Brandon SullivanIn my previous article, I discussed the main focus of the loyalist paramilitary campaigns: sectarian murder. This article will look at another thread of the loyalist campaign: attacks on republican targets (members of republican paramilitary groups, and/or their political representatives). 

Many books on the Troubles focus on this aspect of the loyalist campaign, and on the alleged affects that it had on the IRA’s 1994 cessation. David Ervine described how “republicans found themselves being hounded for the first time” (Loyalists, BBC TV) post 1985, and many other loyalist paramilitaries credit their campaign against republicans as, at least, a “significant factor” in the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire. An extreme interpretation of loyalist attitude around this could be summarised by this solipsistic claim in the “It’s Still Only Thursday” blog:

“The stated approach of ‘two eyes for an eye’ left the Provos in an impossible situation. Rapidly losing support (especially in some rural areas) because of the ‘collective punishment’ visited upon the nationalist/republican community and fighting an unwinnable war of attrition against an unrestrained enemy, the Provisional IRA and their Sinn Fein mouthpieces were left with little option but to abandon their cherished “armed struggle” and sue for peace.”

Could this be true? To address this point, we are able to look at the same period of time, but reverse the protagonists. Much has been written about how loyalists targeted republicans, but comparatively little on republicans targeting loyalists. We can apply the “found themselves hounded” rationale and look at the period between the Anglo-Irish-Agreement (AIA) of November 1985 and the IRA ceasefire of August 1994.

The 1980s

The AIA shocked, humiliated and traumatised unionism and loyalism. The UVF/UDA received an influx of new recruits, and attempted to reassert dominance through mass rallies, the creation of new organisations, such as Ulster Resistance, and an increase of paramilitary activity in the latter half of the 1980s. Perhaps in response to this threat, republican paramilitaries stepped up their campaign against loyalist paramilitaries.

Senior UVF commander John Bingham was killed in 1986, the highest ranking loyalist to die at republican hands since Lenny Murphy in 1982. Bingham was the first of many, with three senior UVF men killed in 1987, alongside UDA 'Brigadier" John McMichael. 1988 saw more of the same, with four militant loyalists killed, and the final year of the 1980s concluded with a further five loyalist paramilitaries killed by republicans.

Alongside the relentless targeting of loyalist paramilitaries, republicans also launched a fierce campaign against those who provided goods and services to the security forces. Deemed as “collaborators” and overwhelmingly Protestant, this campaign incensed loyalists. And, as ever, republicans targeted and killed RUC and UDR members (serving and former), and the so-called economic bombing campaign continued unabated.

The 1990s

The first two years of the new decade saw the republican onslaught against loyalist targets continue, with 11 loyalist paramilitaries killed, seven of them in a six month period. A number of Protestants were also killed, mistaken for loyalist paramilitaries. Republicans (the IPLO) also carried out some of the first overtly sectarian murders of Protestants by republicans for some time, and more contractors were murdered.

1992 saw something of a lull in successful targeting of loyalist paramilitary targets, with one UDA man killed, another man murdered and alleged to have been UVF, and the UDR son of a Shankill UVF man (and UVF feud victim) shot dead in Belfast. This year, however, saw the Teebane massacre, where the IRA murdered eight men who had been working on an army base. Unlike the Kingsmill attack on Protestant workers, a bomb was used instead of firearms, resulting in six serious injuries alongside the fatalities, and it was clear that the IRA unit involved considered all 14 men on the bus “legitimate targets”.

Two more loyalist paramilitary targets were killed in 1993, but many more attempts were made on the lives of leading loyalists, in Belfast, and Portadown.

1994, however, saw republicans kill seven loyalist paramilitary targets, including a number of senior UVF and UDA figures. There were other Protestant men killed; alleged to be members of loyalist paramilitary organisations, bombs planted in loyalist pubs for the first time since the 1970s, and Protestant contractors murdered.

