Caoimhin O’Muraile ☭ As in any War the side which controls the capital city of a country has a huge strategic and psychological advantage. 

The Irish Civil war which lasted eleven months from 28th June 1922 to 24th May 1923 would be no exception to this military rule of thumb. This applies to all wars and although control of the metropolis of a country does not guarantee victory for the successful side it goes a long way towards it. 

Nazi Germany arguably lost World War II on 5th December 1941 when it failed to take the Soviet capital, Moscow. From then on it was downhill for the Nazi armies in the east as Marshal Zhukov of the Red Army, and for the first time since the German invasion pushed, the invaders back. This was arguably and in hindsight the beginning of the end for the Nazi invaders. Modern Russia and their invading forces are struggling in the Ukraine and their failure to take the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, may yet prove vital as the Ukrainian army against all the odds are holding out. Arguably depending on whose reports are to be believed the Russians are suffering setbacks and retreats in many locations. One thing is undeniable, they have failed to take the capital.

It is the Irish Civil War and the taking of Dublin by the pro-treaty Free State Army which I shall concentrate on here. The anti-Treaty IRA were numerically stronger but also divided. After the Treaty was signed the once unified IRA which fought the War of Independence split with eleven divisions opposing the Treaty while only eight were in favour. On paper it was advantage to the republicans, but wars are not fought on paper. 

Liam Lynch was made Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty forces. There were differences of opinion as to why they were fighting, as some were fighting against the partition of Ireland contained in the Treaty signed in December 1921 while others were fighting against the Oath of allegiance to the British Crown others were fighting against both. Plus, the IRA executive refused when ordered to vacate the Four Courts, after Oscar Traynor, O/C in Dublin later in the battle, when it was obvious the Four Courts were lost, ordered such an evacuation, putting strain on the command structure. On the 28th June the pro-Treaty forces, using British artillery under the command of General Emmet Dalton opened fire ultimately destroying the building. 

Minutes after the opening shots, the eighteen pounder guns were put into action. Dalton believed the that the guns would be enough to break the Republicans who were not used to artillery fire. (The Fall of Dublin Liz Gillis P. 51). 

This assumption was to prove wrong as the battle for Dublin continued for eight days. In fact, as far as surrendering to the Free State artillery:

nothing could have been further from the truth. First, the gun crews were so inexperienced in using artillery that Dalton himself had to operate one of the guns staying in position for three hours. Second, the Republicans were not about to surrender and responded to the attack with rifle and machinegun fire. The Vickers gun on the captured armoured car, The Mutineer, was put to good use against pro-Treaty snipers in the towers of St Michan’s church and Jameson’s Distillery. The firing from Republicans was so intense that Dalton had to use Lancia cars to protect the gun crews. (Gillis P 52). 

General Dalton approached General Neville Macready, British Officer Commanding in Ireland, in theory overseeing their withdrawal, in reality something different, for more artillery shells for the eighteen pounders. Macready was, at first reluctant to supply any more as he feared a reunified IRA would use the weapons against the British. Only when Dalton explained he would be unable to dislodge the republicans from the Four Courts without more ammo did Macready agree to this request. As can be seen the Free Staters and the British were working hand in glove. Dalton knew the importance of taking the capital, as did the Republican leadership.

Oscar Traynor requested reinforcements from the country, especially anti-Treaty forces in Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare and he was to be disappointed. The republicans also had huge numbers based in Munster, Cork and Kerry in particular, in what would become known for a time as “The Munster Republic”. Geographically they were a long way off but those in Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare could have come to Traynor’s assistance until greater numbers arrived. Had these reinforcement arrived the final outcome in the battle for Dublin could well have had a different result. Why these troops were not released for battle in the capital, one of the most important venues to take remains a mystery.

