This encompassed the qualifying electorate of all 32 counties. Britain’s Representation of the People Act had recently extended the franchise to all men over 21 and all servicemen over 19 without property qualifications. It also granted the vote to women over 30. The Irish electorate was increased from 700,000 to about 2 million voters.
Sinn Féin contested the election on a manifesto endorsing the 1916 Rising and the Proclamation of the Irish Republic. The manifesto declared that Sinn Féin aimed at securing the establishment of that Republic. It would do this:
The result was an overwhelming endorsement for the Republic proclaimed in 1916. Within the context of the time, it was the most democratic election ever held in Ireland.
Britain responded with the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which partitioned Ireland and formally legislated for the fact that the British government rejected the concept of majority all Ireland opinion. Britain made it clear that the principle of consent did not exist for the Irish nation as a whole, and the only principle they would recognise was the Unionist veto in the Six Counties. The 1918 General Election was the last time the British government would permit the national will to be tested in an Ireland comprising one political unit.
On the same day that the Dáil met, Sean Treacy and Dan Breen were among a group of dynamic and heroic young men who fired the first shots of the Tan War at Soloheadbeg in County Tipperary.
There was no formal oath taken at the establishment of Dáil Eireann, but a republican pledge had been signed at a meeting on 7 January by the elected deputies present. It read:
On the 20th of August 1919, a formal oath was proposed by Cathal Brugha and seconded by Terence MacSwiney containing the words:
Contrary to what partitionist propagandists would have us believe, the Treaty was not the result of a decision that had to be taken for pragmatic reasons in the face of overwhelming odds that everyone in Ireland could recognise and understand. The Treaty passed by only seven votes in January 1922. Had the vote been taken before the Christmas recess, as many had expected, the Treaty would almost certainly have been rejected. Unfortunately, the Christmas break allowed powerful pro-Treaty interests like the Catholic Church, big farmers, big business, the establishment newspapers, and an assortment of gombeen men to wear down the resolve of a number of wavering TDs.
It is interesting to note that although the British government had declared Dáil Eireann an illegal assembly, it made no attempt to disrupt its proceedings while it was debating the possibility of rescinding its allegiance to the Republic and setting up a subordinate parliament in the name of the King.
Padraig Pearse’s literary executor, Desmond Ryan, wrote:
During the Dáil debates on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, a persistent theme was that a pro-Treaty vote was a vote for peace, with the resulting implication that those who stood firmly for the Republic were out for war. Liam Mellows, later executed by the Free State government, replied:
Liam Lynch had been elected Chief of Staff at the IRA Convention in the Mansion House in Dublin in March 1922. A convention the Provisional Government banned because they knew the vast majority of IRA volunteers opposed the Treaty. Lynch was a highly respected IRA leader. He had acquired an excellent reputation as commandant of the Cork No.2 Brigade during the Tan War. He was later made the Officer Commanding of the 1st Southern Division.
Despite the ban defiant IRA delegates from fifty-two of seventy-three IRA brigades, including the majority of the IRA’s most battle-hardened and effective units, voted overwhelmingly against the Treaty. They passed a resolution declaring, ‘That the Army reaffirms its allegiance to the Irish Republic…’ Most active IRA units in the field also rejected it, as did Cumann na mBan.
Michael Collins was still alive and speaking from both sides of his mouth. One side telling the Brits he’d honour the Treaty, and the other side telling his men he’d break it and pursue the Republic the first chance he got. Unfortunately, Collins was killed before we could learn which side of his mouth was telling the truth.
Liam Lynch was on the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood along with Michael Collins. He initially welcomed the Truce as providing an opportunity for IRA volunteers to rearm and regroup. He opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty but did his best to find an accommodation with key pro-Treaty leaders. He did not want to fight a civil war and tried to find ways to unite the two sides, but the British government was having none of it and would not permit Collins to allow the pro and anti-Treaty factions to come to an agreement.
