Lynx By Ten To The Power Of Two Thousand One Hundred And Sixty One

 

Pastords @ 72

 

A Morning Thought @ 3332

Muiris Ó Súilleabháin ✍ First, I welcome the response by Louth Forever to my earlier piece. 

It is thoughtful, generous in its treatment of my argument and, perhaps more importantly, recognises that Sinn Féin's electoral success and progress towards Irish unity are not necessarily the same thing. We agree on considerably more than we disagree.

I find the discussion about Sinn Féin gaining another four Assembly seats but securing no additional Executive ministries in 2027 rather beside the point.

Sinn Féin could become the largest party by an overwhelming margin. It could dominate the Assembly and, hypothetically, occupy every Executive ministry. None of that would, in itself, establish the conditions requiring a border poll.

The Good Friday Agreement does not make the distribution of ministries, the operation of d'Hondt or the number of Sinn Féin MLAs the determining factor in constitutional change. The relevant statutory test is whether it appears likely to the British Secretary of State that a majority voting in a border poll would support Irish unity. That is the test that Sinn Féin signed up to in 1998.

The distinction I have been making is that Sinn Féin can accumulate political power within the North without moving one inch closer to demonstrating the consent required to leave the United Kingdom.

Its success or lack thereof at administering the North cannot be mistaken for evidence that the electorate wishes to abolish it.

But the problem goes beyond ministerial arithmetic. There are three assumptions running through the argument that I think deserve closer examination, particularly if we are serious about establishing where the votes in a border poll might actually come from

The first is Alliance.

Alliance did not emerge from Irish nationalism. It emerged from moderate unionism, offering an alternative to the increasingly polarised politics of the early conflict. Its origins were firmly within the constitutional status quo, even though the party had a cross-community identity.

I accept that Alliance today presents itself as constitutionally neutral and that its electorate contains people who favour Irish unity. But I would be very careful about treating Alliance voters as a reservoir of untapped nationalist support. There is a substantial difference between abandoning the UUP and abandoning the Union.

I would contend that a considerable part of Alliance's appeal has been its ability to accommodate people who remain comfortable with the constitutional position but have become thoroughly uncomfortable with the political parties traditionally charged with either defending or deriding it.

The second weakness is the assumption that a vote for Sinn Féin or the SDLP can automatically be translated into a vote for Irish unity.

I am a republican. I believe in Irish unity. But I would not vote Yes in a border poll tomorrow.

Not because I have abandoned republicanism, but because I believe we have unfinished business in the North (First the North Must Work). We have not yet resolved the divisions that made the place a sectarian sink hole in the first instance. Changing the constitutional arrangements without addressing those divisions risks carrying them, unresolved, into whatever political entity replaces the present one.

My own reservations are primarily political and social, but there are others whose hesitation may have considerably more to do with their economic circumstances.

I am thinking particularly of the new Catholic middle class, the generation that has done rather well out of the North that emerged from the Good Friday Agreement. Civil servants, doctors, teachers, lawyers, business owners and other professionals who have acquired comfortable homes, substantial pensions, secure careers and a standard of living that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. The people once crudely described as the “new Catholic money”.

Many will have grown up in nationalist households, voted Sinn Féin or SDLP and regard Irish unity as a perfectly natural political aspiration. But they have also prospered within the Union.

How many would be prepared to put that prosperity at risk for a constitutional aspiration? The question is no longer simply one of national identity. The North now comfortably accommodates Irishness without requiring anyone to surrender their identity or their constitutional aspirations. The question then becomes a much more practical one, salaries, pensions, taxation, property values, healthcare and the future of their children's education. What, precisely, would a united Ireland offer them that they do not already enjoy, and what might they stand to lose?

There is a world of difference between wanting a united Ireland and being prepared to accept a reduction in your standard of living to achieve it. And I would be very reluctant to assume that every comfortable Catholic professional who votes Sinn Féin in an Assembly election would automatically vote Yes in a border poll.

That brings me to the third weakness, and perhaps the most significant, the people who are not voting at all.

We spend an extraordinary amount of time examining how votes move between the DUP, UUP, TUV, Alliance, Sinn Féin and the SDLP. We spend considerably less time asking why so many people have stopped participating in elections.

I have long suspected that a substantial section of middle-class unionism has simply withdrawn from electoral politics. Not because those people have become nationalists, but because they no longer recognise themselves in the vulgar politics of the parties claiming to represent them.