By the time they had called their ceasefire, republican paramilitaries had killed at least 35 loyalist paramilitaries in the previous seven years, injured many others, and had clearly compiled accurate intelligence on the UVF and UDA. Republicans had shown their willingness to kill large numbers of Protestants, and the capacity to continue their campaign indefinitely. Against this backdrop, the UVF and UDA, as the grandiosely titled “Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) called a ceasefire.

A number of interesting questions arise, and I would welcome discussion and debate on this.
  • Should the heavy losses loyalists sustained be conflated with their decision to call a ceasefire? 
  • Why did republicans attack so many loyalist, unionist and Protestant targets in this period?
  • Did republican or loyalist paramilitaries show any sign of fear of each other during this period?

⏩ Brandon Sullivan is a middle aged, middle management, centre-left Belfast man. Would prefer people focused on the actual bad guys.

Reflections On Loyalist Paramilitary Activity ➖ Targeted Killings (Part 1)

Brandon SullivanIn my previous article, I discussed the main focus of the loyalist paramilitary campaigns: sectarian murder. This article will look at another thread of the loyalist campaign: attacks on republican targets (members of republican paramilitary groups, and/or their political representatives). 

Many books on the Troubles focus on this aspect of the loyalist campaign, and on the alleged affects that it had on the IRA’s 1994 cessation. David Ervine described how “republicans found themselves being hounded for the first time” (Loyalists, BBC TV) post 1985, and many other loyalist paramilitaries credit their campaign against republicans as, at least, a “significant factor” in the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire. An extreme interpretation of loyalist attitude around this could be summarised by this solipsistic claim in the “It’s Still Only Thursday” blog:

“The stated approach of ‘two eyes for an eye’ left the Provos in an impossible situation. Rapidly losing support (especially in some rural areas) because of the ‘collective punishment’ visited upon the nationalist/republican community and fighting an unwinnable war of attrition against an unrestrained enemy, the Provisional IRA and their Sinn Fein mouthpieces were left with little option but to abandon their cherished “armed struggle” and sue for peace.”

Could this be true? To address this point, we are able to look at the same period of time, but reverse the protagonists. Much has been written about how loyalists targeted republicans, but comparatively little on republicans targeting loyalists. We can apply the “found themselves hounded” rationale and look at the period between the Anglo-Irish-Agreement (AIA) of November 1985 and the IRA ceasefire of August 1994.

The 1980s

The AIA shocked, humiliated and traumatised unionism and loyalism. The UVF/UDA received an influx of new recruits, and attempted to reassert dominance through mass rallies, the creation of new organisations, such as Ulster Resistance, and an increase of paramilitary activity in the latter half of the 1980s. Perhaps in response to this threat, republican paramilitaries stepped up their campaign against loyalist paramilitaries.

Senior UVF commander John Bingham was killed in 1986, the highest ranking loyalist to die at republican hands since Lenny Murphy in 1982. Bingham was the first of many, with three senior UVF men killed in 1987, alongside UDA 'Brigadier" John McMichael. 1988 saw more of the same, with four militant loyalists killed, and the final year of the 1980s concluded with a further five loyalist paramilitaries killed by republicans.

Alongside the relentless targeting of loyalist paramilitaries, republicans also launched a fierce campaign against those who provided goods and services to the security forces. Deemed as “collaborators” and overwhelmingly Protestant, this campaign incensed loyalists. And, as ever, republicans targeted and killed RUC and UDR members (serving and former), and the so-called economic bombing campaign continued unabated.

The 1990s

The first two years of the new decade saw the republican onslaught against loyalist targets continue, with 11 loyalist paramilitaries killed, seven of them in a six month period. A number of Protestants were also killed, mistaken for loyalist paramilitaries. Republicans (the IPLO) also carried out some of the first overtly sectarian murders of Protestants by republicans for some time, and more contractors were murdered.