Free Staters called their armed wing the National Army, but it was no national army. Had it been a national army, the British government would never have permitted it to exist. It was an exclusively 26-county force set up under Article 8 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty to fight the only war it ever engaged in – the war to overthrow the Irish Republic. The Staters attempted to justify this by claiming they were implementing the will of the Irish people. But it was not the will of the Irish people that led to the bombardment of the Four Courts in June 1922 with artillery provided by the British army. That attack was carried out on the direct orders of British Prime Minister Lloyd George and his cabinet colleague Winston Churchill.
Bernard Law Montgomery, who became a Field Marshall during the Second World War and had commanded British forces in Cork during the Irish Civil War, wrote in 1923:
In December 1922, Liam Lynch wrote to his mother:
Sinn Féin contested the election on a manifesto endorsing the 1916 Rising and the Proclamation of the Irish Republic. The manifesto declared that Sinn Féin aimed at securing the establishment of that Republic. It would do this:
- By withdrawing the Irish Representation from the British Parliament and by denying the right and opposing the will of the British Government or any other foreign Government to legislate for Ireland.
- By making use of any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise.
The result was an overwhelming endorsement for the Republic proclaimed in 1916. Within the context of the time, it was the most democratic election ever held in Ireland.
Britain responded with the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which partitioned Ireland and formally legislated for the fact that the British government rejected the concept of majority all Ireland opinion. Britain made it clear that the principle of consent did not exist for the Irish nation as a whole, and the only principle they would recognise was the Unionist veto in the Six Counties. The 1918 General Election was the last time the British government would permit the national will to be tested in an Ireland comprising one political unit.
On the same day that the Dáil met, Sean Treacy and Dan Breen were among a group of dynamic and heroic young men who fired the first shots of the Tan War at Soloheadbeg in County Tipperary.
There was no formal oath taken at the establishment of Dáil Eireann, but a republican pledge had been signed at a meeting on 7 January by the elected deputies present. It read:
I hereby pledge myself to work for the establishment of an independent Irish republic; that I will accept nothing less than complete separation from England in settlement of Ireland’s claims; and that I will abstain from attending the English Parliament.
On the 20th of August 1919, a formal oath was proposed by Cathal Brugha and seconded by Terence MacSwiney containing the words:
I will support and defend the Irish Republic and the Government of the Irish Republic, which is Dáil Eireann, against all enemies, foreign and domestic…
Contrary to what partitionist propagandists would have us believe, the Treaty was not the result of a decision that had to be taken for pragmatic reasons in the face of overwhelming odds that everyone in Ireland could recognise and understand. The Treaty passed by only seven votes in January 1922. Had the vote been taken before the Christmas recess, as many had expected, the Treaty would almost certainly have been rejected. Unfortunately, the Christmas break allowed powerful pro-Treaty interests like the Catholic Church, big farmers, big business, the establishment newspapers, and an assortment of gombeen men to wear down the resolve of a number of wavering TDs.
It is interesting to note that although the British government had declared Dáil Eireann an illegal assembly, it made no attempt to disrupt its proceedings while it was debating the possibility of rescinding its allegiance to the Republic and setting up a subordinate parliament in the name of the King.
Padraig Pearse’s literary executor, Desmond Ryan, wrote:
The spirit of the Irish revolution was buried. It was the hour of reaction, of the place-hunter, the intriguer, the hopeless, the mediocre, the superstitious . . . Never had the pride and self-respect of a nation been so deeply wounded.
During the Dáil debates on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, a persistent theme was that a pro-Treaty vote was a vote for peace, with the resulting implication that those who stood firmly for the Republic were out for war. Liam Mellows, later executed by the Free State government, replied:
If peace was the only object why, I say, was this fight ever started? Why did we ever negotiate for what we are now told is impossible? Why should men have ever been led on the road they traveled if peace was the only object? We could have had peace, and could have been peaceful in Ireland a long time ago if we were prepared to give up the ideal for which we fought...
Liam Lynch had been elected Chief of Staff at the IRA Convention in the Mansion House in Dublin in March 1922. A convention the Provisional Government banned because they knew the vast majority of IRA volunteers opposed the Treaty. Lynch was a highly respected IRA leader. He had acquired an excellent reputation as commandant of the Cork No.2 Brigade during the Tan War. He was later made the Officer Commanding of the 1st Southern Division.