With the bombardment of the Four Court using British artillery, records dating back to the twelfth century went up in smoke. The British Government were delighted hostilities had broken out between former allies, especially as the prospect of a reunified IRA was gone forever. Lord Birkenhead stated “war by the Irish on the Irish is the kind of political development which I observe with great pleasure”. Little wonder the British almost stated the “Irish must fight each other”. Lloyd George wanted rid of the Collins/de Valera political pact which lasted from May to June 1922 and was designed to avoid such a civil war. Lloyd Georges and Churchill insisted the pact was in breach of the Treaty, which it was not, and pressurised Collins and, more willingly Griffith, to repudiate it.

As daybreak came on Thursday 29th June the noise of artillery fire on the Four Courts echoed around the city. Still the republicans held out in their Dublin garrison, but for how much longer? Republican forces continued to harass Government troops around the city with sniper fire to great effect. Despite this resistance the Free State forces, though numerically weaker, began to grind down the Republican resistance in Dublin. Why did this happen, the troop numbers were greater on the anti-Treaty side and yet eventually they lost the capital. Perhaps the explanation could be:

the pro-Treaty organisation, though numerically weak, was a strong, compact, confident unit with political and military leadership in harness and with a clear, active chain of command in both spheres and they had the men at hand to carry out their orders. They had four distinct advantages: a common purpose, united leadership and action and public support. It was precisely this lack of purpose, and political (and irresolute military) leadership which then bedevilled the anti-Treatyites and did so for months to come (The Irish Civil War 1922-23 - Eoin Neeson P. 125).

The Free State forces began recruiting and they were not hampered, as it has been said were the anti-Treaty side by a refusal to recruit former British Army personnel. This is not strictly true as the republicans did accept some former British soldiers. For example, Tom Barry was a former British soldier and yet, a great IRA commander in both the war of Independence and for the anti-Treaty side in the Civil War. The Free State had the media and the church on their side to say nothing of British help with equipment. The battle for Dublin alone cost £6,000,000 and the city was in ruins. The importance of taking the capital city in any war cannot be underestimated and this the Free State side eventually, after eight days bitter fighting, succeeded in doing. After the final collapse of the Four Courts the fighting continued in the streets. O’Connell Street, not yet recovered from the damage inflicted in 1916 was once again an important theatre of war. This time it was former comrades in the IRA fighting each other in a conflict which was as bitter, if in many cases not more so, than was the War of Independence.

When the departing British forces handed over their former barracks to the Irish, not all went to the pro-Treaty side. In Limerick, for example, some were handed to the Free Staters while others were relinquished to the anti-Treaty side. This was not the case, however, in Dublin where all barracks and Police Stations and other facilities were handed over to the pro-Treaty side only. This was a clear indication the British were acutely aware of the importance the Irish capital should be in pro-Treaty (pro-British) hands, how important it was to hold the capital city. It was almost as if they, the British, anticipated what was to come. In fact they had, to a great extent engineered the Civil War. This, it could reasonably be argued, was epitomised by Lord Birkenhead’s statement to the British Government about “war by the Irish on the Irish” being the kind of politics he wanted. 

Could the result have been different? Yes, in my view with better and coherent leadership, a willingness to release troops from “The Munster Republic” at a time when in that part of Ireland such numbers were not yet required the outcome in Dublin may well have turned out differently. If the anti-Treaty side had managed to take Dublin the Free Staters would have been denied the capital and all the administration centres for the whole country held therein. This was far more important than having huge numbers of troops in Munster, or even Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare, all within easy marching distance to Dublin. This did not happen and the result was not only a Free State victory in the capital, but also in May 1923 an all-out victory in the Civil War as a whole. 

On 10th April 1923 Liam Lynch was shot by Free State soldiers in the Knockmealdown Mountains in South Tipperary. He was replaced as Chief of Staff anti-Treaty forces by Frank Aitken who on 24th May 1923 ordered all IRA units to dump arms effectively ending the Civil War with a Free State victory. The result of this Free State victory is still with us today in a very negative way.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist

The Irish Civil War ✒ The Taking of Dublin

Caoimhin O’Muraile ☭ As in any War the side which controls the capital city of a country has a huge strategic and psychological advantage. 