1992 saw something of a lull in successful targeting of loyalist paramilitary targets, with one UDA man killed, another man murdered and alleged to have been UVF, and the UDR son of a Shankill UVF man (and UVF feud victim) shot dead in Belfast. This year, however, saw the Teebane massacre, where the IRA murdered eight men who had been working on an army base. Unlike the Kingsmill attack on Protestant workers, a bomb was used instead of firearms, resulting in six serious injuries alongside the fatalities, and it was clear that the IRA unit involved considered all 14 men on the bus “legitimate targets”.

Two more loyalist paramilitary targets were killed in 1993, but many more attempts were made on the lives of leading loyalists, in Belfast, and Portadown.

1994, however, saw republicans kill seven loyalist paramilitary targets, including a number of senior UVF and UDA figures. There were other Protestant men killed; alleged to be members of loyalist paramilitary organisations, bombs planted in loyalist pubs for the first time since the 1970s, and Protestant contractors murdered.

By the time they had called their ceasefire, republican paramilitaries had killed at least 35 loyalist paramilitaries in the previous seven years, injured many others, and had clearly compiled accurate intelligence on the UVF and UDA. Republicans had shown their willingness to kill large numbers of Protestants, and the capacity to continue their campaign indefinitely. Against this backdrop, the UVF and UDA, as the grandiosely titled “Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) called a ceasefire.

A number of interesting questions arise, and I would welcome discussion and debate on this.
  • Should the heavy losses loyalists sustained be conflated with their decision to call a ceasefire? 
  • Why did republicans attack so many loyalist, unionist and Protestant targets in this period?
  • Did republican or loyalist paramilitaries show any sign of fear of each other during this period?

⏩ Brandon Sullivan is a middle aged, middle management, centre-left Belfast man. Would prefer people focused on the actual bad guys.

22 comments:

  1. I’ll answer as the only Loyalist who’ll comment on this blog but my analysis is my own. I can only offer my own opinion gained through conversations with others from my community. I’m on this blog to reach out the Republican community and hope to break down the barriers between us.


    “Should the heavy losses loyalists sustained be conflated with their decision to call a ceasefire? “



    There was no discussion at either a grassroots level or in the leadership of calling a halt to retaliation. Every single casualty just added to the resolve. There’s a reason why the Loyalist slogan is ‘No Surrender’. Every murder increased the call for revenge, not diminished it. The PIRA ceasefire quite simply removed the need for retaliation. But during the war the major players in Belfast were untouchable due to an agreement between all groups. The ones taken out were set up by their own in the most part, Lenny Murphy being the big one.
    John Bingham led to Larry Marley (Father of convicted paedophile rapist Seamus) being taken out. Tit for tat. This scenario continued on and on.



    “Why did republicans attack so many loyalist, unionist and Protestant targets in this period?”


    Vincent McKenna, the nephew of the Provisionals Chief of Staff Kevin McKenna and trusted liaison between the same and Martin McGuiness is under absolutely no illusions of the Sectarian nature of his uncle and is on record as saying that his uncle was thirsty for the blood of ANY Protestant, and frequently made mention of his ancestry to Niall McKenna. In his blog he stated that his Uncle was more than happy to kill an innocent Protestant then issue a claim via the P. O’Neil moniker that they believed the victim was a member of the Brit Security Forces when they knew they weren’t. This fed into the perception of border Protestants of a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

    http://www.theirishobserver.com/

    http://www.theirishobserver.com/loughgall-martyrs-loughgall-informer-jim-lynagh/

    Some of his blog has been removed but there’s still some eye opening information in those links.

     Did republican or loyalist paramilitaries show any sign of fear of each other during this period?

    I’d argue no, but my rationale differs from most. The Celtic people are a very hardy and dour race, one that confounds and excels. Freud once said that psychoanalysis was useless on the Irish as they are far too suspicious for it to be useful. I’d counter that we are also very willing to forgive upon contrition but pomposity, or malevolent intent will fuel our fire for aeons.

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    1. Steve this started out as a comment that could have prompted discussion but quickly degenerated.

      What relevance had Larry Marley's son to the discussion? Particularly so when you went on to cite extensively a convicted paedophile but never referred to his conviction.