For many, the DUP’s and TUV’s brand of unionism has become something they want no association with. They have not necessarily changed their constitutional convictions. They have simply stopped voting for politicians they find objectionable.

That is a hypothesis rather than a measured voting bloc and it deserves further examination. But it is precisely why I would be cautious about projecting Assembly election results onto a constitutional referendum.

In 2022, Assembly election turnout was approximately 64%. In the 1998 Agreement referendum, it was approximately 81%. We cannot assume that those additional voters would divide in any particular direction, but we certainly cannot pretend they do not exist.

A border poll would not be another Assembly election. It would ask a question fundamentally different from which party should administer Stormont for the next five years.

Someone who cannot bring themselves to vote DUP/TUV might nevertheless have very definite views about remaining within the United Kingdom. Just as someone who votes Sinn Féin might have considerable reservations about the economic, political and social consequences of immediate constitutional change.

Both possibilities complicate the neat arithmetic of electoral blocs.

And this is where I think my original argument remains relevant.

Unionism has fragmented electorally, but fragmentation is not constitutional conversion. Sinn Féin has consolidated the nationalist vote, but consolidation is not the same as expansion. Alliance has attracted people from both traditions, but voting Alliance does not tell us with certainty what those people would do in a referendum.

The mistake is to assume that the votes required for Irish unity are simply sitting somewhere waiting to be harvested, whether within Alliance, among the undecided or within a nationalist electorate whose constitutional commitment is taken for granted.

And this is why the argument cannot be settled by examining where the votes currently sit. The real question is what has been done to persuade those who are not already committed to constitutional change.

There is a wider failure here, and it goes to the heart of Sinn Féin's entire border poll strategy.

The Good Friday Agreement, which Sinn Féin signed up to almost thirty years ago, made consent the determining factor in the North’s constitutional future. It did not promise Irish unity, nor did it establish some historical inevitability that would eventually deliver it. It provided a subjective mechanism through which constitutional change could occur, but only when sufficient numbers of people were persuaded to support it.

There is another misconception worth addressing. Louth Forever suggests that the Agreement permits another border poll seven years after a defeat, describing the provision as both a mercy and a trap.

But the Agreement does not say that another border poll must be held after seven years. It says that one cannot be held within seven years of the previous poll. That is a minimum interval, not a timetable, and certainly not a guarantee of another opportunity.

Scotland should provide a sobering lesson. In 2014, 44.7% of Scottish voters supported independence. More than twelve years later, despite continuing support for independence and repeated demands for another referendum, there has been no second vote.

Why should anyone imagine that a defeated border poll in the North, even by the narrowest of margins, would automatically be followed by another seven years later?

A generation could pass before the question was put again. That is not a legal certainty, but Scotland demonstrates the political difficulty of securing another referendum after defeat.

This is why I regard the enthusiasm for a border poll now with considerable caution. The Agreement provides a mechanism for constitutional change, not an endless series of opportunities to keep asking the question until the desired answer is obtained.

Those advocating for a border poll now do not seem to understand the consequences of putting the question before the electorate without first doing the difficult work of persuasion.

The Agreement made persuasion the key to Irish unity. Sinn Féin has spent the intervening years behaving as though demographics would do the persuading for them.

Rather than convincing those who do not already support Irish unity of its merits, Sinn Féin has concentrated on consolidating its own position, displacing the SDLP and celebrating the electoral fragmentation of unionism.

And that is the contradiction at the heart of the Sinn Féin border poll strategy.

You cannot sign an agreement that makes consent the foundation of constitutional change and then spend almost three decades treating the people whose consent you require as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a community to be persuaded.

The Agreement arguably re-offered constitutional nationalists a peaceful and democratic route to their constitutional objective. But that route required something more demanding than Sinn Féin’s electoral success. It required Sinn Féin to make a convincing case to people who had never shared their constitutional ambitions.

That work should have begun in earnest in 1998. It did not.

⏩Muiris Ó Súilleabháin was a member of the Republican Movement until he retired in 2006 after 20 years of service. Fiche bhliain ag fás.

The Votes That Aren't Being Counted 🪶 A Reply

The Fenian Way 🔖 Na Fianna Éireann At War 1916 – 1986.


I never had any official interaction with Na Fianna Éireann. I was well acquainted with former members, and one former Na Fianna leader; some of those members elevated to senior positions within the IRA and pursued exemplary operational records, the vast majority of which reside in the anonymity of true Fenianism.

