The decision to enact Rule 41 and not hold a national strike ballot was taken democratically by delegates representing the whole of Britain’s coalfields from Scotland to Kent, including those areas where the membership wanted a ballot notably Nottinghamshire and the much smaller North Derbyshire areas.
The delegates from these coalfields argued most forcefully for such a ballot but were voted down by the majority who favoured an area-by-area strategy using Rule 41. Despite this democratic vote around 80% of miners in Nottinghamshire broke the strike and worked despite their leaders asking them not to. The Nottinghamshire delegates, Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn had argued at the NEC for a ballot, as was their members wishes and lost the vote. They then got behind the strike and apart from around 3,000 miners in Nottinghamshire were ignored, these miners were out on strike for the full twelve months of the dispute.
In the early days of the strike flying ‘pickets’ had much success in closing the Nottinghamshire and North Derbyshire pits which was something Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, could not tolerate. Miner talking to miner did reap some rewards regards closing working pits. Thatcher then ordered what amounted to a ‘national police force’ as road blocks were set up and freedom of movement was curtailed to prevent ‘flying pickets’ entering Nottinghamshire. In the south the Blackwall Tunnel was closed in an attempt to stop Kent miners travelling north to Nottinghamshire. Other workers were inconvenienced by these road closures as commuters to London were often up to three hours late for work. The Government insisted the public were not inconvenienced by the strike: yet another lie - ask any employer whose staff were not clocking in on time!
The working miners in Nottinghamshire was a leading factor in the strike and it was not the first time the Nottinghamshire miners had broken a strike. They had a history of strike breaking dating back to the 19th century. The coal they dug kept the power stations running as non-union lorry drivers moved coal, they should have been ashamed of themselves. Back in 1893 the coal owners wanted to cut miners' wages because the price of coal had dropped. This resulted in a miners' lockout when the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), forerunner to the NUM, refused to accept the coal owners demands. The Nottinghamshire coal companies found they could still make a huge profit and therefore had no need to cut the miners wages in that area. This caused a split in the ranks of coal miners and half way through the dispute the Nottinghamshire men, not for the last time, returned to work. In 1926 the coal owners wanted to cut miner’s wages and lengthen their hours of work. The MFGB under the stewardship of Arthur James Cook were having none of it and once again the miners were locked out. The British Trades Union Congress called a general withdrawal of labour across Britain, the General Strike, which lasted nine days after which the TUC called the strike off leaving the miners to fight on alone. This time they were out for seven months, thanks in no small way to the cowardice of the TUC leadership.
During the General Strike of 1926 under the guise of carrying out maintenance work two pits, Clipstone and Blidworth, which had only recently started to dig coal worked throughout the strike. This was the thin end of what was to become a very ugly and thick wedge. By the end of August 1926 thousands of Nottinghamshire miners were returning to work forcing the area MFGB leadership, hitherto supportive of the strike, to do a u turn encouraging the men to return to their pits. This was then, as in 1984, because Nottinghamshire was a profitable coalfield, the ‘I’m all right Jack so fuck the rest of you’ attitude as the miners in this area once again scabbed and broke the strike. This, again as in 1984/85, caused a major split in the union as the Nottinghamshire men led by their leader, George Spencer a right-wing labour MP, formed their own union – the Nottinghamshire Miners Industrial Union (NMIU). This was also known as “Spencerism” and the scab union secured negotiating rights in the Nottinghamshire area.