      Delete
    2. Steve & AM

      thank you both for reminding me once again about how it is never too wise to believe all one sees or reads

      Having followed Steve's direction to Vincent McKenna's blog I spent the best part of an hour with my morning coffee to hand reading his contentious ramblings
      Only then to catch the import of AM's reply

      Though Vincent's contributions, like those of Shane Paul O'Doherty whom you've also cited in the past, are all part of the mosaic of commentary ... neither could be considered solid, reliable or unbiased sources

      (Nonetheless its always good to hear your take Steve. Keep at it but with a little bit more due diligence when it comes to your sources please)

      Delete
    3. AM,

      I mention Marley in the context of "“Should the heavy losses loyalists sustained be conflated with their decision to call a ceasefire? " to show that heavy losses counted for nothing. Vincent McKenna also claims that the charges were brought falsely and denies interfering with his own daughter. Regardless, we should play the ball not the man.

      Delete
    4. HJ,

      "Though Vincent's contributions, like those of Shane Paul O'Doherty whom you've also cited in the past, are all part of the mosaic of commentary ... neither could be considered solid, reliable or unbiased sources"

      True, but what sources are unbiased?

      Delete
    5. Steve - that is not in the slightest persuasive. You mentioned Larry Marley's son - who is wholly immaterial to heavy losses. Had you mentioned Larry and left it at that your point would have merited consideration.
      Gerry Adams denies being in the IRA but you would hardly cite his denials as somehow indicative of his reliability on the matter. Seamus Marley denied the rape allegations but you didn't mention that. It seems that is only relevant for those you wish to cite to support your argument. McKenna hasn't the slightest credibility - not just because of his conviction but because he is universally regarded as a Walter Mitty.

      Delete
    6. AM,

      OK I see your point and it was wrong of me to include it.

      But was Vincent McKenna not who he said he was? Or Shane Paul O'Doherty? Or is it just an attempt to discredit what they say by ad hominem?

      Delete
    7. Steve - No big deal. Comments are not meant to be thinking not definitive so nobody should be held to account forever and a day as a result of them.
      I have never yet met anybody who felt McKenna was who he said he was. He is regarded as a spoofer. I don't read him but on the one occasion that I did the piece was so filled with inaccuracies that I read no more.
      I never mentioned Shane Paul - there have been plenty of criticisms of his take on things but I have not come across anybody claiming he is a liar about events. And he was who he says he was. Read his book The Volunteer - I found it much better than his more recent writing.

      Delete
    8. OK thanks AM I'll give it a read.

      Delete
  2. @ Steve R

    "There was no discussion at either a grassroots level or in the leadership of calling a halt to retaliation. Every single casualty just added to the resolve. There’s a reason why the Loyalist slogan is ‘No Surrender’. Every murder increased the call for revenge, not diminished it. The PIRA ceasefire quite simply removed the need for retaliation. But during the war the major players in Belfast were untouchable due to an agreement between all groups. The ones taken out were set up by their own in the most part, Lenny Murphy being the big one. John Bingham led to Larry Marley ... This scenario continued on and on."

    What consistently puzzles me is why loyalists believed that their "retaliation" would have an effect on republicans different to their own experience of being attacked. It is utterly bizarre.

    To return to your points here, I believe that the CLMC debated whether "retaliation" should occur after the Shankill Bomb, and after the INLA killing of three UVF men in 94. And there was the loyalist ceasefire of 91, during which the Provos ramped their campaign against Protestant targets up.

    The "top men's agreement" suited the Provos, and it seems strange that the UDA broke it with a typically bungled operation against Gerry Adams. It's fairly common knowledge that Jim Craig colluded with the Provos, but he was killed in 88, and republicans still had rock solid intelligence on loyalists right up until the ceasefire, and beyond.

    To return to my question, I don't think that the heavy casualties loyalists sustained post AIA should be conflated with the CLMC ceasefire. But equally, neither should republican losses be conflated with the Provo ceasefire of 94. I believe that the loyalist campaigns importance has been very overstated as an influence.

