The Self-Hating Jew
Gilman structures his book on four case studies that for him exemplify the construction of the image of the Jew (and responses of individuals who identified as Jewish to such images). These prejudices are reified as generalised qualities attributed to the ‘Other’ by xenophobes and which, although shifting over time, preserve the fantasy that these qualities are exclusive to the Jew: visible difference (appearance), vulnerability (disease), belonging (rootedness) and boundary setting (self-hatred). The former two would have appeared in any 19th century list but in the post-Holocaust era in which the race pseudoscience on which that cataclysm was predicated has overwhelmingly been discredited (despite the best efforts of the Pioneer fund and the rehabilitation of it in a certain Cambridge University faculty which is a discussion for another day). The association between Jews and disease did make an unwelcome reappearance during the Covid-19 pandemic with bad actors such as the Iranian theocratic regime making conspiracist allegations that Jews were acting as vectors for the spreading of the virus. It is the interplay between the Gilman’s latter two; namely the figure of the self-hating Jew and the Zionist Jewish identity that I focus on in this second part of my review of his book.[3]
According to Gilman, there are Jews who don’t like Jews. There seem always to have been some. And they ‘know where they live.’ The spectre of the ‘self-hating Jew’ has been a frequent theme by right-wing supporters of Israel who not content with attaching their opponents but seek to deJudaicise them if they identify as Jews. In 2016 the Jewish American right-wing talk show host Dennis Prager denounced Senator Bernie Sanders as ‘a non-Jewish Jew and a non-American’ adding Noam Chomsky and George Soros (the bete noire of anti-globalist antisemites of the far right the world over) into the mix of self-hating Jewish demonology. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Prager was echoing the ‘non-Jewish Jew’ positive self-identification of the Marxist historian Isaac Deutscher. While affirming his atheism and internationalism, he stressed that “I am, however, a Jew by force of my unconditional solidarity with the persecuted and exterminated, he concluded in ‘Who is a Jew.’ ‘I am a Jew because I feel the tragedy as my own tragedy.’ Driven by Soviet (or specifically Stalinist persecution as Deutscher was a Trotskyite) and global antisemitism, he became a non-Jewish but a Jew nevertheless and this direction of travel led him to see the creation of a Jewish nation state that was to become the State of Israel as an international humanitarian necessity; a “life raft state.”[4]
In reiterating, at least obliquely, the theme of his book, Gilman posits the question that there are multiple ways of imagining oneself as a Jew. Certainly as the son of a Polish Jewish immigrant who came to the USA at the age of 17 ‘without a nickel in his pocket’, Bernie Sanders identified himself during the 2020 Presidential Election campaign as ‘proud to be Jewish’ but not ‘particularly religious’. He does not claim dual citizenship. He did spend time on an Israeli kibbitz near Haifa in 1963 after graduating from university. He did boycott Benjamin Netananyu’s speech to Congress in 2019. For this and for his opposition to right-wing attempts to turn the Israel-Palestine conflict into another culture war front led to a denunciation of him as ‘worse than Hitler’ by Dinesh D’Souza, the Indian American right-wing political commentator (at least he didn’t descend to the use of the worst insult against recalcitrant critics of Israel – Kapo).
I actually think they hate Israel… Any Jewish person who votes for Democrats hates their religion… They hate everything about Israel, and they should be ashamed of themselves because Israel will be destroyed.
But who in the end is self-hating? The Jew who labels or the Jew who is so labelled? Kenneth Stern, author of the guidelines defining antisemitisms that morphed into the controversial IHRA rubric and which, in 2019, were incorporated into Title VI of the US Civil Rights Act commenting in the aftermath of 7 October 2023 and the resultant global upsurge in antisemitic attacks, argued that the purpose of the IHRA definition:
wasn’t to describe anybody as an antisemite because they said something that was inside or outside the definition. The major point was to get clarity on what should be counted as a hate crime.[6]
More existential concerns have motivated critics of ‘self-hating Jews.” At the end of his life, Jean-Paul Sartre dismissed self-critical Jews as ‘inauthentic Jews,’ on the grounds that.
