Tom Hennessey’s latest book deals with the incredibly emotive issue of the Hunger Strikes in Ireland (1980-81). Historian Hennessey has assiduously trawled the government archives to produce what the publishers have described as 'the definitive account of one of the seminal events in modern Irish history.' I am not certain that even Professor Hennessey himself would be comfortable with that particular piece of promotional hyperbole, and (as we will see) there are some very good reasons why such high praise should be treated with considerable circumspection.Of course, the story and significance of the Hunger Strikes is familiar to anyone with a cursory knowledge of contemporary Irish history, and accounting for the removal of Special Category Status from Republican prisoners, and the momentous events which followed, is unquestionably a task of the utmost importance. The issue precipitating the Hunger Strikes was, in essence, relatively simple and straightforward - whilst the British government claimed that Republicans were criminally motivated, the prisoners themselves insisted that their incarceration was a consequence of their engagement in a political struggle.
The confrontation in Long Kesh became focused upon the so-called “five demands” made by the prisoners: the right not to wear a prison uniform; the right not to do prison work; the right of free association with other prisoners and to organise education and recreational pursuits; the restoration of remission lost as a consequence of the protest; and the resumption of normal weekly prison visits/letters/parcels. Republicans, through these demands, sought to re-assert the political legitimacy of their resistance.
As Hennessey navigates his way around this basic contradiction via reference to the official documents, some interesting information comes to light. For example there is confirmation of the fact (which most of us had always assumed anyway) that Margaret Thatcher had the last word on all policy options, which were often derived from secret contact with Republicans through what Hennessey colourfully describes as the “backchannel”. Thatcher was clearly running the show.
Perhaps more pertinently we can also see with crystal clarity, the government’s attitude toward those Republicans engaged in the prison protest. Although not part of Hennessey’s intention to reveal it, the documentation cannot conceal the contempt which pervaded the perspective of top Tory politicians. For example, Secretary of State Humphrey Atkins informed Thatcher that:
a hunger strike would be a deliberate and ruthlessly determined act to achieve political status for terrorist prisoners ... I see no reason why gangsterism should escape the punishment of the law - (p.68 and p.69).
Of course Atkins was preaching to the converted, since Thatcher had infamously asserted that "crime is crime is crime" (p.184) - although it is somewhat ironic that she made this comment whilst on a visit to Saudi Arabia, hardly a bastion of justice and penal proportionality. Moreover, Thatcher claimed that the IRA, by calling a hunger strike, was cynically playing its “last card”, by which:
they seek to work on the most basic of human emotions – pity – as a means of creating tension and stoking the fires of bitterness and hatred - (p.249).
In this context the phone conversation between Thatcher and Atkins, as Sands was about to die, is particularly enlightening. Atkins remarks:
it is only a day or two before he starts going into a coma and so forth ... there will be a good deal of flurry about all this I’m afraid ... I think there is bound to be a weak link later - (p.192-93).
In short, there will be the usual fuss about nothing, but the cards are stacked. Of course the callous indifference which exudes the documents will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with British policy in Northern Ireland, but rather more extraordinary is the fact Thatcher genuinely believed that the strike was being manipulated from outside (see p.288). As she reflected years afterwards about the strikers: 'poor devils ... if they didn’t go on strike they’d be shot ... I don’t even remember their names.' (p.458). Thatcher could not even recall the name of Bobby Sands (who was an elected MP). Why should she? According to her, as she once said to Peter Mandelson, 'you can’t trust the Irish, they are all liars.' Thatcher was clearly a reactionary Tory bigot, and this is confirmed by some of the documents used in Hennessey’s book – although it is important to stress that the author himself would certainly not agree with that assessment.
In fact it would be fair to say that Hennessey is broadly sympathetic with the position adopted by the British government. Indeed, one of the difficulties in reading the book is the fact that at times Hennessey’s narrative and the official government record seem to merge imperceptibly. For example, in his account of the end of first Hunger Strike Hennessey focuses on the NIO position which stressed that: the lack of support for the prisoners was disheartening for them; the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy was negative; the messages of intermediaries was confusing; the position of the Prime Minister was unequivocal; and the handling of protests by the security services (mainly the RUC) was sensitive.