The working miners in Nottinghamshire was a leading factor in the strike and it was not the first time the Nottinghamshire miners had broken a strike. They had a history of strike breaking dating back to the 19th century. The coal they dug kept the power stations running as non-union lorry drivers moved coal, they should have been ashamed of themselves. Back in 1893 the coal owners wanted to cut miners' wages because the price of coal had dropped. This resulted in a miners' lockout when the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), forerunner to the NUM, refused to accept the coal owners demands. The Nottinghamshire coal companies found they could still make a huge profit and therefore had no need to cut the miners wages in that area. This caused a split in the ranks of coal miners and half way through the dispute the Nottinghamshire men, not for the last time, returned to work. In 1926 the coal owners wanted to cut miner’s wages and lengthen their hours of work. The MFGB under the stewardship of Arthur James Cook were having none of it and once again the miners were locked out. The British Trades Union Congress called a general withdrawal of labour across Britain, the General Strike, which lasted nine days after which the TUC called the strike off leaving the miners to fight on alone. This time they were out for seven months, thanks in no small way to the cowardice of the TUC leadership.
During the General Strike of 1926 under the guise of carrying out maintenance work two pits, Clipstone and Blidworth, which had only recently started to dig coal worked throughout the strike. This was the thin end of what was to become a very ugly and thick wedge. By the end of August 1926 thousands of Nottinghamshire miners were returning to work forcing the area MFGB leadership, hitherto supportive of the strike, to do a u turn encouraging the men to return to their pits. This was then, as in 1984, because Nottinghamshire was a profitable coalfield, the ‘I’m all right Jack so fuck the rest of you’ attitude as the miners in this area once again scabbed and broke the strike. This, again as in 1984/85, caused a major split in the union as the Nottinghamshire men led by their leader, George Spencer a right-wing labour MP, formed their own union – the Nottinghamshire Miners Industrial Union (NMIU). This was also known as “Spencerism” and the scab union secured negotiating rights in the Nottinghamshire area.
In 1984/85 history was to repeat itself when the majority of Nottinghamshire miners formed their own breakaway union, the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) led by Roy Lynk and David Prendergast, two former junior NUM officials. The UDM failed to save one single pit in the area despite helping Thatcher and the NCB defeat the NUM. The UDM was aided greatly by a leading confide of Thatcher’s, David Hart who arranged meetings for the new scab union in five-star plush hotels. Hart was a billionaire playboy and any miner who attended these meetings this man had organised could no longer claim they did not know what was afoot. Miners do not hold meetings in plush hotels, normally reserved for the rich and powerful for their meetings or when on holiday, which was and is most of the time. Although the working miners in Nottinghamshire and North Derbyshire were a factor in the failure of the strike, they were not the leading factor.
The National Association of Colliery Overseers Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) was the pit Deputies union. Under the law if a Deputy was not present at a pit, then that mine could not operate. This was the case in 1984/85 when the NACODS membership voted by a huge majority to join the strike. NACODS was a small but very influential union because, scabs or no scabs in Nottinghamshire, without a Deputy not a single pit could open. If NACODS had come out, as they were mandated to do, it was a game changer and Thatcher knew it - something had to be done to solve this headache. Thatcher berated NCB Chairman, Ian MacGregor, for his instruction to NACODS ordering them to cross NUM picket lines. This aggravated the Deputies union who ignored the instruction in line with their union policy not to cross another union’s picket lines. NACODS members had kept all pits open simply because the NUM could not picket every pit in the country. Most pits kept open were not working, but this instruction from the NCB Chairman was too much, NACODS members would not cross NUM picket lines.
The National Association of Colliery Overseers Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) was the pit Deputies union. Under the law if a Deputy was not present at a pit, then that mine could not operate. This was the case in 1984/85 when the NACODS membership voted by a huge majority to join the strike. NACODS was a small but very influential union because, scabs or no scabs in Nottinghamshire, without a Deputy not a single pit could open. If NACODS had come out, as they were mandated to do, it was a game changer and Thatcher knew it - something had to be done to solve this headache. Thatcher berated NCB Chairman, Ian MacGregor, for his instruction to NACODS ordering them to cross NUM picket lines. This aggravated the Deputies union who ignored the instruction in line with their union policy not to cross another union’s picket lines. NACODS members had kept all pits open simply because the NUM could not picket every pit in the country. Most pits kept open were not working, but this instruction from the NCB Chairman was too much, NACODS members would not cross NUM picket lines.