Despite the ban defiant IRA delegates from fifty-two of seventy-three IRA brigades, including the majority of the IRA’s most battle-hardened and effective units, voted overwhelmingly against the Treaty. They passed a resolution declaring, ‘That the Army reaffirms its allegiance to the Irish Republic…’ Most active IRA units in the field also rejected it, as did Cumann na mBan.
Michael Collins was still alive and speaking from both sides of his mouth. One side telling the Brits he’d honour the Treaty, and the other side telling his men he’d break it and pursue the Republic the first chance he got. Unfortunately, Collins was killed before we could learn which side of his mouth was telling the truth.
Liam Lynch was on the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood along with Michael Collins. He initially welcomed the Truce as providing an opportunity for IRA volunteers to rearm and regroup. He opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty but did his best to find an accommodation with key pro-Treaty leaders. He did not want to fight a civil war and tried to find ways to unite the two sides, but the British government was having none of it and would not permit Collins to allow the pro and anti-Treaty factions to come to an agreement.
Free Staters called their armed wing the National Army, but it was no national army. Had it been a national army, the British government would never have permitted it to exist. It was an exclusively 26-county force set up under Article 8 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty to fight the only war it ever engaged in – the war to overthrow the Irish Republic. The Staters attempted to justify this by claiming they were implementing the will of the Irish people. But it was not the will of the Irish people that led to the bombardment of the Four Courts in June 1922 with artillery provided by the British army. That attack was carried out on the direct orders of British Prime Minister Lloyd George and his cabinet colleague Winston Churchill.
Bernard Law Montgomery, who became a Field Marshall during the Second World War and had commanded British forces in Cork during the Irish Civil War, wrote in 1923:
We (the British Army) could probably have squashed the (IRA 1919-21) rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops…The only way, therefore, was to give them (the Irish) some form of self-government, and let them squash the rebellion themselves; they are the only people who could really stamp it out, and they are still trying to do so and as far as one can tell they seem to be having a fair amount of success.
In December 1922, Liam Lynch wrote to his mother:
Would that England’s hounds had tracked me down rather than old comrades who had been false to their allegiance.
James Connolly wrote in 1915:
The self-interest of the Free Staters lay in an opportunity provided by the British government to achieve managerial control of a state with the pay, pensions, patronage, and prestige that went with it. A state whose parameters had been determined by a Tory-dominated cabinet committee that consulted nobody in Ireland except unionists. Achieving managerial control of a state, any state is something that has exercised the energies of ambitious opportunists throughout our history - a fact we know all too well in our own time.
There is a contextual thread running through every British attempt at an Irish settlement since at least the mid-19th century. In the summer of 1921, at the height of the Tan War, British Prime Minister Sir Lloyd George sent a telegram to the then Sinn Féin leadership seeking negotiations. This message was sent:
Reconciling Irish nationalism with British sovereignty has dominated British strategic thinking since Gladstone first jettisoned his Liberal party’s hostility toward Irish Home Rule and embraced it as a buffer between an independent national republic and British sovereignty.
That buffer in 1914 was Home Rule. In 1923, it was the Anglo-Irish Treaty. That buffer today is the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement is a snare and a delusion. It entangles us in a web of terms and conditions regarding Irish unity that only Britain can interpret and adjudicate. It invites the delusion that British legislation will pave the way to a national democracy within an All-Ireland republic. A political outcome Britain has strenuously rejected and sabotaged at every opportunity and will continue to do so.
An Irish republican is often defined as someone who wants a united Ireland. But that is not exclusively the case. England fought hard to unite Ireland as a single polity under her control and jurisdiction. England governed a united Ireland for hundreds of years. It only partitioned Ireland in 1920 to prevent the emergence of a sovereign republic immune to its influence. A republic that might conceivably place the welfare of the Irish people above the strategic interests of the United Kingdom.
London would welcome a re-united Ireland provided the 26 counties concedes its essential Britishness by re-joining the Commonwealth, harnesses itself to Britain’s war chariot by joining NATO, and discards republican rubbish such as the tricolur and Amhrán na bhFiann. In a future ‘Shared Island’ political flags, songs, and symbols must reflect the conflicting national allegiances that England imposed on Ireland. Differences that the British are determined to maintain in any future constitutional arrangements. Many nationalists, not least those in the Provisional movement, are fully up for uniting Ireland on Britain’s terms and claiming victory by maintaining that is what we were fighting for all along. Instead of breaking the connection with England, we are being conditioned into becoming more closely incorporated into a British sphere of influence on a more national level.
