The purpose of these talks was to bring to an end the Irish “War of Independence.” The British side had expressed an interest in July of that year to examine the possibilities of exploratory talks which Eamon de Valera – de facto President of the Irish Republic, not recognised as such by the British – attended in person as de facto Head of State. He left empty handed except being in the full knowledge that The Republic, as far as the British were concerned, was a non-starter. However, the door was left open for future negotiations which did take place in December, resulting in a treaty being signed by both sides. The Irish team did not include de Valera, on 6th December of that year.
The Irish delegation consisted of Michael Collins (Minister for Finance) hitherto unknown to the British in appearance who had a bounty of £10,000 on his head, Arthur Griffith (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) and Chairman for the Irish side [though not the head of the delegation, de Valera chose Collins for that role], Robert Barton (Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), George Gavan Duffy TD for Dublin County and Eamon Duggan TD for Louth-Meath. Secretarial duties for the Irish side were carried out by Erskine Childers, cousin of Robert Barton, Fionan Lynch, Diarmuid O’Hegarty and John Smith Chartres.
The Irish delegation consisted of Michael Collins (Minister for Finance) hitherto unknown to the British in appearance who had a bounty of £10,000 on his head, Arthur Griffith (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) and Chairman for the Irish side [though not the head of the delegation, de Valera chose Collins for that role], Robert Barton (Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), George Gavan Duffy TD for Dublin County and Eamon Duggan TD for Louth-Meath. Secretarial duties for the Irish side were carried out by Erskine Childers, cousin of Robert Barton, Fionan Lynch, Diarmuid O’Hegarty and John Smith Chartres.
This was a strange mix to send over for such important talks - all picked by de Valera - as Griffith was not even a republican. He believed in a dual monarchy with separate parliaments similar to the Austria/Hungary arrangement prior to World War One. Both Barton and his cousin Childers, Chief Secretary to the delegation, were former unionists who had both completed a political metamorphosis via Home Rule to republicanism. Collins, de facto head of the delegation, was a republican and hated the treaty even though he eventually signed it as did Gavan Duffy, the last to sign. Griffith who was the least reluctant (which does not mean he was staunchly in favour) was the first to sign the treaty which was completed in the early hours of 6th December 1921. The delegation had full plenipotentiary powers, meaning they had the full authority to sign without reference back to de Valera and Dail Eireann in Dublin.
The alternative according to Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, was an “immediate and terrible war within three days” which would include flooding Ireland with thousands of British troops, suspension of civil liberties and civil courts which would be replaced by military courts. Did Britain have the capacity to carry out this threat? They were disarming after the 1914-18 war and troop numbers were being reduced. How then could they flood Ireland with thousands of troops? Was it an idle threat? No, I don’t think so, they could easily have recruited these demobbed soldiers into the Black and Tans (they had done that previously) which would have made matters worse. At least regular troops had an element of military discipline which the Tans did not. If Lloyd George had not stooped to this then the opposition conservative and unionists under Andrew Bonar law most certainly would. Were the IRA, who had fought so heroically, ready for such a scenario? It’s all hypothetical now anyway but worth questioning (see paragraphs below).
The British delegation was a powerful one to say the least consisting of David Lloyd George (Prime Minister), Winston Churchill (Secretary for the Colonies), Lord Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor), Austen Chamberlain (Lord Privy Seal), Sir Laming Worthington Evans (Secretary of State for War), Sir Gordon Hewart (Attorney General) and Sir Hamar Greenwood (Chief Secretary for Ireland). Their main interest was maintaining the integrity of the British Empire and the granting of a republic would compromise that integrity in the eyes of the British.