The opening chapter in James Durney’s book leaves no doubt as to the importance of the role and contribution Na Fianna has played in the republican struggle. Its members have paid the ultimate sacrifice throughout that conflict from 1916 through to the hunger strikes of 1981.

From its founding in 1906 its potential to the revolutionary movement was quickly realised as Séan MacDiarmada sought to bring it under the control of the IRB, a critical contingent of which was plotting the ground for the 1916 Rising.

Another central premise of its founding gave it a depth of character beyond a mere transition hub from youthful training to adult militarism. Irish cultural identity was pivotal in republican thinking at the time.

As Home Rule was sending the youth of Ireland to the Somme to make itself ‘acceptable’ to an English establishment an Irish counterpoint was deemed essential in promoting a separate and sovereign identity.

The Irish language was seen as the ultimate manifestation of that Irish identity which made its learning a crucial part in the role of Na Fianna. It wasn’t simply a case of ‘Brits Out’ but the realisation and establishment of a culturally aware Republic. Small wonder it found a welcome home in Padraig Pearse’s St Endas.

With an impressive array of significant republican figures at its helm, Liam Mellows, Con Colbert, Bulmer Hobson, Constance Markievicz, Na Fianna quickly developed a national foothold and its impact on the ground was beginning to be felt.

One of its members, Patsy O’Connor, died at the hands of the RIC as it baton charged striking workers during the 1913 Lockout; Na Fianna members playing a supporting role in that bitter industrial dispute.

But perhaps the most indelible memory for most is the photograph of Na Fianna members on Howth Harbour with outstretched arms reaching for smuggled armaments aboard the Asgard; their military credentials confirmed.

But beyond the photographs and historical footnotes there are personalised accounts from those who explained their reasons for joining Na Fianna and outlining their roles in its activities which gives an essential perspective to the times and decades through which Na Fianna Éireann evolved and developed.

The period between 1916 and The War of Independence is competently covered and well researched. And what’s more insightful for the reader is the continuing use of personal narratives to convey a sense of clarity to an oft-times chaotic environment, the product of dissent, countermanding orders and personal loyalties.

But without question that tumultuous week in 1916 would read very different were it not for the involvement of Na Fianna Éireann. The book’s detailed description of their activities, and death and injuries incurred, translates that sentiment into fact.

As with the broader republican struggle it was not the rebellion that sparked growth in its aftermath but rather the British response to it. The executions of the Rising’s leaders proved a powerful fillip for still active commanders to recruit and renew in various regions throughout the country.

As ever in republican circles funerals, commemorations and agitation on prisoners issues became the stock in trade of daily activity and national focus. But there is something missing from the transition from Easter Week to the War of Independence and that is Na Fianna Éireann’s role, if any, in the 1918 General Election.

It was that election result which both democratised and gave full manifestation to the institutions of the proclaimed Republic. But it was also central to the whole question of loyalty, a benchmark of fidelity, which would be challenged when it came to the subsequent negotiations. A salient question to be asked and answered would have been where Na Fianna’s loyalties lay at the time as it applied to Dáil Eireann!

Perhaps an explanation for this apolitical interpretation of Na Fianna stems from a general attitude that IRA members had towards them. Whilst Na Fianna members were highly active in military activity both in the sectarian violence by loyalists in Belfast and from the Black & Tans in Cork and Kerry the author unearths an element of developing tension between, ostensibly, the senior and junior wings of republican armed forces.

The clear reticence of IRA commanders and volunteers to give orders to ‘youngsters’ to engage in direct military confrontation was fairly widespread even leading to a directive that all armaments held by Na Fianna should be given to local IRA Quartermasters. Did this lack of confidence in Na Fianna’s military abilities due to their youth also extend to their abilities to offer political commentary and insights that were worth listening to?

At this juncture in the text the author introduces their own take on developments concerning the Anglo – Irish Treaty which he describes as ‘the best possible compromise at the time.’ Is this the lens of reasoning through which the rest of the text was written?

For Na Fianna both the truce and the Treaty seem to have been addressed from a local perspective, or loyalty to the local IRA Command to which they were seconded. Although their Árd Fheis reiterated allegiance to ‘the Republic’ a neutral stance on emerging divisions and hostilities was adopted.

This however did not insulate them from the escalating violence particularly in Belfast where both the RUC and the Ulster Special Constabulary engaged in widespread attacks on Catholic Communities. The author duly notes that between 1916 and 1923 it was the Civil War period which claimed the higher death toll for Na Fianna members.

