The Shankill Butchers 📖 A Reappraisal 📖 Part Three

Brandon Sullivan & Sean Bradfield 🕮 continue with their review of Martin Dillon's The Shankill Butchers.

The Shankill Butchers – A Reappraisal – Part Two (A),

The Shankill Butchers – A Reappraisal – Part Two (B).

Intro – 16th November, 1982

Today, 42 years ago, Lenny Murphy was shot and killed by an IRA unit. He was probably the highest ranking loyalist killed at that point by the IRA, and arguably the most infamous. I have been told by a prominent journalist that his house was filled with items to be given as Christmas present, all of then stolen or extorted, and that the car he was driving was likewise obtained dishonestly.

To this day, debate continues as to how the IRA managed to kill Murphy. It is widely accepted that UDA commander Jim Craig assisted them, with some within the IRA saying that Craig was sitting in an IRA man’s house at the time of the killing. The identity of the members of the unit has been difficult to ascertain. The media popularly link the late Gerard “Hucker” Moyna as being one of the gunmen, but some republican sources have disputed this. A 48 year old Protestant man, linked to Jim Craig, named David Thompson was murdered by the UVF in August 1994. The UVF claimed he had been giving the IRA information, including about Lenny Murphy for a number of years. This was disputed by relatives, who claimed he had in fact been kneecapped by the IRA.

A 25 year old Catholic man, Michael Fay, was murdered by the UVF a few days after Murphy’s killing. Fay’s murderer, Billy Giles, took his own life on the 25th September 1998. In an interview with BBC journalist Peter Taylor, he said that he “never felt like a whole person again” after committing murder.

This is a fairly long piece, which will cover two chapters of Dillon’s book. As ever, comments and questions are welcomed.

Chapter 3 – A Killer Squad is Formed

Dillon spends considerable time once again analysing the political situation in NI and also a divergence of attitudes within paramilitary loyalism. Various strands of militant loyalist thinking are discussed, all of which are interesting. It’s also worth noting that when this book was first published in 1989, analysis of the political posturing and beliefs of loyalist paramilitaries was rare in published works. Dillon quotes from a 1975 copy of Combat magazine which articulates a strategy of violent sectarian domination:

And we further hold that the lust for Republican socialism or popish nationalism on the part of our enemies is so deeply rooted in the nature and instinct that nothing less than superior force will ever induce them to abandon their assaults upon the lives and liberties of the Ulster Protestants (p53).

The UVF’s then leader in prison, Gusty Spence, is quoted as condemning sectarian killings and, with a candour that is still striking decades later, offering this political analysis:

Insofar as people speak of fifty years of misrule, I wouldn’t disagree with that. What I would say is that we have suffered every bit as much as the people of the Falls Road, or any other underprivileged quarter and in many cases more so (p52).

Combat also carries quotes it claims come from RUC officers, saying that had the UVF focused exclusively on republican targets, then the “war would have been won in 1972.” The article did not discuss the efficacy of sectarian violence the UVF had been engaged in, which constituted the vast majority of its actions.

Murphy and his cohort didn’t have time for Spence’s developing political narrative of anti-sectarianism and class-based politics. Dillon describes Murphy as being one of the UVF members “who had joined the UVF not for a political education but to lay their hands on guns” and who had “no time for politics.” Dillon doesn’t say when Murphy got out of prison, but it was the 13th May 1975:

Lenny Murphy’s return to the Shankill Road and his traditional stomping grounds of North and West Belfast was greeted with satisfaction by many young men who needed somebody to lead them in a new campaign. Murphy decided to set up his own unit which would be solely under his control and not that of the UVF Brigade Staff in West Belfast … In the same area he found himself faced with a competing unit which operated from the Windsor Bar and was run by a man of Murphy’s generation: Anthony ‘Chuck’ Berry.

There are four elements to this paragraph that are worth discussing. First, Dillon does not refer in any part of the book to the fact that following the October 1974 Long Kesh fire Murphy and some of his supporters, as well as other anti-Spence personnel, took the opportunity to move to Magilliagan prison camp on the north coast. There he encountered a much more relaxed atmosphere where the military discipline instilled by Spence did not exist. Murphy was not an outlier in disregarding Spence's orders. At one stage the Brigade Staff, then led by a young militant from the Shankill sent a communique into Long Kesh telling Spence to “fuck off” when he asked for a television during a prison hospital stay.

Dillon’s assertion that there were loyalists “who needed somebody to lead them in a new campaign” is naive and ahistorical. Loyalists killed scores of people in 1975. Indeed, according to the imperfect CAIN website, it was the year they killed the most people (123, the same number as 1973). Everything that loyalists were doing in 1972, they were still doing in 1975, including the use of torture and knives in murders.