the sole tie that binds them is the disdain and hostility of the societies which surround them … [and they] decided to run away from this insupportable situation … They display various types of behaviour, not all of which are present at the same time in the same person but each of which may be characterised as an (inauthentic) avenue of flight.[7]
The political consequences of “inauthentic behaviour” particularly in relation to support for the State of Israel are laid out in this 2021 piece by Natan Sharansky the most prominent of all Soviet refusenik émigré to Israel and long-time Likud Party figure:
We call these critics ‘un-Jews’ because they believe the only way to fulfil the Jewish mission of saving the world with Jewish values is to undo the ways most actual Jews do Jewishness. They are not ex-Jews or non-Jews, because many of them are and remain deeply involved Jewishly, despite their harsh dissent. Many un-Jews ate active in forms of Jewish leadership, running Jewish studies departments, speaking from rabbinic pulpits, hosting Shabbat dinners. For many of these un-Jews, the public and communal staging of their anti-Israel and anti-Zionist beliefs appear to be the badge of a superior form of Judaism, stripped of its unsavoury and unethical ‘ethnocentric’ and ‘colonialist’ baggage . . . [8]
What Sharansky is articulating, according to Gilman, is the traditional term lashon hara, speaking with an evil tongue, and, in being silent, avoiding fuelling enemies’ attacks on the Jews. According to Sharansky’s ‘My Country, Right or Wrong’ credo, support for the State of Israel, regardless of its government’s actions, is a sign of ahavath Israel - love of the homogenous collectivity of the Jewish people.[9] In drawing up and policing the boundaries of authentic Jewish identity in such a way, Sharansky and unconditional supporters of Israel (as distinct from critical friends), presumably exclude American Jewish liberals, still a solid majority among American Jewry, and other high profile Jewish critics of Israel’s current trajectory such as the actress Miriam Margoyles and comedian Alexei Sayle and the UK Foreign Secretary Ed Milliband, from the community of true Jews.
The expressions ‘non-Jews’ and ‘self-hating Jews’ carry echoes of exclusionary epithets from other ethno-nationalist discourses, such as “West Brit,” “Castle Catholic’ or “souper” from Irish nationalist/republican demonology or “Lundy” or “Rotten Prods” from the Ulster Unionism/Loyalist type.
Gilman draws extensively from social psychology to explain the emergence of the figure of the self-hating Jew and the consequent schismatic developments among Jewry. He begins with Theodor Lessing’s Jewish Self-Hatred (1930) which remains the classic study of the pitfalls (rather than the complexities) of acculturation in the age of antisemitisms. Drawing on his own experience as a middle-class, urban, marginally religious Jew in Imperial and then Weimar Germany, he used this study to reject the social integration of the Jews into German society, which had been his own experience, by tracking the most radical cases. This early awareness of the impossibility of acculturation into what he saw as an inherently antisemitic world soon led him to become a Zionist and in parallel a visceral opponent of the rise of German Nazism.
Gilman describes how Lessing’s “popular” book summarises a massive critical literature, begun in the age of scientific racism with texts such as the secular Eastern Jew Leon Pinsker’s Auto-Emancipation from which Lessing converts theological claims into psychological ones. Since Jewish doctrine has, since ancient times, responded to the question ‘why we are not loved?’ with ‘because we are guilty’ it is within this theological attribution of guilt and ‘in the experience of Jewish communal attribution of guilt and communal suffering’ and within the concept of suffering as punishment, lies the origins of the concept of Jewish ‘self-hate.’ Lessing’s interest in the psychopathological is rooted in his first impulse as a student of medicine; institutional factors led him to switch his interest to philosophy.
to the living the Jew is a corpse, to the native a foreigner, to the homesteader a vagrant, to the proprietary a beggar, to the poor an exploiter and millionaire, to the patriot a man without a country, for all a hated rival.
Antizionisms as Antisemitisms/Self-Hatreds
However, just as antisemitisms are wobbly and time and context specific, so Gilman fits theories of Jewish self-hatred into similar frameworks. For these theories always relate to the concept and reality of the Jews who experience. At the University of Berlin, the social psychologist Kurt Lewin appears to endorse the Zionist project as he, like Pinsker, became convinced that only a political solution beyond the Global North could ameliorate what he labels in his 1941 essay ‘Self-Hatred among Jews.’ Lewin articulated the thesis that Jewish identity, as a negative, is the internalisation of antisemitisms, but which envisaged a recovery of Jewish identity if a national homeland existed that would see ‘the solution of the minority problem with the problem of the welfare of all human beings’. While both Lewin and Lessing were victims of the Nazis, the latter murdered by Sudeten Nazis in 1939 after fleeing to Czechoslovakia, and Lewin though the murder of his mother in the camps and his own flight from Germany, Lewin’s work reflected his historical location during the Nazi regime, while Lessing focused on a 19th century model of introjection.[12]