Ulster Unionists are against a united Ireland because they don’t want to be subject to the democratic decision making of a national electorate that contains a Catholic majority, irrespective of how infiltrated, counter-revolutionary, reactionary, and dependent upon British patronage those Catholics happen to be. The sectarian bedrock at the heart of unionist objections to even the most benign and insipid form of Irish self-government was summed up by their slogan Home Rule is Rome Rule. A key component of unionist dogma is that they inhabit a unique and entitled position in Irish politics. A national democracy rooted in non-sectarianism and civic equality holds no allure for this mindset.
Unionist fears about the potential of a united Ireland emerging from the Good Friday Agreement confirms for many nationalists that the political tide has to be moving in the right direction. Why else would unionists object? Unfortunately, the sectarian zero-sum game that passes for politics in the North ensures that for many nationalists, the alarm among unionists obscures the hidden agenda of England’s intelligence, diplomatic, and security strategists who have designed a constitutional model where the Irish republic proclaimed in 1916 is finally consigned to the dustbin of history. The Brits have rewritten and redefined the very concept of unity by guaranteeing that the political malignancy through which they historically manipulated and controlled our country will remain intact in a two-nations ‘Shared Island’ that bears little resemblance to the one-nation republic we fought for.
Britain is not in Ireland for the sake of unionists. England’s conquest of Ireland began centuries before the Ulster plantations. It does not care about unionists beyond their utility as a bulwark against the evolution of a national citizenship based on republican principles. What England does care about is maintaining a significant influence in this substantial landmass on her western flank. A land mass that permits rapid access to areas of the North Atlantic crucial to British defence interests. An island whose territorial waters contain, or are in close proximity to, underwater fibre-optic cables that carry approximately ninety-seven percent of all global communications. The Brits see in Ireland a bread basket and cattle ranch. An unsinkable aircraft carrier and potential ports for their warships and submarines. An island with approximately two million men and women of military age. An island where six of its counties are members of NATO, and the remaining twenty-six must somehow be cajoled or conned into joining. The Brits will form alliances and build the political prestige of the leadership of any community who will help them pacify, normalise and stabilise the status quo so that they can achieve their political and military strategic objectives.
An Irish republican supports the united Ireland of Wolfe Tone and of the 1916 Proclamation. An Ireland that the signatories to the Proclamation declared must be ‘oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.’
In contrast, those who support the Good Friday Agreement are willing to internalise the differences fostered by an alien government in order to shape the political architecture of Ireland to comply with Britain’s terms and conditions on Irish re-unification.
What happened to the republican project?:
Did it die here with Liam Lynch? Did it starve to death with Bobby Sands and Francis Hughes in Long Kesh, or was it killed in action with Jim Lynagh and his comrades at Loughgall?
As we gather at the spot where Liam was killed by Irishmen armed by Britain, it is easy to become disheartened by the opportunism and corruption exhibited by many of our fellow countrymen. Today, we have only to look North to see the unedifying spectacle at Stormont where nationalist politicians on Britain’s payroll eagerly perform as regional managers for the UK government. The Brits know the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.
How has the British counter-insurgency machine so thoroughly changed the narrative and co-opted so many former republicans to its policy of validating and perpetuating the civic disunion of Irishmen and women in the deferred hope of achieving territorial unity in some vague and distant future determined exclusively by Britain?
Irish republicanism is in a bad place, but we’ve been here before. Imagine how disheartened the Proclamation signatory Thomas Clarke must have felt when, after years of struggle and imprisonment in England, he and his comrades seemed little more than an insignificant group of irrelevant cranks calling from the margins for a sovereign republic against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people they fought for. An Irish electorate who wanted nothing more than a devolved Home Rule assembly within the British Empire and voting exclusively for candidates who pursued that agenda.