But also of note was the high rate of accidental deaths amongst its members from the inexperience use and handling of weapons. In a well sourced note a British officer makes this very same claim as just cause to disarm the organisation.

Nor did Na Fianna escape the bitterness of the Civil War. The text outlines several high profile killings, murders and executions with Na Fianna personnel involved on both sides. The ultimate toll of these internecine actions was the high rate of its members simply calling it a day.

One discernible pattern emerges in that the level of activity of the IRA determines subsequently the level of activity of Na Fianna. This may seem a trite and obvious point to make for although the purpose of the organisation is well established the fact that it has no collective voice of its own is overlooked.

Certainly individual members had their own personal motivations and political viewpoints which are expressed on various events like the Spanish Civil War and the Official/Provisional split, the rejection of Marxism in the latter on patriotic grounds demonstrating a dread of detachment from its proverbial umbilical cord. Prophetically this rejection of ‘new thinking’ in favour of orthodoxy would manifest itself in a future split in its parental organisations.

Fian Gerard McAuley became the first fatal republican casualty when he was shot dead by British soldiers in August 1969. He would not be the last of Na Fianna Éireann to make the ultimate sacrifice, nor indeed the last to sacrifice a future via youthful imprisonment.

As the early years of the 1970’s slowly evaporated from republican claims of being the years of victory the dark realism of attrition and an altered definition of that victory began to prevail.

The activities of Na Fianna in that phase of the struggle are well documented, as they should be, because the final word of history has yet to be written as to how that chapter in the republican struggle came to a close. And although the book terminates at 1986 it is becoming ever clearer that the machinations and infiltrations which led to the Good Friday Agreement were already well established, even in the midst of the 1981 Hunger Strikes.

Alluding to my earlier observation regarding the authors description of the Anglo-Irish Treaty as ‘the best possible compromise at the time’ that niggling suspicion, to my mind, bore fruit with the closing declaration of the book.

Quoting Pearse the author reaches a conclusion which I profoundly disagree with. And it reinforces my contention that having a voice is critical to having a purpose because all silence has to offer are the echoes of a history we profoundly disagree with. And that is the true definition of a war of attrition.

James Durney, 2026, Boyhood's Fire: Na Fianna Éireann at War 1916–1986. 
ISBN-10: 1785376012. 
ISBN-13: 978-1785376016. 
Publisher 📖 Merrion Press.

⏩ The Fenian Way was a full time activist during the IRA's war against the British.

Boyhood’s Fire

Lynx By Ten To The Power Of Two Thousand One Hundred And Sixty

 

A Morning Thought @ 3331

Gearóid Ó Loingsigh ☭ writing in Substack on 19-November-2026.

Photo: Buenaventura Port, Colombia (GOL)

In Hollywood films drug traffickers are often seen taking direct charge of drugs when they are not using mules. The drug trafficker, regardless of his rank in the hierarchy sticks his neck out, gets himself dirty and plays a direct active role at all times. The reality of it is quite different. The highest capos do not live in Colombia, they are not even Colombian and the shipment of their merchandise is done in much the same way as many legal products. In the same way that dirty money is laundered through international clean money circuits, drugs are sent alongside normal products and it is the same companies who take charge of getting them from A to B.

Sometimes we see news about seizures of cocaine in commercial shipments, although not always in the main newspapers, nor on the main TV stations and you have to search out for the news item in specialised magazines. According to the Ports Europe magazine, the following seizures occurred in different operations: 1.68 tonnes in Urabá, Colombia going to Antwerp, Belgium; 2.6 tonnes in Valencia, Spain; 300 kg in Nuremberg, Germany; 1.184 tonnes in Alicante, Spain. All of these loads were hidden in banana shipments.

According to figures from EUDA (European Union Drugs Agency), Antwerp and Rotterdam account for most seizures of cocaine in Europe. These two ports taken together account for more than all the other ports together and Antwerp, in turn, more than doubles Rotterdam. Guayaquil in Ecuador is the main port from which cocaine is sent, if we measure it against the number of seizures. More than 80% of the drugs that come into the EU arrive in commercial ships. Let’s leave to one side the myths of mules and the drug trafficker in his four wheel drive. Drugs flow through the same economic circuits as all other commercial products.

In its report the World Customs Organisation analyses various manners in which cocaine is sent to the consumer countries. It has a whole chapter given over to the banana industry and provides figures on the number of cocaine seizures in banana shipments.

