Brandon Sullivan & Bleakley ✍ In IRA terms, it can be argued that 1991 was a successful year, and forms part of an evidence base which challenges the notion that the IRA was in decline in the 1990s.

Looking at the first two months of 1991 in terms of IRA operations gives a flavour of the capabilities and capacity of the IRA. I picked January and February pretty much at random, though I was aware of the unusual nature of the Downing Street mortar attack.

Two Months in 1991

The first IRA killing of 1991 was squalid. On the 21st January, five men in combat fatigues surrounded a car containing a 63 year old creamery worker named Thomas Edward Cullen Stephenson. One of the men opened fire, and Stephenson was killed. He had left the RUC two years previously, having served for 14 years. His wife took her own life a year after being made a widow. Former DUP First Minister Arlene Foster knew Mr Stephenson and described the “shockwaves through the community” following the shooting. The IRA claimed Mr Stephenson had been seen operating an RUC checkpoint, and that both he, and another man in the car who managed to escape, had been identified as RUC members.

Shortly after Cullen Stephenson’s killing, on the 7th February, an IRA unit drove a van into central London. The rear windows had duct tape which, when lined up with landmarks, created a crude yet accurate aiming mechanism for the mortars contained within it. Senior Met Police officer Peter Gurney is quoted in Toby Harnden’s excellent book Bandit Country as saying:

that the range and angle of firing had been worked out using scale maps and photographs before a reconnaissance run had been carried out. If the van had been just five degrees out then the Prime Minister might well have been killed.

That same day there was a bomb attack on an army barracks in Belfast. A few days previous, a UDR base had been severely damaged in a bomb attack.

There were three attacks on British army aircraft in the first two months of year. The first, at the end of January, was a helicopter being struck by an IRA bullet. The most serious attack resulted in a Lynx helicopter being shot down on the 15th February, with an internal MOD report saying it was "by a stroke of luck" that there weren’t fatalities. Another attack, two days afterwards, resulted in the helicopter’s mission being aborted.

Bombing London

As well as the Downing Street mortar attack, there were at least three other IRA attacks in England, including a bomb attack on an army base. The IRA decided to attack London’s transport system for the first time since 1976. The plan seems to have been one bomb to go off several hours before rush-hour to act as a statement of intent and capability, and then with real bombs and hoaxes to paralyse the city. A bomb at Paddington station went of with no casualties around 4am. At 7am, an IRA member stated in a telephone warning that “We are the Irish Republican Army. Bombs to go off in all mainline stations in 45 minutes.” The security forces did not evacuate all stations, which was the IRA’s intention. An IRA bomb at Victoria station resulted in one man being killed, and 38 injured. This, along with hoax warnings, caused chaos and terror across London. The IRA released the following statement:

The cynical decision of senior security personnel not to evacuate railway stations named in secondary warnings, even three hours after the warning device had exploded at Paddington (Station) in the early hours of the morning was directly responsible for the casualties at Victoria. All future warnings should be acted upon.

There were at least 85 IRA operations in January and February 1991, with targets ranging from the British Prime Minister John Major to a retired judge. Commercial targets were bombed, as were law courts, and indeed train stations in the North. Interestingly, at least two businesses publicly declared that they would no longer provide goods/services to the security forces as a result of IRA threats and/or actions.

Across the Barricades: The IRA & Loyalist Paramilitaries

The IRA relentlessly attacked those they claimed were involved in loyalist paramilitary attacks against nationalist/republicans in 1991. Ten men were killed, whilst others escaped the attacks, sometimes with serious injuries. On the very day that the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a ceasefire, an IRA unit raked a garage with machine-gun fire. The garage, the IRA said, was being used by the Mid-Ulster UVF. This is possible. Two IRA targets, Leslie Dallas (shot dead in 1990) and Keith Martin (wounded in 1991) were Hot Rod racers, and frequented garages in that particular area: Dallas owned the garage where he was shot dead.

On the 9th of April, the IRA shot Derek Ferguson dead. Ferguson worked for Henry Brothers, a construction firm that specialised in renovating and repairing security force bases, but the reason that the IRA gave for his killing was his alleged membership of the UVF. The IRA said they had spotted Ferguson in a car that was used in a loyalist attack. Ferguson was a cousin of the wretched DUP MP Willie McCrea, and was an associate of Leslie Dallas. Contemporaneous media reports named Dallas as a leading UVF member.

Another attack was on former UDR member, David Jameson. Jameson’s brother Richard, a “UVF Brigadier”, would infamously be shot dead in a loyalist feud. David Jameson had convictions for arms offences, and was deeply involved in repairing and building security force bases. He survived the attack, though he lost a leg.

There were at least 20 attacks on named members of the PUL community, who the IRA said they had under surveillance and whom they planned to kill. These were not random assassinations, although that is not to say all of those targeted were responsible for what they IRA said they were.

Meanwhile, the War News section of Republican News continued to publish the details of businesses which had publicly said were now no longer supplying goods and services to the security forces.

Conclusion

None of this means that the IRA were anywhere close to victory. But neither were they in significant operational decline. Twice in 1991, the RUC police federation via their magazine Police Beat called for internment to be, at the very least, seriously considered. Others in the security establishment were even more pessimistic about the IRA’s decline. A “senior security source” had this to say about the IRA at the end of 1991 (Fortnight magazine):

The IRA terrorists are better equipped, better resourced, better led, bolder, and more secure against our penetration than ever before. They are absolutely a formidable enemy. The essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some of their operations are brilliant, in terrorist terms.

Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.

Bleakley is an IT consultant currently living in the south of Ireland. Covid-19 boredom spurred an interest in the nitty gritty of Irish history. 