One of our greatest sources of inspiration is that men and women like Tom Clarke and his comrades stood their ground, kept their principles, preserved their integrity, and maintained their republican values through dark times when hope shone its farthest light. Their courage never faltered. They inspired patriots like Liam Lynch and his comrades to do likewise. We can take heart from their example.
Look at this beautiful monument to Liam Lynch. Look at the republicans gathered here to remember the man and what he stood for over a century after his death. Who honours the men who killed him? Nobody sings songs about Free Staters.
The roots of the national flower run deep. From time to time, weeds carefully cultivated by Britain attempt to choke it off. Although these weeds are plentiful and well-nourished, their roots are shallow. Easy plucked once we achieve the complete freedom of our country.
Liam Lynch famously said in 1919, ‘We have declared for an Irish Republic, and will not live under any other law’. He died here true to his oath on the 10th of April, 1923.
Up the Republic!
When a foreign invader plants himself in a country which he holds by military force his only hope of retaining his grasp is either that he wins the loyalty of the natives, or if he fails to do so that he corrupts enough of them to enable him to disorganise and dishearten the remainder…The chief method of corruption is by an appeal to self-interest.
The self-interest of the Free Staters lay in an opportunity provided by the British government to achieve managerial control of a state with the pay, pensions, patronage, and prestige that went with it. A state whose parameters had been determined by a Tory-dominated cabinet committee that consulted nobody in Ireland except unionists. Achieving managerial control of a state, any state is something that has exercised the energies of ambitious opportunists throughout our history - a fact we know all too well in our own time.
There is a contextual thread running through every British attempt at an Irish settlement since at least the mid-19th century. In the summer of 1921, at the height of the Tan War, British Prime Minister Sir Lloyd George sent a telegram to the then Sinn Féin leadership seeking negotiations. This message was sent:
With a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.
Reconciling Irish nationalism with British sovereignty has dominated British strategic thinking since Gladstone first jettisoned his Liberal party’s hostility toward Irish Home Rule and embraced it as a buffer between an independent national republic and British sovereignty.
That buffer in 1914 was Home Rule. In 1923, it was the Anglo-Irish Treaty. That buffer today is the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement is a snare and a delusion. It entangles us in a web of terms and conditions regarding Irish unity that only Britain can interpret and adjudicate. It invites the delusion that British legislation will pave the way to a national democracy within an All-Ireland republic. A political outcome Britain has strenuously rejected and sabotaged at every opportunity and will continue to do so.
An Irish republican is often defined as someone who wants a united Ireland. But that is not exclusively the case. England fought hard to unite Ireland as a single polity under her control and jurisdiction. England governed a united Ireland for hundreds of years. It only partitioned Ireland in 1920 to prevent the emergence of a sovereign republic immune to its influence. A republic that might conceivably place the welfare of the Irish people above the strategic interests of the United Kingdom.
London would welcome a re-united Ireland provided the 26 counties concedes its essential Britishness by re-joining the Commonwealth, harnesses itself to Britain’s war chariot by joining NATO, and discards republican rubbish such as the tricolur and Amhrán na bhFiann. In a future ‘Shared Island’ political flags, songs, and symbols must reflect the conflicting national allegiances that England imposed on Ireland. Differences that the British are determined to maintain in any future constitutional arrangements. Many nationalists, not least those in the Provisional movement, are fully up for uniting Ireland on Britain’s terms and claiming victory by maintaining that is what we were fighting for all along. Instead of breaking the connection with England, we are being conditioned into becoming more closely incorporated into a British sphere of influence on a more national level.
Ulster Unionists are against a united Ireland because they don’t want to be subject to the democratic decision making of a national electorate that contains a Catholic majority, irrespective of how infiltrated, counter-revolutionary, reactionary, and dependent upon British patronage those Catholics happen to be. The sectarian bedrock at the heart of unionist objections to even the most benign and insipid form of Irish self-government was summed up by their slogan Home Rule is Rome Rule. A key component of unionist dogma is that they inhabit a unique and entitled position in Irish politics. A national democracy rooted in non-sectarianism and civic equality holds no allure for this mindset.