Secondly, Dillon’s claim that Murphy made a decision to set up a unit which was not under the control of the UVF Brigade Staff in west Belfast is questionable. A source for this information is not given. Nor is a rationale for Murphy’s alleged action. The notion that Murphy and his unit were mavericks or renegades occurs throughout the book. As previously noted, the Balaclava Street blog explained that, far from being a rogue member, Murphy held rank, occupying a powerful position at the time of his death in 1982. We do not believe that there was anything unusual about Murphy assembling his own unit – it was typical of the times and his remit - to terrorise the opposing community - would have fallen under 1st Battalion. What transpired over the following months was only differentiated from other loyalist paramilitaries by the means, not the end.

Lastly, Dillon introduces the reader to “Chuck” Berry from a “competing” UVF Unit. As we have pointed out, Chuck Berry operated with Murphy and those close to him for a time. Contemporaneous news reports exist of this, but Dillon did not reveal this in his book. There is a suggestion that it was in fact Berry that fingered Murphy for the Pavis killing and it was he whose evidence almost secured another murder charge against Murphy for a shooting carried out in Greencastle in late 1972.

The Shankill Butchers Gang is formed

We will quote Dillon’s account of how the Butchers gang came to exist. This is a collection of quotes across a number of paragraphs, but on the same theme:

Murphy knew he needed more recruits in his team if he were to have sufficient power to operate independently of the UVF leadership. He reckoned he required fifteen or twenty, of whom three or four would form an inner circle. A team of twenty would offer him protection not only from the orders of the leadership but also from ‘Chuck’ Berry’s Windsor Bar team. Murphy was fortunate in having alongside him two personal friends who were able to give him a picture of the structure of the UVF in the Shankill area, how it had changed while he was in prison, and who was available for recruitment. Two men were to be his constant support and his eyes and ears. They cannot be named here for legal reasons and will subsequently be referred to throughout this book as Mr A. and Mr B.

As previous stated, we are sceptical of Dillon’s claim that Murphy took a strategic decision to form a unit that would “operate independently of the UVF leadership.” Dillon’s book, and Roy Garland’s biography of Gusty Spence provide examples of when Murphy clashed with the UVF leadership in prison. However, as previously cited, Murphy’s internment was brought up by the loyalist politician Hugh Smyth, and a loyalist prisoners’ welfare magazine publicised and criticised his ongoing confinement.

Dillon’s theorising about Murphy setting up a unit independent of the UVF has thematic echoes of ascribing Murphy’s violent sectarian nature on his supposedly “Catholic” name. Would up to 20 men join an independent organisation, which could clash or be attacked by the much larger UVF, which it was supposedly independent from? Or for that matter the Red Hand Commando, or Ulster Defence Association?

Dillon continues:

Mr A. and Mr B. were several years older than Lenny and had remained closely in touch with him since his school days. Mr A. was a cold, astute and ruthless character who did not have the flamboyance of Lenny, but one thing they did have in common was a deep hatred of Catholics and a desire to carry out a war of attrition. Mr B. was two years older than Lenny and though not as prominent a figure as Mr A., he also detested the other community to the extent that he was willing to do whatever Lenny asked of him.

Mr B, as is now commonly known, was Lenny’s older brother John Murphy, who died in a car accident in republican west Belfast in 1997. The identity of Mr A is fairly well-known, but for legal reasons we won’t name him.

Dillon again:

Three others were chosen to form the inner circle of the unit. These three other ‘lieutenants’ had the distinction of also being well known to Murphy: Bates and McAllister, who regarded Lenny as a hero, and a third man, twenty-six-year-old William Moore, from 88 West Circular Road in Belfast. Moore was not well known to the authorities, like Bates and McAllister, but he did have a criminal record dating back to 1966.

An interesting, and not well known, fact about Basher Bates is that he was in the doomsday outfit Tara with Davy Payne. Both were also members of the UVF. They later, with a number of others, left for the UDA. Payne stayed and enjoyed the kudos of rank (it was easier to achieve authority in the often rudderless UDA), but Bates returned to the UVF. For his part Bates was a well-known and well-liked member of the Orange Order on the Shankill who had given evidence to the Scarman Tribunal in 1971 and was regarded as something of a character, having made newspaper articles in the mid-1960s for causing trouble at a Linfield away game. He was also part of a blended UVF/RHC squad who were charged with armed robbery in 1973 and was once acquitted of weapons charges, once being caught in possession of a humane killer.