    I don't think discussing someone as discredited as Vincent McKenna is a worthwhile venture, to be honest. I think as well as being an exceptionally unsavoury character, he's wired to the moon. However, sectarianism blatantly existed within the Provos and INLA, and I've already mentioned the IPLO's overt sectarian "wildcat" strikes.

    My point is that republicans showed not the slightest concern for loyalist "retaliation" against the CRN community, and in fact at times seemed to undertake actions designed to provoke such "retaliation".

    Regarding republicans and loyalists showing any signs of fear of each other, I disagree with you. Michael Stone's attack on the IRA funeral at Milltown led to him being denied as a member and, I have heard, frantic overtures from some UDA men to republicans to disassociate themselves from it. I don't think that this would ever have happened if the protagonists were reversed.

    I'll develop all of these points in my next piece.

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    1. “What consistently puzzles me is why loyalists believed that their "retaliation" would have an effect on republicans different to their own experience of being attacked. It is utterly bizarre.

      To return to your points here, I believe that the CLMC debated whether "retaliation" should occur after the Shankill Bomb, and after the INLA killing of three UVF men in 94. And there was the loyalist ceasefire of 91, during which the Provos ramped their campaign against Protestant targets up.”

      There was no debate. An attack on the Shankill Road would always have led to retaliation. The Provos would have known this yet they went ahead anyway.

      “The "top men's agreement" suited the Provos, and it seems strange that the UDA broke it with a typically bungled operation against Gerry Adams.”
      The only thing odd about that was the bullets. Grugg Gregg was adamant of the opinion that there was something wrong with the ammunition and believed they’d been tampered with.

      “It's fairly common knowledge that Jim Craig colluded with the Provos, but he was killed in 88, and republicans still had rock solid intelligence on loyalists right up until the ceasefire, and beyond.”
      Considering the level of Brit Intel infiltration of the Provos this is unsurprising.

      “To return to my question, I don't think that the heavy casualties loyalists sustained post AIA should be conflated with the CLMC ceasefire. But equally, neither should republican losses be conflated with the Provo ceasefire of 94. I believe that the loyalist campaigns importance has been very overstated as an influence.”
      I agree.

      “I don't think discussing someone as discredited as Vincent McKenna is a worthwhile venture, to be honest. I think as well as being an exceptionally unsavoury character, he's wired to the moon.”
      Why not? He seems to be backing up his claims.
      “ However, sectarianism blatantly existed within the Provos and INLA, and I've already mentioned the IPLO's overt sectarian "wildcat" strikes.”
      Correct, many former members have confirmed this.

      “My point is that republicans showed not the slightest concern for loyalist "retaliation" against the CRN community, and in fact at times seemed to undertake actions designed to provoke such "retaliation".”
      Don’t need to be Einstein to work out why. Who pulled the strings?

      “Regarding republicans and loyalists showing any signs of fear of each other, I disagree with you. Michael Stone's attack on the IRA funeral at Milltown led to him being denied as a member and, I have heard, frantic overtures from some UDA men to republicans to disassociate themselves from it. I don't think that this would ever have happened if the protagonists were reversed.”

      Flint was a nutcase. Still is. Probably just helped himself to a dump and went solo. To my mind I don’t remember Loyalist attacking funerals though? Could be wrong though.

      Delete
  3. Larry Hughes comments

    My recollection of the early 90s in particular was that the IRA leadership was putting the brakes on killings in general. They were, in hindsight, deep in peace talks with the British government and did not want anything upsetting these talks the more serious they got.
    Loyalist targets were available but the go ahead was denied in a lot of instances. Volunteers were confused for a period of time to say the least. But faith in leadership was total at the time and a 'bigger picture' was accepted in some capacity or other. Both Republican and Loyalists can attempt to say they militarily drove the other to the peace process. Reality is Loyalists were killing relatives of Republicans and the IRA were moving towards retaliating by bombing loyalist housing estates with a warning.
    Billy Wright for example was considering standing for election at a time when the IRA had bombed Protestant housing estates in Tyrone and Donacloney in retaliation for RUC wrecking entire Catholic housing estates seeking Libyan weapons they KNEW were south of the border. Billy Wright was seemingly oblivious to the 8000 signatories to a petition in Killicomain housing estate in Portadown demanding he leave the estate. Essentially people had had enough. The GFA now we have all had 22 years to cool off and reflect, was a GI .... GOOD IDEA

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    1. Larry - that's a thoughtful take.