Unionist fears about the potential of a united Ireland emerging from the Good Friday Agreement confirms for many nationalists that the political tide has to be moving in the right direction. Why else would unionists object? Unfortunately, the sectarian zero-sum game that passes for politics in the North ensures that for many nationalists, the alarm among unionists obscures the hidden agenda of England’s intelligence, diplomatic, and security strategists who have designed a constitutional model where the Irish republic proclaimed in 1916 is finally consigned to the dustbin of history. The Brits have rewritten and redefined the very concept of unity by guaranteeing that the political malignancy through which they historically manipulated and controlled our country will remain intact in a two-nations ‘Shared Island’ that bears little resemblance to the one-nation republic we fought for.
Britain is not in Ireland for the sake of unionists. England’s conquest of Ireland began centuries before the Ulster plantations. It does not care about unionists beyond their utility as a bulwark against the evolution of a national citizenship based on republican principles. What England does care about is maintaining a significant influence in this substantial landmass on her western flank. A land mass that permits rapid access to areas of the North Atlantic crucial to British defence interests. An island whose territorial waters contain, or are in close proximity to, underwater fibre-optic cables that carry approximately ninety-seven percent of all global communications. The Brits see in Ireland a bread basket and cattle ranch. An unsinkable aircraft carrier and potential ports for their warships and submarines. An island with approximately two million men and women of military age. An island where six of its counties are members of NATO, and the remaining twenty-six must somehow be cajoled or conned into joining. The Brits will form alliances and build the political prestige of the leadership of any community who will help them pacify, normalise and stabilise the status quo so that they can achieve their political and military strategic objectives.
An Irish republican supports the united Ireland of Wolfe Tone and of the 1916 Proclamation. An Ireland that the signatories to the Proclamation declared must be ‘oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.’
In contrast, those who support the Good Friday Agreement are willing to internalise the differences fostered by an alien government in order to shape the political architecture of Ireland to comply with Britain’s terms and conditions on Irish re-unification.
What happened to the republican project?:
…To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissentions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in the place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter….
Did it die here with Liam Lynch? Did it starve to death with Bobby Sands and Francis Hughes in Long Kesh, or was it killed in action with Jim Lynagh and his comrades at Loughgall?
As we gather at the spot where Liam was killed by Irishmen armed by Britain, it is easy to become disheartened by the opportunism and corruption exhibited by many of our fellow countrymen. Today, we have only to look North to see the unedifying spectacle at Stormont where nationalist politicians on Britain’s payroll eagerly perform as regional managers for the UK government. The Brits know the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.
How has the British counter-insurgency machine so thoroughly changed the narrative and co-opted so many former republicans to its policy of validating and perpetuating the civic disunion of Irishmen and women in the deferred hope of achieving territorial unity in some vague and distant future determined exclusively by Britain?
Irish republicanism is in a bad place, but we’ve been here before. Imagine how disheartened the Proclamation signatory Thomas Clarke must have felt when, after years of struggle and imprisonment in England, he and his comrades seemed little more than an insignificant group of irrelevant cranks calling from the margins for a sovereign republic against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people they fought for. An Irish electorate who wanted nothing more than a devolved Home Rule assembly within the British Empire and voting exclusively for candidates who pursued that agenda.
One of our greatest sources of inspiration is that men and women like Tom Clarke and his comrades stood their ground, kept their principles, preserved their integrity, and maintained their republican values through dark times when hope shone its farthest light. Their courage never faltered. They inspired patriots like Liam Lynch and his comrades to do likewise. We can take heart from their example.
Look at this beautiful monument to Liam Lynch. Look at the republicans gathered here to remember the man and what he stood for over a century after his death. Who honours the men who killed him? Nobody sings songs about Free Staters.
The roots of the national flower run deep. From time to time, weeds carefully cultivated by Britain attempt to choke it off. Although these weeds are plentiful and well-nourished, their roots are shallow. Easy plucked once we achieve the complete freedom of our country.
Liam Lynch famously said in 1919, ‘We have declared for an Irish Republic, and will not live under any other law’. He died here true to his oath on the 10th of April, 1923.
Up the Republic!
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John Crawley is a former IRA volunteer and author of The Yank. |
Reading a sermon from a Yank re imperialism # Vietnam # Afghanistan # Iraq # Palestine etc L O L
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