Many have questioned whether Lloyd George was serious with his threat of “immediate and terrible war within three days?” According to Thomas Jones, Deputy Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, and Chief Secretary to the British team, the Prime Minister was “deadly serious.” Even though he knew failure to bring about a treaty may cost him his premiership he was serious. Perhaps what the Irish delegation did not take into account, or maybe they did, was that the alternative to Lloyd George was the Conservative and Unionist party leader, and staunch supporter of the Orange Order and sectarian bigot, Andrew Bonar Law. It may have cost Lloyd George his premiership not because the establishment were against war - Bonar Law would have relished it - but because no agreement would have been seen as a failure by Lloyd George himself, as would the opposition – who would privately been rubbing their hands with glee – which would have forced Lloyd George to resign. However, war it would have been, and war perhaps conducted by Bonar Law, and the suspension of civil liberties, civil courts and the introduction of martial law.
These were the terms the Irish delegation were up against! Not easy, and that is an understatement. De Valera, who should have gone in person sat back in Dublin knowing that bringing back The Republic was tantamount to mission impossible. He needed scapegoats and these, particularly Collins, would fit the bill perfectly from his clandestine point of view.
The British delegation was a powerful one to say the least consisting of David Lloyd George (Prime Minister), Winston Churchill (Secretary for the Colonies), Lord Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor), Austen Chamberlain (Lord Privy Seal), Sir Laming Worthington Evans (Secretary of State for War), Sir Gordon Hewart (Attorney General) and Sir Hamar Greenwood (Chief Secretary for Ireland). Their main interest was maintaining the integrity of the British Empire and the granting of a republic would compromise that integrity in the eyes of the British.
Many have questioned whether Lloyd George was serious with his threat of “immediate and terrible war within three days?” According to Thomas Jones, Deputy Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, and Chief Secretary to the British team, the Prime Minister was “deadly serious.” Even though he knew failure to bring about a treaty may cost him his premiership he was serious. Perhaps what the Irish delegation did not take into account, or maybe they did, was that the alternative to Lloyd George was the Conservative and Unionist party leader, and staunch supporter of the Orange Order and sectarian bigot, Andrew Bonar Law. It may have cost Lloyd George his premiership not because the establishment were against war - Bonar Law would have relished it - but because no agreement would have been seen as a failure by Lloyd George himself, as would the opposition – who would privately been rubbing their hands with glee – which would have forced Lloyd George to resign. However, war it would have been, and war perhaps conducted by Bonar Law, and the suspension of civil liberties, civil courts and the introduction of martial law.
These were the terms the Irish delegation were up against! Not easy, and that is an understatement. De Valera, who should have gone in person sat back in Dublin knowing that bringing back The Republic was tantamount to mission impossible. He needed scapegoats and these, particularly Collins, would fit the bill perfectly from his clandestine point of view.
The Irish delegation negotiated well, given the cards they were dealt, and squeezed concessions out of the British but not The Republic. Nevertheless, they achieved more than any other group, anywhere in the empire it would be fair to say, from the imperial negotiators. To go into every detail would be too deep and long for this blog but defence, taxation and civil laws and liberties would be Irish, not British responsibilities. An independent Irish parliament, Dail Eireann, would be established. A major sticking point was the position of what are now known as the six counties, or “Northern Ireland” and the future of that part of the island. It was proposed that Ireland would become part of the “Community of Nations” known as the “British Empire” with dominion status similar to that enjoyed by Canada. “Northern Ireland" could pull out of this arrangement if they wished, a clause the unionists triggered two days after the treaty was enacted on 6th December 1922, one year after the signing of the agreement.
The new state would be named the “Irish Free State” with its own armed forces, and would consist of 26 of Irelands 32 counties. A border commission would be set up to look at possible boundary changes between the “Free State” and “Northern Ireland” to sit at a later date. It would be 1924/25 when this commission would sit with representatives from the “Free State” Government, the British Government and the Government of “Northern Ireland”, who refused to nominate a delegate (this is another story for another day). Ireland would be partitioned and the oath of allegiance to the British Crown would remain for the “Free State” Government. The ports of Berehaven, Cobh (then Queenstown) and Lough Swilly would be retained by the Royal Navy [these ports were retrieved in 1938 by the Irish after negotiations between ironically de Valera, by then Irish Taoiseach and British PM Neville Chamberlain younger half-brother of Austen Chamberlain].
