el Estado pueda comprar coca 

[3] Ó Loingsigh, G. (2007) El Catatumbo: Un reto por la verdad. Bogotá. CISCA. pp.247 y 248. 

[4] Letter from Otty Patiño to the Central Command of the ELN, 2025, no precise date.

[5] Verdad Abierta (18/02/2016) 15 años de la muerte de los caminantes de Puracé. 

[6] El Espectador (27/02/2023) El tardío reconocimiento de las extintas Farc por la masacre de Rivera Huila.

[7] Infobae (24/02/2024) Quién es el firmante de la paz capturado tras transportar cocaína en una camionet de la UNP: esto es lo que se sabe. Mariana Mejía Marulanda. 

[8] ELN (20/01/2025) Reporte sobre el Catatumbo.

⏩ Gearóid Ó Loingsigh is a political and human rights activist with extensive experience in Latin America.

Colombia 🪶 Total Failure Of Total Peace

Gearóid Ó Loingsigh ☭ writing in Substack on 21-January-2025.

Photo: Soldier in Catatumbo region.
Gearóid Ó Loingsigh

On many occasions I described Petro and his government as a remould of the liberalism of the 1990s, specifically the government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998). I even said so before he took over the presidency. It was obvious even before the election campaign. Petro proved me right time and again. I never thought that he would prove me right by showing the same appetite for the declaration of a State of Internal Unrest. But he did, just like Samper and to give it a more modern touch - in Trump-like fashion - he announced it on Twitter (or X if you prefer) instead of through official channels.

The argument waved about by Petro is the increase in violence in the Catatumbo region i.e. the failure of various state policies on drugs, peace, human rights and economic development, amongst others. However, Petro presents it all as down to a lack of a desire for peace on the part of the National Liberation Army (ELN). Whether the ELN has a desire for peace or not, we don’t know. The ELN knows. It is best that we look at the facts rather than subjective factors such as their willingness.

What is at stake in his announcement is his entire policy of Total Peace, a policy that was poorly thought through, designed and executed. Petro’s arrogance and megalomania, alongside that of the sycophants he is surrounded by, who fear to criticise him lest they supposedly play into the hand of the right-wing or simply lose their jobs do not make for fertile ground in which to design coherent national and international policies. Not even on an issue such as drugs. Those on the left supposedly understand something about the issue as they have campaigned against state policy on fumigations and analysed crop substitution programmes for three decades, at least since Samper’s government, if not before. But it would seem all the militants in the Historic Pact woke up with a profound amnesia on August 7th 2022 and remembered nothing. 

I have already dealt with the shortcomings of Petro’s drug policies in other articles,[1] and do not intend to go into detail here. However, Petro has not straightened himself out on the issue and continues to be erratic, incoherent and more. He does not listen, he does not learn, he surrounds himself with friends and sycophants guaranteeing a disproportionate number of inept fools, who drown out those who do know how to do their job. He recently came out with another piece of foolishness on drugs when he proposed buying the coca leaf from the producers in El Plateado, without taking into account national and international legal aspects, the real market for the coca leaf and what he is going to do in the area.[2] State policy can’t be the result of his love affair with Twitter. It is best to leave that to Donald Trump and not imitate him.

Drugs are a factor in the instability and violence in the whole country, particularly in the Catatumbo region. In 2018, the ELN and the EPL found themselves in a war without quarter precisely due to the attempt by the EPL (in reality a narco organisation) to expand the coca crops in the zone, which the ELN opposed. But Petro doesn’t have any serious proposals on the matter or any issue. In 2005, the Governorship of Norte de Santander spoke of an open cast mine of 71,000 hectares for the region.[3] This project was renewed under Duque and is still in force at the moment with some progress made. Petro did not stop it. The region is at the centre of various damaging policies for the population, monocultures, coal mines, and the Ruta de Sol road network to extract resources. However, the situation of the people is only of note when there is fighting, not when the multinationals and palm companies take real power in the area, left, right and centre.

If Petro is not capable of learning on drugs, neither is he when it comes to peace. Even before he took over the presidency he had said that he would demobilise the ELN in three months. The first of many mistakes. He thought they were a walk over. It seems incredible that there was no one in the government who could try to understand the dynamics of that guerrilla group.

Another mistake was to place the ELN on the same plane as narcos and paramilitaries such as the Clan del Golfo. That was never going to go down well. But he did it, nonetheless. In his megalomania Petro thought that he, and only he, could sort out all the problems of the country in less than four years. He had the option of looking at whether he could convince a political group to renounce violence and then later deal with the criminals or to throw them all into the same bag. He learnt nothing.

But perhaps his greatest mistake was that Petro thought that neither the ELN nor the political juncture would ever catch up with him for his breaking of what he agreed to with the ELN. He agreed to remove them from the list of organised armed groupings. Of course, acknowledging the ELN as insurgents i.e. an armed political force has consequences for society and also for his policy of Total Peace. However, it is what was agreed to. Otty Patiño, in a letter to the ELN stated that:

At the same time, the Central Command of the National Liberation Army asks to be designated as a political armed rebel organisation i.e. that there be a clear distinction drawn between them and the other groups which the government is currently talking to as part of the Total Peace policy.

The Central Command thus ignores that its recognition as a rebel organisation comes from society and not the law.[4]

If he is talking in terms of the opinion of wider society, it would have to be said that when he and his comrades in M-19 demobilised, many considered them to be war criminals, particular for the holocaust of the Palace of Justice. But this is not what it is about. It is the government that decides if its interlocutor is a criminal or a rebel and it has to do so, as this determines the type of agreement that can be reached.