Of the 2,252 container-based drug detections in the analysis period, a commodity description was recorded for 1,613 (72%). Of those, 35% (564) had a reported commodity of bananas, although the actual number would be higher due to the large number of ‘unknown commodity’ containers contaminated with cocaine that were shipped from well-known banana exporting countries.[1]

Furthermore, they state that in many cases the cocaine is not simply in banana crates but rather is hidden behind structural concealments of the containers themselves. The report explains various ways of hiding drugs and speculates on what they refer to as infiltration of the export chain or internal conspirators. Without doubt, there are employees in the ports who place drugs in the shipment, but at no stage do they talk about the company’s responsibility or role. In the case of traditional cocaine shipments where the cocaine is hidden in the same banana crates and covered by the fruit the report states that:

no internal conspirator connection could be made or inferred… It is possible but remains unknown if the importing and exporting businesses were complicit in the drug trafficking venture.[2]

The law is usually implacable with lower income people when drugs are found on their properties. Such is the case of the Chingaté Baracaldo family in Fusagasugá, Colombia that rented out a part of its house to a woman. Later when they realised that the tenant was using the space to store and sell marijuana they reported her and the police found 32 grams of drugs in the place. However, the prosecutor proceeded to confiscate the property alleging that the owner had a legal duty to control the use of her property. Following an 18 year battle the family has been unable to recover their house. There are 32,000 other cases in Colombia, some are rich and participate in the drugs trade and others are low income families and are victims of it.[3]

But in the case of import-export companies they are absolved of any responsibility and they concentrate on the individuals arrested in the port, when there are any. The company is not intervened, and its assets are not seized. The companies would have a greater degree of responsibility than the Chingaté Baracaldo family, as the family reported the drug vendors and the maritime and banana companies are not exactly the ones who report the drugs shipments. Quite the opposite. Even so, nothing happens to them. In many countries public records are not even kept on the companies involved and we will not find information that details the maritime and banana companies involved or the amounts of drugs per company in any report. This is the case with the European Union.

In Ecuador there are some records on the companies associated with the drugs trade but “The authorities do not reveal the identity of the owners nor the names of the legally established companies”[4] though the “National Department of Anti-Drugs Investigations formally asked the Ministry of Agriculture to suspend the export licences of recidivist drug trafficking companies.”[5] In 2025, 66 companies were linked to drug trafficking. Amongst the companies are those of the family of the current president Noboa.

In an encrypted chat from February 2021, alleged drug traffickers from the Balkans boasted of having the exclusive rights to traffic cocaine hidden in export banana containers from the family company of the president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa.[6] 

Despite at least eight shipments of cocaine in containers belonging to his companies, the president does not even appear on the Clinton List and has not been sanctioned by the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control).[7]

The situation is even worse in Colombia where they really don’t acknowledge the companies’ responsibility. Thanks to the work of journalists we can point to two companies, both linked to political sectors in the country. One of them, Banacol, contributed to the election campaign of Federico Gutiérrez and other Colombian politicians[8] and the other company, Banasan, belongs to the brothers of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism in the Santos government.[9] None of these cases had positive outcomes. They were not charged.

As Bloomberg points out in the USA the maritime and banana companies usually negotiate the reduction of any sanction imposed and in Europe, it is very rare that the companies are fined. In one of the most notorious cases investigated by Bloomberg, the Gayane ship that had trafficked 20 tonnes with an calculated value of one billion dollars continues to plough the seas of the world.[10] A clean slate. The governments and authorities are loathe to publish data that indicate which companies are involved, the recidivist rate nor the quantity of drugs seized per company. The law is for the poor and the authorities haven’t the slightest intention of investigating the top executives and owners of the banana and shipping companies. It is implausible that none of the companies is complicit in the drugs trade but no one wants to bring the great business opportunity, that is the banana-drug trafficking industry, to an end.

References

[1] WCO (2025) Infiltration of maritime cargo supply chains. Brussels. WCO p.31 

[2] Ibíd., p.32

[3] See.

[4] El Diario Correo (31/08/2025) 56 exportadoras de banano han estado asociadas con el narcotráfico. 

[5] Ibíd.

[6] OCCRP (04/12/2025) Cocaína y banano: traficantes de los Balcanes usaron cargamentos de fruta de la empresa familiar del presidente de Ecuador para enviar drogas. Stevan Dojčinović et al. 

[7] The list can be consulted.