      The GFA a good idea?

      I'll put it like this - it was probably the logical outcome of a conflict energised by much more than timeless ideological positions around the constitutional position.

      From the point of view of the British state it was a serious victory. It was a major achievement for the SDLP but the party fell off the stairs on the way up to claim the trophy.

      While the balance of forces probably did not allow for much else, not even joint authority which we could say would have been a draw, it amounted to the failure of the IRA campaign.

      My main objection to is that it was a republican failure not a republican success. Our acceptance of it amounted to proving ourselves and our war wrong. Yet we sought to disguise that with cries of victory by stepping stone.

      Our war was against the logic of the GFA. We did not fight for it. We did not kill for it. We did not die for it. If we are to accept it, even acquiesce in it, we should at least describe it for what it is and acknowledge that the difference between it and Sunningdale was not worth one single life of combatant or non-combatant.

      Delete
    2. Larry Hughes comments

      Mackers I think the GFA was a good idea strictly in hindsight. The Provos emerged out of programs and state/paras murder and internment. As self proclaimed defenders of the Catholic population. Things evolved. The Provo campaign evolved and the mood music in the communities changed over the years. By the end the Provos were rotten to the core bar S. Armagh and defending the Catholic community was seen as a distraction the IRA refused as much as possible to be drawn into. The Provos were outa gas and people had had enough. So apart from not attaining a victory, yeah ... a good idea.

      Delete
  4. @ Steve R

    "There was no debate. An attack on the Shankill Road would always have led to retaliation. The Provos would have known this yet they went ahead anyway."

    I think David Ervine is on record as saying that he was pushing for no retaliation following the killings of three UVF men on the Shankill in 94 - but I'm going from memory here. I re-watched Loyalists (BBC, Peter Taylor) and Ervine described the Loughinisland murders as the "worst day" of his life.

    "The only thing odd about that was the bullets. Grugg Gregg was adamant of the opinion that there was something wrong with the ammunition and believed they’d been tampered with."

    I think sheer incompetence is likely, rather than ammunition being tampered with. In one of his superb articles on loyalist paramilitaries, Balaclava Street addresses this point: https://www.facebook.com/balaclavastreet/posts/heres-a-passage-from-the-loyalist-guns-article-examining-the-allegations-made-by/608520225951879/

    "Grugg" might have been wanting to deflect attention away from what was an embarrassing escapade - an open goal with four republicans, they fail to kill anyone, one of them shoots himself, and then get captured almost immediately

    What is interesting, and not really discussed, is the colossal "own goal" that loyalists narrowly missed. If they'd killed Adams, they'd have killed his fledgling peace strategy. Who knows who'd have become the driving force in republicanism then, but they would not have had the drive, vision and capabilities to bring it to a close the way that Adams did.

    "Considering the level of Brit Intel infiltration of the Provos this is unsurprising."

    I find this train of thought interesting - but I'm not convinced. Scapatticci was arrested over John Bingham's killing. But my hunch is that the Provos were way to paranoid to be fed intelligence from Brit. sources without investigating. And, besides, the INLA and IPLO killed a surprising number of loyalist targets, and without the sophisticated apparatus that the Provos had.

    "Flint was a nutcase. Still is. Probably just helped himself to a dump and went solo. To my mind I don’t remember Loyalist attacking funerals though? Could be wrong though."

    Stone had support, as he said on arrest his "mate fucked off and left him". Regardless, the point I'm making is that if an IRA man would not be disowned by his organisations because his superiors were worried about loyalist reprisals. The point I'm making is that there is more evidence that loyalist leaders feared the IRA than republicans leaders feared the UVF/UDA.