Was The IRA in Decline by the 1990s? Part Two ◆ 1991 – A Case Study

Brandon Sullivan & Bleakley ✍ In IRA terms, it can be argued that 1991 was a successful year, and forms part of an evidence base which challenges the notion that the IRA was in decline in the 1990s.

Looking at the first two months of 1991 in terms of IRA operations gives a flavour of the capabilities and capacity of the IRA. I picked January and February pretty much at random, though I was aware of the unusual nature of the Downing Street mortar attack.

Two Months in 1991

The first IRA killing of 1991 was squalid. On the 21st January, five men in combat fatigues surrounded a car containing a 63 year old creamery worker named Thomas Edward Cullen Stephenson. One of the men opened fire, and Stephenson was killed. He had left the RUC two years previously, having served for 14 years. His wife took her own life a year after being made a widow. Former DUP First Minister Arlene Foster knew Mr Stephenson and described the “shockwaves through the community” following the shooting. The IRA claimed Mr Stephenson had been seen operating an RUC checkpoint, and that both he, and another man in the car who managed to escape, had been identified as RUC members.

Shortly after Cullen Stephenson’s killing, on the 7th February, an IRA unit drove a van into central London. The rear windows had duct tape which, when lined up with landmarks, created a crude yet accurate aiming mechanism for the mortars contained within it. Senior Met Police officer Peter Gurney is quoted in Toby Harnden’s excellent book Bandit Country as saying:

that the range and angle of firing had been worked out using scale maps and photographs before a reconnaissance run had been carried out. If the van had been just five degrees out then the Prime Minister might well have been killed.

That same day there was a bomb attack on an army barracks in Belfast. A few days previous, a UDR base had been severely damaged in a bomb attack.

There were three attacks on British army aircraft in the first two months of year. The first, at the end of January, was a helicopter being struck by an IRA bullet. The most serious attack resulted in a Lynx helicopter being shot down on the 15th February, with an internal MOD report saying it was "by a stroke of luck" that there weren’t fatalities. Another attack, two days afterwards, resulted in the helicopter’s mission being aborted.

Bombing London

As well as the Downing Street mortar attack, there were at least three other IRA attacks in England, including a bomb attack on an army base. The IRA decided to attack London’s transport system for the first time since 1976. The plan seems to have been one bomb to go off several hours before rush-hour to act as a statement of intent and capability, and then with real bombs and hoaxes to paralyse the city. A bomb at Paddington station went of with no casualties around 4am. At 7am, an IRA member stated in a telephone warning that “We are the Irish Republican Army. Bombs to go off in all mainline stations in 45 minutes.” The security forces did not evacuate all stations, which was the IRA’s intention. An IRA bomb at Victoria station resulted in one man being killed, and 38 injured. This, along with hoax warnings, caused chaos and terror across London. The IRA released the following statement:

The cynical decision of senior security personnel not to evacuate railway stations named in secondary warnings, even three hours after the warning device had exploded at Paddington (Station) in the early hours of the morning was directly responsible for the casualties at Victoria. All future warnings should be acted upon.

There were at least 85 IRA operations in January and February 1991, with targets ranging from the British Prime Minister John Major to a retired judge. Commercial targets were bombed, as were law courts, and indeed train stations in the North. Interestingly, at least two businesses publicly declared that they would no longer provide goods/services to the security forces as a result of IRA threats and/or actions.

Across the Barricades: The IRA & Loyalist Paramilitaries

The IRA relentlessly attacked those they claimed were involved in loyalist paramilitary attacks against nationalist/republicans in 1991. Ten men were killed, whilst others escaped the attacks, sometimes with serious injuries. On the very day that the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a ceasefire, an IRA unit raked a garage with machine-gun fire. The garage, the IRA said, was being used by the Mid-Ulster UVF. This is possible. Two IRA targets, Leslie Dallas (shot dead in 1990) and Keith Martin (wounded in 1991) were Hot Rod racers, and frequented garages in that particular area: Dallas owned the garage where he was shot dead.

On the 9th of April, the IRA shot Derek Ferguson dead. Ferguson worked for Henry Brothers, a construction firm that specialised in renovating and repairing security force bases, but the reason that the IRA gave for his killing was his alleged membership of the UVF. The IRA said they had spotted Ferguson in a car that was used in a loyalist attack. Ferguson was a cousin of the wretched DUP MP Willie McCrea, and was an associate of Leslie Dallas. Contemporaneous media reports named Dallas as a leading UVF member.

Another attack was on former UDR member, David Jameson. Jameson’s brother Richard, a “UVF Brigadier”, would infamously be shot dead in a loyalist feud. David Jameson had convictions for arms offences, and was deeply involved in repairing and building security force bases. He survived the attack, though he lost a leg.

There were at least 20 attacks on named members of the PUL community, who the IRA said they had under surveillance and whom they planned to kill. These were not random assassinations, although that is not to say all of those targeted were responsible for what they IRA said they were.

Meanwhile, the War News section of Republican News continued to publish the details of businesses which had publicly said were now no longer supplying goods and services to the security forces.

Conclusion

None of this means that the IRA were anywhere close to victory. But neither were they in significant operational decline. Twice in 1991, the RUC police federation via their magazine Police Beat called for internment to be, at the very least, seriously considered. Others in the security establishment were even more pessimistic about the IRA’s decline. A “senior security source” had this to say about the IRA at the end of 1991 (Fortnight magazine):

The IRA terrorists are better equipped, better resourced, better led, bolder, and more secure against our penetration than ever before. They are absolutely a formidable enemy. The essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some of their operations are brilliant, in terrorist terms.

Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.

Bleakley is an IT consultant currently living in the south of Ireland. Covid-19 boredom spurred an interest in the nitty gritty of Irish history. 

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