[8] Vorágine (07/11/2023) Bananera que financió a Fico en la mira por envíos de cocaína a la mafia italiana. https://voragine.co/historias/investigacion/bananera-que-financio-a-fico-en-la-mira-por-envios-de-cocaina-a-la-mafia-italiana/

[9] Vorágine (03/12/2023) Los ‘narcobananos’ que exporta la empresa de los hermanos de un exministro. José Guarnizo y Nicolás Sánchez Arévalo. https://voragine.co/historias/investigacion/los-narcobananos-que-exporta-la-empresa-de-los-hermanos-de-un-exministro/

[10] Bloomberg (16/12/2022) How a Cocaine-Smuggling Cartel Infiltrated the World’s Biggest Shipping Company. Lauren Etter and Michael Riley. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-12-16/how-world-s-top-shipping-company-became-hub-for-drug-trafficking


⏩ Gearóid Ó Loingsigh is a political and human rights activist with extensive experience in Latin America.

Exporting Bananas And Cocaine 🪶 A Great Business Opportunity

Dixie Elliot ✊ writing last month about the criminalisation of Irish culture in Maghaberry prison.


At a time when the headlines are dominated by Unionist culture, which is based entirely on sectarian hatred and the Orange Order's determination to walk where they are not wanted, behind the walls of Maghaberry Prison Irish culture is being criminalised.

The silence from Nationalist politicians and the so called media is both shameful and cowardly.
If they have a conscience then they are easing it by telling themselves that Niall Sheerin is a 'Dissident Republican.'

The Derry man has served the original sentence imposed upon him by a British court, but continues to be held after Parole Commissioners, adopting the powers of a court of law, insisted he remain imprisoned several months beyond the usual and expected release date.
A report in the Sunday Life suggested that the decision was based on concerns that he had not been sufficiently depoliticised while behind bars at Maghaberry prison.

What are these so called 'concerns' based on?
 
His love of Irish culture, in particular the Gaelic language and sport. Because of that they have decided that Niall Sheerin has not been 'sufficiently depoliticised'.
 
Do the words of Bobby Sands no longer mean anything, have they become an inconvenient truth which highlights the fact that nothing has been gained by his sacrifice and that of his nine brave comrades?
 
They will not criminalise us, rob us of our true identity, steal our individualism, depoliticise us, churn us out as systemised, institutionalised, decent law-abiding robots. Never will they label our liberation struggle as criminal.

Read this and see how they are criminalising Irish culture inside prison walls.

Thomas Dixie Elliot is a Derry artist and a former H Block Blanketman.
Follow Dixie Elliot on Twitter @IsMise_Dixie

A Tale Of Two Cultures

Christopher Owens 🔖has been delving into . . .  

Photographs & Graphics from the 1980s Anarcho-Punk Underground



Zounds always had a way of articulating the optimism of the anarcho punk scene. Emerging as an alternative to the commercial punk scene, anarcho punk turned a generation into anarchists. And one such person was Chris Low.

Originally from Stirling, Low first discovered punk when he saw Crass at the age of eleven. As a result, he threw himself into the fledging anarcho punk scene with gusto, producing a fanzine called Guilty of What?’as well as drumming for the likes of Political Asylum, The Apostles, Oi Polloi and Part One from the age of 13 onwards, often bunking the train to London to hang out at various squats and anarchist centres.

In light of recent news re. the contradictory positions between wanting to raise the age of consent and lower the voting age, the idea of a young teenager travelling around the country and involving himself with adult activities such as anarchist politics and punk rock seems unfathomable today.

Most of the book are photographs taken by Low throughout the period in question and while they may not be the most sophisticated, they do capture the period and the individuals involved that not only depict their youth, but also a sense of fun and possibility, such as these two photos.


The final segment sees Low going through his archive of flyers, fanzines and propaganda with each one containing a recollection. In an era of Photoshop and AI, these cut and paste affairs hit in a way that modern tech couldn’t conceive: stark yet amateurish, funny but deadly serious and deeply political and artistic.


As a coffee table book, this is a must have for anyone vaguely interested in this period of British history.

Chris Low, 2025, Beyond the Monochrome: Photographs & Graphics from the 1980s Anarcho-Punk Underground, Lowthario Press.

 ⏩ Christopher Owens was a reviewer for Metal Ireland and finds time to study the history and inherent contradictions of Ireland. He is currently the TPQ Friday columnist and is the author of A Vortex of Securocrats and “dethrone god”.

Beyond The Monochrome

Lynx By Ten To The Power Of Two Thousand One Hundred And Fifty Nine

 

Religious Derangement Syndrome @ 25