The very last comment on the ending of the first strike is left to official source PRONI NIO/12/196A which says: 'probably the single most important factor was that the seven hunger strikers just did not have the will to die' (p.123). Hence the “official” position is effectively endorsed by Hennessey. In fact the reason the strike collapsed was because the prisoners believed that an acceptable offer was on the table – it had nothing to do with the absence of a willingness to die. Yet Hennessey disputes this, saying that the idea that a “deal” was on offer was 'a straightforward lie, issued for propaganda purposes. There was no deal in December 1980' (p.462-63).
Hennessey is playing a disingenuous game of semantics here. Of course there was no “deal” because the word itself indicates an agreement concluded and accepted by both parties – however there was an “offer” which included the issue of “civilian type clothing” which we now know was blatantly duplicitous and designed to deceive the prisoners. That is why the first Hunger Strike collapsed. Indeed, in the days before the first hunger strike even began the British were making proposals (regarding clothes) if the strike was called off, but Brendan Hughes rejected them as insufficient. So the possibility of a “negotiated settlement” was real enough right from the start, even though an actual “deal” was never reached. However, to suggest that the British authorities were serenely intransigent in their principled determination to resist an accommodation with “terrorists” is a mischievous misrepresentation of the facts.
In other key areas Hennessey’s work claims to provide some new evidence. For example, we learn that Bobby Sands offered to abandon his protest for five days, at a point when his condition had become critical, in order to discuss issues with officials from the Northern Ireland Office. This opportunity was apparently lost when Atkins refused to accept the offer because it was “conditional” (that discussions should be witnessed by two priests and three non-hunger striking prisoners). However, with regard to one of the most significant recent controversies concerning the strike Hennessey’s intervention (or the official record) remains inconclusive. Richard O’Rawe, in his book Blanketmen, claimed that the British (via “mountainclimber” Brendan Duddy) made an offer to settle the strike in July, shortly before death of Joe McDonnell, the fifth hunger striker. O’Rawe claims that O/C Bik McFarlane accepted this offer but that it was rejected by the Sinn Fein leadership outside the prison. In effect the implication is that hunger strikers were sacrificed to enhance the Sinn Fein leadership’s electoral strategy. McFarlane himself rejects this claim, but the accusation has caused extraordinary acrimony within the Republican community.
Hennessey confirms that there was indeed an offer, but O’Rawe’s suggestion that McFarlane actually agreed that the offer was acceptable is, in reality, “unprovable” (p.464). Moreover, as former Tommy McKearney has argued, if the British had genuinely wanted to end the protest after four deaths they could have used a variety of intermediaries to confirm this fact, such as the SDLP, Dublin government, Catholic Church, or even the Irish-American lobby, and this would have placed huge pressure on Sinn Fein to comply. They didn’t. Indeed it is not unreasonable to consider that there might even have been a misunderstanding between MI6 and PIRA/SF, given the essentially clandestine nature of the contacts through third party intermediaries. In any event, it is exceedingly difficult to prove conclusively that more men died simply because of the cynical political calculations of those leading Sinn Fein at the time, and Hennessey’s account acknowledges this fact.
The precise nature Hennessey’s contribution to the debate surrounding the Hunger Strikes actually becomes most revealing when the underlying Unionism of his political perspective seeps out. We can illustrate this with reference to a number of particular examples, some of them somewhat bizarre. For instance Hennessey records that a Major Nicholas Ridley, who had responsibility for briefing Thatcher about the Republican stronghold of South Armagh, sent a personal letter to the Prime Minister after she had made a visit to the area. In the letter Ridley stated that:
many of the villagers of Crossmaglen who normally refuse to talk to us except to express hostility to the British have been coming up to my soldiers expressing great admiration and respect for you and sadness that they could not have met you personally when you visited - (p.52).
Instead of questioning Ridley’s sanity, or suggesting he should have been tested for drugs at the time, the credulous Hennessey reports this without comment. However, the less than subtle subtext of political Unionism, clearly discernible in the narrative, often has more serious and insidious implications. For instance Hennessey gives prominence to the accounts of prison medical officers who claimed that Ray McCreesh wanted to come off his hunger strike, but that his family “persuaded” him to persist. Quite why these accounts are given credence over and above the persistent denials of those members of the McCreesh family who visited Ray (one of whom was a priest) is not explained.