The Irish delegation, against huge odds, had secured much more than the Home Rule Bill offered but fell short of The Republic. The alternative would have been “immediate and terrible war” within three days, probably three hours if Bonar Law had been in charge, which looked likely if the treaty talks failed. It must be noted that without the guerrilla war waged by the IRA it is highly unlikely these negotiations would have taken place at all! What the treaty did give was the potential for the twenty-six-county Free State to become a nation state, a new phenomena which came about, in its complete form, after the First World War. The Irish Free State, after the Civil War of 1922/23, set about using the few benefits the treaty provided to build that nation state, the criteria being; stable government, an independent stable monetary currency and the ability to defend its own territory. These, among many other criteria the Free State, albeit only just, qualified for.
There were great military victories secured by the IRA against the British, like the actions of the “Squad” sometimes called “The Twelve Apostles” headed by Michael Collins in Dublin who on November 21st 1920 clinically executed a number of British agents, known as the Cairo Gang, in the capital. A week later, 28th November at Kilmichael the IRA under Commandant Tom Barry ambushed a group of Auxiliaries successfully wiping them out. On 19th March 1921 at Crossbarry, again under Tom Barry, the IRA won a major military engagement against regular British troops securing yet another victory for the Irish Republican Army against a far better equipped and numerically stronger enemy. Nevertheless, and despite these victories, it would be a mistake (romantic maybe) to claim an outright military victory by the IRA over British Crown Forces. A psychological victory, certainly, a moral victory, definitely but not outright victory. Had this been the case the treaty talks would have taken place in Dublin, not London, we would have been talking of a thirty-two-county Republic, not a twenty-six-county Free State and it would have been Collins threatening Lloyd George with “immediate and terrible war within three days”, not the other way round, and the Treaty Ports would not have been retained by the British Navy. It would be fair to say the IRA won a well-deserved score draw.
Today people still talk about the rights and wrongs of signing The Treaty - was it right or wrong? This is perhaps the wrong question. Maybe what should be asked is what was the alternative? None of us know for sure what extra concessions could have been wrought out of the British side, we were not there, even though some know-nothings like to imagine they could have done a better job, which is comical really.
There were great military victories secured by the IRA against the British, like the actions of the “Squad” sometimes called “The Twelve Apostles” headed by Michael Collins in Dublin who on November 21st 1920 clinically executed a number of British agents, known as the Cairo Gang, in the capital. A week later, 28th November at Kilmichael the IRA under Commandant Tom Barry ambushed a group of Auxiliaries successfully wiping them out. On 19th March 1921 at Crossbarry, again under Tom Barry, the IRA won a major military engagement against regular British troops securing yet another victory for the Irish Republican Army against a far better equipped and numerically stronger enemy. Nevertheless, and despite these victories, it would be a mistake (romantic maybe) to claim an outright military victory by the IRA over British Crown Forces. A psychological victory, certainly, a moral victory, definitely but not outright victory. Had this been the case the treaty talks would have taken place in Dublin, not London, we would have been talking of a thirty-two-county Republic, not a twenty-six-county Free State and it would have been Collins threatening Lloyd George with “immediate and terrible war within three days”, not the other way round, and the Treaty Ports would not have been retained by the British Navy. It would be fair to say the IRA won a well-deserved score draw.
Today people still talk about the rights and wrongs of signing The Treaty - was it right or wrong? This is perhaps the wrong question. Maybe what should be asked is what was the alternative? None of us know for sure what extra concessions could have been wrought out of the British side, we were not there, even though some know-nothings like to imagine they could have done a better job, which is comical really.
No, perhaps the question was, not the right or wrongs, but what would the British response have been to a refusal to sign? According to Tom Johnson, Lloyd George was not bluffing, and I do not think he was either given the historical information available. Another war I doubt could have been won, given the strength of the IRA at the time – which perhaps only Michael Collins really knew – but no matter facing another 100,000 British regulars, or worse Black and Tans, would have been too bigger ask, no matter how brave the volunteers were. Another thing these barrack room lawyers fail to take into account - that is if they had given it a moments consideration - was the precarious position the Irish delegation and particularly Michael Collins were in. He was a wanted felon sitting face to face with his would-be jailers and he had a £10,000 bounty on his head. Would, in the event of not signing, he have been allowed back to Ireland? Or would the British side have made him stand trial? All supposition and I doubt Lloyd George would have wanted to hold him, the same cannot be said of Churchill, Birkenhead in particular and the British military establishment, and certainly not the Conservative opposition and Andrew Bonar Law.