NACODS balloted their members on joining the strike and around 83 percent voted in favour of strike action. This was a definite potential strike winner. This was a huge mandate for action and the date October 25th 1984 was pencilled in for the strike to commence” (Striking Similarities - Kevin Morley P 184).
Thatcher and the Coal Board were worried and that is an understatement, something had to be done to avert this strike. If the NACODS leadership had carried out, as expected, their mandate every pit in the country including Thatcher’s lifeline in Nottinghamshire would be forced by law to close. Through the dictatorial actions of the NCB Chairman “the future of the Government was in their hands and they had to remedy their terrible mistake” (The Enemy Within Seumas Milne P17) the Prime Minister said. Another Tory defeat at the hands of the miners was a stark possibility, and given the fact Thatcher had called the strike in the first place deliberately for a showdown with the NUM it would have served them right.
Thatcher ordered the NCB to come up with something to offer NACODS, nothing too committal which would have to be honoured in the future but something to keep the Deputies working. They offered NACODS a vague promise of a pit closure review, a very vague ambiguous offer which was enough to buy off most of the union leadership who called the strike off within 24 hours of receiving the offer. This was a very foolish decision by the leadership who did not consult their members, no outcry about ballots this time, and the deal made failed to save one Deputy's job. Obviously if a mine closes then there is no need for a Deputy, that is basic common sense. The NACODS leadership had been conned or, more to the point chose to be conned by the NCB and Government. Thatcher was bewildered as to why the NACODS leadership had been bought off so easily and saved her skin. The decision to call off the strike failed to save one single pit and all but wiped NACODS out as a union. There was much talk at the time of the more pliant union leaders being given ‘backhanders’ in financial inducement to sell their members out. Given the dirty nature of the tactics adopted by Thatcher and MacGregor this should come as no surprise.
The Prime Minister also used the spy agency MI5 to defeat the NUM. The Chief Executive Officer, Roger Windsor, was reportedly an MI5 agent placed inside the NUM higher echelons. The CEO was the only unelected position within the NUM leadership ranks and when Windsor applied, he sat a brilliant interview. He was one of MI5 Chief, Stella Rimmington’s, right hand men, something the spy agency denies but they would of course. They are not ging to admit who their agents are otherwise it defeats the object! It was Windsor who was photographed hugging Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi which he was not authorised to do. He had not been authorised by the NUM to meet Gaddafi at all let alone hug him, his role was to meet Libyan trade unions, not the country’s political leadership. This was done purposely by MI5 to put the miners in a bad light in the eyes of the public. It was only a few weeks after WPC Yvonne Fletcher had been shot dead outside the Libyan Embassy. Anti Libyan feeling was running high, something MI5 were fully aware of and utilised. They could not care a fuck about the dead policewoman but would use her tragic slaying to beat the NUM and Arthur Scargill in particular.
Despite the scabbing and betrayal of their members by NACODS leaders not one coal mine was saved. In Nottinghamshire Lynk and the UDM had been promised by Thatcher they would be rewarded for helping her. They were, every pit in Nottinghamshire closed despite this treachery by the scabs. Roy Lynk, who became Lord Lynk, was in tears as he pathetically pleaded with Thatcher not to close the pits, the same pits the closure of he had helped bring about.
In March 1985 after one year on strike the NUM called a delegates meeting where it was decided, by a small majority, to organise a return to work. Many rank and file miners were reluctant to follow this decision and many stayed out hoping to negotiate local deals at their pits to stop any victimisation of any miner who had been on strike for the year. It was noticeable to see that those crying for a strike ballot a year before were not demanding a ballot on returning to work. The miners returned to their pits behind their colliery brass bands heads held hight. It was an emotional sight to see as some men had tears in their eyes fighting hard to hold them back.
Next week a look at the vital role of women in the strike, something not seen since the 1913/14 Dublin Lockout in a trade dispute.
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| Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent Socialist Republican and Marxist. |
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