To take another example, Hennessey quotes RUC sources on the number of people attending Sands’ funeral at 30,000 with 300 from Dublin (p.217-18), with other figures regarding the attendance at funerals quoted as facts (e.g. see p.242). Some of these statistics are risible (certainly to anyone who attended), but they are left unchallenged in the text. The pro-Unionist deference to the British position is also evident elsewhere. For example Hennessey states that the British response to possible international reaction to the strikes was:
to marshal, where it could, its tremendous diplomatic capacities to counter the enormous emotive potential that the hunger strikers had in the minds of those unfamiliar with the intimacies (sic) of Northern Ireland - (p.223).
The implication of course is that, if made aware of the relevant “intimacies” (intricacies?), they would not be sympathetic to the hunger strike. Hennessey also says that, in response to possible protests as a consequence of events in the Maze: 'the operational requirement to act sensitively was fully recognized by the security forces' (p.82). Indeed:
the necessary actions of the security forces in containing riots were inevitably exploited by PIRA sympathizers...The task of the security forces in policing Catholic areas had become more difficult, and the growing acceptance of the RUC by the Catholic community was being checked (p.245).
Sensitive security forces and an increasingly popular RUC! This is a picture few people with any familiarity with that period would recognize. At other times it is more difficult to discern whether the political posture is deliberate or simply the product of assumptions subconsciously assimilated by reading too many government documents. For instance, when detailing the PIRA’s responsibility for the horrific events of “Bloody Friday”, Hennessey adds:
by this stage elements of the Protestant community were taking matters into their own hands, with the formation of their own Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), alongside the pre-existing Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) - (p.10).
Of course the UVF not only “pre-existed” “Bloody Friday”, it also “pre-existed” the “troubles” – UVF were indiscriminately killing Catholics years before the PIRA was formed.
Nowhere is Hennessey’s political perspective more explicit than when he discusses the Republican Movement. According to Hennessey the PIRA launched its campaign 'when a British government was engaged in reforming Northern Ireland. It was the wrong war against the wrong enemy' and Republicans took up arms 'to expel an imperialist British state that existed only in their own minds...there were alternatives to politically motivated violence' (p.466 and p.467). However, the importance of contextual factors, such as the nature of the “Orange State”, Unionist hegemony at Stormont, the denial of civil liberties, the imposition of internment, “Bloody Sunday” and so on, are effectively downplayed or dismissed by Hennessey. As a result the Republican position is portrayed as the consequence of personal pathology and the extraordinary capacity for self-deception amongst individual members of the PIRA. The Provos thus become the cause of conflict rather than the symptomatic consequence of coercion, bigotry and political misrule.
When it comes to his analysis of the conflict in the prison Hennessey’s position is made abundantly clear: 'not for nothing were the Maze compounds known as a ‘university of terrorism' and 'the government was not going to give in to intimidation.' (p.459 and p.460). Indeed Hennessey even argues that the government did not negotiate with “terrorists” in the prison. 'The government refused to negotiate with Republicans. To the outside observer, differences between ‘clarification’ and ‘negotiation’ may seem semantic”,' but 'clarification, not negotiation, is what occurred down the Duddy backchannel' (p.463). Here Hennessey is, of course, talking out of his own backchannel. What possible purpose might be served by “clarification” if you are intent on not negotiating? The British were “negotiating” as they had always done, throughout the “troubles”. When the entire Provo leadership was flown to Cheyne Walk in London to negotiate with William Whitelaw in 1972 it was not an elaborate exercise in “clarification”, nor was it a sight-seeing prison excursion! Hennessey’s attempt to portray the Thatcher government as occupying the moral high ground above the tawdry tactics of those who would converse with the “men of violence” is simply erroneous.
Hennessey clearly believes that Thatcher “won” the hunger strike - this particular Thomas has no doubts. Yet even this conclusion is contentious. The Hunger Strike was about the specific issue of “criminalisation” rather than the final outcome of the struggle (which may or may not be lost from a Republican perspective – history has a way of confounding the most obvious conclusions). Those men who died absolutely refuted the notion that prisoners were “ordinary” criminals, and Republicans did end up wearing their own clothes, running their own wings, organising their own education and so on – I know because I visited Long Kesh and I saw it for myself. Moreover, most of the world acknowledged that Republicanism was not a criminal conspiracy or an enterprise motivated by pecuniary self-interest. The fact that certain British/Unionist politicians (and their para-literary wing in academia) still fail to recognise this, says much more about them than it does about the reality of politics in the north of Ireland.