Bates was also one of the UVF men chosen to speak to Irish journalist Michael Hand in 1972:

Hand later stated that he recognised Basher from seeing him at various ‘no-go’ barricades. He is also infamous for being captured in the photograph from Ardoyne during the post-internment disturbances of August 1971 which eventually formed the cover of a Dexys Midnight Runners album.

Basher at left, in suit. Roy Stewart in denims.

Bates' presence in Murphy’s unit makes a nonsense out of Dillon’s claim of independence from the UVF.

Dillon again:

By September 1975 Murphy had recruited types who would allow him to establish his dominance … their names are worth mentioning at this stage to illustrate the type of people with which Murphy surrounded himself. There was twenty-two-year-old Arthur Armstrong McClay who worked as a plasterer and who committed his first crime at the age of thirteen when he placed explosives in a letter box. He was not known to the police as someone involved in illegal activities until the time the butchers were caught.

Once again Dillon reveals that he hasn't done the most cursory of research into the individuals he is writing about; in fact, Arthur Armstong ‘Artie’ McClay was remanded in custody in October 1975, where he remained until being found not-guilty of possession of a loaded .45 revolver. His two co-defendants were found guilty, and named as UVF members.

Dillon again:

(David) McKittrick, a fine investigative journalist, was aware in the autumn of 1975 that, in his words, a ‘blood-thirsty’ leadership had taken control of the UVF which was planning a new terror campaign. The Brigade Staff called for a ‘Big Push’ for the beginning of October to give notice of their intentions … Lenny Murphy received orders to plan ‘something’ for 2 October.

This contradicts Dillon’s earlier theorising about the supposed independence of Murphy’s unit. If he was a renegade then why did Brigade Staff choose him for this “offensive”? The ‘something’ that Murphy planned was the robbery of the Catholic owned “Casey’s Wholesale Wine and Spirits establishment in the Millfield area.” The robbery, most likely by Murphy's design, turned into a quadruple murder of four politically uninvolved Catholics: two middle-aged women, and two men in their teens, all shot dead by men with Murphy. This was a shocking incident, even by the standards of Belfast in the mid-1970s.

Towards the end of this chapter, Dillon claims that:

Lenny Murphy by this time (October 1975) had his own unit firmly established and seemed beyond control. He operated as he wished and without fear of retribution either from the new leaders in his own organization or the authorities. He knew that within the UVF and within his own unit he was so feared that no one dared compromise him because of the terrible revenge he would exact on them or their families. He was secure, with Mr A. and Mr B. in position to guard his back, and was confident that the rest of his associates would carry out orders. Within three weeks of the killings in Millfield he was evaluating his strategy for the future. The policy outlined to his men was that, for every Protestant killed, a Catholic should be killed in revenge. He boasted of the terror he would instil in the enemy and expressed his conviction that the ultimate way to kill a man was to cut his throat. He now felt so secure that he could revert to type, to the days of 1972. He believed he was invincible, to the extent that he could publicize to his unit his intentions for the campaign he planned to wage against the other community.

There are a number of challenges with these claims. Dillon does not say how he came to know that Murphy believed that “the ultimate way to kill a man was to cut his throat” – it is unreferenced. There is also no reference as to how Dillon knew that Murphy believed he was invincible, or indeed that he publicly shared his intentions to terrorise the nationalist community. The claim that Murphy “now felt so secure that he could revert to type, to the days of 1972” is also supposition, and given the context it is clear that Dillon is referring to knife murders. As we have discussed, there is no evidence linking Murphy to any knife murders in 1972.

Chapter 4 – The Butchery Begins

Like the previous chapters, Dillon begins with some context and analysis. In this case, he cites some studies about prejudice, and also the extent to which the conflict in Northern Ireland was religious in nature:

In Northern Ireland Catholics often saw the whole Protestant and Unionist community as the oppressors and, obversely, Protestants believed that all Catholics were subversives and therefore Republicans. As a result, when the IRA began to destroy the fabric of Unionism, Catholics were seen by the Loyalist paramilitaries as the root cause of the evil.

