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| 26-November-2024 |
This is the legal reasoning set out on the Memorial / Support Political Prisoners site. Read Igor Paskar’s story here.
The investigators considered Igor Paskar’s arson an act of terrorism due to the following attributes:
🟌 intimidation of the population;
🟌 causing danger to the lives of persons; and
🟌 causing danger of significant harm to property or of other serious consequences.
But the court’s decision states that “in court, the state prosecutor Khanenya … altered the prosecution case, removing from the case against the defendant, Paskar, under Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code, the allegation that he had “caused the danger of significant harm to property or of other serious consequences”.
Paskar was found guilty by the court of “committing, with the aim of influencing the organs of state power of the Russian Federation to decide to cease the Special Military Operation, arson at the Krasnodar regional offices of the [local] Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, thereby intimidating the population and causing danger to the lives of persons”.
An act of terrorism is a crime committed with its perpetrator’s premeditated intent. The objective attributes of the crime must not only have been manifested in fact, but must also have been intended by the perpetrator.
The court found Paskar guilty of an act of terrorism, no less, in part because his action caused danger to the lives of persons. This danger must both be intended by the perpetrator of the action and must result, in fact, from his action.
Igor Paskar himself categorically denies the accusation that he wished to harm anybody, pointing out that he rejected the idea of throwing a Molotov cocktail at people celebrating Russia Day on 12 June, precisely because of the danger that this could cause somebody real harm.
As for the possible danger caused by his action objectively, as it happened, the insignificance of such a possibility is proven by the fact that, as a result of the fire-setting, the only damage done was to a plastic mat in the building entrance, and [FSB] employees who came out of the building put out the fire without difficulty, and detained Paskar.
No evidence that this symbolic, demonstrative fire-setting on the porch of the building put anybody’s life in danger was heard in court.
The attribute “intimidation of the population” may be approached similarly. This intimidation must be shown to be present, or absent, in the intentions of the person who lit the fire, and in the objective consequences of their action: as a result of the action, was any member of the public, or the public as a whole, intimidated?
In court, Igor Paskar denied any such intention. As for the statements made during the initial investigation, the court was obliged to take serious note of Paskar’s declaration that these statements were taken from him with the use of torture.
In such a situation, in our opinion, the court should have considered conviction in line with the requirements of Article 14 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, according to which any doubt as to the guilt of the accused, that can not be satisfied in keeping with the provisions of the Rules, must be weighed in favour of the accused, and the conviction and sentencing can not be based on assumptions of guilt. But it appears to us that exactly such assumptions have been made in drawing conclusions about the motives of the accused.
As for establishing “intimidation” as an attribute of the crime in an objective sense, the court’s conclusion is not convincing. This conclusion was based on the evidence of an employee of the FSB Directorate, that, when the action took place, people who were walking past the building were frightened, and “changed their route to avoid the FSB Directorate”.
No manifestation of any “intimidation”, in our view, was substantiated in the text of the court’s decision. At the court hearing no video recordings were shown, and no witnesses questioned, who had allegedly experienced fright.
Moreover, we consider that even if one or two passers-by were indeed frightened, having witnessed a plastic mat burning on the FSB’s porch, and even if they had been found and had confirmed their experience to the court, that would not correspond to the letter and spirit of the Article [of the Criminal Code] on acts of terrorism.
In our view, the normative meaning of “intimidation” is such that the citizens who had been frightened would act upon the organs of state power of the Russian Federation, with the aim of influencing their decisions.
In other words, a sufficient number of people must be “intimidated” that they would discuss what had happened, form a point of view about it, and in some way or other make representation to the organs of state power, to demand, for example, a change of domestic or foreign policy.
Nothing of the kind happened as a result of Igor Paskar’s actions. We do not see any basis for the assumption that a fire on the porch of an FSB office, which typically has little connection to citizens’ daily lives, could terrify the population.
Given the absence, or at least the absence of proof of, such attributes in Igor Paskar’s actions, we allow that those actions could probably be covered by Article 167 of the Criminal Code, that refers to deliberate destruction of, or harm to, property. The maximum punishment under this Article, even in the case of a crime with serious consequences, is five years’ imprisonment.
In the case of actions that do not cause substantial loss or damage, there is also Article 7.17 of the Administrative Code, covering “deliberate destruction or damage to property, if that action did not cause substantial loss or damage”, which provides for an administrative fine of between 300 and 500 rubles.
What is more, the definition of setting fire to a banner with a “Z” symbol as vandalism, undertaken for “politically hostile” motives, is extremely questionable, given the unconvincing basis on which the court drew this conclusion. In its absence, apart from the alternatives mentioned above, the burning of the banner could have been dealt with under Article 214.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides for punishments less severe than imprisonment.
We consider that [Paskar’s] negative view of a war of aggression, which claims new victims with every passing day, and a negative view of the people and state organs that started the war, can not be defined as “political hostility”.
This negative view does not make Igor Paskar’s deeds more dangerous to society: on the contrary, it reduces danger, to the point where his motivation can be understood as useful to society, notwithstanding the methods of protest he chose.
Without accepting that those methods were correct, or legal, we note that, according to the [standard] Ozhegov dictionary, vandalism is “unthinking, truculent destruction of historic monuments and cultural values, barbarism”.
Igor Paskar’s action was driven not by truculence, but by anti-war ideals, and the “Z” symbol is neither a historic monument nor reflective of cultural values: it is an instrument of pro-war propaganda.
Given all these circumstances, we can not accept that the court’s definition of Igor Paskar’s actions is truthful or objective.