Where Hennessey is on safer ground is in his conclusion that, in terms of its strategic orientation and in relation to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein has now adopted a position similar to that of Margaret Thatcher. Both accept the notion of Unionist consent. Hennessey is right that the Good Friday Agreement recognizes British sovereignty and that Sinn Fein could have accepted a similar deal agreed in 1974 at Sunningdale. Hennessey is also correct to say that when Deputy First Minister McGuinness met the Queen he was, in effect, meeting his boss (p.469). As Hennessey says, 'the irony is that Sinn Fein’s contemporary position on how to achieve a united Ireland is exactly the same as Margaret Thatcher’s in 1981' (p.470). This will make uncomfortable reading for Republicans and there are snippets of information in the book that are undoubtedly of interest to those of a “dissident” persuasion. For instance An Phoblacht/Republican News (in response to the Pope’s call to end armed struggle), commented on 6 Oct 1979 that 'the struggle is not merely for civil rights within the six county state. Rather it is a war of national liberation against English occupation and colonialism' (p61). Evidently Gerry Adams needs to make sure that Republicans remember to forget.
Having said all of this, the real substance of my dismay with this book is not actually political. Hennessey is entitled to his Unionism (although he should be more explicit about his partisanship), and I am entitled to resist it. This is the nature of ideological conflict. My issue is to do with historiography. Hennessey is an assembler of information, and many trees have been sacrificed in order that government documents could be collated and published (most of the footnotes are from the archives, although it is a poorly referenced text). Not only does this mean that the author’s interpretive voice is almost inaudible, there is a tendency to treat government documents as truthful accounts. There is not enough critical distance from the sources.
Moreover, it is impossible to tell the whole story of the Hunger Strike with reference primarily to government documents. Comparative sources are required to tease out and test arguments, there needs to be more detailed examination of the socio-political and historical context, and there needs to be a genuine assessment of the extraordinary human cost of this tragedy. Some historians are able to interweave the micro and the macro dimensions, drawing out from the specifics to elucidate and assess the broader trajectory of events. Eric Hobsbawm was a master, as is Ian Kershaw, and there are others, such as Michael Burleigh, whose political opinions I find just as objectionable, but who are nevertheless able to provide the appropriate context, depth and texture, to move beyond partial description.
I was never likely to agree with Professor Hennessey. I had good friends in Long Kesh (some of whom were on the Hunger Strike). However, nothing could illustrate with greater clarity the insubstantial distraction of Hennessey’s approach to history than a small passage where he quotes the opinion of a NIO official: 'Sands likes to see himself as one of life’s victims and admits that he suffers from chronic depression' (p.170). Hennessey chooses to quote the extemporal musings of an administrative minion, an official scribbler, a man or woman who in all probability never had to struggle for anything, ever. Frankly, what this bureaucratic bean-counter says about Sands is not worth a bucket of warm piss. Of course hero worship is the product of lazy thinking (a point often made to me by Brendan Hughes, another Republican maligned during the course of Hennessey’s turgid tome), and Bobby Sands was just an ordinary, decent man in the most extraordinary circumstances. However, it is still his voice that should be heard most clearly above the cacophony of nonsense that surrounds the Hunger Strike. Bobby Sands said that the Republic of 1916 will never die. He was right – and about that there can be absolutely no doubt.
Thomas Hennessey, 2014, Hunger Strike: Margaret Thatcher’s Battle with the IRA 1980-1981.