    Regarding the sectarian nature of the Provos - I don't dispute that it was there, and it was significant. But I believe to a large degree murderous sectarian intent was kept in check by the Provo constitution and strong leadership. Had Adams been killed in 1984, someone far less concerned with reducing sectarian murders of Protestants could have risen in power, with disastrous effects for the conflict and the Protestant community. Loyalists would never acknowledge this, but there is no evidence of sectarianism with Adams, and actually some evidence to suggest the opposite. I believe all life was similarly meaningless to him in his pursuit of his goals.

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    1. @ Steve R

      “I think David Ervine is on record as saying that he was pushing for no retaliation following the killings of three UVF men on the Shankill in 94”
      -He would have been in a minority of one on that day.

      I think sheer incompetence is likely, rather than ammunition being tampered with. In one of his superb articles on loyalist paramilitaries, Balaclava Street addresses this point: https://www.facebook.com/balaclavastreet/posts/heres-a-passage-from-the-loyalist-guns-article-examining-the-allegations-made-by/608520225951879/
      -Perhaps. The wombles could fuck up tying their own shoe laces!

      "Grugg" might have been wanting to deflect attention away from what was an embarrassing escapade -
      -Yes, that’s feasible. But twenty shots I’d have expected someone to die.

      What is interesting, and not really discussed, is the colossal "own goal" that loyalists narrowly missed.
      -You are really putting too much forward thinking into the UDA’s actions. They lacked brains but not balls.

      "Considering the level of Brit Intel infiltration of the Provos this is unsurprising."
      “I find this train of thought interesting - but I'm not convinced. Scapatticci was arrested over John Bingham's killing…”
      Scapatticci was only one of many. Brit Spooks estimated 1 in 3 ‘Officer level’ and 8/10 rank and file Provos was an informer. Cultivating these required the setting up of Loyalists to grain credibility. Notice how after the break in at Castlereagh calls for an Amnesty died off? Makes you wonder what Storey found in those files, and specifically who’s names came up… Besides, if you live in Belfast you are well aware of who the main players on either side are.

      Stone had support, as he said on arrest his "mate fucked off and left him". Regardless, the point I'm making is that if an IRA man would not be disowned by his organisations because his superiors were worried about loyalist reprisals. The point I'm making is that there is more evidence that loyalist leaders feared the IRA than republicans leaders feared the UVF/UDA.
      Then why did the Provos ask the Loyalists to have a mutual ceasefire and allow the Provos free reign on Brit targets? And they definitely feared Loyalists in East Tyrone and North Armagh.

      Regarding the sectarian nature of the Provos - I don't dispute that it was there, and it was significant. But I believe to a large degree murderous sectarian intent was kept in check by the Provo constitution and strong leadership.
      What the fuck are you talking about? Teebane, Shankill, Kingsmill,Le Mon, Enniskillen not to mention serving and former members of the UDR/RIR and RUC. Invoking a supposed belief that somehow they were combatants and legitimate targets didn’t and doesn’t wash with us. They were ordinary Protestants in our eyes.
      Had Adams been killed in 1984, someone far less concerned with reducing sectarian murders of Protestants could have risen in power, with disastrous effects for the conflict and the Protestant community. Loyalists would never acknowledge this, but there is no evidence of sectarianism with Adams, and actually some evidence to suggest the opposite. I believe all life was similarly meaningless to him in his pursuit of his goals.
      Adams is a careerist above all so maybe, but all professed sorrow coming from him was viewed by us as crocodile tears. It takes a callous bastard to order the death of a widowed mother of nine taken screaming from her weans.

      Delete
  5. Brandon
    Why the obsession with who feared who the most? Clearly the loyalist leadership was more fearful of republicans until the enormous draft of new recruits after the AIA kicked them out. The new leaders after '89 were significantly less fearful sending sledgehammer teams into the hardest of republican estates in Belfast, and to places like Cappagh, Arboe, Donegal etc on a weekly basis. This resulted in a rush of new locked gates being fitted at the bottom of stairs in republican homes. Loyalists by '91 were out killing republicans for the first time.