🟌 Read Igor Paskar’s story, told by Solidarity Zone
The investigators considered Igor Paskar’s arson an act of terrorism due to the following attributes:
🟌 intimidation of the population;
🟌 causing danger to the lives of persons; and
🟌 causing danger of significant harm to property or of other serious consequences.
But the court’s decision states that “in court, the state prosecutor Khanenya … altered the prosecution case, removing from the case against the defendant, Paskar, under Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code, the allegation that he had “caused the danger of significant harm to property or of other serious consequences”.
Paskar was found guilty by the court of “committing, with the aim of influencing the organs of state power of the Russian Federation to decide to cease the Special Military Operation, arson at the Krasnodar regional offices of the [local] Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, thereby intimidating the population and causing danger to the lives of persons”.
An act of terrorism is a crime committed with its perpetrator’s premeditated intent. The objective attributes of the crime must not only have been manifested in fact, but must also have been intended by the perpetrator.
The court found Paskar guilty of an act of terrorism, no less, in part because his action caused danger to the lives of persons. This danger must both be intended by the perpetrator of the action and must result, in fact, from his action.
Igor Paskar himself categorically denies the accusation that he wished to harm anybody, pointing out that he rejected the idea of throwing a Molotov cocktail at people celebrating Russia Day on 12 June, precisely because of the danger that this could cause somebody real harm.
As for the possible danger caused by his action objectively, as it happened, the insignificance of such a possibility is proven by the fact that, as a result of the fire-setting, the only damage done was to a plastic mat in the building entrance, and [FSB] employees who came out of the building put out the fire without difficulty, and detained Paskar.
No evidence that this symbolic, demonstrative fire-setting on the porch of the building put anybody’s life in danger was heard in court.
The attribute “intimidation of the population” may be approached similarly. This intimidation must be shown to be present, or absent, in the intentions of the person who lit the fire, and in the objective consequences of their action: as a result of the action, was any member of the public, or the public as a whole, intimidated?
In court, Igor Paskar denied any such intention. As for the statements made during the initial investigation, the court was obliged to take serious note of Paskar’s declaration that these statements were taken from him with the use of torture.
In such a situation, in our opinion, the court should have considered conviction in line with the requirements of Article 14 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, according to which any doubt as to the guilt of the accused, that can not be satisfied in keeping with the provisions of the Rules, must be weighed in favour of the accused, and the conviction and sentencing can not be based on assumptions of guilt. But it appears to us that exactly such assumptions have been made in drawing conclusions about the motives of the accused.
As for establishing “intimidation” as an attribute of the crime in an objective sense, the court’s conclusion is not convincing. This conclusion was based on the evidence of an employee of the FSB Directorate, that, when the action took place, people who were walking past the building were frightened, and “changed their route to avoid the FSB Directorate”.
No manifestation of any “intimidation”, in our view, was substantiated in the text of the court’s decision. At the court hearing no video recordings were shown, and no witnesses questioned, who had allegedly experienced fright.
Moreover, we consider that even if one or two passers-by were indeed frightened, having witnessed a plastic mat burning on the FSB’s porch, and even if they had been found and had confirmed their experience to the court, that would not correspond to the letter and spirit of the Article [of the Criminal Code] on acts of terrorism.
In our view, the normative meaning of “intimidation” is such that the citizens who had been frightened would act upon the organs of state power of the Russian Federation, with the aim of influencing their decisions.
In other words, a sufficient number of people must be “intimidated” that they would discuss what had happened, form a point of view about it, and in some way or other make representation to the organs of state power, to demand, for example, a change of domestic or foreign policy.
Nothing of the kind happened as a result of Igor Paskar’s actions. We do not see any basis for the assumption that a fire on the porch of an FSB office, which typically has little connection to citizens’ daily lives, could terrify the population.
Given the absence, or at least the absence of proof of, such attributes in Igor Paskar’s actions, we allow that those actions could probably be covered by Article 167 of the Criminal Code, that refers to deliberate destruction of, or harm to, property. The maximum punishment under this Article, even in the case of a crime with serious consequences, is five years’ imprisonment.
In the case of actions that do not cause substantial loss or damage, there is also Article 7.17 of the Administrative Code, covering “deliberate destruction or damage to property, if that action did not cause substantial loss or damage”, which provides for an administrative fine of between 300 and 500 rubles.
What is more, the definition of setting fire to a banner with a “Z” symbol as vandalism, undertaken for “politically hostile” motives, is extremely questionable, given the unconvincing basis on which the court drew this conclusion. In its absence, apart from the alternatives mentioned above, the burning of the banner could have been dealt with under Article 214.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides for punishments less severe than imprisonment.
We consider that [Paskar’s] negative view of a war of aggression, which claims new victims with every passing day, and a negative view of the people and state organs that started the war, can not be defined as “political hostility”.
This negative view does not make Igor Paskar’s deeds more dangerous to society: on the contrary, it reduces danger, to the point where his motivation can be understood as useful to society, notwithstanding the methods of protest he chose.
Without accepting that those methods were correct, or legal, we note that, according to the [standard] Ozhegov dictionary, vandalism is “unthinking, truculent destruction of historic monuments and cultural values, barbarism”.
Igor Paskar’s action was driven not by truculence, but by anti-war ideals, and the “Z” symbol is neither a historic monument nor reflective of cultural values: it is an instrument of pro-war propaganda.
Given all these circumstances, we can not accept that the court’s definition of Igor Paskar’s actions is truthful or objective.
🟌 Read Igor Paskar’s story, told by Solidarity Zone
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