Irish Academic Press, Co Kildare Ireland: pp.488. Euro22.95 (pb) ISBN: 987 0 7165 3176 0
That's the book I was asking you about Mackers, kinda glad I didn't buy it now after reading that account
ReplyDeletegot this on internet about this "historian" -
ReplyDeleteDr Thomas Hennessey, Reader in History, has had a busy November! On the 23rd he was a Roundtable participant in a discussion, held at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, entitled ‘British Security in the Post-Cold War World: Challenges and Responses’. Thomas’ paper was entitle, ‘Terrorism - Northern Ireland and British Counter-Terrorism Strategy’. As well as assessing the impact of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ on British counter-insurgency generally, the roundtable also considered the UK’s military performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.
whoever wants to read nearly 500 pages by this toxic bag of spooky puke needs their head examined (unless u hav the unfortunate job of having to review it) dont give ur money to this 'historian' - 20 euros u must be joking. if u want to read it i will gladly shop lift it for you. these roundtable boys talk about the "UK’s military performance in Iraq and Afghanistan" - imagine the shi*e spoken at that discussion and the type of creeps in attendance. 1.5 million dead innocent iraqi men women and children and its a "military performance". the more this creep insults our volunteers the better it makes them look.
shoplifters of the world unite.
Reading Mark Hayes review I feel that he himself hasn't really researched the facts regarding the 1st and 2nd Hunger Strikes...
ReplyDeleteFirstly Hennessey was in fact partially correct in that not all the 7 had a willingness to die during the 1st Hunger Strike. I know of one who told Jake Jackson from the outset that he wasn't going to die. We also know that the Dark had promised men he wouldn't let them die.
Also there was no offer made by the British which led the men to believe they could end it. The Dark ended it to save Sean McKenna's life and if Mark took the time to read even the various books on the subject he'd know that Bobby Sands returned to the wing that night and told us we had got nothing.
In fact he'd also know that the document which referred to “civilian type clothing” - which we could wear during the working week - was just delivered into the hands of Gerry Adams by Fr Meagher when they got word that the Hunger Strike was over.
Therefore no one on the Hunger Strike had seen the document, nor would they have known of its content which was worthless anyway, when The Dark called off the Hunger Strike.
As for Mark's assertion that O'Rawe's 'suggestion' that McFarlane actually agreed that the offer was acceptable is, in reality, “unprovable”. It is hardly unprovable when others on both sides of Bik and Ricky's cells overheard that conversation and in fact one, Cleaky Clarke publicly stated he overheard Bik agreeing the offer contained enough to end it.
Does Mark not realise that Bik has since admitted this himself?
As for using a variety of intermediaries such as the SDLP, Dublin government, Catholic Church, Mark doesn't seem to realise they were used and went under the name of the ICJP. However Gerry Adams and Morrison ensured they were forced off the scene as he was dealing with Thatcher via The Mountain Climber Contact and claimed they were doing more damage than good.
However the ICJP did offer to act as guarantors over any deal shortly before Adams put pressure on them to step back. Why remove any potential witnesses which could have made it harder for the Brits to renege on an offer?
In fact the proof that an offer to end it was revealed in the same Thatcher documents which contained not only the offer but Thatcher's handwritten amendments to it. Why bother to amend something if you were going to renege on it?
I think Mark Hayes has a hell of a lot of reading up to do in regards to the Hunger Strikes. He should start with Richard O'Rawe's 'Afterlives'.
'the operational requirement to act sensitively was fully recognized by the security forces'
ReplyDeleteThis is the type of ‘sensitivity’ that allows for things like defiling Patsy O Haras remains , breaking his nose and putting cigarettes out on his face? I don't think my archive is missing this book.
Dixie
ReplyDeleteThanks for confirming what Hayes mangled, namely that Brendan Hughes called off the first hunger strike because of Sean McKenna's dire state. The Dark was obviously in a terrible bind. It's certainly bewildering to see even a fairly sympathetic reviewer like Hayes get that essential point wrong by omission. As for Richard O'Rawe's assertions, let's hope they find wider airing and then acceptance. Thank you for your comments Dixie, always interesting to read what you have to say.
"Bobby Sands said that the Republic of 1916 will never die. He was right – and about that there can be absolutely no doubt."
ReplyDeleteSands was right--something that never lived can never die. The Republic of 1916 was stillborn. Someone reading a piece of paper to a bunch of bemused by-passers does not constitute the establishment of a government or a regime.
"Someone reading a piece of paper to a bunch of bemused by-passers does not constitute the establishment of a government or a regime."
ReplyDeletewhat does thomas.