The Irish Civil war which lasted eleven months from 28th June 1922 to 24th May 1923 would be no exception to this military rule of thumb. This applies to all wars and although control of the metropolis of a country does not guarantee victory for the successful side it goes a long way towards it. 

Nazi Germany arguably lost World War II on 5th December 1941 when it failed to take the Soviet capital, Moscow. From then on it was downhill for the Nazi armies in the east as Marshal Zhukov of the Red Army, and for the first time since the German invasion pushed, the invaders back. This was arguably and in hindsight the beginning of the end for the Nazi invaders. Modern Russia and their invading forces are struggling in the Ukraine and their failure to take the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, may yet prove vital as the Ukrainian army against all the odds are holding out. Arguably depending on whose reports are to be believed the Russians are suffering setbacks and retreats in many locations. One thing is undeniable, they have failed to take the capital.

It is the Irish Civil War and the taking of Dublin by the pro-treaty Free State Army which I shall concentrate on here. The anti-Treaty IRA were numerically stronger but also divided. After the Treaty was signed the once unified IRA which fought the War of Independence split with eleven divisions opposing the Treaty while only eight were in favour. On paper it was advantage to the republicans, but wars are not fought on paper. 

Liam Lynch was made Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty forces. There were differences of opinion as to why they were fighting, as some were fighting against the partition of Ireland contained in the Treaty signed in December 1921 while others were fighting against the Oath of allegiance to the British Crown others were fighting against both. Plus, the IRA executive refused when ordered to vacate the Four Courts, after Oscar Traynor, O/C in Dublin later in the battle, when it was obvious the Four Courts were lost, ordered such an evacuation, putting strain on the command structure. On the 28th June the pro-Treaty forces, using British artillery under the command of General Emmet Dalton opened fire ultimately destroying the building. 

Minutes after the opening shots, the eighteen pounder guns were put into action. Dalton believed the that the guns would be enough to break the Republicans who were not used to artillery fire. (The Fall of Dublin Liz Gillis P. 51). 

This assumption was to prove wrong as the battle for Dublin continued for eight days. In fact, as far as surrendering to the Free State artillery:

nothing could have been further from the truth. First, the gun crews were so inexperienced in using artillery that Dalton himself had to operate one of the guns staying in position for three hours. Second, the Republicans were not about to surrender and responded to the attack with rifle and machinegun fire. The Vickers gun on the captured armoured car, The Mutineer, was put to good use against pro-Treaty snipers in the towers of St Michan’s church and Jameson’s Distillery. The firing from Republicans was so intense that Dalton had to use Lancia cars to protect the gun crews. (Gillis P 52). 

General Dalton approached General Neville Macready, British Officer Commanding in Ireland, in theory overseeing their withdrawal, in reality something different, for more artillery shells for the eighteen pounders. Macready was, at first reluctant to supply any more as he feared a reunified IRA would use the weapons against the British. Only when Dalton explained he would be unable to dislodge the republicans from the Four Courts without more ammo did Macready agree to this request. As can be seen the Free Staters and the British were working hand in glove. Dalton knew the importance of taking the capital, as did the Republican leadership.

Oscar Traynor requested reinforcements from the country, especially anti-Treaty forces in Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare and he was to be disappointed. The republicans also had huge numbers based in Munster, Cork and Kerry in particular, in what would become known for a time as “The Munster Republic”. Geographically they were a long way off but those in Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare could have come to Traynor’s assistance until greater numbers arrived. Had these reinforcement arrived the final outcome in the battle for Dublin could well have had a different result. Why these troops were not released for battle in the capital, one of the most important venues to take remains a mystery.