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    1. @ Peter

      I'm not "obsessed" with who was feared the most, I'm challenging the idea that the loyalist campaigns had much effect on the IRA ceasefire, and also the idea that post AIA loyalist paramilitaries were doing anything new.

      Loyalist killings reached their height in 75/76, and were only about 10% - 15% less than republican killings.

      Within loyalism, where strategic thinking is largely absent, it seems that the fact that loyalists killed more people than republicans (in 93 and 94, not 91 onwards as you say) including a few actual republican targets, meant that they "won the war".

      This is an extremely dangerous fiction in my opinion, and I seek to prove that. Senior loyalists admit that their campaign of sectarian murder was counter productive, but hold on to the targeted campaign as having been a success. Individual loyalists maintain that they "took the war" to republican's front doors. And they did kill a few. But republicans were absolutely capable of returning in kind, and yet loyalists never stopped to think that what they were doing was sustaining republicans, and increasing nationalist support, just as their own losses sustained their desire for revenge. Again, tactically and strategically, loyalism is and was a complete basket case.

      Republicans didn't call a ceasefire because of the loyalist campaign - that's a solipsistic myth that loyalists tell themselves to justify the terrorism that they engaged in.

      Delete
    2. @Brandon

      Was there any calls within the CRN community for the Provisionals to pursue peace after the Loyalist gun attacks on ordinary Catholics?

      Republicans didn't call a ceasefire due to victory,that's a solipsistic myth that Republicans tell themselves to justify the terrorism that they engaged in.

      Delete
  6. @ Steve R

    "Was there any calls within the CRN community for the Provisionals to pursue peace after the Loyalist gun attacks on ordinary Catholics?"

    Not that I recall - I've seen footage of SDLP politicians being abused by nationalists following loyalist attacks for being anti-violence. Again, I find it completely baffling that loyalists believe the CRN community would be cowed when the PUL isn't. There is simply no evidence for it, and plenty to suggest the exact opposite.

    I do, however, recall opposition to the Provos decommissioning from ordinary nationalists because of the loyalist threat. I've also read reports of nationalist crowds chanting "retaliation" at rallies, with reference to loyalist attacks, as well as the infamous "bring back the IRA" call.

    "Republicans didn't call a ceasefire due to victory,that's a solipsistic myth that Republicans tell themselves to justify the terrorism that they engaged in."

    No, it's worse than that. Adams realised, I think, that the "long war" was unwinnable, and that the tactic of armed struggle was counter-productive. He also realised that winding the IRA down having said this would lead to his removal, if not death, and so at considerable personal risk followed his vision of a peaceful strategy. With a man like Adams, it's impossible to know what truly motivated him, but I think that it was at least in part a recognition that he had played a huge part in the ferocity of the IRA campaign and didn't want something like that to happen again. Anyway, part of selling the winding down of the IRA was to present it as something approaching victory. As AM has pointed out, the IRA lost in that they didn't get what they wanted. But the IRA remained a formidable opponent that the British simply didn't want to fight any more. And so plenty of sops were made, starting with the AIA. As unpalatable as it is to many, the IRA campaign did brings many victories for the CRN community, but they ultimately lost the war. Adams could never admit that, of course, but he knows it.




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  7. Larry Hughes comments

    As for Steve R and his list of atrocities against prods I suggest there's a difference between a mistake by amateur militarists with minimal training and basic logistics as compared to deliberately targeting pregnant women and teenage girls in mobile shops. I think it is the evil in the mindset. A mindset that as a policy and strategy largely targeted known innocents at random. Crawl back under that rock Steve R til ye clear yer head again.

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  8. Larry Hughes comments

    If the UDA had killed Adam's we know exactly who would have replaced him. Scap - Donaldson - Marty MI6 McGuinness - Mac The Hat Morrison who got convicted but didn't lol .. The SB+Brits had a long line of people in place.

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