This, like preceding analysis, could arguably be described as lacking in depth. Generally, loyalists harboured grave suspicions of Westminster politicians whose actions (or lack of them) they considered part of the continuing destruction of the “fabric of Unionism.” Ironically, Dillon (or was it Lehane?) himself skilfully pointed this out in another one of this books, Political Murder in Northern Ireland, in which he published what he described as “a cogent and compelling justification of their (loyalist paramilitaries) actions.” The relevant sections read:

Traditionally the English politicians let us down - betrayal we call it … The politicians who rule our lives from England do not understand us. They stop the Army from defending us properly and stop us from defending ourselves. We do not like these flabby-faced men with popeyes and fancy accents. We do not like Heath and we do not like his 'side-kicks'. We had to stomach Reggie (Maudling) until (John) Poulson saw him off, and Lambton and Jellicoe went in a more interesting way. We should really like to see wee Willie (Whitelaw) waddle off to cut the throats of his colleagues in Westminster and leave us to sensible ideas and policies which will work. (p280 – 283)

In "The Butchery Begins" chapter Dillon continues with his claim that Murphy had established a unit “independent” of the UVF, but this thesis loses even more credibility in the context he offers to support it:

It was against this background (loyalist fears of Catholics ‘taking over’ Protestant areas) in late 1975 that Lenny Murphy began a new campaign of terror. In spite of the fact that a new Brigade Staff of the UVF had taken over, Murphy was determined to go it alone and to vent his hatred as he thought best. It is an indication of his single-mindedness, his sense of omnipotence and invincibility, that he ignored a plea from within Long Kesh to accept the orders of the new Brigade and not to wage war on any group except armed Republicans. Murphy had only one formula in his mind, which was that all Catholics were potential targets.

The “plea” to which Dillon is referring is a communiqué issued from Long Kesh which concluded:

These men (the new leadership) have our trust and our blessing to restructure the UVF. The sole aim of our organisation is to defend the Loyalist people against their enemies, at the same time stating that it is not our wish to wage war on anyone except armed Republicans determined to overthrow Ulster in order to force us into an Irish Republic. (p67).

The victims of UVF terrorism in the last quarter of 1975 did not differ in any meaningful way to the first three quarters. The UVF killed UDA men, Protestants mistaken for Catholics, Catholics from Northern Ireland as well as Eire, a number of UVF members in different circumstances, and an English civilian. They also killed a 17 year old IRA member, Francis Rice (who was stabbed to death), and a member of the SDLP (Denis Mullen). If Murphy didn’t follow the orders from Long Kesh, then neither did all of the UVF personnel involved in the vast majority of UVF killings. When one analyses the UVF communiqué against the details and status of victims of UVF violence, it is difficult to dismiss the idea that it was a public relations exercise of some description.

Dillon again:

On 23 and 24 November four young soldiers were murdered in South Armagh. The Newsletter, a Belfast-based daily paper, on 24 November dealt graphically with the killing of the soldiers and reported the tough talk of politicians on the need for increased security and stricter measures to deal with the IRA. (p67)

The Belfast Newsletter led on the story of the IRA killings of British soldiers in South Armagh with a headline “Wave of Fury” on 24/11/75. Two days later, also on the front page, though not the leading article, the Belfast Newsletter published an article titled “Blood Flows in Shankill Gutter.” The article noted that 34 year old Francis Joseph Crossan “died of vicious knife wounds” and that his head was “almost hacked from his body.” The article also said that Mr Crossan was a married man, with two children, a teenager aged 14, and an eight year old.

The Scotsman reported that Francis Crossan’s brother had also been murdered by loyalists. Patrick Crossan was a 34 year old married man with two daughters. He was working, driving a bus, when two UVF men opened fire on the driver’s cabin, killing Patrick and wounding a colleague, in full view of a busy bus full of passengers. It was reported that he was “well known” for voluntary work and that, in the moments after his murder, his killers were chased by a woman passenger who was “screaming her head off.” Bus drivers staged a strike in protest against the murder. The next day, republican gunmen shot two men outside Ligoneil Orange Lodge. 52 year old George Walmsley, the secretary of the Lodge was killed instantly and a friend seriously injured. Some reports said that this was a reprisal for attacks on Catholics, including Patrick Crossan’s murder.

Towards the end of the chapter, about Murphy’s actions after cutting Francis Crossan’s throat, Dillon wrote this: “(f)inally, and triumphantly, he held the knife aloft. It was a demonstration by Murphy of the ‘ultimate way to kill a man’”. Murphy’s claim that using a knife was the “ultimate way to kill a man” is unreferenced, as is the claim that he held the knife aloft “triumphantly.” It is more than possible that both things are true, but reappraising the Shankill Butchers has uncovered what appears to be a reliance on unreferenced or cited incidents or details that confirm Dillon’s overall narrative.

Basher Bates articles:

1973

1970

Feb 1966

‎Martin Dillon, 2009, The Shankill Butchers: A Case Study of Mass Murder. Cornerstone Digital. ASIN: ‎B003RRY608

⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.

⏩Sean Bradfield is a Former researcher who shouldn't care about this stuff so much but can't help himself.