With the bombardment of the Four Court using British artillery, records dating back to the twelfth century went up in smoke. The British Government were delighted hostilities had broken out between former allies, especially as the prospect of a reunified IRA was gone forever. Lord Birkenhead stated “war by the Irish on the Irish is the kind of political development which I observe with great pleasure”. Little wonder the British almost stated the “Irish must fight each other”. Lloyd George wanted rid of the Collins/de Valera political pact which lasted from May to June 1922 and was designed to avoid such a civil war. Lloyd Georges and Churchill insisted the pact was in breach of the Treaty, which it was not, and pressurised Collins and, more willingly Griffith, to repudiate it.

As daybreak came on Thursday 29th June the noise of artillery fire on the Four Courts echoed around the city. Still the republicans held out in their Dublin garrison, but for how much longer? Republican forces continued to harass Government troops around the city with sniper fire to great effect. Despite this resistance the Free State forces, though numerically weaker, began to grind down the Republican resistance in Dublin. Why did this happen, the troop numbers were greater on the anti-Treaty side and yet eventually they lost the capital. Perhaps the explanation could be:

the pro-Treaty organisation, though numerically weak, was a strong, compact, confident unit with political and military leadership in harness and with a clear, active chain of command in both spheres and they had the men at hand to carry out their orders. They had four distinct advantages: a common purpose, united leadership and action and public support. It was precisely this lack of purpose, and political (and irresolute military) leadership which then bedevilled the anti-Treatyites and did so for months to come (The Irish Civil War 1922-23 - Eoin Neeson P. 125).

The Free State forces began recruiting and they were not hampered, as it has been said were the anti-Treaty side by a refusal to recruit former British Army personnel. This is not strictly true as the republicans did accept some former British soldiers. For example, Tom Barry was a former British soldier and yet, a great IRA commander in both the war of Independence and for the anti-Treaty side in the Civil War. The Free State had the media and the church on their side to say nothing of British help with equipment. The battle for Dublin alone cost £6,000,000 and the city was in ruins. The importance of taking the capital city in any war cannot be underestimated and this the Free State side eventually, after eight days bitter fighting, succeeded in doing. After the final collapse of the Four Courts the fighting continued in the streets. O’Connell Street, not yet recovered from the damage inflicted in 1916 was once again an important theatre of war. This time it was former comrades in the IRA fighting each other in a conflict which was as bitter, if in many cases not more so, than was the War of Independence.

When the departing British forces handed over their former barracks to the Irish, not all went to the pro-Treaty side. In Limerick, for example, some were handed to the Free Staters while others were relinquished to the anti-Treaty side. This was not the case, however, in Dublin where all barracks and Police Stations and other facilities were handed over to the pro-Treaty side only. This was a clear indication the British were acutely aware of the importance the Irish capital should be in pro-Treaty (pro-British) hands, how important it was to hold the capital city. It was almost as if they, the British, anticipated what was to come. In fact they had, to a great extent engineered the Civil War. This, it could reasonably be argued, was epitomised by Lord Birkenhead’s statement to the British Government about “war by the Irish on the Irish” being the kind of politics he wanted. 

Could the result have been different? Yes, in my view with better and coherent leadership, a willingness to release troops from “The Munster Republic” at a time when in that part of Ireland such numbers were not yet required the outcome in Dublin may well have turned out differently. If the anti-Treaty side had managed to take Dublin the Free Staters would have been denied the capital and all the administration centres for the whole country held therein. This was far more important than having huge numbers of troops in Munster, or even Wicklow, Blessington and Kildare, all within easy marching distance to Dublin. This did not happen and the result was not only a Free State victory in the capital, but also in May 1923 an all-out victory in the Civil War as a whole. 

On 10th April 1923 Liam Lynch was shot by Free State soldiers in the Knockmealdown Mountains in South Tipperary. He was replaced as Chief of Staff anti-Treaty forces by Frank Aitken who on 24th May 1923 ordered all IRA units to dump arms effectively ending the Civil War with a Free State victory. The result of this Free State victory is still with us today in a very negative way.

Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent 
Socialist Republican and Marxist

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