Prior to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement Sinn Fein played republican songs including “Take it Down from The Mast” which is vehemently anti-treaty and calls the Free Staters “Traitors”. However, when the same Sinn Fein were invited to sign the GFA, which offered much less than the treaty of 1921, they could not get pen to paper quick enough!! The song Take it Down from the Mast is seldom heard these days now SF have joined the club!!!
Prior to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement Sinn Fein played republican songs including “Take it Down from The Mast” which is vehemently anti-treaty and calls the Free Staters “Traitors”. However, when the same Sinn Fein were invited to sign the GFA, which offered much less than the treaty of 1921, they could not get pen to paper quick enough!! The song Take it Down from the Mast is seldom heard these days now SF have joined the club!!!
The treaty of 21 did not ask for any form of decommissioning or surrendering of IRA arms and to be fair neither does the text of the GFA. The treaty of 1921 did not even ask for parties with influence to “use such influence they may have” to bring about decommissioning which the GFA does. Yet these same, once militant republicans in SF, pursued beyond the call of duty the cry to decommission, surely this lost them the moral right to condemn those who, very reluctantly, signed the treaty of 6th December 1921. Unlike the treaty the GFA pegs six county politics to Westminster indefinitely, the “Legislative Assembly” at Stormont is not a proper government, like the one established in the south after the treaty was signed.
Finally, as a person who certainly ideologically would have opposed The Treaty and like to believe I still would, in practical not ideological terms what would I have done in the position of Collins and the other delegates? I think all of us who are critical of the Irish delegation should ask ourselves the same question. Perhaps the main point was, why did Eamonn de Valera not go for a second time himself. He went over, as head of the (not recognised by the British) Irish Republic as he thought it befitting of him. Well in December he was still head of state so why was it not still befitting of him to attend? That is another more prudent question than whether those who did go and give it their best should have signed the treaty or not.
Finally, as a person who certainly ideologically would have opposed The Treaty and like to believe I still would, in practical not ideological terms what would I have done in the position of Collins and the other delegates? I think all of us who are critical of the Irish delegation should ask ourselves the same question. Perhaps the main point was, why did Eamonn de Valera not go for a second time himself. He went over, as head of the (not recognised by the British) Irish Republic as he thought it befitting of him. Well in December he was still head of state so why was it not still befitting of him to attend? That is another more prudent question than whether those who did go and give it their best should have signed the treaty or not.
My own view, for what it is worth, and given the self-perceived glory of their empire, the British would not have given any more concessions at that time. For the time being the Irish delegation had gone perhaps as far as they could. Not perfect, far, far from it, not The Republic but more than home rule had to offer (certainly much more than the GFA offers republicans in the six counties), and more than any other body had wrought from the British side anywhere in their empire as a result of armed struggle. And it was the armed struggle which brought the whole thing about! The politics followed.
The modern Irish twenty-six county republic can trace its origins back to the treaty of 1921. Some, mistakenly still call it the Free State which is untrue. The oath of allegiance to the British monarch has long gone and the Queen's writ does not carry in this part of Ireland. It is not the perfect republic, but it is a non-monarchist state. It cannot in any way claim to be the inheritors of the 1916 Proclamation.
The modern Irish twenty-six county republic can trace its origins back to the treaty of 1921. Some, mistakenly still call it the Free State which is untrue. The oath of allegiance to the British monarch has long gone and the Queen's writ does not carry in this part of Ireland. It is not the perfect republic, but it is a non-monarchist state. It cannot in any way claim to be the inheritors of the 1916 Proclamation.
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Caoimhin O’Muraile is Independent Socialist Republican and Marxist |
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