Lewin’s work is on the cusp between pathological internalisation and redemptive political identity. Jonathan Judaken, in his 2024 Critical Theories of Anti-Semitism, argues that the concept of the self-hating Jew shifted after the establishment of the State of Israel. Probably the most contentious terrain of contestation in this new arena are the controversies in the 1960s around Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). Moving from multiple theories focusing on those read having internalised antisemitisms to critics of Zionism, Judaken’s work echoed the demands of political Zionism from Pinsker and for a unitary (if undefined) idea of the Jew in their own national state (if undefined). Self-awareness of Jewish difference seen through the experience of Nazi antisemitism and the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was read as a cure for the Jewish ‘identification with the aggressor’, whomever that was applicable to.[13]
As I explained in Part I of this review, Hannah Ardendt had never in her life ‘’loved” ‘some nation or collective – not the German, French or American nation, or the working class, or whatever else might exist.’ Arendt also invoked in addition to the Enlightenment claims of universalism (contra emergent nationalism of that time) that she espoused, the increased reliance on a specific code of symbols, forcing such “states within a state” and “nations within the nations,” such as the Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Scots and the Irish, to accommodate public life only as individuals, not as collectives, to a national symbolic register. Arendt appears to refute the Wandering Jew narrative of the Jews as ‘a state within the state,’ incapable of any integration and thus damned to wander the world, by her observation in The Origins of Totalitarianism while the:
Jews had no political ambitions of their own and were merely the only social group that was unconditionally loyal to the state, they were half right … because the Jews, taken as a social and not as a political body, actually did form a separate group within the nation.[14]
Prefiguring Sharansky’s “unJew” denunciations decades later, Gershom Scholem’s condemned Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem as a work on inherent Jewish self-hatred. For her ‘as with so many intellectuals coming from the German left,’ there was no trace of (pace Sharansky) ahavath Israel ‘that completely indefinable, yet fully concrete love for the Jewish people.' He cautioned that after the Holocaust, even for a Zionist evoking national identity was problematic. For Scholem, peoplehood, defined by a common language (parole) is a much more comfortable “imaginary community.” He thus appears to be enunciating more a Gemenschaft, organic, communitarian form of nationalism than one defined by territorial integrity.[15]
After 7 October 2023 and the resultant brutal Israeli assault on Gaza, the schism that developed between camps of Jews evoked the spectre of Jewish self-hatred that corresponded to the sense of the wobbliness that Gilman structures his book around. By then, the debates about self-hatred had become inexorably associated with the politics of a new Jewish ‘imagined community’ since the 1950s. All Jews, regardless of identification, came to be incorporated into a new global community, demarcated by the symbol role that the State of Israel had taken in defining ‘Jewishness.’ As tent encampments grew all over US campuses to, in the case of groups like Jewish Voice for Peace and the Liberation Sukkah Collective, oppose the Gaza war in solidarity with Palestinian activists while these spaces were contested by pro-Israel students who mourned the dead of 7 October, prayed for the hostages to come home and sang the Israeli national anthem under small Israeli flags in the trees. A new dichotomy within Jewish identity construction emerged: Jewish religious identity as universal in opposition to a Jewish religious identity tied to a national state. Within the peace camp, the self-declared Jewish celebrants opened their ranks to members of all religions, stressing religious identity among the Abrahamic religions. The pro-Israel demonstrations were primarily political and used Zionist imagery from the flag and posters and speeches held at the rallies. [16]
Despite the acknowledgment by, among others, a young Zionist student that the motivation for joining radical groups and erecting a sukkah in solidarity with the millions of displaced Palestinians and Lebanese as celebration of the full harvest festival, Sukkot was because ‘they cared so very deeply about their Jewishness’ they would soon receive the “standard treatment”, in the words of the famed American journalist I.F. Stone in 1978 that ‘all Jewish dissidents get’ from the new gatekeepers of Jewish identity, in this context, the Netananyu government and it’s US philosemitic/philozionist right wing allies – the label “self-hating Jews”.[17]
In conclusion, Professor Gilman’s book is an original and imaginative contribution to what is often a hotly contested area of scholarship and to an often toxic and divisive area of public debate. By eschewing the conventional Longest Hatred narrative of antisemitism and reframing it as one of plural context and contingency, affords a more nuanced account of “Jew hate” and “Hated of Jews” and an intellectual resource for those who wish to challenge the reductionist views that often dominate the air waves, the campus and print and electronic media, be they antisemitisms or philosemitisms.
[1] Sanders L. Gilman (2026) Antisemitisms. A History of Jew Hating. London: Reaktion Books. p.13
[2] Ibid, p,.15
[3] Ibid, p.79
[4] Ibid p. 219
[5] Ibid, p.220
[6] Ibid pp.220-21
[7] Ibid, p.221
[8] Ibid pp.221-22
[9] Ibid, p.222
[10] Ibid pp.226-27
[11] Ibid pp.227-29
[12] Ibid, p.242
[13] Ibid, pp.242-43




