The FARC accepted that they were not rebels but criminals. The irrefutable proof is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). There are those who have sharply criticised the JEP and others who make positive assessments of it due to the various issues it has investigated, but no matter what they say, the JEP is a court of law and as such finds guerrillas guilty and sentences them. Only criminals voluntarily appear before a court. Petro thought that the ELN would do the same. Maybe they will later on, but for the moment their position is clear and a sensible coherent president who was not so arrogant, would have taken note. It is worth pointing out that neither Otty Patiño nor Petro went before a court for their actions in the M-19 insurgency. The treatment given to Patiño and Petro, if it is was valid for them, it will be so for everyone else. There are other breaches such as the regional dialogues, amongst others, but the point is that the handling by Petro brought us to a situation in which the cease fire was not renewed and here we are in the midst of the war, again.

Photo: Catatumbo. Gearóid Ó Loingsigh

The specific actions in the Catatumbo region

What is happening in Catatumbo is part of the legacy of other peace processes with the FARC and the paramilitaries. The Clan del Golfo are the paramilitaries that Uribe did not demobilise and the dissidents are what is left of the FARC and the process with Santos. What happened in Catatumbo and gave rise to this wave of violence is disputed. The government exclusively blames the ELN. This organisation for its part blames the dissidents. According to the ELN the ex-FARC (as they like to call them) front No. 33 murdered Miguel Ángel López, alongside his wife, Zulay Durán Pacheco and their small child Miguel Herney. As they rightly point out there is a long history of ex-FARC attacks against the civilian population. It couldn’t be otherwise. The FARC prior to their demobilization had committed numerous massacres against civilians the length and breadth of the country, such as the nine hikers murdered in the national park of Puracé in 2001 in the midst of the peace process.[5] It is worth pointing out that Petro did not call for the talks to be suspended back then. Or there is the massacre of nine town councillors in Rivera, Huila. It took the FARC 17 years to admit they were behind the massacre,[6] so you have to take with a pinch of salt what the dissidents say. They broke with the FARC politically, but not with their methods. The press speak of how the ELN entered into houses to murder peace signatories, i.e. FARC members who had signed up to the peace accord. The ELN responded to this with something that does not sound off the wall. In fact, the rearming of the FARC and paramilitaries is notable, public and criticised by human rights groups and functionaries of the government itself. To give just one example, in 2024, the signatory to the peace accord, Arlez Porras Gómez who enjoyed the benefits of a truck provided to him by the National Protection Unit, as a security measure was arrested transporting 74 kilos of cocaine in the same truck. He was a peace signatory, dissident guerrilla and drug trafficker at the same time.[7]

It is no secret in the country that the failure of these accords led to hundreds of former combatants rearming and joining different groups that operate in various regions of the country in the service of drug traffickers, gangs and state security forces etc.

The 33rd front of the ex-FARC is a product of that failed peace process and proof of that is that part of its leadership and combatants are demobilised former members of the FARC-EP that act as “peace signatories” at the same time they operate as combatants or militiamen of the 33rd.

Whilst the ELN has been very critical of what was agreed to with the FARC by the Santos government it has respected the implementation and development of those accords and the former combatants who were lawfully committed to them.

As happens in various regions of the country, and this is the case of Catatumbo, active members of the 33rd front of the ex-FARC continue to figure as “peace signatories” and receive benefits from the state as a result of the Havana Accord.

They played both sides, on the one hand they went before the JEP to receive benefits and on the other they were members of the 33rd, proof of this being the weapons, logistics and cocaine captured in operations against them. The people of the region know well the actions of these militiamen, but this is not the case with the functionaries and governors who opine from offices in Bogotá and ignore the reality of the regions.[8]

Petro and the media ignore this reality of Catatumbo whilst they do talk about the problems of rearming in other parts of the country. Although the social organisations in the zone have asked for a cessation of hostilities by all groups, Petro only talks about the ELN. It would seem to be the case, that given the failure of his policies he would like to fish in troubled waters to see what advantage he can gain from the violence and how of all the organisations involved, only the ELN represents an obstacle to his flagship policies at the moment. With the declaration of a state of internal unrest, he can blame the ELN for the failure of his Total Peace project. The former president Santos amongst others has stated that there is no justification for the state of internal unrest. It seems to be a manoeuvre by Petro, whilst he ignores the reality of the region and does little to resolve it.

The poor management of his economic, social and peace policies, the constant change in functionaries, whimsically naming friends, friends of friends, the lovers of friends, the children of friends and their lovers, everyone except qualified people, makes Petro entirely responsible for the failure of his government and the current situation in Catatumbo.

References

[1] Amongst my articles on the issue you can consult some of these:

[2] El Espectador (24/10/2024) Los cabos sueltos en propuesta de Petro para que el Estado pueda comprar coca 

[3] Ó Loingsigh, G. (2007) El Catatumbo: Un reto por la verdad. Bogotá. CISCA. pp.247 y 248. 

[4] Letter from Otty Patiño to the Central Command of the ELN, 2025, no precise date.

[5] Verdad Abierta (18/02/2016) 15 años de la muerte de los caminantes de Puracé. 

[6] El Espectador (27/02/2023) El tardío reconocimiento de las extintas Farc por la masacre de Rivera Huila.

[7] Infobae (24/02/2024) Quién es el firmante de la paz capturado tras transportar cocaína en una camionet de la UNP: esto es lo que se sabe. Mariana Mejía Marulanda. 

[8] ELN (20/01/2025) Reporte sobre el Catatumbo.

⏩ Gearóid Ó Loingsigh is a political and human rights activist with extensive experience in Latin America.

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